ML20009B856
| ML20009B856 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello, Dresden, Davis Besse, Palisades, Perry, Fermi, Kewaunee, Point Beach, Byron, Braidwood, Prairie Island, Callaway, Duane Arnold, Clinton, Cook, Quad Cities, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Zion, Midland, LaSalle, Zimmer, Bailly, Marble Hill  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1981 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107170251 | |
| Download: ML20009B856 (1) | |
Text
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p%M *< D(rtD N American Electric Power Service Corporation D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)
Cincinnati Gas and Elect ric Company i
Zimmer (50-358)
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)
Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 50-457)
Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455)
Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
LaSalle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)
Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155)
Palisades (50-255)
Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330)
Dairyland Power Cooperative LACBWR (50-409)
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341)
Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)
Iowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331)
Northern Indiana Public Service Company
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Bailly (50-367)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)
Public Service of Indiana Marble Hill 1, 2 (50-546, 50-547)
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Toledo Edison Company O
Davis-Besse 1 (50-346) 9l l 4
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(,)g Union Electric Company L
Callaway 1, 2 (50-483, 50-486) y, Wisconsin Electric Power Comnany Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301) h Wisconsin Public Service Cor; ; ration Kewaunee (50-305) 8107170251 810715
- DR ADOCK 05000010 G
.f SSIN No.:
6830 Access No.:
810330373 IEC 81-09B$
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UNITED STATES p p fic NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Uff 4h#,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 July 10, 1981 IE Circular No. 81-09:
CONTAINMENT EFFLUENT WAFER THAT BYPASSES RADI0 ACTIVITY MONITOR Description of Circumstances:
At Indian Point Units 2 and 3 and at H. B. Robinson Unit 2, licensee reviews of service water systems have identified unmonitored effluent paths from contain-ment.
Although containment cooler water effluerL is monitored, containment coolu fan motor cooling water bypasses the monitors by joining the containment cooler water effluent downstream of the radiation monitoring equipment.
This represents a potential unmonitored release path if the containment is at design pressure due to a design basis accident (DBA) and if leaks are present in the fan motor cooler system.
Similar designs may exist at other plants.
Appropriate monitoring of direct discharges (from containment to the environment following a DBA) having the potential to exceed the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 is required.
Recommended Actions:
1.
All water system effluents that are not automatically isolated by a high-containment pressure containment isolation signal and that flow directly to the environment from containment should be reviewed to determine whether or not a pathway exists for "significant" unmonitored discharge.
A "signif-icant" discharge, for purposes of this circular, is a discharge where projected concentrations in unrestricted areas are likely to exceed the concentrations listed in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, column I with the containment at design pressure due to a design basis accident and with maximum credible leakage, such as a single completely severed cocler tube, assumed to be present in the water system inside containment.
i You may take credit for design pressure in the water system being higher l
than containment design pressure only for cases where neither single failures, nor operation in degraded modes as permitted by Technical l
Specifications under a limiting condition of operation (LCO), are likely to result in operation of the water system at water pressures lower than the containment design pressure.
2.
All water system effluents that are not automatically isolated by a high-containment pressure containment isolation signal and that flow directly to the environment from containment should be reviewed to determine whether
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or not any "significant" radioactive discharge can be isolated once it is detected.
The review should include evaluation of the capability of the system to be isolated without interruption of any safety-related functions.
Isolation of the system's inlet as well as its discharge may be required i
IEC 81-09 s
July 10, 1981 Page 2 of 2 to prevent radioactive discharge through the inlet piping to the inlet piping of a parallel system and/or to the environment.
3.
Corrective actions to install detection and isolation methods that provide performance consistent with Technical Specification requirements shruld be initiated for any "significant" unmonitored and/or unisolable discharge pathways.
Although no written response to this circular is requested, a report and cor-rective actions may be required by applicable Technical Specifications in the event an unmonitored and/or unisolable effluent pathway is identified.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the aporo-priate IE Regional Office.
Attachment:
Recently Issued IE Circulars
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Attachment IEC 81-09 July 10, 1981 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCU,LARS
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Circular Date of No.
Subject Issue Issued to 81-10 Steam Voiding in the Reactor 7/2/81 All power reactor Coolant System During Decay facilities with an Heat Removal Cooldown OL or CP 81-08 Foundation Materials 5/29/81 All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 81-07 Control of Radiactiviely 5/14/81 All power reactor Contaminated Material facilities with an OL or CP 81-06 Potential Deficiency Affecting 4/14/81 All power reactor Certain Foxboro 20 to 50 facilities with an Milliampera Transmitters OL or CP 81-05 Self-Aligning Red End Bushings 3/31/81 All power reactor for Pipe Supports facilities with an OL or CP 81-04 The Role of Shift Technical 4/30/81 All power reactor Advisors and Importance of facilities with an Reporting Operational Events OL or near-term OL 81-03 Inoperable Seismic Monitoring 3/2/81 All power reactor Instrumentation facilities with an OL or CP 81-02 Performance of NRC-Licensed 2/9/81 All power reactor Individuals While on Duty facilities (research
& test) with an OL or CP 81-01 Design Problems Involving 1/23/81 All power reactor Indicating Pushbutton facilities with Switches Manufactured by an OL or CP Honeywell Incorporated 80-25 Case Histories of 12/5/80 All radiography Radiography Events licensees OL = Operating Licenses CP = Construction Permit
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