ML20009B881

Slide Presentation Entitled, Presentation to Auxiliary Sys Branch on CESSAR-F

ML20009B881
Person / Time
Site:	05000470
Issue date:	06/09/1981
From:	ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
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ML20009B880	List: ML20009B879 ML20009B881
References
NUDOCS 8107170303
Download: ML20009B881 (97)

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{{#Wiki_filter:. ENCLOSURE 2 1 PRESENTATION TO AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH ON CFSSAR-F JUNE 9 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. 4 4 } @'i!Moting, ~ PDR

l AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH AUXILIARY. SYSTEMS BRANCH ON CESSAR-F June 9,1981 (Begin at 9:00 a.m.) ~ MORNING SESSION

• 3.4 WaterLevel(Flood) Design
• 3.5 Missile Protection 3.6.1 Postulated Piping Failures In Flu' ' Systems Outs'ide of Containment 4.6 Functional Design of Reactivity Control Systems AFTERNOON SESSION 5.2.5 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems 5.4.11 Pressurizei Relief Tank
• 9.1.1 New Fuel Storage
• 9.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks
• 9.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 9.1.4 Fuel Handling System
• 9.2 Water System June 10,1981 (Begin at 9:00 a.m.)
• 9.3.1 Compressed Air Systems
• 9.3.3 huipment andFloor Drainage System
• 9.4 Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation Systems
• 10.3 Main Steam Supply System
• 10.4.5 Circulating Water System
• 10.4.7 Condensate and Feedwater System
• 10.4.9 Auxiliary Feedwater System
• These SAR sections are prinarily cutside of CESSAR-F scoce. However, presentations will discuss interfaces wi h CESSAR-F systens, as related to t

theso SAR sectiens.

O CESSAR SECTION SYSTEf1 5.1.4 RCS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY) 5.4.7 SCS SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM 6B IRS ,10 DINE REMOVAL SYSTEM 6A CSS CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM 6.3 SIS - SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM .7.1&7.2 RPS REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM 7.1&7.3 ESFAS - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 9.3 CVCS - CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 9 6 J

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.4.1 FLOOD PROTEcll0E ~ SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.B.1 THE CONTAINMENT 'SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOR THE FULL RANGE, PER GDC 2, OF NATURAL PHENOMENA (EARTHOUAKES, TORNADOES, TORNADO MISSILES, FLOODING CONDITIONS, HURRICANES, WINDS, SNOW, AND ICE) AND EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. g D

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE RE0llIREENTS SAR SECTION: 3.4.1 ~ SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION:

5. 4. 7. L 3. B.1

'l THE LOCATION, ARRANGEMENT, AND INSTALLATION OF THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS SHALL BE SUCH THAT FLOODS (AND TSUNAMI AND SEICHES FOR APPLICABLE SITES) OR THE EFFECTS THEREOF WILL NOT PREVENT THEM FROM PERFORMING THEIR SAFETY FUNCTIONS. 0 t

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREfENTS SAR SECTION: 3. 11. 1 SYSTEM: IRS, CSS, SIS CESSAR-F SECTION: APP. 6B 7.2 APP. 6A 7.2-6.3.1.3.B.1 DESIGil PROVISIONS SHALL BE INCORPORATED SUCH THAT (SYSTEM) COMPONENTS ARE CAPABLE OF FUN,CTIONING lll THE EVEllT OF THE MAXIMUM PROBABL4 FLOOD OR OTHER NATURAL PHENOMENON DEFINED IN GDC 2. -1 ~ w

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIRF' NTS SAR SECTION:

3.4.1 SYSTEM

RPS, ESFAS CESSAR-F SECTION: 7.1.3.2 PROTECTION FROM NA~ URAL PHENOMENA REFER TO SECTION 3.1.2. CESUAR LICENSING SCOPE CLASS'IE EQUIPMENT SHALL BE LOCATED WITHIN THE PLANT SO AS TO ENSURE THE VARIOUS NATURAL PHENOMENA SPECIFIED IN GDC 2 WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO THE APPLICANT'S SITE WILL NOT RESULT IN DEGRADATION OF THAT EQUIPMENT BELOW THE LEVEL REQUIRED TO ALLOW IT TO PERFORM REQUIRED PROTECTIVE ACTION ASSUMING A SINGLE FAILURE k S 9 e

g CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.4.1 SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 9.3.4.6.B.1 THE LOCATION, ARRANGEMENT, AND INSTALLATION OF THE RWT, CHARGIt!G PUMP ER'AV:iv FEED PIPING, CHARGING PUMPS, CHARGING PUMF DISCHARGE PIPING, THE LETDOWN LINE BETWEEN THE RCS AND LETDOWN C0flTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES, AND SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMS (SIS) TRAINS SUCTION PIPING SilALL BE SUCil THAT FLOODS (AND TSUNAMI AND SEICHES FOR APPLICABLE SITES) OR THE EFFECTS THEREOF WILL fl0T PREVEf1T THEM FROM PERFORMING THEIR FUNCTIONS. IllE SEVERITY OF.THE ABOVE NATURAL PliEll0MEllA TO BE CollSIDERED, AS WELL AS THE COMBINATI0ft OF THE EFFECTS OF THESE NATURAL PHENOMENA WITil THE DESIGft C0flDITIONS OF ANSI N18.2-1973, SHALL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRITERION 2 0F 10CFR50, APPEtlDix A. i 4 9

PLANT MISSILES (CESSAR 3.5) l - MI"3ILE SELECTION-ROTATING EQUIPMENT PRESSURIZED COMPONENTS i l MISSILE PROTECTION u MISSILE BARRIER DESIGN 6 m (

(. ~ ..a CESSAR SECTI0il 3.5 PLA!!T MISSILES 3.5.1.1 - OUTSIDE C0flTAlfii;EllT ~ ROTATIflG MACHIllERY PUMPS MOTORS PRESSURIZED COMPO?lEllTS VALVES VESSELS 3.5.1.2 IllSIDE C0ilTAli!MEllT ~ PRETEllSI0ilED STUDS /i!UTS-CEDM SRV IllSTRU,'iEllTS e '.r

CESSAR-F INTERFACE' REQUIREMENTS-SAR SECTION: 3.5.1.1 INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES ~ SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTI0ii: 'I 5.1.fl.D.2 A CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SHALL BE PROVIDED TO PROTECT THE RCS FROM LOSS OF FUNCTION DUE TO MISSILES GENERATED OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT, INCLUDING THOSE RESULTING FROM EQUIPMENT FAILURE, AND llEATilER INDUCED FORCES SUCH AS TORNAD0ES AND HURRICANES. 9 I )

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION:. 3.5.1 ~ ' SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION: So4.7.1.3.D 10 FOR T!!E PORTION OF THE SCS LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT, APPROPRIATE MISSILE BARRIER DESIGN PROCEDURES SHALL BE USED TO INSURE THAT THE IMPACT OF ANY POTENTIAL MISSILE WILL NOT. LEAD TO A LOSS-0F-COOLANT ACCIDENT OR PRECLUDE THE SYSTEM FROM CARRYING OUT ITS SPECIFIED, SAFETY FUNCTI0f1S. 2. FOR Tile PORTION OF THE SCS LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, APPROPRIATE DESIGN PROCEDURES (E.G., PROPER TURBINE ORIENTATION, PHYSICAL SEPARATION, OR MISSILE BARRIERS) SilALL BE USED TO IllSURE TilAT Tile IMPACT OF ANY POTENTIAL MISSILE DOES NOT PREVENT THE SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT FROM CARRYIl1G OUT ITS SPECIFIED SAFETY FUNCTIONS. 3o APPROPRIATE DESIGN PROCEDURES SilALL BE USED TO INSURE THAT THE IMPACT OF ANY POTENTIAL MISSILE DOES NOT PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF A-SAFE PLANT SilUIDOWN, OR PREVENT TiiE PLANT FORM REMAllllflG IN A SAFE SilVTDOWN CONDITION. i O O

'CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION:

3.5.1 SYSTEM

IRS, CSS, SIS CESSAR-F-SECTION: APP. 63 7.4 APP. 6A 7.4 - 6.3.1.3.D.1 Tile SYSTEM SHALL BE PROTECTED FROM MISSILES IN ACCORDANCE WITH Ti1E f11SSILE' BARRIER DESIGN lilTERFACE REQUIREMENTS OF CESSAR SECTION 3.5.3.1. 1 L

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.5.1.1 AND 3.5.1.2 ~ SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 9.3.4.6.D Tile PORTION OF Tile CVCS PROTECTED FROM PIPE FAILURE (SEE 9.3.4.6.C) SHALL-ALSO BE PROTECTED FROM LOSS OF FullCTION FROM THE EFFECTS OF MISSILES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MISSILE BARRIER DESIGN IflTERFACE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 3.5.3.1. 9.3.4.6.C Tile LETDONN SUBSYSTEM (FROM THE RCS COOLANT SYSTEM), CHARGING SYSTEM (FROM VALVE CH-118 THROUGH Tile CilARGING PUMPS TO RCS TO Cil523), AUXILIARY SPRAY, HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION HEADER, AllD DRAIN llEADER ISOLATION VALVES (CH-329, 332, 3367) AND BORIC ACID ADDITION SYSTEM (IllCLUDING BOTl1 0F Tile REFUELING WATER TANK GRAVITY FEED CONNECTI0flS TO Tile C11ARGIflG PUMP SUCTION llEADER) THE CoullECTIONS FROM Tile REFUELING WATER TANK TO Tile SUCTION OF Tile SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM PutiPS, AND Tile REFUELING WATER TANK AND SPENT FUEL POOL C0flNECTIONS TO THE CilARGING PUMP SUCTION llEADER VIA Tile BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS AND VALVE Cil-514 SilALL BE PROTECTED FROM LOSS OF FUllCTION FROM Tile EFFECTS OF PIPE RUPTURE, SUCll AS PIPE WillP, JET IMPINGEMENT, JET REACTI0ll, PRESSURIZATION, OR FLOODING.

CES3AR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR.SECTION: 3.5.1.2 SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.C.6 Tile CONTAINMENT, INCLUDING PENETRATIONS, SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO LOSS OF FUNCTION FROM DYNAf1IC EFFECTS (E.G., MISSILES, PIPE REACTIONS, FLUID REACTION FORCES) RESULTING FROM FAILURE OF'RCS EQUIPMENT OR PIPING WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT. 5.1.4.D.1 Tile RCS, WHICH IS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF MISSILES, SilALL TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, BE EITHER SURROUllDED BY BARRIERS OR RESTRAINED TO PREVENT MISSILES FROM REACHING OTilER PARTS OF Tile RCS, Tile CONTAINUENT LINES, THE SECONDARY-STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPING OR Tile ENGIllEERING ' SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS. SEE SECTION 3.5 FOR ADDITIONAL. DISCUSSION OF HISSILES. .g e n

TABLE 3.5-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) KINETIC ENERGY OF POTENTIAL MISSILES Initial Kinetic Weight Item (I) Energy (ft-lb) (1b) Impact Section 1. Reactor Vessel ~ Closure Head Nut-1,706 100 Annular Ring, 00 = 10-2/16" ID = 6.9" Closure Heat-Nut and Stud 5,226 577 Solid Circle, 6-3/4" Diameter Control Rod Drive . Assembly 57,600 1100 Solid Circle, 10" Diameter 2. Steam Generator Primary Manway Stud and Nut. 71 4-1/4 Solid Circle, 1-1/2" Diameter Secondary Handhole . Stud and Nut 7 1.15 Solid Circle, 3/4" Diameter Secondary Manway Stud 7 3.36 Solid Circle, 1-1/4" Diameter 3. Pressurizer Safety Valve With Flange 89,200 550 Solid Circle, 2" Diameter Safety Valve Flange Bolt 15 3.7 Solid Circle, 1-14" Diameter Lower Temperature Edge of Solid Disk 2-3/4" Element 288 3 Diameter and 1/2" Thick Manway Stud and Nut 71 4-1/4 Solid Circle, 1-1/2" Diameter 4. Main Coolant Pump and Piping I Temperature Nozzle Edge of Solid Disk 2-3/4" Diameter and 1/2" Thick-with RTD Assembly 1,095 8 Surge and Spray Piping Thermal Wells Edge of Solid Disc 2-3/4" with RID Assembly 277 3-3/4 Diameter and 1/2" Thick j (1) All materials are steel. (continued)

.a, . TABLE 3.5-1 (Cont'd.) (Sheet 2 of 2) KINETIC ENERGY OF POTENTIAL MISSILES Initial.Xinetic Weight Item Energy (f t-lb) (1b) Impact Section Main Coolant Pump Edge of_ Solid Disk 2-3/4"- Thermal-Well with RTO _ 1,095 8 Diameter and 1/2" Thick Shutdown Cooling Solid Circle 2-1/2" Valve Stem. 3,340 85 Diameter

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.5.1.4 MISSILES GENERATED BY NATURAL PHENOMENA SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.B.1 THE CONTAINMENT SHALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOR THE FULL RANGE, PER GDC 2, 0F NATURAL PHENOMENA' l (EARTHOUAKES, TORNAD0ES, TORNADO MISSILES,. FLOODING CONDITIONS, HURRICANES, WINDS, SNOW, AND' ICE) AtlD EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. 5.1.4.D.2 A C0flTAlflMENT STRUCTURE SHALL BE PROVIDED TO PROTECT THE RCS FROM LOSS OF FUNCTION DUE TO MISSILES GENERATED OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT, INCLUDING THOSE RESULTING FROM EQUIPMENT FAILURE, AND WEATHER INDUCED FORCES SUCH AS-TORHAD0ES AND HURRICANES. e o __m

a "^ CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREHENTS . SAR SECTION: 3.5.1.4 L SYSTEM: CVCS 4 CESSAR-F SECTION: 9.3.4.6.B.2 I Tile LOCATION, ARRANGEMENT AND INSTALLATION OF THE RWT, CHARGING PUMP GRAVITY FEED PIPING, CHARGING PUMPS, CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING, THE LETD0llN LINE BETWEEN THE RCS AND LETDOWN C0ilTAINiiENT ISOLATI0fl VALVES, AND SIS TRAINS SUCTION PIPIllG SHALL BE SUCH THAT WINDS AND ' TORI 1ADOES OR Tile EFFECTS THEROF WILL NOT PREVENT TilEM FROM PERFORMING TilEIR FUNCTIONS Tile 1 SEVERITY OF Tile HINDS AND TORNAD0ES TO BE CONSIDERED, AS WELL' AS THE' C0fBINATION'0F Tile EFFECTS OF TilESE NATURAL PliENOMENA WITH Tile DESIGN CONDITIONS OF ANSI N18.2-1973, SilALL MEET Tile j RE0VIREf1ENTS OF CRITERION 2 0F 10CFR50, APPENDIX A. e 4

k CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTI0ll: 3.5.2. SYSTEMS TO BE PROTECTED SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.C.6 THE CCHTAINMEllT, IllCLUDING PENETRATIONS, SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO LOSS OF FUNCTION FROM DYNA!!IC EFFECTS (E.G., MISSILES, PIPE REACTIONS, FLUID REACTION FORCES) RESULTING FR0fl FAILURE OF.RCS EQUIPilEllT OR PIPIllG WITHIN TliE C0iiTAINMENT. 5.1.4.D.1 Tile RCS, 'elHICH IS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF MISSILES, SilALL TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, BE EITHER SURROUilDED BY BARRIERS OR RESTRAINED TO PREVENT. MISSILES FROM REACHING OTHER PARTS OF Tile RCS, Tile CGl!TAlflMENT LIllES, TiiE SECONDARY STEAf1 AND FEEDWATER PIPING OR THE EllGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS. SEE SECTION 3.5 FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF MISSILES. 5.1.4.B.1 Tile C0fiTAll!nEiiT SilALL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOR THE FULL RANGE, PER GDC 2, OF NATURAL P)1EN0HENA (EARTil0UAKES, TORNADCES, TORilADO MISSILES, FLOODIllG CONDITI0flS, HURRICAMES, WINDS, SN0'.l, AllD ICE) AllD EXTERilAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. 5.1.4.F.1 THE PROVISIONS OF GEllERAL DESIGil CRITERIA 54 AND 57 FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES SHALL BE iiET.

.g CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION:.3.5.2 SYSTEM: RPS, ESFAS CESSAR-F SECTION: 7.1.3.4 MISSILES THE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SHALL BE PROTECTED FROM POTENTIAL MISSILE SOURCES. THE 1E'AND ASSOCIATED CABLING AND SENSING LINES SHALL BE HANDLED IN A SIMILAR FASHION. e

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREME"TS SAR SECTION: 3.5.2 SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 9.3.4.6.D Tile PORTION OF THE CVCS PROTECTED FROM PIPE FAILURE (SEE 9.3.4.6.C) SHALL ALSO BE PROTECTED-FROM LOSS OF FUNCTION FROM THE EFFECTS OF MISSILES IN ACCORDAllCE WITH THE MISSILE BARRIER DESIGil IllTERFACE REQUIREMEfiT OF SECTI0fl 3.5.3.1. 9.3.4.6.C Tile LETDOWN SUBSYSTEM (FR0fl THE RCS COOLANT SYSTEM), CHARGING SYSTEll (FR0f1 VALVE CH-118 TliROUGH Tile CHARGIrlG PUMPS TO RCS TO CH523), AUXILIARY SPRAY, HIGil PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTI0il HEADER,. A!!D DRAlil llEADER ISOLATION VALVES (Cil-329, 332, 3367) AND BORIC ACID ADDITION SYSTEM (IllCLUDIfiG. BOT!! 0F THE REFUElliiG WATER TANK GRAVITY FEED C0llNECTI0flS TO THE CHARGIllG PUMP SUCTI0il llEADER) Tile CollllECTIONS FROM Tile REFUELIllG WATER TANK TO Tile SUCTION OF Tile SAFETY lilJECTIO!1 SYSTEil PU.51PS, A!!D TilEREFUELING WATER tat!K Ai!D SPEilT FUEL P0OL C0tlHECTIONS TO Tile CHARGING PUMP SUCTI0fl llEADER VI A TllE BORIC ACID 11AKEUP PUMPS AND VALVE Cil-514 Sl1ALL BE PROTECTED FR011 LOSS OF FUNCTION FR011 THE EFFECTS OF PIPE RUPTURE, SUCH AS PIPE WillP, JET IllPIllGEMENT, JET REACTI0ll,-PRESSURIZATI0il, OR FLOODIllG.

.= PIPE BREAKS (CESSAR 3.61 3.6.1 PIPE BREAKS. OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT-1. BREAKS REQUIRED IN: 'HIGH ENERGY PIPING ' MODERATE ENERGY PIPING 2. ALL PIPING IN APPLICANTS SCOPE 3.6.2 PIPE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT 1. RCS PIPE BREAKS PER CENPD-168A 2. ALL OTHER PIPING IN APPLICANTS SCOPE

9 CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR.SECTION: 3.6 PROTECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POSTULATED RUPTURE _DE ELEIE SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.B.3 Tile VALVES, PIPIllG, AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS OF THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM FROM AliD.INCLUDIllG THE MAIN FEED'.IATER ISOLATI0fl VALVES (MFIV'S) TO THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED N0ZZLES SHALL BE SEIS'4IC CATEGORY 1 AilD DESIGliED TO ASME B&PV CODE SECTION III, CLASS 2 REQUIREi!ENTS. 5.1.4.B.4 ALL COMP 0NEllTS AND PIPIflG 0F THE EMERGENCY FEEDHATER SYSTEM BETWEEN THE STEAf1 GEilERATORS AliD THE C0ilTAIHUEilT ISOLATION VALVES SHALL BE SEISf1IC CATEGORY I AllD DESIGNED TO ASME B8PV CODE SECTION III, CLASS 2 REQUIREMENTS. 5.1.4.B.5 -ALL C0ilPONEUTS, PIPING AND ASSOCIATED SUPP0"TS IN THE CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITIES FOR EHERGENCY FEED',lATER SHALL BE SEISMIC CATEGORY I AllD DealGt!ED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME B&PV CODE,SECTI0ii III, CLASS 3. 5.1.4.B.6 ALL C0 lip 0'lEllTS Ai!D PIPIllG ASSOCIATED WITH STEAf1 GENERATOR BLOWDOWN BETWEEN THE STEAM GEi!ERATOR AflD THE C0llTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES SHALL BE SEISMIC CATEGORY I ATID DESIGNED TO ASME B?.PV CODE SECTI0il III, CLASS 2 REQUIREMENTS. 10F 7

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6 (CONT'D) PRisTECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POSTULATED RUPIURE 0F PIPING SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.II.E.3 REDUNDANT FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES IN EACH FEEDWATER LINE MEETIliG THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA SHALL BE PROVIDED IN PIPING INTERCONNECTING THE STEAM GENERATORS TO PRECLUDE BLOUDOWN OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS FOLLOWIllG A PIPE RUPTURE. e 2 or 7

s CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6

(CONT'D) PROTECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POSTULATED' RUPTURE'

~ OF PIPMG SYSTEM: 'RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1~.4.C 1. Tile FOLLOWING VALVES.SilALL-BE PROTECTED. AGAINST INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES OR Tile EFFECTS RESULTING FROM A IlIGH ENERGY PIPE RUPTURE (E.G., PIPE. WHIP,-' JET If1PINGEMENT KlD. STEAM ENVIR0fil1ENT) SUCll THAT THESE EVENTS WILL NOT PREVENT THE VALVES FROM PERFORMING'THEIR: REQUISITE SAFETY FullCTIONS. A. MSIV'S B. 3EC0iiDARY SAFETY VALVES C. ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES (ADV'S) ~ D. MSIV BYPASS VALVES. i E. MFIV'S, F. BLOUDOWN ISOLATION VALVES. 2. PIPE WilIP STOPS' SilALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE RCS PIPING.- (SEE SECTI0f! 3.9.1.4). 3 0F.7

~ CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6 (CONT'D) IM01ECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POSTULATED RUPTURE 0F PIPING SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTI0ll: 5.1.fl.C (CONT'D) A POSTULATED DOUBLE-ENDED SEVERANCE OF THE LARGEST REACTOR COOLANT PIPE OR, (2) A COMPLETE BLOWDOWN OF THE UNIS0 LATED STEAM SYSTEM THROUGH ANY RUPTURE OF THE STEAM LIllE PIPING, UP TO AND INCLUDING A POSTULATED DOUBLE-ENDED SEVERENCE OF THE LARGEST MAIN STEAli LIllE PIPE, ASSUMING A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR EITilER CASE lillICH LEADS TO THE PEAK TRA!1SIEf1T ACCUMULATION OF ENERGY IN Tile BUILDING ATM0SPilERE. TO MEET Tills EilD, A SPECTRUfl 0F LOSS-0F-COOLANT ACCIDENTS (LOCA) AND MAIN STEAM LINE BREAKS (MSLB) IIAVE BEEN AllALYZED. TilEY SHALL BE USED BY Tile APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH THE DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE OF THE CONTAll! MENT. (REFER TO SECTIONS 6.2.1.3 AND 6.2.1.fi). B. TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL CREDIBLE POST-BLO'.lD0llN ENERGY ADDITIONS TO Tile CONTAINMEllT ATriOSPilERE, SUCil AS CORE RESISUAL HEAT, THIN AND TillCK STRUCTURAL METAL STORED ENERGY, STEAM GEllERATOR REVERSE llEAT TRANSFER, METAL-WATER REACTIONS AND OTHER POSSIBLE CHEillCAL REACTI0l!S RESULTING FR0f1 A LOSS-0F-COOLANT ACCIDENT. 8. C0llPARTHENTS WITl!IN THE CONTAINf1ENT INCLUDING THE REACTOR VESSEL CAVITY SilALL BE DESIGNED FOR THE 11AXIMUM PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL BETilEEN Tile COMPARTMENT AlID TiiE REMAINDER OF THE C0llTAINllENT BASED ON THE MAXIMUM RCS PIPE BREAK THAT CAN OCCUR IN THE.COMPARTHENT AS DEFINED Ill SECTION 3.6. 5 0F.7

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6 (C0f1T'D) ERDIECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POSTULATED RUPTURE 0F PIPING SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: Sol.4.C (C0llT'D) 3. Tile !1SIV'S SHALL BE SUPPORTED SUCll THAT Tile VALVE BODY AND ACTUATOR 11ILL NOT BE DIST0RTED-OR DISPLACED AS A RESULT OF PIPE BREAK THRUST LOADINGS TO SUCH A DEGREE TilAT THE VALVE CANi10T CLOSE. 4. FEED'lATER PIPING SliALL BE ROUTED, PROTECTED AND RESTRAINED SUCll TliAT IN Tile CASE OF A-RUPTURE OF A FEEDWATER LINE OR ANY OTHER SYSTEf1 PIPELINE, A SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA llILL fl0T BE EXCEEDED WITH REGARD TO SAFE SHUTDOWil 0F Tile PLANT. 5. A C0i1TAINMEllT SilALL BE PROVIDED TO LIMIT Tile RELEASE OF ENERGY AND RADI0 ACTIVITY TO Tile EiiVIRONS IN Tile EVENT OF. A RUPTURE OF Tile RCS AND TO PROTECT Tile PUBLIC llEALTil AND SAFETY. 6. Tile C0llTAINf1ENT, INCLUDING PENETRATIO!lS, SHALL fl0T BE SUBJECT TO LOSS OF FUNCTION FROM DYllAM!C EFFECTS (E.G., f11SSILES, PIPE REACTIONS, FLUID REACTION FORCES) RESULTIllG FROM FAILURE OF RCS EQUIPMENT OR PIPING WITilIN THE CONTAINtiENT. 1 7. Tile DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE OF THE C0flTAINMENT SHALL, AS A MINIMUM, A. BE EQUAL TO Tile PEAK PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RESULTING FR0f1 EIT!!ER (1) C0f1PLETE BLOW-00Hil JF Tile REACTOR COOLANT THROUGH Ally RUPfuRE OF THE RCS PIPING, UP TO AND INCLUDIEG fi cr 7

4 CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6 (CONT'D) PROTECTION AGAINST DYNAf11C EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POSTULATED RUPTURE 0F PIPING SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.F.2 Tile FEEDilATER SYSTEM PIPING, EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPING, AND MAIN STEAH PIPING AllD ALL OF THEIR ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS AND RESTRAINTS SHALL BE DESIGNED S0 THAT A SINGLE ADVERSE EVEilT, SUCil AS A RUPTURED FEEDWATER LIf1E, Ef1ERGENCY FEEDWATER LINE, MAIN STEAM LIllE INSIDE C0ilTAlff1ENT, OR A CLOSED ISOLATION VALVE CAil OCCUR llITHOUT: A. IllITIATIl1G A LOSS-0F-COOLANT INCIDENT. B. CAUSING FAILURE OF 0 tiler STEAli GENERATOR'S SAFETY CLASS STEAf1 AND FEEDWATER LIllES, MISV'S, SAFETY VALVES, MFIV'S BLOWE0WN LIllE ISOLATION VALVES, OR ADV'S. C. REDUCIllG Ti1E CAPABILITY OF KtY OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMS OR Tile PLAllT PROTECTIVE SYSTEll. D. TRNlSMITTING EXCESSIVE LOADS TO Tile CONTAlllMENT PRESSURE B0UNDARY. E C0HPR0f'llSING Tile FUNCTION OF THE PLANT CONTROL ROOM. F. PRECLUDING ORDERLY C00LDOWN OF THE RCS. G c. c 7 ~

a CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR;SECTION:. 3.6 (CONT'D) -Ef!0TECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCI ATED WITH POSTULATED RUPTURE ~ QF PIPING . SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.-l.4.F.10 THE ABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY FEEDNATER SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUilCTION CONSIDERING A POWER SUPPLY FAILURE, A SINGLE ACTIVE OR PASSIVE MECHANICAL COMPONENT FAILURE,14 SINGLE-ACTIVE OR PASSIVE FAILURE OF AN' ELECTRICAL COMPONENT, OR THE EFFECTSLOF A HIGH OR MODERATE ENERGY PIPE RUPTURE S!IALL BE DEMONSTRATED. ~ d 4 9 h e 7 0F 7 a

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6 SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.4.7.1.3.C 10 PIPE BREAK CONSIDERATIONS Tile SiluTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT SHALL BE PROTECTED FROM Tile EFFECTS OF POSTULATED HIGH /U1D MODERATE ENERGY PIPE RUPTURE. 2. PIPE LEAKAGE CONSIDERATIONS NO LIMITED LEAKAGE PASSIVE FAILURE OR Tile EFFECTS THERE0F (SUCll AS FLOODING, SPRAY IMPINGEMENT, STEAM, TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, RADIATION, OR LOSS OF NPSil) IN A CONNECTING SYSTEM (E.G., SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM OR CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM) SilALL PRECLUDE Tile AVAILABILITY OF MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SiluTDOWN COOLING CAPABILITY. MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SiluTDOWN COOLING CAPABILITY IS DEFINED AS THAT PROVIDED BY ONE LPSI PUMP AND ITS ASSOCIATED llEAT EXCilANGER TRAIN. i ALL SCS INSTRUMENTS AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENT LINES, ROOT VALVES, AND ISOLATION VALVES, SilALL BE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY FOLLOWING A SEISMIC EVENT. 1 os 2

~ CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: -3.62 SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.4.7.1.3C (CONT'D) 3', ' DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PARTS 0F THE SCS APPROPRIATE DESIGN PROCEDURES SHALL BE EMPLOYED TO ENSURE THAT ~ A POSTULATED PIPE FAILURE DOES NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF FUNCTION OF THE SCS. l A. PROTECTION OF THE SCS FROM THE. CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED PIPE FAILURE SHALL BE BY. (1)-SEPARATION VIA PHYSICAL PLANT LAYOUT, (2) PIPE RESTRAINTS, (3) PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES, (4) WATERTIGHT R00f1S, (5) ISOLATION CAPABILITY, 0R (6) OTHER SUITABLE MEANS. B. ISOLATION VALVES (SYSTEf! AND/0R C0llTAINMENT) USED T0.CONTAIN-LEAKAGE SilALL BE PROTECTED FROM Tile-ADVERSE EFFECTS OF A PIPE FAILURE WHICH MIGHT PRECLUDE ~THEIR OPERATION WHEN RE0lllRED. 4 .2 0F 2

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 3.6 SYSTEM: IRS, CSS, SIS CESSAR-F SECTION: APP. GB 7.3 APP. GA 7.3 6.3.1,3.C 1. Tile MAXIMUM EXPECTED LEAKAGE FROM A f10DERATE EllERGY PIPE RUPTURE POSTULATED DURING ll0RMAL PLAllT C0ilDITIONS IN THE SYSTEM SilALL BE AS DEFINED BY THE METHODS OF SECTION 3.6. ISOLATION VALVES USED TO CONTAIN LEAKAGE SilALL BE PROTECTED FROM THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF A MIGli OR

10DERATE EllERGY PIPE RUPTURE WHICH MIGHT PRECLUDE THEIR OPERATION WilEN REQUIRED.

2. NO LIMITED LEAKAGE PASSIVE FAILURE OR Tile EFFECTS TilERE0F (SUCH AS FLOODING, SPRAY IMPINGE-MENT, STEAM, TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, RADIATION, LOSS OF NPSil, OR LOSS OF RECIRCL'LATION WATER lilVENTORY), IN Tile SYSTEM DURING TiiE RECIRCULATION MODE SHALL PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF MilllMUM ACCEPTABLE RECIRCULATION CAPABILITY (MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CAPABILITY IS DEFillED AS THAT WillCil IS PROVIDED BY THE OPERATION OF ONE SUBSYSTEM). 4 3. lilE SYSTEM SH4LL BE PROTECTED FROM TiiE EFFECTS OF PIPE RUPTURE. 4. Tile SYSTEM SilALL BE PROTECTED FROM THE EFFECTS OF PIPE WHIP.

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION:

3.6 SYSTEM

RPS, ESFAS CESSAR-F SECTION: 7.1.3.3 PROTECTION FROM PIPE FAILURE Tile LOCATION OF SAFETY-RELATED INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL COMPONENTS SHALL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TilEIR POTENTIAL DAMAGE DUE TO PIPING FAILURES, SUCH AS PIPE WHIP, JET EMPINGEf1ENT, FTC., FROM llIGil OR MEDIUM ENERGY FLUID SYSTEMS. THE LOCATI0l10F TilESE COMPONENTS AND Tile ROUTING 0F 1E AND ASSOCIATED CABLES AND SENSING LIllES S110ULD AVOID SUCil llAZARDS OR SilALL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE PROTECTION SUCH TilAT REQUIRED PROTECTIVE ACTION CAN BE PERFORMED ASSUMING A SINGLE PIPING FAILURE, ITS ASSOCIATED EFFECTS, AllD A SIflGLE FAILURE.

CESSAR - FSAR SECTI0ft 4.6 FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF REACTIVITY. CONTROL SYSTEMS SYSTEf1 80 INCLUDES 3 REACTIVITY C0ilTROL SYSTEMS: I.' CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISMS ~ 2, SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEPi 3. CHEMICAL AllD VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM I i i L'

~ 'CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 4,6 CHEiilCAL Al!D VOLUtiE CONTROL SYSTEi1 FUtiCTIONAL DESCRIPTION REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 9,'3','4,f,3 REACTIVITY CONTROL ~~ FUt!CTIOllS: 1. CONTROL BORON C0:iCENTRATI0il FOR OPTIMUi1 CEA POSITION 2, CONTINUGUSLY tiONITOR RCS BOR0il CONCFflTRATI0il AND SPECIFIC RADI0 ACTIVITY 3. RECEIVE, STORE, AND SEPARATE B0 RATED WASTE NATER FOR REUSE 4. SOURCE OF BORATED WATER FOR SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM e v

LESSAR - FSAR SECil'lil 11.b APPLICABLE CVCS GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA ~

1. CRITERIA 20 PROTECT 10(1 SYSTEl1 FUNCT10lls llEFEREllCE CESSAR - FSAR SECT 10lls 9.3.II.5.L 9.3 II.

?

2. CRITERI A 2.1 PROTECTI0ll SYS'IEll 1:ELI ABil.ilY NID IE' Helm liY REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 9.3.II.3.1

3. CRITERIA 23 PROTECTION SYSTEl1 FAILURE !! ODES REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTI0tl 9.3.II.3.7

11. CRilERIA 25 PROTECTI0ll SYSIFil REQUIRDlElllS FOR REACll' illy CONTROL l1ALFUNCTIONS REFEREilCE LESSAR - I-SAR SEC110il II.3. I 7 6

6

b- ~ ~ CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 4.6 APPLICABLE'CVCS GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA

5. CRITERIA 26 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM REDUNDANCY AND CAPABILITY REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTIONS 4.3.1.10, 9.3.4.6

6. CRITERIA 27 COMBINED REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CAPABILITY REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTIONS 4.3.1.10, 9.3.4.6

7. CRITERIA 28 REACTIVITY LIMITS REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTIONS 4.3.1. 7, 9.3.4.6 4

e

FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF THE . CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEF ~ ~ INFORMATI0f! ON CRDS gg (89 12EQ ' O - EFEA'S foe Pu EELcADQ THE CRDS CONSIST OF M CEDMs POUNTED ON THE REACTOR HEAD. MADE UP OF 7 MAJOR SUB ASSEMBLIES, (SEE ATTACHED OUTLIFE DWG.) EVALUATION OF CRDS THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE CRDS IS TO DROP CEAs INTO REACTOR CORE WHEN DE-ENERGIZED. SINGLE FAIUJRE A FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF THE RPS IS PRESEf1TED IN SECTION 7.2. . ALL CEDMs ARE INDEPEf! DENT OF OtlE ANOTHER. SUFFICIENT SHUTDOWN MARGIN IS ALWAYS MAINTAINED EVEP IF THE EVENT OF FAILURE OF ANY Sit!GLE CEDF. ISOLATION OF THE CRDS FROM OTHER E0!!IPMENT THE INTERFACE BETWEEfl CEDPs AND CEDM CONTROL SYSTEP IS AT THE CEDMCS POWER Sh' ITCHES, WHICH PROVIDES ISOLATION OF THE MOTIVE -POWER FROM THE LOW VOLTAGE LOGIC CONTROL SIGNAL.

INTERFACE BETWEEN THE CEDMs AND THE CEAs INVOLVES N0 NON-ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, THUS NO ISOLATION IS REQUIRED. PROTECTION F'(OM C090N MODE FAILURE DUE TO PIPE BRE KS IS DESCRIBEDINTHEAPPLICANT'SSAR. ^ [BD'C00 LING SYSTEM FORCED AIR AT 700 SCFM. MIN. AND 120 F MAXIMUP If!TEPFACE REQUIREt'EPT. ?!0 LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION IF COOLING SYSTEM FAILS. TESTING AND VERIFICATION OF CRDS ' DESIGN PERFORMANCE VERIFICATI0p MECTiod 'o.9) ACCELERATED LIFE TESTS USING 450 li DROP TESTS WITH MINIMUM WEIGHT UNDER SIMULATED SEISFIC DEFLECTIONS. FULL FLOW TESTING WITH PROTOTYPICAL COMP 0f!ENTS. AIR COOLING TESTS (NORMAL-LOSS OF) WITHDRAWAL AND INSERTION FORCE VERIFICATION. ~ INSTALLATION VERIFICATION TESTS ON EACH CRD PRE-CORE COIL' TEMPERATURE TESTS PRE-CORE CEDM OPERATIONS POST-CORE R0D DROP TESTS POST-CORE CEDM OPERATION VERIFICATION C0ll CURRENT SPEED R0D POSITION INDICATION

e SURVEILLANCE TESTS 1, OPERABILITY TEST AT LEAST 5 INCH MOTI0fl EVERY 31 DAYS, 2. DROP TESTS PERFORMED EVERY 18 M0t!THS, OR AFTER HEAD REMOVAL. COMBIt!ED PERFORMANCE OF THE PEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CRDS WILL PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS UNDER REQUIRED ACCIDEf!TS LISTED IN TABLE 4.6-1 +

, O.. L, qY, HEED SWITCH ASSY - i i /,- P.; e t 3: !n' SHROUD I =, pj iib CONDUlT dSSY ~ i m h; jj--- :<., MAGNET ASSY j'} l. i - i. 3. t lC - UPPER PRESSURE HOUSING H' h'N l 2 ;- 1, r (1- 'F.- OMEGA SEAL 3< MOTOR ASSY e 1 t j';; jj wT '. j. .o- 'b i @. lie. s t .'T s.M*I 1 ( N. A ;M i .4 4 'p'C ] < r COILSTACK ASSY -i[ 5.E f p ge 4 4 L=... =.) \\ ...p : l;.O.:WCd' i '\\ f ]b.lQ,s li

5 3

-{'E i i UPPER GRIPPER ASSY ? . =: - .2 . s. t a ^ {

,F 0

MOTOR HOUSING ,=

, ;;.C

{, ', ; 4 g Y2 ki!"f .h".. ii, g g@4 DRIVE SHAFT - l Ij l. s g =i Te - WIRING TROUGH - 1: I l < = i E i e 'i. j "g" ' h:. a ,j !.i j COOLING SHROUD I .1. ,m s: i 3 i m,.1 E.. !!! . l. l4 ~ 5

E5 j,l; iL t.

s c.:

x m r ~ V )i ! ( n ii s li

. ti e.74 N-LOWER GRIPPER ASSY

', %/j-j /1 / t, \\_ - OMEGA SEAL y -- h ( REACTOIT VESSEL NOZZLE =- I 1

CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 5.2.5 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS CRITERIA: GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 30 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.45 CLASSIFICATION: UNIDENTIFIED IDENTIFIED e b e v e-

CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 5.2' 5 DETECTION METHODS DETECTION METHODS IN APPLICANTS SCOPE INTERFACEREQUIREMENTSSTATEDINSECTION5.1.4 ~ A. SECONDARY SIDE OF STEAM GENERATORS B. COMPONENT COOLING WATER C. APPLICANT COMPONENT AND CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE LIMITS KNOWN SOURCE 10 GPM ~ UNKNOWN SOURCE 1 GPM SECONDARY SIDE 1 GPM d l

\\ CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 5.2.5 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE: MONITOR RCS MAKEUP WATER IDENTIFIED: RCS SAFETY VALVE TEMPERATURE 6uoicanous 4 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL PRESSURE htlaas v2omoeo) STEAM GENERATOR TUBES ~ SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM PRESSURE 1 9 e ~

.a CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 5.2.5 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REFERENCE CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 16 3/4.4.5 LIMITING CONDITION: 1. NO PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE 2'.~ 1 GPM UNID'ENTIFIED LEAKAGE 3. 1 GPM STEAM GENERATOR TUBE 4, 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE ACTION: 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY ~ HOT STANDBY WITHIN 10 HOURS COLD SHUTDOWil WITHIN 30 HOURS 2. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM REDUCE LEAKAGE RATE WITHIN 4 HOURS HOT STANDBY WITHIN NEXT 6 HOURS COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN NEXT 30 HOURS e

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 5.2.5 DETECTION OF LEAKAGE THROUGH REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5,1.4.H 1. MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR DETECTION OF REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE INTO THE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE STEAM GENERATORS AND COOLING WATER SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPONENTS CONTAINING REACTOR COOLANT. 2. APPLICANT SUPPLIED COMPONENT DESIGNS AND RCS CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES SHALL ENSURE THAT RCS LEAKAGE FROM KNOWN SOURCES WILL NOT EXCEED 10 GPM; FROM STEAM GENERATOR TUBES WILL NOT EXCEED 1.0 GPM; AND FROM UNKNOWN SOURCES WILL NOT EXCEED 1 GPM, TO MINIMIZE IN-PLANT AIRBORNE AND SURFACE ACTIVITY LEVELS AND ACTIVITY RELEASES TO THE ENVIRONS AT SYSTEM ~ NORMAL OPERATING TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE. 5.1.4.P 4 SYSTEMS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE DE'TECTION OF REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE FROM UNIDENTIFIED SOU l

CESSAR - FSAR SECTION 5.4.11 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK SYSTEM 80 NSSS PRESSURIZER RELIEVES T0 THE REACTOR DRAIN TANK RDT FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION REFERENCE CESSAR-FSAR SECTION 9.3.4.2.2 1. QUENCH PRESSURIZER SAFETY RELIEF 2. RECEIVE SHUTDOWN COOLING / SAFETY INJECTION RELIEF 3. RECEIVE DRAINS FR0t1 CONTAINMENT COMPONENTS 4. RECEIVE RCS DRAINS i O

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 5.4.11 PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE SYSTEM SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.0.1 EACH PRIMARY SAFETY VALVE INLET LINE SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PASS 125 PERCENT 0F THE MINIMUM REQUIRED ^ SAFETY VALVE CAPACITY OF 460,000 LB/HR WITH A MAXIMUM PRESSURE DROP 0F 50 PSI. THIS FRESSURE DROP 0F 50 PSI IS FOR PIPING AND N0ZZLE LOSSES. (PRESSURE LOSS FACTOR FOR PRESSURIZER N0ZZLE IS K - 0.23 BASED ON 6" SCHEDULE 160 PIPE.) Sol.4.0.2 EACH PRIMARY SAFETY VALVE DISCHARGE LINE SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PASS 125 PERCENT OF THE MINIMUM REQUIRED SAFETY VALVE CAPACITY WITH A MAXIMUM VALVE BACK PRESSURE OF 500 PSIG AT THE SAFETY VALVE DISCHARGE DURING BLOWDOWN, ASSUMING THE DISCHARGE TANK.IS AT 132 PSIG. THE MINIMUM REQUIRED FLOW RATE FOR EACH SAFETY VALVE IS 460,000 LB/HR. FOR THE COMMON DISCHARGE LINE, THE MINIMUM SAFETY VALVE FLOW IS 1,840,000 LB/HR (TOTAL FLOW 0F FOUR VALVES). DISCHARGE TANK DESIGN PRESSURE IS 130 PSIG. MAXIMUM PRESSURE OF 132 PSIG IS CALCULATED FROM RUPTURE DISK BURST PRESSURE OF 120 PSIG PLUS 10% TOLERANCE. 0 l e

O SECTION9.1.1 NEW FUEL STORYE

1. Ib EQUIPMENT IN C-E SCOPE OF StPPLY.

2. SEE APPLICANTS SAR FOR STORAGE EQUIPtENT NJD SYSTEMS.

3. INTERFACES: CESSAR t.2.5 f C-1 TE FUEL SHALL BE PROTECTED FROM THE EFFECTS OF PIPE WHIP WHILE IN STORYE. E-1-A TIE NEW FLEL STORAGE RACKS SHALL BE DESIGNED SUCH THAT FtEL ASSEfSLIES WILL NOT BE INSERTED IN 0' iller THAN PRESCRIBED LOCATIONS. E-1-B ADEGUATE MARGIN TO CRITICALITY SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR FULL RACK LOADIN U Gil SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN CHAPTER U ASSEMBLIESHAVINGAMEQENICALDES[3. NID Ef1RICtfiENTS UP TO.7./ W/0 ll-23 E-1-C OFMlSISTN4DARDfilo{TICALITYPROMIQEpl.GHALLBECONSISTENTWITHTHERE0lllRENNTS THE DEGREE OF SUBCR ./., SECTION 5./. L. P-2

1. 1 OVERHEAD CRNJE SliALL BE PROVIDED IN THE NEW FUEL STORKE AREA TO FACILITATE IWIDLING OF NEW FlEL.

A. TliE CRN4E CAPACIT/ SHALL BE AT LEAST 1 TON TO ACCOPt10DATE THE NEIGHT OF A FUEL ASSEMBLY. B. A VERTICAL HolSTING SPEED OF 6 FEET /MINtfiE OR LESS SHALL BE PROVIDED. C. THE CRNIE LOAD St BE CAPABLE OF BEING LIMITED TO PREVENT THE HOIST LOAD FROM EXCEEDING . P0l#4DS WHEN HANDLING FUEL ASSEfSLIES. e

SECTION9.1.2 SPENT FWL STORKE

1. NO EQUIPMENT IN C-E SCOPE OF SUPPLY.

2. SEE APPLICANTS SAR.

3. INTERFACES CESSAR I.2.5 I B-2 TE SPENT FEL POOL SHALL BE A SEISMIC CATETORY'I STRUCURE. 8-3 TE LOAD BEARING FOEERS OF BE SPENT FEL STORME RACKS SHALL WimSTAND TE FORCES IN-DUCED BY THE SSE VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL SEISMIC LOADINGS. THESE FORCES SHALL BE ASStPED AS ACTING SIMlLTANEOUSLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH VE COPEINED DEADWEIGHT. AND LIVE LOADS Wim-OUT EXCEEDING MINIMlN MATERIAL YlELD STRESStS AS SPECIFIED BY ASTM. }Lil THE SPENT F E L STORAGE RACKS SHALL BE SEISHIC CATEGORY 1. C-1 TIE FUEL SHALL BE PROTECTED FR0f4 TIE EFFECTS OF PIPE MilP WHILE IN STORAGE. C-3 SPENT FEL SHALL BE PROTECTED FROM TE EFFECTS OF PIPE RUPTURE. D-2 TIE FEL O'ALL BE PROTECTED FROM TIE EFFECTS OF MISSILES WilLE IN STORAGE. fr2

DRAINS, 34ANENTLY CONNECTED SYSTEftS, AND OTER FEATURES OF TE SPENT FUEL POOL SHALL BE.

DESIGNED 3 THAT.NEITHER i%LOPERATION NOR FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF C00UWT THAT WOULD UNC.0VER THE STORED FEL. fr3 SPENT FWL POOL COOLING SHALL BE CAPABLE 05 REMQVING BE DECAY HEAT GENERATED Fh0M 1 C0fFLETE ORE OF SPENT FUEL PLACED IN die POOL / DAYS AFTER SIRED 0HN IN ADDITION T01/3 0F A C0fPLETED CORE THAT llAS BEEN IN THE POOL 90 DAYS AFTER SiluTDOW. ll-l LOW WATER LEVEL ALARMS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR TE REFWLING POOL AND THE SPENT FEL POOL. l 9 9

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS ~ SAR SECTION: 9.1.3 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND ClFANUP SYSTEM SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 9.3.4.6.P.2 THE SPENT FUEL P0OL SHALL PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE SOURCE OF B0 RATED WATER T0-THE CVCS. A. A VOLUME OF 33,500 GALLONS SHALL BE AVAILABLE TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN AT THE END OF CORE LIFE (5 PERCENT SUBCRITICALITY WITH RODS) ASSUMING 4000 PPM BORON WITHIN THE FUEL P00L. B. THE B'AiC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS SHALL BE ABLE TO TAKE SUCTION FROM THE SPENT FUEL P00L. 8 )

SECTION9.1.fl FUEL HANDLING SYSTEtiS SYSTEM CmPLIES WITH 1HE REQUIREfENTS AND STN4DARDS AS FOLLOWS:

1. @C NATURAL PHENTENA TRANSFER TUBE BLIND FLANGE - ONLY SAFET/ RELATED ITEM WITHIN CONTAlf4fENT.

2.. GDC BLIND FLAfGE NOT SHARED.

3. REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29 -- BLIND FLANGE WILL REMAIN FUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING SSE-FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT-SEISMIC ANALYSIS PERFORMED TO INSURE EQUIPMEtlT DOES NOT FALL OVER OR FALL INTO POOL.

fl. ANSI STM4DARDS: A. ANSI /ANsp.1(1980)'DESIGNREQUIREMENTSFORPWRREACTORFUELHANDLING SYSTEfG. B. C6.1 TERMINAL fMRKINGS FOR ELECTRICAL APPARATUS C. C19 INDUSTRIAL CONTROL APPtRATUS D. 60 ROTATING ELECTRIC MACHINERY E. IU.01.l4 Q/A FOR PROTECTIVE COATING

5. STANDARDS:

A. Ctf% SPEC. NO. 70 CRANE MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATION OF MERICA B. AISC - MANUAL OF STEEL CONSTRUCTION C. NFPA - NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE D. NEMA 1. INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS

2. HC-5 FU ME TESTING

3. tri-1 MOTORS Af0 GENERATORS 11. lii-2 SAFETY STANDARDS-CONSTRUCTION OF MOTORS AND GENERATORS E.

ASASTANDARD[$6.1,1962, SURFACE TEXTURE F. ASTti STANDARDS 1976 G. LIBRARYOFCONGRESS#65-22067'THEHMANBODYINEQUIPf1ENTDESIGN' H. WI100-711 ELECTRIC WIRE ROPE STANDARDS U6 SPEC. Illi FR-1 VERTICAL Fl>ME TEST J. REGULATORYGUIDE1.122FLOORDESIGNRESPONSESPECTRA K. OSHA

6. HOIST INFORMATION:

5:1 SAFET/ FACTOR ON ULTIMATE E LOAD TEST

CESSAR SCOPE OF SLPPLY

1. REFTLING MACHitE A.

(MDERWATER TV B. DRY SIPPitt. EQUIPMENT

2. TRANSFER SYSTEM A.

TRANSFER CARRI GE B. LFENDER C. HYDRAULIC POVER PACKAGE

3. TRANSFER TWE BLIND FLANGE" I4. CEA CHAPK3E PLATFORM

5. FUEL HANDUNG TOOLS

6. RV HEAD LIFTING RIG 7.

INTERNALS HANDUNG EQUIPtENT

8. SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE

9. NEW FUEL ELEVATOR

10. TRANSPORT CCNTAINER

11. REFUELING POOL SEAL 2.

ICI AND CEA CLITTERS

13. CEA EXTENSION SHAFT TOOL

• SAFETY RELATED I

v w O

1 DESIGN BASIS - FUEL HANDLING EQUIPENT DESIGED FOR HANDLING APO STORAGE OF FLEL ASSENLY & CEA'S - ALSO INCLUDED IS EQUIPENT FOR HANDLING THE RV EAD & REACTOR INTERNALS - F.H. EQUIPENT HAS AS APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE. DEVICES TO MINIMl2E MISHAPELING milch COLLD RESLA.T IN FUEL CLADDING DAt1 AGE WITH THE. POTENTIAL RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS - FUEL IS HANDLED AND STORED UNDERWATER 1) REMOVE DECAY HEAT 2) RAD PROTECTION WITH VISIBILITY - EQUIPMENT IS DESIGNED TO INDUSTRY STANIMDS - AND IS NOT SAFETY RELATED - EQUIPMENT IS DESIGtED NOT TO FAIL AND FALL I.1TO THE POOL t#0ER SEISNIC C0f0IDl0NS

• SEISMIC ANALYSIS IS PERFORE D USING ENVELOPE SEISMIC RESPONSE SPECTRA
• DEAD LOAD, LIVE LOAD & SSE SEISMIC LOAD IS CONINED IN CALCLA.ATING STRESSES
• MATERIAL YIELD & ULTIMATE STRENGTH VALUES TAKEN FROM ASTM STANDARDS 1976

- GRAPPLES ARE MECHANICALLY INTERLOCKED AGAINST INADVERTENT OPENING - POSITIVE ECHANICAL STOPS ARE PROVIDED TO INSURE ADEQUATE WATER COVERRE - LOAD INDICATING DEVICES WITH AUTOMATIC ELECTRICAL CUT-0UT TO PROTECT FROM OVERLOADS - EQUIPMENT ASStPES SAFE CONDITION IN THE EVENT OF POWER LOSS - MANUAL NOTION IS POSSIBLE TO ALLOW C0ffLETION OF OPERATION IN THE EVENT OF A POWER LOSS - ELECTRICAL INTERLOCKS ARE NOT UTILIZED TO PREVENT CRITICALITY OR RADIATION EXPOSURE

• MECilANICAL RESTRAINTS, PlWSICAL BARRIERS, HOIST STALL TORQUE LIMIT POSSIBLITY OF FUEL DAMAGE

~ SYSTEM ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS S.C.E. EXCEPT FOR TT ALL-RODS-0UT CONCEPT AND THEREFORE TE:

1. UGS STRUCTURE LIFT RIG milch REMOVES THE CEA'S WITH THE UGS

[

2. REQUIRENNT FOR A CEA OinNGE PLATFORM VICE A CEA CHANGE ECHANISM TESTING - ACCEPTANCE TESTING AT VENDOR'S FACILIT/ PRIOR TO SITE DELIVERY i

- PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING AT SITE PRIOR TO USE - ALIGttiENT FIXTURES AND TEST DEVICES PROVIDED - DtMW FlEL BUNDLE PROVIDED TRAINING-TEOfHCAL MANUAL ADE00 ATE FOR OPERATOR TRAINING t e

f0EG-0612 CONTROL OF HEAW LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS HEAW LOAD - ANY LOAD THAT WEIGHS MORE'WAN WE CGEINED WEIGHT OF A SINGLE SPENT FUEL ASSEtELY AND ITS ASSOCIATED HANDLING TOOLS. C-E SCOPE 1.HEADLIFT

2. UGS/CSB LIFT

3. S.F. CASK 1.HEADLIFTRIG

2. usS/CSB LIFT RIG 3. PK)NE LIFTINGDEVICEREFERENCEIEE6-06.1.2APPENDIXEREF.3 ANSI (114.6-1978"... SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES" C-E DESIGNS C Y, WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS:

SECTION M. 5% FOR LOAD TEST WHICH IS IN ACCO TESTING - TEST LOAD OF 150%. C-ESPECIFIES12

1. S P 9.1.4-13, ITEM 4, PARAGRAPH B.

2.REGULATORYGUIDE1.104

3. ANSI P30.2 2-2.2.2

4. OSHA, TITLE 29,PART1910, PARAGRAPH 1910.179 " RATED LOAD TEST" SECTION 3.2.1.h:1 UTILIZATION OF.6 YS IS IN ACCOR

-- STRESS DESIGN FACTOR 3:1 ON YS C-E SPECIFIES c

1. AISC SECTION 1.5

2. ASME ARTICLE 17-2211 OT}ER REFERENCES IN l!UE6 0632 ANSI P30.2-67 CRANES 71 TON (APPLICANTS SCOPE)

ANSI.i60.9-71 SUNGS (CHAINS, R0PE & SYNETHETIC)(NOT APPLICABLE) i l 9 9

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6. SPENT FUEL HANDLING f1ACHINE T3m

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7. NEW FUEL SillPPING CONTAINER

. l l!l , 8. TRANSFER SYSTEM CONTROL CONSOt (

9. HYDRAULIC POWER PACK AGE D

10. SPENT FUEL SHIPPING CONTAINER Pil

11. REFUELING MACHINE

12. CEA CHANGE PLATFORM fi

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15. REACTOR VESSEL HEAD ASSEMBLY

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17. CEDM CABLE TRAYS r-

18. UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE LIFT RIG

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19. UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE sE

20. FUEL TR ANSFER TUBE 13

21. TRANSFER SYSTEM WINCH

22. NEW FUEL ELEVATOR

23. r'P.*1 Fi !E I ".70 "

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CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.2.2 COOLING SYSTEM FOR REACTOR AUXILIARIES SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.G 1. A COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (CCS) SHALL PROVIDE COOLING WATER TO EACH.RCP AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 5.1.2-2. t 2. RCP llEAT LOAD AND FLOW DATA PRESENTED IN TABLE 5.1.4-1 SHALL BE UTILIZED IN THE DESIGN 0F Tile COOLING WATER SYSTEM. 3. Tile MAXIMUM AND 111NIMUM TEMPERATURE OF THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER DURING NORMAL OPERATIO!! SHALL BE 105 F AND 65 F RESPECTIVELY. 5. 1. 4. 11. 1 MEAllS SilALL BE PROVIDED FOR DETECTION OF REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE INTO THE SECONDARY SIPE OF

• Tile STEAM GENERATORS AND COOLING WATER SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPONENTS CONTAINING REACTOR COOLANT.

e

.-c CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS ~ SAR SECTION: 9.2.2 ' SYSTEM: CSS CESSAR-F SECTION: APP. 6A 7.16.3 COOLING WATER SHALL BE PROVIDED TO EACH SHUTDOWN COOLING llEAT EXCHANGER T0-TRANSFER HEAT FROM THE SUMP FLUID DURING THE RECIRCULATION MODE. TilEC00LIllGWATERSUPPLIEDTOEACilof'!TDOWN090LINGHEATEXCHANGERSHALLBEPROVIDEDATtiFLOWRATE OF 11,000 GPM. C00LIflG WATER FLOW SilALL BE ESTABLISHED TO THE SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANE0USLY WITH THE START OF RECIRCULATION. Tile C00LIflG WATER TEMPERATURE TO Tile INLET OF THE HEAT:EXCHANGERS SilALL BE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF. 65-120 F DURING A LOCA. 6 l 1 5

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS ~ SAR SECTION: 9.2.2 SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.4.7.1.3.P.2 A. THE COOLING WATER SYSTEM DESIGN SHALL BE SUCH THAT COOLING WATER CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF B. BELOW IS AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY THE SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS WHEN ~ AN IRRADIATED CORE IS PRESENT IN THE REACTOR VESSEL OR THE SPENT FUEL P00L. B. COOLING WATER SHALL BE SUPPLIED AT THE FOLLOWIllG TEMPERATURES AND BE ABLE TO REMOVE THE HEAT LOADS LISTED FOR THE GIVEN CONDITIONS SHUTDOWN C00LINr2_11 EAT EXCHANGERS DESIGN HEAT LOAD l COOLINGllATER (MILLION BTU / HOUR) INLET (INCLUDES BOTH HEAT SLT_llAIl0fl TEMPERATURE _ EXCilANGERS) POST-LOCn 65 - 120 F 290 SHUTDOWN COOLING: 3-t HOURS AFTER SHUTDOWN 65 - 120 F 247 27-b HOURS AFTER SHUTDOWN 65 - 105 F 87.6 j 1 0F 2

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.2.2 ~ SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.4.7.1.3.P.2-(CONT'D) C. FOR ALL C0flDITIONS, COOLING WATER SHALL BE SUPPLIED AS FOLLOWS: REQUIRED VALUE PARAMETER PER HEAT EXCHANGER NORMAL ALLOWABLE DELIVERY PRESSURE 100 PSIG MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DELIVERY PRESSURE 150 PSIG REQUIRED FLOWRATE 11,000 GPM MAXIMUM ALL0llABLE FLOWRATE 13.000 GPM D. COOLING WATER PIPING SUPPLYING Tile SilVTDOWN LOOLING HEAT EXCHAllGERS SHALL BE DESIGilED AllD FABRICATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME B8PVC, SECTION III, CLASS 3, AS A MINIMUM, AND SHALL BE DESIGNED AS SEISMIC CATEGORY I, SAFETY CLASS 3, AS A MINIMUM, E. THE COOLING WATER SYSTEM WHICH SERVICES THE SCS SHALL BE DESIGNED WITH SUFFICIENT REDUNDANCY AND DIVERSITY SUCil THAT ONE SCS HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN WILL ALWAYS BE SUPPLIED COOLING WATER. F. THE COOLING WATER SYSTEM WHICH SERVICES THE SCS SHALL BE DESIGNED CONSISTENT WITH THE COOLING PATER CHEMISTRY. 2 0F 2

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.2.2 SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: TABLE 9.3-4 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER FLUID COMPONENT COOLING WATER DESIGN PRESSURE 150 PSIG DESIGN TEMPERATURE 250 F lioRi1AL FLOW 870 GPM DESIGN FLOW 1500 GPM PRESSURE LOSS 15 PSID a 1500 GPM & 105 F Il0RIC ACID CONCEtiTRATOR ~ COOLING WATER FLOW 700 GPM (MAXIMUM) 4 GAS STRIPPER COOLING WATER FLOW 700 GPM (OPERAiiONAL & MAXIMUM) O

' e ~2GF : QU;?E6-CflTI 0 SYSTEM 80 - RCPUf1PS 1 INCIDENT: LOSS OF AC POWER (LOSS OF CCW & SIW TO PUMP SEALS) INTERRUPTION: 2 HOURS (PUMP ON HOT STANDBY) ACTION REQUIRED: RESTORE SEAL INJECTION WATER (SIW) BY FURNISHING EMERGENCY POWER TO CHARGING PUMPS. EFFECTS: PUMP SEALS - NO LOSS OF FUNCTION PUMP BEARINGS - NOT AFFECTED, PUMP SHUTDOWN CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENT: SECTION 9.3.4.6 ,+ -69'-* e

ym. i / SYSTEM ~80 - RCPUMPS INCIDENT: LOSS OF SEAL INJECTION WATER (SIW) COMPONENT COOLING W.-1TER (CCW) AVAILABLE PUMP OPERATING INTERRUPTION:- NO LIMIT (24 HOURS MAXIMUM DESIREABLE) ACTION-REQUIRED: RE3 TORE SIW WITHIN 24 HOURS EFFECTS: PUMP SEALS - NO LOSS OF FUNCTION,CCW PROTECTS SEALS PUMP BEARING - NO AFFECT ON PUMP COASTDOWN,CCW PROTECTS BEARING CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENT: CENPD-201-A 4

SYSTEM 80 - RCPUMPS INCIDENT: LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SEAL INJECTION WATER (SIW) AVAILABLE INTERRUPTION:

30. MINUTES (PUMP OPERATING)

ACTION REQUIRED: TRIP RCPUMPS AND INITIATE A PLANT SHUTDOWN IF CCW CAN NOT BE RESTORED WITHIN 30 MINUTES EFFECTS: PutiP SEALS _ NO LOSS OF FUNCTION,SIW PROTECTS SEALS PUMP BEARINGS - NO AFFECT ON PUMP COASTDOWN CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENT: SECTIONS 5.4.1.2, 5.4.1.3 & CENPD-201-A e i h

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\\ oSEAL LEAKAGE P01 = SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE P02 -INTERMEDIATE PRESSURE 6 STAGING P03 = BACKUP PRESSURE FLOW P275 = STAGING PRESSURE P275 ... FLOW %?RESTRICTOR -e_ RIGID COUPLING HIGH r PRESSURE COOLER c I ~ qw - TOS _I t J_ THIRD SEAL

• THROTTLE (BACKUP SEAL) d o

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y CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 'SAR SECTION: 9.2.3 DEf1INERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: gg TABLE 9.2-1 NEW M 7EFEh W Q psg32 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MAKEUP WATER LIMITS pH* 6.0 TO 8.0 .~ CONDUCTIVITY LESS THAN 2 UMHOS CllLORIDE LESS THAN 0.15 PPM C1 FLUORIDE LESS THAN 0.10 PPM F SUSPENDED SOLIDS LESS THAN 0.5 PPM GASEOUS ** NON-DEAERATED/DEAERATED SILICA (S10 )*** LESS TilAN 0.01 PPM 2

• IF WATER CONTAINS CO, THE pH SPECIFICATION f1AY BE LOWERED TO 5.8 TO COMPENSAT,E FOR 2

C0 ABSORPTION. 2

• • DEAERATION GIVES CONSERVATISM TO MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM DESIGN BUT IT IS NOT C0flSIDERED NECESSARY.
    • PERTAINS TO SECONDARY MAKEUP WATER ONLY.

O

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.2.6 SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.F.2 (CONT'D) D. TRANSMITTING EXCESSIVE LOADS TO THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY. E. COMPROMISING THE FUNCTION OF THE PLANT CONTROL ROOM. F. PRECLUDING ORDERLY C00LDOWN OF THE RCS. 5.1.4.F.9 NO SINGLE ACTIVE OR PASSIVE COMPONENT FAILURE, SINGLE PASSIVE OR ACTIVE ELECTRICAL COMPONENT FAllVRE, OR POWER SUPPLY FAILURE SHALL PRECLUDE ADEQUATE OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING EVENTS: A. LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER WITH OR WITHOUT A CONCURRENT LOSS OF NORMAL ONSITE OR 0FFSITE AC POWER. B. MINOR SECONDARY SYSTEM PIPE BREAKS WITH OR WITHOUT A CONCURRENT LOSS OF NORMAL ONSITE 0R OFFSITE AC POWER. C. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE WITH OR WITHOUT A CONCURRENT LOSS OF NOR.\\1AL ONSITE OR OFFSITE AC POWER. 2 OF 3

CESSAR-F IllTERFACE REQUIREMENTS -SAR SECTION: 9.2.6 SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.1.4.F.9 (CONT'D) Do MAJORSECONDARYSYSTEMPIPE"5REAKSWITHORWITHOUTACONCURRENTLOSSOFNORMALONSITE OR OFFSITE AC POWER. E0 SMAll. LOCA WITH OR WITHOUT A. CONCURRENT LOSS OF NORMAL ONSITE OR OFFSITE AC PO 5 3 0F 3

4 ) E AC NI 9 EMD ON NA E H, PWO LN AS h I R U TS AD NN I EW HT S FE 0N,A C 2I R CR DU GH S R T ES N PN E O M ,I E M ET R E GI I T ND U S AN Q Y RO E S C R L E LG E G UN C A FI A N D F I EO M HO R TL ET D F N R R O I O FS F O E L LL R F AI A NSS S D OSN S N I I O E A TMI C T C T NOI N UDD E FAN M NO P NRC I I O U ATL Q M A E E ,T RSNEE L0M 3 LDN AAO 3 HNR SRI N 9 OV O TTN I N E T S E C C MSL N R E NEA O S I KN I 1 AAR T F TUE C E M R B. NOT OHX S E A I CTE I T S R R S S 1 EAD A Y E HEN S S C 5 T( A

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.3.3 ~ SYSTEM: SCS t -CESSAR F SECTION: 5A.7.1.3.C 5 A. 7.1. 3. M. 9 5.4.7.1.3.P.1.G NO LIMITED LEAKAGE PASSIVE FAILURE OR THE EFFECTS THERE0F (SUCH AS FLOODING, SPRAY IMPINGEMENT, STEAM, TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, RADIATION, OR LOSS OF NPSH) IN A CONNECTING SYSTEM (E.G., SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM OR CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM) SHALL PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF MihiMUM. ACCEPTABLE SiluTDOWN COOLING CAPABILITY. MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SHUTDOWN COOLING CAPABILITY IS DEFINED AS THAT PROVIDED BY ONE LPSI PUMP AND ITS ASSOCIATED HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN. PROTECTION OF THE SCS FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED PIPE FAILURE SHALL BE BY (1) SEPARATION VIA PilYSICAL PLANT LAYOUT, (2) PIPE RESTRAINTS, (3) PROTECTIVE. STRUCTURES, (4) WATER-TIGHT ROOMS (5) ISOLATION CAPABILITY, OR (6) OTHER SUITABLE MEANS. IN THE EVENT OF A LIMITED LEAKAGE PASSIVE FAILURE IN ONE SCS TRAIN DURING LONG TERM COOLING, PERSONNEL ACCESS TO THE INTACT TRAIN SHALL BE POSSIBLE. . Tile FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM PIPING DESIGN AND ARRANGEMENT SHALL BE SUCH AS TO ASSURE THAT THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM IS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF PIPE WHIP, JET IMPINGEMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS RESULTING FROM POSTULATED PIPING RUPTURES IN THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM.

o CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.3.3 SYSTEM: IRS, CSS, SIS CESSAR-F SECTION: APP. 6B 7.3.1 APP. 6A 7.3.1 6.3.1.3.C APP. 6B 7.16.4F APP. 6A 7.16.4.F 6.3.1.5.M.7 APP 6B 7.13.6 APP 6A 7.13.6 6.3.1.3.P.4.F APP. 6B 7.14 APP. 6A 7.14 6.3.1.3.N THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED LEAKAGE FROM A MODERATE ENERGY PIPE RUPTURE POSTULATED DURING NORMAL PLANT CONDITIONS IN THE (SYSTEM) SHALL BE AS DEFINED BY THE METHODS OF SECTION 3.6. NO LIMITED LEAKAGE PASSIVE FAILURE OR THE EFFECTS THERE0F (SUCH AS FLOODING, SPRAY IMPINGEMENT, STEAM, TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE, RADIATION, LOSS OF NPSH, OR LOSS OF RECIRCULATION WATER INVENTORY), IN THE (SYSTEfD DURING THE RECIRCULATION MODE SHALL PRECLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF f11NIMUM ACCEPTABLE RECIRCULATION CAPABILITY (MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CAPABILITY IS DEFINED AS THAT WHICH IS PROVIDED BY THE OPERATION OF ONE SUBSYSTEM). 1 0F 3

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: 9.3.3 SYSTEM: IRS, CSS, SIS CESSAR-F SECTION: (SEE PREVIOUS SLIDE) IN THE EVENT OF A LIMITED LEAKAGE PASSIVE FAILURE IN ONE (SYSTEM) TRAIN DURING RECIRC PERSONNEL ACCESS TO THE INTACT TRAIN SHALL BE POSSIBLE. LARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO ENSURE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE DES RUPTURE OR INADVERTENT OPERATION DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIR THE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS. SIS, CSS: (SYSTEM) LEAKAGE TO THE SAFEGUARDS ROOM WILL NORMALLY DRAIN TO T PRO-VISIONS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO ACCEPT THE MAXIMUM LEAKAGE RATES LISTED BELO A. (SYSTEM) PUMP SEALS: 100 CC/HR/ PUMP B. VALVES BACKSEAT LEAKAGE 10 CC/HR/ INCH SEAT DIAMETER ACROSS THE VALVE SEAT: 10 CC/HR/ INCH OF NOMINAL VALVE SIZE ALL LEAKAGES SHALL BE TREATED AS RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE WITH A LOW DISS CONTENT. 2 0F 3

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION: .9,3.3 '~ SYSTEM: IRS, CSS, GIS CESSAR-F SECTION: (SEE PREVIOUS SLIDE) THE IRS COMPONENTS ARE DESIGNED FOR ZERO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT LEAKAGE SHOULD OCCUR, PROVISIONS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO ACCEPT THE MAXIMUM LEAKAGE RATES LISTED BELOW FOR PURPOSES OF ROOM SUMP DESIGN. A. SCAP SEALS 100 CC/HR/ PUMP 1 R. VALVES BACKSEAT LEAKAGE: 10 CC/HR/ INCH SEAT DIAMETER / VALVE ACROSS THE VALVE SEAT: 10 CC/HR/ INCH OF-NOMINAL VALVE SIZE / VALVE ALL LEAKAGES SHALL BE TREATED AS POTENTIALLY T0XIC WASTE WITH A LOW DISSOLVED SOLI CONTENT. l 3 0F 3 l

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS-SAR SECTION: 9.4 AIR CONDITIONING. HEATING, COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS SYSTEM: RCS CESSAR-F SECTION: l 5.1.4.0 1. FOR THE APPLICANT SUPPLIED NSSS COMPONENTS ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS SHALL BE FOLLOWED. A. DEMONSTRATION OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ENVELOPES FOR ANY OR ALL OF THESE BUILDINGS NOT TO EXCEED THE QUALIFICATION ENVELOPES OF SECTION 3.11. B. EXCLUSION OF SPECIFIC COMPONENTS FROM-EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS BY SUITABLE PHYSICAL SEPARATIONS OR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM TECHNIQUES. C. USE OF THE SAME ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION CONDITIONS BEING EMPLOYED BY C-E SUPPLIED NSSS COMPONENTS. 2. THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS RESULTING FROM THE LOCA SHALL MEET ' CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN SECTION 6.2.1.5. 3. A CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM SHALL BE PROVIDED TO HANDLE THE TOTAL RCS HEAT LOSSES TO CONTAINMENT. TABLE 5.1.4-2 LISTS THE HEAT LOADS FROM NSSS SUPPORT STRUCTURES TO CONTAINMENT. lABLE 5.1.4-3 LISTS TYPICAL LOADS THROUGH THE NSSS INSULATION T0 CONTAINMENT. THESE VALUES WILL BE' CONFIRMED BY EACH APPLICANT SINCE THE FINAL VALUE DEPENDS ON SYSTEM INSULATION EFFICIENCY. l l

' l CESSAR-F IRTERFACE REQUIREMENTS t SAR SECTION: 9.4 SYSTEM: SCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 5.4.7.1.3.0 1. THE PROPER OPERATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EQUIPMENT OF ONE TRAIN OF THE SCS SHALL BE MAINTAINED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE OTHER TRAIN OF THE SCS, E.G., FAILURE OR ISOLATION OF THE VENTILATION CAPABILILITY TO ONE TRAIN OF THE SCS SHALL NOT. CAUSE THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIMITS OF THE OTHER.SCS TRAIN TO BE EXCEEDED. 2. fHE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM SHALL CONTROL AMBIENT AIR CONDITIONS IN THE PR0XIMITY OF ALL C-E SUPPLIED MOTOR DRIVEN OR DIAPHRAGM OPERATED EQUIPMENT IN THE SCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3.11. 6

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REQUIREfENTS SAR SECTION: 9.4 SYSTEM: IRS, CSS, SIS CESSAR-F SECTION: APP. 6B 7.7 APP. 6A 7.7 6.3.1.3.0 EACH (SYSTEM) SAFEGUARDS TRAIN SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH AN INDEPENDENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM SUCH THAT THE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN EACH TRAIN OPERATES WITHIN THE' ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN LIMITS SPECIFIED IN SECTION 3.11. .g

~ CESSAil-F INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SAR SECTION:

9.4 SYSTEM

RPS, ESFA: CESSAR-F SECTION: 7.1.3.7 THERMAL LIMITATIONS THE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SHALL BE LOCATED SO AS NOT TO VIOLATE THE TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY LIMITS OF SECTION 3.11. 7.1.3.17 ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS SHALL BE PROVIDED TO ENSURE THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS OF THE SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS DO NOT EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 1E EQUIPPENT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 3.11. j i 1

CESSAR-F INTERFACE REGUIREIENTS SAR SECTION: 9.4 <.A SYSTEM: CVCS CESSAR-F SECTION: 9.3.4.1.2.1 THE ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN CONDITIONS OF THE CVCS COMP 0NENTS ARE GIVEN IN SECTION 3.11. e I e 1

STEAM SUPPLY Af!D FEEDWATER SYSTEMS-10.3 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY CE SCOPE - FLOW DIAGRAM CONFIGURAT10fl ISOLATION ATMOSPHERIC Duf1P VALVES SAFETY VALVES SINGLE FAILURE 10.4.7 MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM CE SCOPE - FLOW DIAGRAM CONFIGURATION ISOLAT10h WATERHAMMER ~ 10.4.9 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM CE SCOPE CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS FLOW REQUIREf1ENTS i ) l 1 j

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CONFIGURATION B. PROTECTION Thesteampipingandassociatedsupportsfromthesteamgener$ tors 2. up to and including the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) and any auxiliary steam supply systems up to the isolation valves which connect upstream of the HSIV's shall be seismic category I and designed to ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 2 equirements. M. ARRANGEMENT Following a secondary line break, either all steam paths downstream 7. of the MISV's shall be shown to be isolated by their respective control systems following a MSIS actuation signal, or the results of a blowdown through a non-isolated path shall be shown to be acceptable. An acceptable maximum steam flow from a nong solated i steam path is 10% of the main steam rate (MSR) (1.9 x 10 lb/hr 9 1000 psia saturated steam). It is not required that the control systems for downstream valves nor the downstream valves themselves be designed to IEEE 279 and IEEE 308 or ASME Code, Section III and Seismic Category I criteria respectively. 8. The MSIV's for each steam generator shall be arranged such that a maximum of-2000 cubic feet (total for two steam lines per steam generator) is contained in the piping between each steam generator and its associated MSIV's. This solume shall include all lines off of the main steam line up to their isolation valves. The main steam lines shall be arranged such that a maximum of 9. 14,000 cubic feet is contained between the MSIV's and the turbine stop valves. This volume shall include all lines off of the main steam line up to their isolation valves.

10. The main steam lines shall be headered together prior to the turbine stop valves but not upstream of the MSIV's, and a cross-connect line shall be provided which will maintain steam generator pressure differences within the following limits for'all normal and upsec conditions.

0-15% power operation pressure difference to be 1 psi. a. b. 15-100% power operation pressure difference to be 3 psi.

11. No automatically actuated valves shall be located upstream of the MSIV's except as required for supply to steam driven emergency Provisions shall be made to prevent blowdown of feedwater pumps.

both steam generators through the emergency feedwater supply headers in the event of a steamline break. The maximum allowable flow rate per valve is 1.9 x 10 lb/hr.

12. There shall be no isolation valves 'ih the main steam lines between the steam generators and the secondary relief valves.

13. The main steam safety valves shall be arranged such that any condensate in the line between the safety valves and main steam line drains back to the main steam line.

All valves in the main steam line outside of containment up to 14. and including the MSIV's shall be located as close as practical to the containment wall.

e e ISOLATI0il ^" 'I.! OPERAT10:lAL/C0ilTROLS 1. A power-operated MSIV capable of establishing shutoff under conditions of design pressure, design temperature, and flow' conditions resulting from a break just upstream or downstream shall~be provided in each main steam line outside of containment. 2.- Capability for controlling MSIV position shall be provided in the control room and remote from the control room. 3. The MSIV and MSIV bypass valve shall be either a fail close valve or a valve that is shown by the applicant to close upon receipt of a MSIS. 4. The full open to close stroke time of each MSIV and MSIV bypass valve shall be 5 seconds or less upon receipt of an MSIS. G. THERMAL LIMITATI0t!S t. 10. Each MSIV leak flow shall not enceed 0.001 percent of nominal flow at 1270 psia in the forward direction and shall not exceed 0.1 percent of nominal flow at 1270 psia in the reverse direction. ._ 11. No single MSIV bypass valve or bypass valve line shall have a 6 capacity greater than 1.9 x 10 lb/hr of saturated steam at 1000 psia. (,12. No singig turbine bypass valve shall have a capacity greater than 1.9 x 10 lb/hr at 1000 psia. e

ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES G. THERMAL LIMITATIONS 4. ' Power operated atmospheric dump valves shall be provided in 2ach of the four main steam lines to allow cooldewn of the steam generators when the main steam line isq}ation valves are closed, or when the main condenser is not available as a heat' sisk. Each. ADV shall be capable of holding the plant at hot standby dissipating core decay and reactor coolant pump heat, and allowing controlled cooldown from hot standby to Shutdown Cooling System initiation conditions. Each valve shall be sized to allow a rupture, which renders one steam generator unavailable for heat removal, concurrent with a loss of normal A.C. power and single failure of one of the remaining two ADV's. To accomplish the above, each A0V shall have sufficient capacity to meet the saturated steam flow condi-tions in Figure 5.1.4-1. Also no gingle valve shall have a maxi-mum ca(acity greater than 1.9 x 10 lb/hr. at 1000 psia. 1. OPERATIONAL / CONTROLS 5. The ADV's shall be fail close and shall be capable of being remote manually positioned to control the plant cooldown rate. 6. The'ADi's shall be provided with manual operators such that the valves may be hand operated from the control room and remote shutdown panel in the event of a loss of normal power supply. 7. In the combined event of either a steam line break or steam generator tLbe rupture and the loss of power operation of the ADV's, personnel access to the manual operators of the intact valves on the other steam generator shall be possible. P. RELATED SERVICE 5. If air-operated ADV's are used, a safety related control air system shall be provided to supply air to the ADV actuators should the normal air supply fail to be available. 6. Air for the ADV and t1FIV pneumatic valve operator shall be clean, dry and oil-free. The air shall be delivered at the point of use under system full flow conoitions at a pressure of 70 psig minimum to 105 psig maximum. Pneumatic lines and fittings shall have a minimum design pressure.of 150 psig. a T. - *

.~ a l SAFETY VALVES 0, OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION 3. Each main steam line shall be provided with ASME Code, spring-loaded secondary safety valves between the containment and the isolation valves. 4. The total relieving capacity of the secondary safety valves shall be equally divided between the main steam lines. 5. The total segondary safety valve capacity shall be. sufficient to pass 19 x 10 lb/hr at the maximum valve set pressure. 6. The maximum steam flog per secondary safety valve shall be no greater than 1.9 x 10 lbs/hr at 1000 psia. 7. Secondary safety valve set pressure'shall be calculated in accor-dance with Article NC-7000 of ASME Section III, which requires that the following be considered: a. A maximum allowable set pressure of 110% steam generator design pressure (1270 psia) which equals 1397 psia. b. A valve accumulation of 3% c. A valve set pressure error of + 1% d. Incorportation of the aP between the steam generator nozzles and the safety valves. 8. The design pressure, temperature, and flow rating of the main steam piping and valves shall be greater than or at least equal to the design pressure, temperature, and fl'ow rating of the steam generator secondary side.

v l SINGLE FAILURE L. F. INDEPENDENGE 2. The feedwater system piping, Emergency Feedwater System piping, and main steam piping and all of their associated supports and restraints shall be designed so that a single adverse event, such as a ruptured feedwater line, emergency feedwater line, main steam line inside containment, or a closed isolation valve can occur without: g a. Initiating a Loss-of-Coolant incident. b. Causing failure of the other steam generator's safety class steam and feedwater lines, MSIV's, safety valves, MFIV's blowdown line isolation valves, or ADV's. c. Reducing the capability of any of the Engineered Safety Features systems or the Plant Protective System. d. Transmitting excessive loads to the containment pressure boundary. e. Compromising the function of the plant control room. f. Precluding orderly cooldown of the RCS. 4 3. An electrical or mechanical malfunction of one solenoid shall not prevent a MSIV from closing. 4. No single failure in the control circuits shall prevent closure of the MSIV bypass valves. 4 5. The MSIV bypass valve control circuits shall be designed, or precautions shall be taken, such that no single electrical failure would result in the spurious motion of the valves. 6. The ADV control circuits shall be designed or precautions taken, such that no single electrical failure would result in the opeging of valves with a total combined capacity greater than 1.9 x 10 lb/hr at 1000 psia. 7. Nu single failure in the control circuits shall prevent operation of at least one ADV on each steam generator. l

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a a 4 MFWS COUFIGURATION C. PROTECTION 3. "The valvas, piping' and associated su'pports of'the Feedwater-System from and including the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV's) to the steam generator feed nozzles shall be Seismic Category I and designed to ASME B&PV Code Section III, Class 2 requirements. 4. Feedwater piping shall be routed, protecte6..id restrained such that in the case of a rupture of a feedwater line or any other system pipeline, a single failure criteria will not be exceeded with regard to safe shutdown of the plant. M. ARRANGEMENT

15. A 90' or 45' elbow facing downward shall be attached to each feedwater nozzle. Such a precaution will aid in tha prevention of water hammer.

16. The MFIV's shall be located outside of the containment building as close to the containment wall as possible.

17. The MFIV's for each steam generater shall be arranged such that a maximum of 500 cuoic feet of fluid is contained in the piping between each steam generator and its associated isolation valves.

This volume shall also include the volumes between the redundant MFIV's. This volume shall include the volumes up to their respec- ~ tive isolecion valves of all lines off of the main feedwat.r lines downstream of the MFIV's for which a mechanism exists for getting the fluid into the main feedwater line (e.g., gravity, floworflushing).

3) The Emergency Feedwater System connection shall be located in the downcomer feedwater line between the MFIV's and the steam generator downcomer nozzle. Emergency feedwater flow.< hall be directed to the downcomer nozzle only. A safety Class 2 cneck valve shall be located in the main feedwater piping uostream of tnis interface to prevent back flow of emergency feedwater to other portions of -

the Main Feedwater System.

a a ISOLAT10tl l. OPERATI0tlAL/C0!!TROLS ? 9. Redundant feedwa'ter. system isolation valving shall be provide'd in both the economizer feedlines and the downtomer feedlines~such that the following criteria are met when the effects of single failure criteria are imposed: a. Complete termination of forward feedwater flow is assumed within 5 seconds after receipt of an MSIS. b. Abrupt complete termination of reverse feedwater flow with the existance of a reverse flow condition. Check valves are considered to be an acceptable means of achieving the above. 10. The economizer and downcomer feedwater line isolation valves (MFIV's) in each main feedwater line shall be remote-operated and be capable of maintaining leak rate of itss than 1000 cc/hr under the main feedwater line pressure, temperature and flow resulting from the transient conditions associated with a pipe break on either side of the valves. F. INDEPENDEflCE I 8. Each MFIV actuator shall be physically and electrically independent of the other such that failure of one will not cause failure of the other. G. THERMAL LIMITATIONS / 13. The total reverse leak rate of feedwater check valves to each '~ steam generator shall not exceed 1000 cc/hr. e i

o a -s DESIGil FEATURES TO PREVEilT 1.'ATEfdREER IN ~ .THE STEAil GEiiERATOR SPARGER 1. 90* ' DOWNWARD SLOPING ELB0'.l 0FF THE FEEDN0ZZLE. '2. "J" TUBES OR' TEES. 3. LOOP SEAL. 4 e 9" ~ 9er 4 i t d k + e e o e i E. 1

i 'WATERHAidERPREVENTIVEFEATURES ? IN THE ECONOF:lZER DESIGN e B 1. Ec0NOMIZER N0ZZLE LOCATION. 2. INTERFACE REQUtREMENTS. 3. CONTROL FEATURES. 4. IhTERNAL DESIGN FE!TURES. i a ~** i l 4 1. 6 l i

EFWS - CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENT.S F. INDEPENDENCE No single active or passive component fiiluEe, single passive *o'r 9. active electrical component failure, or power supply failure shall preclude adequate operation of the Emergency Feedwater System, such as the following events: a. Loss of normal feedwater with or without a concurrent loss of normal onsite'or offsite AC power. b. Minor secondary system pipe breaks with or without a concurrent loss of normal onsite ve offsite AC power. c. Steat generator tube rupture with or aithout a concurrent loss of..ormal onsite or offsite AC power. d. Major secondary system pipe breaks with or without a concurrent loss of normal onsite or offsite AC power. s. Small LOCA with or without a concurrent loss of normal onsite or offsite AC power. 10. The ability of the Emergency Feedwater System to perform its design function considering a power supply failure, a single active or passive mechanical component failure, a single active or passive failure of an electrical component, or the effects of a high or moderate energy pipe rupture shall be demonstrated. 11. The Emergency Feedwater System shall provide double isolation from the Main Feedwater System during plant conditions when the Emergency Feedwater System is not required. OPERATIONAL CONTROLS 11. The Emergency Feedwater System shall be controllable in a post-accident environment from either the control room or a remote shutdown station. g g 12. The Emergency Feedwater System shall be controllable such that post accident operation will not result in overfilling the intact steam generator (s). 13. If the Eme gency feedwater System is used as an auxiliary feedwater system, the emergency feedwater pumps shall be designed for operation when steam generator pressure is negligible and not result in damage to the pumps or erfect the ability of the system to deliver the required ei.tergency feedwater flow. Such a condition can exist during startup or shutdown operation subsecuent to an EFAS which starts the emergency feedwater pumps and fully opens the system isolation and control valves.

T ^ c EFWS - FLOW REQUIREMENTS G. THERMAL LIMITATIONS 5. Following the events stated in Section 5.1.4.F.9, the emergency feedwater system shall maintain adequate inventory in the steam generator (s) for residual heat rem ~ oval and be capable of the following: Maintaining the NSSS at hot standby with or without normal a. offsite and normal onsite power available. b. Facilitating NSSS cooldown at the maximum administrative 1y controlled rate of 75*F/hr. from hot standby to shutdown cooling initiation with or without normal offsite or onsite power _ available. (The Shutdcsn Cooling System becomes available for plant cooldown when the RCS temperature and pressure are reduced to approximately 350*F and 400 psia.) s 6. The Emergency Feedwater System shall be available to deliver flow to the rteam generator (s) automatically upon receipt of an EFAS as follows: a. Within 10 seconds when normal offsite or normal onsite power is available. b. Within 45 seconds when both normal onsite and normal offsite power are not available. s 7. The required emergency feedwater flow, based on residual heat removal requirements is 875 gpm delivered to the steam generator (s) downcomer feedwater nozzle. Maximum expected steady state steam generator pressure at the downcomer nozzle is approximately 1275 psia. 8. Emergency feedwater temperature shall be at least 40F and no greater than 180F. 9. A minimum of 300,000 gallons of secondary quality makeup water as defined in Section 10.3.4 shall be available to the Emergency Feedwater System for delivery to the intact steam generator (s). B. PROTECTION F 4. All components and piping of the Emergency Feedwater System 'between the steam generators and the containment isolation valves shall be Seismic Category I and designed to ASME B&PV Code Section 4 III, C1sss 2 requirements. l -}}