ML20008F626

Forwards Responses to NRC 810414 Questions Re Technical Issues on Hydrogen Control.Potential for Significant Fog Formation After Small Break Would Be Low,Due to Low Steam Concentrations Present During Hydrogen Release

ML20008F626
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/17/1981
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8104210401
Download: ML20008F626 (12)

Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHCRITY cur r a s x. :4 T r.v.rutt an: t 400 Chestnut Street Tower II April 17, 1981 DII k *.cq.m Director of Nuclear Peactor Regulation

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Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief I-Licensing Branch No. 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccrnmission y

Washington, DC 20555 (f/

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Dear Mr. Schwencer:

M I"U In the Matter of

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Docket No. 50-323 Tennessee Valley Authority

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Enclosed are TVA's responses to the questions for unit 2 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant which were transmitted by R. L. Tedesco's letter to H. G. Parris dated April 14, 1981. 'Ihese questions address the technical issues on hydrogen control considered in the course of the recent public hearing on the McGuire Nuclear Plant.

Very truly yours, l

TENNESSEE VALLEY AMEORITY l

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.J A IT.' M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Pegulation and Safety l

Sworn to and subscribed before me l

this l'1tk day of Moa\\

1981 NLuh.

Notary Public Q

My Ccanission Expires bh 11.k d s

l Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Mr. K. C. Canaday, Manager Project Coordination & Licensing 300/

Duke Power Ccxnpany U

P.O. Box 33189 5

Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 l

Mr. Juan Castresan American Electric Power Service Co.

2 Broadway New York, New Ycrk 10004 l

810422oyoL.

DC[DSURE RESPCNSES 'IO NIC QUESTICNS Question 1

'IVA views on the likelihood for inerting of the lower empartment with steam and/or fog

Response

TVA does not believe that the lower cmpartment would be inerted with either steam or fog following a small break (S D-type event during the 2

time in which significant amounta of hydrogen could be released into containment. By definition, an inerted atmosphere would not be flamable for any concentration of hydrogen. For example, a 60-percent concentration of steam by volume would effectively inert any hydrogen-rich atmosphere.

However, a smaller steam fraction could prevent the combustion of a very low hydrogen concentration mixture that might otherwise be flamable without steam sinply by depressing the concentration below the lower flamability limit.

(A mixture with a steam fraction of less than 60 percent by volume would not be inerted for concentrations of hydrogen above the lower flamability limit.)

As explained in our response of December 1, 1980, to the NRC Request for Additional Infor:ntion on the Segacyah Interim Distributed Ignition System (IDIS), Volume 2, iten 4, the concentration of steam during the long term following a small break when hydrogen could be present is sufficiently low to have little effect on flamability limits and, therefore, the behavior of the igniters. When the air return fans are turned on at ten minutes after a phase B containment isolation signal, the lower compartment atmosphere is diluted with 80,000 cfm of air and rapidly deinerted. This occurs long before hydrogen generation would be expected.

(See attached figure 1-1 frm our previous submittal.)

Similarly, the potential for significant fog tormation after a small break would be low due to the relatively low steam concentrations that would be present when hydrogen could be released. In addition, experimental evidence of fog inerting was observed after a stepwise injection of steam followed by ambient coolina. During a small break, the superheated steam and hot hydrogen would be released into the lower compartment continuously during the event. Such continual injection of a high enthalpy mixture would reduce the tende cy for fog formation due to the increased energy removal required before dropwise condensation could result. Further, experimentally observed fogging appeared to be due to a wall-cooling effect; but the Sequoyah 1cNer cmpartment has a much smaller ratio of surface area to volume than the experimental facility. Also, those surfaces would be prewarmed before any release of hydrogen, thus reducing their potential for condensation. Finally, it is expected that continual and local fog formation could only occur at the interface between colder upper ccrcpartment air. and warmer lower empartment air during air return fan injection into the lower ccmpartment. However, the cooler air frcm the upper ccupartment would tend to sink to the ficor placing the localized interface away frcm the igniters and icw in the volume where any fog would rain out to the water present at the floor.

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Question 2 Whether continuous burning of hydrogen gas can be expected in the upper plenum of the ice condenser for a significant fraction of degraded core scenarios er for.significant durations of selected degraded core scenarios Resoonse Controlled burning above the ice bed was addresed by TVA in section IV.B of our submittal of September 2, 1'380, on the Sequoyah IDIS and our response of December 1, 1980, to NRC Rettuest for Additional Information on the Sequoyah IDIS, item 5.

Burnin; was considered to be likely in this location due to the concentrating effects of the ice condenser on noncondensible gases. For this reason, igniters were originally located in and above the upper plenum to provide for controlled burning. TVA centinues to maintain that upper plenum igniters are desirable and beneficial.

For a small break (S D) event, a recent base case containment analysis 2

using the revised CLASIX code that incorporates a separate upper plenum volume shows that semicontinuous burns would occur in the upper plenum (and in no other volume) throughout the hydrogen release portion of the event.

Such a characteristic pattern of burning could be dependent on assumptions made for the calculation such as lower flamability limit and burn completeness fraction. However, this pattern certainly bounds one end of the realistic containment burning response spectrum with the pattern of predominantly 10wer compartment burns as submitted earlier bounding the other end.

Question 3 h e Sandia National Laboratory views regarding the potential for

" transition to detonation" in the upper plenum of ithe ice condenser that may be brought about by obstructions in the flow path or by jetting effects as hot gar. s or cmbustible products leave the ice condenser and enter the upper compartment

Response

The phenomenon of " transition to detonation" observed experimentally was dependent on the simultaneous presence of at least two factors that can be shown not to exist in the upper plenum of the ice condenser following a degraded core event. First, detonable or near-detonable concentrations of hydrogen must be present. Second, a narrowly-confined linear gemetry which may have wake-producing obstacles must exist for the transition to i

accelerate through. Also, high-velocity flows frm self-acceleration of the gas would have to result along the axis of the confined gemetry to create sufficient turbulence to collapse a highly packed flame brush and initiate the detonation.

As explained in our responses of December 1,1980, to NIC Request for Additional Information on the Sequoyah IDIS, Volume 2, items 5 and 10, TVA does not believe that highly concentrated pockets of hydrogen would exist in the upper plenum following a degraded core event (item 10) nor that j

hydrogen concentrations would approach the detonable limit effect due to steam stripping in the ice condenser (its 5). In addition, the igniters would burn any hydrogen entering the upper plenum as soon as it reached a flammaole concentration, preventing any buildup in the plenum. Therefore, as stated in our previous subnittal, detonable hydrogen concentrations would not be present in the ice condenser upper plenum after a degraded core event.

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Re upper plenum is bounded above and below around its entire circumference l

by door panels which allow flow in frm the ice condenser and out to the l

upper cmpartment. Upon initiation of a burn in the upper plenum, the top deckbganketdoorswouldbegintoopenatapressureofmuchlessthan1 l

lbs/in.

W eir opening would not only promote dilution, mixing, and the I

addition of moisture frm the action of the containment sprays but would preclude the narrow geometric confinement essential to the transition phenmenon.

If a deflagration occurred in the upper plenum due to ignition of flamable hydrogen mixtures frm the ice condenser, the flame would be relatively slow and could not generate the self-accelerating process leading to the l

transition effect. he flows issuing frm the ice condenser are low l

velocity and would not provide an initial jet inpetus for acceleration l

around the plenum. We deflagration would expand in all directions around I

the plenum and up through the opening top deck blankets preventing any l

confined propagation and dispersing any pressure waves. Also, any burning that might occur in the turbulent wake of obstructions in the upper plenum would be very slow ompared with velocities reqaired for the transition phenomenon to occur.

Since these conditions necessary for the transition to detonation phenmenon do not exist in the upper plenum, TVA does not believe that it is a safety concern for cperation of a controlled ignition system.

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Question 4 Tne inventory, distribution, and protective encapsulation for the polyurethene foam insulation

Response

WA's September 4,1980, subnittal frm J. L. Cross to Robert L. Tedesco provides the type, location, quantity, and encapsulating material for the polyurethane foam insulation in the Sequoyah ice condenser. See attached table 4-1 for information fran our previous subnittal. 'Ihe inter:nediate deck doors contain an additional 1500 pounds of urethane foam enclosed in galvanized steel. 7he top deck blankets contain 500 pounds of polyurethane foam encapsulated above and below in stainless steel sheets.

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1 TABLE 4-1 ICE CONDENSER POLYURETHANE INSULATION

SUMMARY

Containment Wall Type: Rigid urethane foam, "Chempol 30-1324/30-1426" (Freeman)

Conductivity: 0.21 BTU-in./hr-ft - F 3

Density: 3 lb/ft Total Weight: Approximately 26,000 lb.

Flammability: Self extinguishing as installed per Westinghouse test Encapsulation: Foamed-in-place behind multilayer steel duct panel

cuestions 5 and 6

5) Se thermal response of polyurethene foam to various assump-tions as to semi-steady flame positions in the ice condenser

6) Se effects of continuous burning of the wall panel duct including the temperature increase and subsequent decrease in structural capability which if severe enough could result in rupture of the ducting Resconse TVA has not performed an analysis of foam heatup due to continuous burning in the ice condenser. However, analyses have been performed by Duke Power Ca pany to study the effects of a continuous burn on the wall panel insulation. he design and construction of the ice condensers at Sequoyah and McGuire are essentially the same; therefore, the results of the Duke studies, as presented at the McGuire ASIB hearings should be equally valid for either plant. As was noted in the McGuire hearings, should burning take place in the ice condenser, the " semi-steady flame position" would be expected to occur fairly low in the ice bed due to the steam stripping by the large quantity of ice present. However, in order to maximize the amount of heat input to the wall panel fom, the center of the ice bed was chosen for the burn location to reduce radiative heat losses outside the bed. Se Duke Power Cmparry studies were also conservative in that all the hydrogen produced was assumed to burn, no heat transfer to the ice was allowed, the flame was assumed to remain at the same elevation throughout the burning, and a larger flame width than is believed to occur was considered, te heat transfer calculation considered convection, conduction, and radiation. He result of the analysis showed that the surface temperature of the foam behind the air ducts would not exceed 3700 Se surface temperature of the ductwork steel, except in the F

vicinity of the flame, was calculated to be 4000F frm energy balance considerations. At joint connections between ducts, a total of 3 to 4 square feet of steel-encapsulated foam would be exposed to the flame.

Based on values provided by Duke and Westinghouse (see attached Table 5/6-1), the snall amounts of encapsulated foam exposed to the flame could rapidly pyrolize. However, no significant pyrolysis of the foam behind the air ducts would occur at the calculated temperature of 3700F.

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temperatures produced by a continuous burn in the ice condenser would i

pyrolyze insignificant quantities of polyurethane foam.

Further, the distributed temperatures resulting frcm the energy balance assumption are not high enough to cause structural damage to the ductwork.

Local hot spots that might occur have not been analyzed in detail.

However, we believe that the ducts would r eain fastened in place on the centainment shell and that they would be unlikely to fail in a manner to expose the foam due to their double duct and flange design.

'1 TABLE 5/6-1 FOAM PYROLYSIS AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPERATURE 1.

At 400 F, 4 to 5% of the foam insulation will pyrolyze 'in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

2.

At 500 F, 20 to 30% will pyrolyze in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

3 At 1000 F,100% of the foam will pyrolyze in 10 minutes, 4.

Below 400 F, pyrolysis is not significant, although some release of the gaseous CO trapped in the foam will be experienced.

2 5.

The rate of pyrolysis increases with temperature as can be seen in 1-3 above. As a gross approxgmation, the reaction rate may be assured to double for each 10 C rise if one wants to consider the i

effect between the temperature values given in 1-3 above.

6.

The values given in 1-3 above are based on experimental measurement.

Question 7 he pyrolysis and ombustion potential for the foam insulation resulting frm the thermal responses called for in item 5

Response

h e response to questions 5 and 6 provides worst-case conditions for heatup of the foam wall panels. We other cmponents using foam in the ice condenser are the top blanket and intermediate deck doors. As stated in our response to questions 5 and 6, if a burn occured in the ice bed, it would be well below the intermediate deck doors. Radiative heat transfer would reduce the flame tenperature to approximately 5000F within 10 feet of the flame. At this tenperature, foam pyrolysis is a slow process. For a burn in the ice condenser, based on values given in Table S/6-1, no more than four percent of the foam in the intermediate deck doors would be expected to pyrolyze. Since the top deck doors are further removed and covered above and below with stainless steel, even less pyrolysis of their foam would occur.

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Question 8 The concequences en containment structural integrity as a result of a release and possible coc;bustion of the decomposition products from the polyurethene foam

Response

The effects of foam pyrolysis en the structural integrity of the containment are negligible. Duke Power Company calculated that insignificant quantities of the wall foam would pyrolyze due to a continuous hydrogen burn in the ice ccndenser (see our response to questions 5 and 6).

However, even if one percent of the total wall panel foam inventory was assumed to completely pyrolyze, an energy release of only three million BTU would occur. Also, if all the foam in both the top deck blanket and the intermediate deck doors was assumed to pyrolyze, 24 million BTU would be added to the containment. The energy input to the containment due to this conservative approximation of thn nount of foam pyrolyzed is much less than the energy added from the hyacogen burn (90 million BTU).

The energy additions due to pyrolysis of the foam and a continuous hydrogen bum are small compared to the heat removal capability of the containment sprays. The energy removal rate of the Sequoyah sprays, considering only sensible heat, is five billion BTU /hr.

i Question 9 The merit of the tripping of electrical power to the air handling units located in the upper plenum of the ice condenser as a means for resolving concerns regarding:

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rapid hydrogen combustion in the duct work; b.

ingestien of hot gases into the duct increasing the temperature response of the polyurethene foam Resoonse Removing electrical power to the ice condenser air handling units (IC AHU's) before possible hydrogen generation and release to the containment would stop forced circulation of air through the IC air ducts. The cooling function of the AHU's would not be required after a LOCA and was not assured in the original design. Even after tri.pping the AHU's, however, the intake grilles of the AHU's and the return ducts would still be open to the general upper plenum space. Two intake grilles are located on the front face of each AHU. The AHU dLacharge floss into a norizontal circumferential supply header, down into the vertical supply ducts, turns and flows up into the vertical return ducts, and then out into the upper plenum. Since the AHU intake grilles ar.d associated return ducts are located within a few feet of each other around the upper plenum, they would be exposed to essentially the same pressure during an upper plenum burn.

i Thus, there would be no differential pressure mechanism to set up flow in the now-stagnant duct system which could induce sf gnificant quantities of either hydrogen er hot gas. Therefore, tripping the IC LHU's would preclude hydrogen combustion in the duct system and appreciable foam heatup l

due to ingestion of hot gase s into the ducts.

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400 Ciestnut Street Tower II April 17, 1981 Dir e tcr of Mu laar Recctor Pagelation Attention: It. A. Schwrr'.ct, Chief Licensing Stanch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Ibclear P.cquhtory Ccrmission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

In the Matter of

)

Docket No. 50-328 Tcnnes.:ce Vallay Autirrity

)

Dricsed are T'IA's responces to tha questions for unit 2 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant which were transmitted by R. L. Tedesco's letter to H. G. Parris dated April 14, 1981. 'Ihose questions address the technical issues en hydrogen control considered in the course of the recent oublic hearing on the :*dhire Nuclear Plant.

Very truly yours, maESSEE W4 LEY AUEORI?l p

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L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear regulation arri Safety Sworn to and subscribed before me this \\'id day of b 1981 hu 9. L a l

lbtary Public Q

d dd My Cccmissico Expires 3

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l Erclosure i

cc (2nclosure):

Mr. K. C. Cenaday, Manager Project Coordination & Licensing Duke Power Ccupany P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, Ibrth Carolina 23242 Mr. Juan Castresan knerican Electric Power Service Co.

2 Broadway New York, New York 10004 l

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"CNN ESSE E V ALLEY AU THC R r~'r c. _ : = s r ;,,,

t'. u.sc., c ;7a t 400 Chestnut Street h r II Vrf1 17, 1981 Directer of 7,eclear Fecctor IWgulaticn Attention: tir. A. Sch.encer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Divisien of Licensing U.S. Ibclear Pegulatory Cennission 17ashington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Schiencer:

In the %tter of

)

Docket Nc. 50-328 Ten cccce Valley Authority

)

relesed are 7/A's retnonses to the questions for unit 2 of the Se@ovah Nuclear Plant 'hich w=re transnitted lyf R. L. Tedesco's letter to H. G. Parris <.'.ater* April 14, 1981. 'Ihese questions vA' ress the technical issues en hydro;en control censidered in the cource of the recent public

'ecring en the McGuire !bclocr Plant.

Very truly yours, T it m O V M i rl A T i m I'~Y N /q

1. j O/'Q/Q.(~

L. ?!. Mills, tunager

!?uclear Fequlation and Safety Dem to and subv;ribed before rc t'.is n day of b eh 1981 h\\M D.

umm Netary Public Q

ltr Ca=is?ien Dgircs hhk %4 Enclosure cc (Encimtra):

W. K. C. CanMyf, !iangr Project Cecrdin=tien & Licenning tuke P2Mr Ccyny P.O. Ibx 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 23242 Mr. Juan Castresan A.Tierican Electric Ihr Service Co.

2 Broadway New York, New York 10004

A27 8104 3 n 014 j

400 Chestnut Street Tower II April 17, 1981 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Camission Washington, DC 20555 i

Dear Mr. Schwencert j

In the Matter of

)

Docket No. 50-328 Tennessee Valley Authority

)

Enclosed are 'IVA's responses to the questions for unit 2 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant which were transmitted by R. L. Tedesco's letter to H. G. Parris dated April 14, 1981. 'Ihese questions address the technical issues on hydrogen control considered in the course of the recent public l

hearing on the McGuire Nuclear Plant.

l Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUIBORITY m

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C; 14. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Sworn to and subscribed before :ne this \\% day of MM 1981 Dien D.

m Notary Public Q

My Canission Expires d%k ed

' DLL:A'IK Ihclosure cc (Ehclosure):

Mr. K. C. Canaday, Panager Project Coordination & Licensing Duke Power Capany P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, !beth Carolica 28242 Mr. Juan Castresan A:nerican Electric Power S4rvice Co.

2 Broadway New York, New York 10004 cc: See page 2 i

A27 810417 014 400 Chestnut Street Tower II April 17, 1981 i

Director of Nuclear Peactor Regulation l

Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief l

Licensing Branch No. 2

}

Division of Licensing l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Oczumission Washington, DC 20555 Dear Mr. Schwencers In the Matter of

)

Docket No. 50-328 l

Tennessee Valley Authority

)

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Ehclosed are TVA's responses to the questions for unit 2 of the Sequoyah l

Nuclear Plant which were transmitted by R. L. Tede9:o's letter to r

I H. G. Parris dated April 14, 1981. 'Ihese questions address the technical l

issues on hyirogen control censidered in the course of the recent public l

hearing on the McQ2 ire Nuclear Plant.

Very truly yours, 4

I TENNESSEE VALLEY AUIBORITY i

~*'kh%<('yy\\~.

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1 L M. Mills, Manager

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Nuclear Pegulatien and Safety Sworn to and subsc[ibed before me j

this M day of n M 1981 h%.1 l

Notary Public Q

i My Canission Expires % b k 7A DLL:AM Ehclosure cc (Enclosure):

Mr. K. C. Canaday, Manager Project Coordination & Licensing Duke Po wr Ccnpany l

P.O. Box 33189 l

Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Mr. Juan Castresan American Electric Power Service Co.

2 Broadway New York, Nes York 10004 i

j cc: See page 2 i

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l Mr. A. Scbiencer April 17, 1981 i

cc (Enclosure):

Al+G, 640 CST 2-C i

A. W. Crevasse, 401 UBS-C I

H. N. Culver, 249A TEB-K l

l E. Ibrd, Sequoyah-NBC H. J. Green, 1750 CST 2-C l

l J. A. Raulstxm, W10C126 C-K l

l H. S. Sanger, Jr., EllB33 C-K j

l F. A. Szczepanski, 417 UBB-C f

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APMS, 640 CST 2-c A. W. Crevasse, 401 UBB-C H. N. Culver, 249A BBB-K E. Ford, Squoyah-NIC H. J. Green, 1750 CST 2-C J. A. Raulston, W10Cl26 C-K H. S. Sanger, Jr., R11R12 C-K F. A. Szczepanski, 417 UBB-C COCRDINMSD IN CES/dilliams h

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