ML20009B112
| ML20009B112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009B107 | List: |
| References | |
| CLI-80-21, IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8107140802 | |
| Download: ML20009B112 (19) | |
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6 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-334 s
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I CONTENTS P. age 1
Introduction...............................................
1 2
Background.................................................
1 2.1 Purpose...............................................
2 2.2 Scope.................................................
2 3
Staff Evaluation...........................................
2 3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment..............
3 3.2 Service Conditions....................................
4 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment....................................
4 3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment...................................
5 5
3.5 Submergence...........................................
3.6 Chemical Spray........................................
6 3.7 Aging.................................................
6 3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment).............
7 4
Qualification of Equipment.................................
7 4.1 Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action.......
8 4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action.....................................
9 4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable............................................
10 5
Deferred Requirements......................................
10 6
Conclusions................................................
10 APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrc:tive Action APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable APPENDIX 0 Safety-Related Systems e
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTCR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UHIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-334
!NVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 1 anc 4 specify that safety-related electrical equip-ment in nuclear facilities must be capable of performing its safety-related function under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and accident plant operation.
In order to ensure compliance with the cri-teria, the NRC staff required all licensees of operating reactors to submit a reevaluation of the qualification of safcty-related electrical equipment which may be exposed to a harsa environment.
2 BACKGROUND On February 8,1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin IEB 73-01B, " Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment." This bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
Subsequently, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23, 1930) states that the 00R guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 (which were issued on January 14, 1980, as enclosures 4 and 5 to IEB-79-018) form the requirements that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GOC) 4.
This order also requires the staff to complete safety evaluation reports (GRs) for all operating plants by February 1, 1981.
In addition, this order requires that, the licensees have qualified salety-related equipment in:talled in their plants by June 30, 1982.
Supplemeats to IEB 79-01B were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs.
These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
In addition, the staff issued orders daced August 29, 1980 (amended in September 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licensees.
The August order required that the licensees provide u report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualifica-tion of safety-related electrical equipment.
The October order reqMeed the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment-qualification records. The central file was mandated to be established by
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December 1, 1980. The order also required that all safety-related electrical equipment be qualified by June 30, 1982.
In response to the above, the licensee submitted an environmental qualification j
program on September 30, 1980 and October 30, 1980.
Staff review of these submittals determined that several areas were deficient in the information supplied and an adequate review could not be performed.
On December 2, 1980, the licensee met with the staff to review these deficiencies.
Subsequently, the licensee submitted a revised environmental qualification program on December 31, 1980, which superseded the previous submittals.
In addition, a " Qualification Assurance Plan" was submitted on March 12, 1981. The staff review for this SER encompasses the December 31, 1980 and March 12, 1981 submittals.
2.1 Purpose The purpose of'this SER is to identify equipment whose qualification program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of performing the design function in hostile environments.
The staff position relating to any identified deficiencies is provided in this report.
- 2. 2 Scooe The scope of this report is limited to an evaluation of the equipment which must function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a high-energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents.
3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licensee's response included an onsite inspection of selected Class 1E equipment and an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and acceptability.
The criteria described in the 00R guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement performed (1) a preliminary evaluation of the licensee's response, documented in a technical evaluation report (TER), and (2) an onsite verification inspection (May 8-9, 1980) cf selected safety-related electrical equipment.
Flow transmitters, limit switches, motor-operated valves, solenoid-operated valves, junction boxes, and pressure transmitters were inspected.
The inspection addressed proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturers' nameplate data.
The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data were compared to the information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report.
Four deficiencies were noted during the inspection:
(1) A solenoid associated with a throttle valve was.found to be internally disassembled in that the solenoid retaining clip had fallen from the core guide.
This deficiency has since been corrected.
(2) A throttle valve was identified as having an unqualified position-indicating limit switch.
Six additiJnal limit switches of the same model were.
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subsequently identified as not having qualification documentation. The licensee has ordered qualified replacement switches and has committed to installing these at the first outage in which plant conditions are such that equipment can be removed from service to make the replacement.
The staff requires, however, that a specific commitment be made for the replacement of the switches. The licensee has provided a justification for interim operation.
(3) Main steam flow transmitters appeared to have unqualified installations which could permit transmitter internals.to be exposed to steam or humidity during both normal and accident conditions.
The licensee subsequently determired that these flow transmitters are not required for any protection function and are not covered by IEB 79-01B.
(4) A motor-operated valve which the licensee had identified as required to operate during post-accident conditions was found to be below containment flood level. The IE inspector observed that the valve had an unsealed motor conduit. The licensee has since committed to modifications in the control circuit of the valve. These modifications will prevent any possi-bility of a spurious opening of the valve. A justification for interim operation has been provided.
Additional details of the site inspection can be found in IE Report 50-334/80-12.
For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation.
3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment In accordance with IEB 79-01B, the licensee was directed to'(1) establish a list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate a LOCA and an HELB, and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures. The instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the per-formance of the systems on the list. The systems list was established on the basis of the functions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without regard to location of equipment relative to hostile environments).
The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.
Display instrumentation which provides information for the reactor operators to aid them in the safe handling of the plant was not specifically identified by the licensee.
A corelete list of all display instrumentation mentioned in the LOCA and HELB eme Nency procedures must be provided.
Equipment qualifi-cation information in the form of summary sheets should be provided for all components of the display instrumentation exposed to harsh environments.
Instrumentation which is not considered to be safety related but which is men-l tioned in the emergency proccdure should appear on the list.
For these instruments, (1) justification should be provided for not considering the 7
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instrument safety related and (2) assurance should be provided that its t
subsequent failure will not mislead the operator or adversely affect the l
mitigation of the consequences of the accident. The environmental qualification l
of post-accident sampling and monitoring and radiation monitoring equipment is closely related to the review of the TMI Lessons-Learned modifications and will be performed in conjunction with that revie$i.
Based upon information in the licensee's subminal, the equipment location references, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee, the staff has verified and determined that the systems included in the licensee's submittal are those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) contaimnent isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containment heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of signi)icant release of radioactive material to the environment.
The staff therefore concludes that.the systems identified by the licensee (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable.
The licensee identified 247 individual items of equipment relating to 55 equipment types.
3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the 00R guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety related electrical equipment environmental quali-fication program. These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified in these' documents.
On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the analysis for developing the environmental envelopes '~ Reaver Valley Unit No.1 relative to the temperature, pressure, and the containme.. spray caustics, has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the qualification documentation to ensure that the qualification specifications envelope the conditions established by the licensee.
During this review, the staff assumed that for plants designed and equipped with an automatic containment spray system which satisfies the single-failure cri-terion, the main-steam-line-break (MSLB) environmental conditions are enveloped by the.large-break-LOCA environmental conditions.
Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that flooding of equipment may result from HELBs.
j 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment The licensee has provided the results of accident analyses as follows:
Max Temp (*F)
Max Press (psig)
Humidity (%)
LOCA 269.3 38 100 41.1 100 MSLB v.
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j The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for higher-than-average temperatures in the upper regions of the containment that can exist due to stratification, especially following a postulated MSLB.
Use of i
the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the total building pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time will provide an acceptable margin for either a postulated LOCA or MSLB, whichever is controlling, as to potential adverse environmental effects on' equipment.
The licensee's specified temperature of 269'F does not satisfy the above requirement.
Furthermore, the licensee's specified pressure is low as compared with plants of similar design.
The licensee is requested to ve'ify that the LOCA pressure profile in the FSAR was calculated based on the code requirements defined in NUREG-0588.
If, by using these codes, the peak containment pressure is still 38 psig, a saturation temperature corresponding to the pressure profile (284*F peak temperature at 38 psig) should be used.
If, however, the calculated peak pressure is higher than 38 psig, the saturation temperature corresponding to the new pressure profile should be used.
In addition, the licensee should provide the calculated valte for temperature in an MSLB accident.
The licensee should update his equipment' summary tables to reflect this change.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Hu'midity Conditions Outside Containment The licensee has provided the temperature, pressure, humidity, and applicable environment associated with an HELB outside containment. The following areas outside containment have been addressed:
(1) auxiliary building (2) cable vault area (3) main steam valve house 4
The staff has reviewed the parameters used by the licensee for determination of harsh environments outside containment, and the method appears to be based on HELB analyses in the FSAL However, the licensee has indicated that plant j
modifications will be implemented to reduce the severity of the harsh environment in several areas outside con.ainment.
No schedule for completion was provided.
The licensee must furnish a cammitment for these modifications for staff review.
3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee. Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.
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The licensee's value for maximum submergence is 698 ft 9 in.
Equipment below this level has been identified by the licensee, along with the proposed cor-rective action.
The licensee identified four equipment types which could be subjected to submergence during an accident.
The control circuit for motor-operated gate valves will be modified by June 30, 1982 to prevent any possi-bility of a spurious opening.
Limit switches and power cables were also listed as being subject to submergence. The licensee should provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of these components. The licensee should also provide assurance that the subsequent failure of these components will not adversely affect any other safety functions or mislead an operator.
It is not clear from the information submitted that submergence of safety-related electric equipment outside of containment was addressed.
The licensee should address this area more specifically in the 90-day response and upgrade the CES as appropriate.
3.6 Chemical Spray The licensee's FSAR value for the chemical concentration is 15,000 ppm boric acid solution.
In most cases, equipment was qualification tested at this concentration.
In several instances, however, lower concentrations were utilized, as noted in Appendix B.
The licensee must provide justification for the lower values or test the components at the nominal boric acid concentration.
A_g.i.ng in 3.7 Section 7 of the DOR guidelines does not rer,uire a qualified life to be established for all safety-related electrical equipment.
However, the following actions are required:
(1) Make a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identified in Appendix C of the 00R guidelines.
The first supplement to IEB-79-01B requires licensees to utilize the table in Appendix C and identify any additional materials as the result of their effort.
(2) Establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potential age-related degradations.
(3) Establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components.
The licensee identified a number of equipment items for which a specified qualified life was established (for example, 5 years, 15 years, or 40 years).
In its assessment of these submittals, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology or the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that the established values are based on state-of-the-art technology and are acceptable.
For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supplemental information to verify and identify the degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response should include all the equipment l
identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh environments. *
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3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)
The licensee has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA.
The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presented to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria con-tained in the 00R guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-018, Supplement 2.
Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified enveloped the requirements identified by the licensee.
The value required by the licensee inside containment is an integrated dose ranging from 1.0 x 107 to 2.2 x 108 rads.
In one location (outside the crane wall in containment), the radiation service condition provided by the licensee is lower (1.0 x 107) than that provided in the 00R guidelines (4 x 107) for i
gamma and beta radiation. The licensee is requested t'o either provide justifica-i tion for using the lower service condition or use the service condition provided in the 00R guidelines for both gamma and beta radiation. If the former option is chosen, then the analysis--including the basis, assumptions, and a sample calculation--should be provided.
The required values of radiation doses outside containment supplied by the licensee range from 1.6 x 105 to 6.7 x 106 rads. These values appear to consider the radiation levels influenced by the source-term methodology associated with post-LOCA recirculation fluid lines and are, therefore, acceptable.
4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the licensee's submittal, of the qualification status of safety-related electrical equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip-ment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in.Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
In its assessment of the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine.the values established by the licensee.
However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination as to the stated conditions presented by the licensee. Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licen-see (for example, test reports).
It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing licensee.
If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either establish qualification or replace the item (s) of concern. This effort will begin in early 1981.
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An appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list of equipment for which additional information and/or corrective action is required. Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the appendices to identify deficiencies.
It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Order, that the deficien-cies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
- However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
Equipment Requiring Im'ediate Corrective Action 4.1 m
Appendix A identifies equipment in this category.
The licensee was asked to review the facility's safety related electrical equipment.
The licensee's review indicated that an HELB in the steam supply line to the auxiliar) feedwater pumps could disable both motor-driven pumps, as discussed in licensee c: fat report 80-073/01T-1, dated November 24, 1980. As an interim solution, the licensee has instituted procedural changes and will utilize a dedicated backup operator to mitigate the consequences of an auxiliary feed pump room HELB.
A design change has been initiated by the licensee to provide isolation valves external to the auxiliary feed pump room to preclude the possibility of an HELB during normal operation. The licensee should provide a completion date for this design change.
On December 12, 1980, the licensee submitted licensee event report 80-89/03L stating that a pressurizer level transmitter not qualified for post-accident monitoring had been installed as a temporary replacement for a qualified unit.
The licensee indicated that two qualified units provide the identical functions of the original transmitter and are. powered from different power supply trains.
In addition, plant operating procedures instruct the operators to refer to redundant instrumentation during an accident.
The original qualified transmitter is being repaired and will be returned to service at the first outage following delivery in which plant conditions permit replacement, but not later than June 30, 1982.
In a meeting with the licensee on December 2, 1980, the staff identi a
potential problem with NAMCO limit switches whose failure could causs a loss of containment isolation.
In the event that containment isolation is called for, the initial isolation function will be performed as required.
- However, subsequent failure of the switch in the harsh environment, followed by resetting of the isolation signal, would cause its associated solenoid to be re-energized.
l This would result in a reopening of the air-operated isolation valve.
Protection against a loss of containment isolation is provided by redundant air-operated valves outside containment.
To p.utect against the random failure of these redundant valves, the plant operating procedures were revised on December 3, 1980, instructing the operator to check for successful operation of the valves and to take certain actions before resetting any emergency safety features or containment isolation functiuns.
4.2 Eauipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action I
Appendix B identifies equipment in this category, including a tabulation of deficiencies.
The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.
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Legend R
- radiation T
- temperature QT qualification time RT - required time P
pressure H
- humidity CS - chemical. spray A
- material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment surveillance S
- submergence M
- margin I
- HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM qualification method RPN - equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted ' equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate-effects qualification justification inadequate QI qualification information being developed RPS - equipment relocation.or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation.
The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the following can be established and verified by the licensee:
(1) Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environment, and equipment failure in the harsh environment will not impact safety-related functions or mislead an operator.
(2a) Equipment performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environment, and the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified,and (2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-failure criterion.
(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the informat'on presented by providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applicable), and so forth. The staff will review the licensee's response and discuss the resolution in a suppleoental report.
It should be noted that in cases where testing is being conducted, a condition may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the eyJipment
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licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective acticn, on a timely basis, to ensure that qualification can be established by June 30, 1982.
4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable Based on the staff review of the licensee's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifi-cation program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not clearly (1) state that an equipment material evaluation was conducted to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been
- used, (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and maintenance records in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related, and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.
The licensee is, therefore, required 'to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category bsfore full acceptance of this equipment can be established. The staff will review the licensee's, response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-018, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equipment and TMI lessons-learned modifications. The staff will provide a supplemental safety evaluation addressing these concerns.
6 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the licensee's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is required to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is complete and acceptable, except as noted in Section 3 of this report. The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions to be met by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
Outstanding information identified in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
The staff has reviewed the qualification of safety-related electrical
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equipment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant.
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However, the staff has determined that many items of safety-related electrical equipment identified by the licensee for this' review do not have adequate documentation to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the j
harsh environmental service conditions.
This review was based on a comparison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required
-by the design, which were provided in the licensee's summary sheets.
Subsection 4.2 identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lack-ing in this category be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
Within this period, the licensee should either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets the 00R guidelines or NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requaliff-cation, replacement, relocation, and so forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982.
If the latter option is chosen, the licensee must provide justification for operation until such corrective action is complete.
Subsection 4.3 identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies. Where additional information is required, the licensee should respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that these concerns will be satisfactorily resolved by June 30, 1982.
The staff issued to the licensee Sections 3 and 4 of this report and requested, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f), that the licensee review the deficiencies enumerated and the ramifications thereof to determine whether safe operation of the facility would be impacted in consideration of the deficiencies.
The licensee has completed a ' preliminary review of the identified deficiencies and has determined that,*after due consideration of the deficiencies and their ramifications, continued safe operation would not be adversely affected.
Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conformance with the above requiremtats and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by June 30, 1982 vill ensure compliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980.
The staff further concludes that there is reasonable assurance of continued safe operation of this facility pending completion of these correctivi actions. This conclusion is based on the following:
(1) there are no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to assure safety of plant operation (2) some of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated, thus improving the facility's capability to function following a LOCA or HELB (3) the harsh environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low probability events; events which night reasonably be anticipated during this very limited period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment.
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APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1)
Equipment Description-Manufacturer Component No.
Pump Motori Louis Allis 1-279480-001, 002 1
Louis Allis 269319-001, 002 Pump Motor Level Transmitter 2 Barton
[386]a,c; LT-RC-459 Limit Switch 3 NAMCO EA180:
CC-10501, CC-11101, CH-200 series, RC-455C, RC-4550, RC-456, SI-101-2, SI-865A, SI-8658 Limit Switch 3 NAMCO EA700:
CC-10701, CC-107E1, CC-110E3 Limit Switch 3 NAMCO EA740:
CC-103 series,
'CC105E1, CC-1100, CC-111A2, CV-102-1, DA-100A, DG-108A, DG-109A2 1The licensee committed to relocate the feed pump valves to another room to preclude the possibility of an HELB.
In the interim, a dedicated operator has been stationed to isolate the steam line which could cause the harsh environment (LER 80-073/01T-1).
2The licensee will replace this transmitter with a qualified unit at the first outage following delivery in which plant conditions permit replacement, but not later than June 30, 1982. Two qualified units provide the identical functior.: of this transmitter and can be utilized by the operators for post accident monitoring (LER 80-89/03L).
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3Tha licensee revised the operating procedures on December 3, 1980 instructing plant operators to check for successful operation of the valves and to take certain actions before resetting any emergency safety features or containment isolation functions to prever.t opening of the isolation valves. A redundant valve outside containment and not exposed to the harsh environnant also provides isolation.
The switches will be qualified at the first outage following delivery of seals in which plant conditions permit replacement, but not later than June 30, 1982.
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APiENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action
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1 (Category 4.2)
LEGEN0:
Designation for Deficiency R - Radiation T - Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P - Pressure H - Humidity CS - Chemical spray A - Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance S - Submergence M - Margin I - HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiancy Power Cable Kerite 5000V Insulation QT,A High Temperature Cable Cerro 1000V SR Insulation QT,T,CS,A Power Cable Okonite 600V Okonite QT,CS,A,5 Insulation Power Cable Okonite 1000V Okonit.:
QT,CS,A,5 Insulation Instrument Cable Continental SR Instrument QT,CS,R,A,QI l
Cable Electrical.
Viking Types I, II, III, QT,M,A Penetration IV, V, VIII, & IX Terminal Block Buchanan 0511, 0211 QT,M,A B-1 1
.e Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency j
Terminal Block Penn Union Series 1000 QT,A Solenoid Valve ASCO NP8320, 8316 QM,QI,A Limit Switch NAMCO EA180 QM,CS,A,S Limit Switch NAMCO EA700 QT,T,P,H,CS,R,A, RPS,RPN i
Limit Switch NAMCO EA740 QM,CS,A,RPS Flow Transmitter Fischer-Porter 1082496 M,CS,R,A,RPC Flow Transmitter Barton 386a, c CS,M,A,5,RPS Level Tra ismitter GEMS XM-59342 QT,M,P,A,QI Level Transmitter Mason-Neilan 12522 QT,T,P,R,H,CS, A,M,RPS Pressure Transmitter Fischer-Pcrter 50EP1031 QT,T,P,R,H,CS,RPS RTD Sostman 118348-1 QT,R,A,RPS Temperature Resistance Bulb Trinity n/a QT,T,P,H,CS,R,A, RPS Motor Operator Limitorque SM80140 QT,A i
Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:MOV-CH-310 S,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:MOV-CH-378 RT,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:MOV-RC-535 RT,A 536, 537 Motor Operator Limitorque SM8:SI-842 A,QT,RPS Pump Motor General Electric SK6319XJ20A QT,M,A,CS Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:CC-112 Series QT,T,P,H,CS,R,A 1
i Pump Motor Westinghouse 70F67868 QT,T,P,H,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:RH-605 QT,T,P,H,R,A Motor Operator Limitorque SM8:RH-700, 701 QT,P B-2 t
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Motor Operator Limitorque RH-720A&B QT Motor Operator Limitorque RH-758 QT,T,P,H,R,CS,A Terminal Block Marathon 1500 Series QT,A,QI Cable Splice Okonite T95, T35 QT,A Cable Splice Xerite Biseal 3 Tape QT,T,R,A,RPS SIS Wire General Electric Vulkene #57275 QT,T,A,RPS SIS Wire General Electric Vulkene #57279 QT,A Control Switch Westinghouse OT2 QT,T,R,H,A Motor Control Center Allis-Chalmers n/a QT,T,A Solenoid Valve ASCO HPX8320A26 QT,T,H,R,A,RPN Limit Switch NAMCO 02400X QT,T,P,H,R,A,RPS Limit Switch NAMCO EA740 QM,T,A,RPS Pressure Transmitter Fischer-Porter 50EP1071BCXB QT,T,P,H,R,A,RPS Pressure Transmitter Fischer-Porter 50EP1041 QT,T,P,H,R,A,RPS Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:SI-863A,8; T,A SI-864A,B;SI-885A,B,C,0; SI-890A,8,C Motor Operator Lim! torque SMB:860A,B; QT,A 862A,B QT,A Pump Motor Westinghouse 5070F67723 QT,T,A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB Series:
FW-EXN 151, 156; MS-105; RS-155,156; RW-103, 104, 105, 106, 114 B-3
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APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptabic (Category 4.3)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency SIS Wire Rockbestos Firewall SIS A
Pressure Transmitter Barton Lot 2 A
Pressure Transmitter Barton Lot 2 A
Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:SI-865, A, 8, C A Motor Operator Limitorque SMB:CH-115 Series; A
CH-275 Series; CH-289; 370; 373; 381; 836; 867A, B, C, 0; 869 A, B J
. C-1
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APPENDIX D 1
Safety-Related Systems Function System 1
Emergency reactor shutdown Reactor coolant Reactor protection Safeguards actuation Charging and volume control Containment isolation Containment isolation:
Main steam Feedwater Safety injection Charging and volume control Residual heat removal Containment depressurization Primary sampling Leakage monitoring Containment vacuum Reactor core cooling Charging and volume control Safety injection Containment heat removal Containment depressurization Core residual heat removal Residual heat removal Reactor coolant Feedwater Main steam Steam dump Component cooling water Service water Prevention of significant Containment depressurization release of radioactive Hydrogen recombiner material to environment Radiation monitoring Primary sample Supporting systems Emergency power Safety equipment area ventilation Control room habitability Drains aerated system Drains hydro system HTG, vent, air conditioner reactor Reactor plaqt river water system
'The NP.C staff recognized that there are differences in nomenclature of systems because of plant vintage and engineering design; consequently, some systems performing identical or similar functions may have different names.
In those instances it is necessary to verify the system (s) function with the IE regional reviewer and/or licensee.
2 Consists of other isolation valves not listed below, s
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.