ML20009B879

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Summary of 810609 Meeting w/C-E Re Scope & Design for CESSAR Std NSSS Auxiliary Sys.W/List of Attendees & Viewgraphs
ML20009B879
Person / Time
Site: 05000470
Issue date: 07/06/1981
From: Charemagne Grimes
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20009B880 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107170301
Download: ML20009B879 (4)


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APPLICANT: Combustion Engineering Inc.

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FACILITY:

CESSAR Standard Nut. lear Steam Supply System u.s amu j

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF JUNE 9,1981 MEETING ON AUXILIARY SYSTEMS \\

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On June 9,1901, the staff met with representatives from Combustion Engineering (CE) to discuss the scope and design for the CESSAR stcndard NSSS auxiliary systems. The meeting attendees are identified in Enclosure 1 and the slides presented during the meeting are contained in Enclosure 2.

CE indicated that the majority of the scope of the Auxiliary Systems Branch review, as defined in the Standard Review Plan, are outside the scope of the CESSAR design.

Hosever, CE does provide interfaca infomation cn these areas and these interfaces were discussed as shown in Enclosure 2.

The staff generally comented that the interface descriptions in the CESSAR FSAR lack consistency.

In addition, the staff noted the following specific deficiencies in the CESSAR FSAK during the course of the meeting:

1.

Although flood levels are the reference-plant applicant's responsibility, CESSAR should distinguish internal and external flooding protection require-ments and refer to the probable maximum flood (PMF) as the basis for pro-viding protection for safety-related equipment from external flooding.

2.

CE should revise Section 3.5 of CESSAR to include their response to the Auxiliary Systems Branch question 010.2 regarding missile sources from equipment in the CESSAR scope outside containment.

3.

CESSAR does not consistently identify the single-failure design criteria as an interface requirement.

4.

CE should reassess the interface requirements for the spent-fuel facility (subcriticality margin) to assure that the fuel handling accident analysis event is bounding.

5.

CE should include an interface which will assure that the CVCS connection to the spent fuel pool will be made at a location which will not result in a pool level below the minimum required in the event of operation of the CVCS utilizing the spent fuel pool source.

6.

In order to generically address the control of heavy loads (NUREG-0612),

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CE should provide a summary of the analysis which demonstrates that the Ifmiting event (reactor vessel closure head drop) is not a " critical" load; i.e., unacceptable consequences will not occur.

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The CE response to the staff's pos% tion regarding design requ1rements for

""" cool ing % ter"to" reactor tbo16nt'psnps"(CESSAR page"A;73)"has incorrectly-

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y jljl. C, 1M cited the staff position. CE should either correct the position or refer it to the applicant's scope and include only the results of the loss of cooling water to the reactor coolant pump test results from CENPD-201-A.

8.

CC should clarify the safe failure positions of all air-operated valves in the CESSAR scope by reference to Chapter 6.

In addition.

CE should provide an interface requirement for instrument air quality.

9.

CE should includs the interface requirement for redundant air conditioners for the RPS and ESFAS.

10. CE should identify a recomended water-hammer testing program which addresses NUREG/CPal606.

11.

CE will review and revise as necessary the interface references identified in Section 9.2.3 of the CESSAR FSAR for the demineralized water system.

Based on the informatio.n presented during the meeting and in anticipation of the resolutinn of the issues described above, the staff indicated that it would begin to drait a safety evaluation report (SER) for the applicable sections of the CESSAR FSAR.

SM@L% SIC 3 BY:

Chris I. Grimes, Project Manager Standardization and Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

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JUL 6 1981 Docket No. STN 50-470 APPLICANT: Combustion Engineering, Inc.

FACILITY:

CESSAR Standard Nuclear Steam Supply System

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF JUNE 9,1981 MEETING ON AUXILIARY SYSTEMS On June 9,1981, the staff met with representatives from Combustion Engineering (CE) to discuss the scope and design for the CESSAR standard NSSS auxiliary systems. The meeting attendees are identified in Enclosure 1 and the slides presented during the meeting are contained in Enclosure 2.

CE indicated that the majority of the scope of the Auxiliary Systems Branch review, as defined in the Standard Review Plan, are outside the scope of the CESSAR design.

However, CE does provide interface information in these areas and these interfaces were discussed as shown in inclosure 2.

The staff generally commented that the interface descriptions in the CESSAR FSAR lack consistency.

In addition, the staff noted the following specific deficiencies in the CESSAR FSAR during the course of the meeting:

1.

Although flood levels are the reference-plant applicant's responsibility, CESSAR should distinguish internal and external flooding protection require-ments and refer to the probable maximum flood (PMF) as the basis for pro-viding protection for safety-related equipment frtr external flooding.

2.

CE should revise Section 3.5 of CESSAR to include their response to the Auxiliary Systems Branch question 010.2 regarding missile sources from equipment in the CESSAR scope outside containment.

3.

CESSAR does not consistently identify the single-failure design criteria as an interface requirement.

4.

CE should reassess the interface requirements for the spent-fuel facility (subcriticality margin) to assure that the fuel handling accident analysis event is bounding.

5.

CE should include an interface which will assure that the CVCS connection to the spent fuel pool will be made at a location which will not result in a pool level below the minimum required in the event of operation of the CVCS utilizing the spent fuel pool source.

6.

In order to generically address the control of heavy loads (NUREG-0612).

CE should provide a summary of the analysis which demonstrates that the limiting event (reactor vessel closure head drop) is not a " critical" load; i.e., unacceptable con' sequences will not occur.

7.

The CE response to the. staff's position regarding design requirements for cooling water to reactor. coolant pumps (CESSAR page A-73) has incorrectly j

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Combustion Engineering, Inc. JUL 6 1981 cited the staff position. CE should either correct the position or refer it to the applicant's scope and include only the results of the loss of cooling water to the reactor coolant pump test results from CENPD-201-A.

8.

CE should clarify the safe failure positions of all air-operated valves in the CESSAR scope by reference to Chapter 6.

In addition, CE should provide an interface requirement for instrument air quality.

9.

CE should include the interface requirement for redundant air conditioners for the RPS and ESFAS.

10. CE should identify a recommended water-hammer testing program which addresses NUP.EG/CR-1606.

11.

CE will review and revise as necessary the interface references identified in Section 9.2.3 of the CESSAR FSAR for tne demineralized water system.

Based on the information presented during the meeting and in anticipation of the resolution of the issues described above, the staff indicated that it would begir, to draft a safety evaluation report (SER) for the applicable sections of the CESSAR FSAR.

C1.ka Chris I.

Brimes, Project Manager Standardization and Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

As stated e

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e ENCLOSURE 1 MEETING ATTENDEES CESSAR AUXILIARY SYSTEMS June 9, lib 1 Name Organization C. I. Grfmes NRC/DL/SSPB J. S. Wermiel NRC/DSI/ASB Y. W. Panciera NRC/DSI/ASB C. B. Brinkman CE (Bethesda)

Terry F. Quan APS W. W. Boles Bechtel M. F. Hodge APS George Davis CE E. S. Markowski CE C. W. Ruoss CE Dan Peck CE Rick Turk CE Greg Wuertz CE Irving Bernstein CE John Waters CE Rick Bradshaw CE Davis W. Tolli CE Nick Floravante NRC/DSI/ASB h

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