ML20008F271
| ML20008F271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1981 |
| From: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NO-81-405, NUDOCS 8103120669 | |
| Download: ML20008F271 (36) | |
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- .* h *;&r:s March 6,1981 File: NG-3514(B)
Serial: NO-81-405 q \\ ~~
Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie pf Acting Chairman gegG United States Nuclear Regulatory esGO Commission 6-g 1 ()$61 P O
Washington, D.C.
20555 3
ctrica d Sh BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT 6
Es5Tj e y
UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2
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DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 Y
g LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62
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PETITION OF CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 550.48 AND APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50 f*
Dear Mr. Hendrie:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 550.12(a) and $50.48(c), Carolina Power &
l Light Company ("CP&L" or "the Company") hereby petitions the Nuclear
(,
Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "the Commission") for exemption from certain of the requirements of 10 CFR 650.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (sometimes referred to collectively herein as the fire protection rule) with respect to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 ("BSEP 1 and 2").
The specific provisions of 10 CFR 550.48 from which exemption is sought are set out in D503 5
Part I below. Technical and other support for the relief requested
/!
l in Part I is provided in Parts II and III.
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810312066@
H:nsrzble Jos ph M. H:ndrie March 6, 1981 I.
SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED A.
Primary Relief Requested With respect to the requirement.s of Section III.G of I
Appendix R,
(1) CP&L requests exemptions from the requirements of $50.48(c) in the following respects:
(a) Extend from March 19, 1981 to September 1, 1981 the date for:
(i) Submittal of plans and schedules for any modifi-cations necessary to achieve compliance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R; (ii) Filing requests for additional exemptions from Section III.G. pursuant to @S50.12(a) and 50.48(c)(6).
(b) Extend from March 19, 1981 to December 1, 1981 the date for submittal of design descriptions of alter-native or dedicated shutdown systems to comply with Section III.G.3, if such are-necessary.
ICP&L intends to meet the remaining applicable requirements of $50.48 and Appendix R in accordance with the schedules established in $50.48(c).
--A
H:nsrebic Jastph M. H:ndrie March 6, 1981 (c) Extend from February 17, 1981 to December 1, 1981 the date from which the installation schedules established in $50.48(c)(2) and (3) are calculated, with leave to request an additional extension of time on or before September 1,1981 if such additional extension is found to be necessary.
(2) CP&L requests an exemption from tae last paragraph of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of fire suppression systems in the control room and cable spread rooms.
B.
Alternative Relief In the alternative, CP&L requests an exemption from all provisions of Section III.G. of Appendix R, except to the extent current plant configurations and procedures comply with said Section'.
2By seeking the particular relief requested in this petition and in presenting technical and legal justifications for such relief, CP&L is not abandoning or waiving any of its claims or rights asserted in or arising out of the suit pending in the Court of Appeals for the
' District of Columbia Circuit in Connecticut Light and Power Company, et al v. NRC, No. 81-1050. Any commitments made by CP&L in the instant petition are made conditionally, subject to a deterninatica by the Court as to the validity of the provisions of the fire protection rule which are being challenged in that litigation.
Honorable Josrph M. Hzndrie March 6, 1981 II. TECHNICAL AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED A.
Background
On November 19, 1980 the Commission promulgated the final fire protection rule, the effective date of which is February 17, 1981. With the exception of the three backfit requirements set forth in Sections III.G, III.J and III.0 of Appendix R, 950.48(b) provides, in pertinent part, that Appendix R'is inapplicable to a facility licensed prior to January 1, 1979
... to the extent that fire protection features proposed or implemented by the licensee have been accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appen-dix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 reflected in staff fire protection safety evaluation reports issued prior to the effective date of this rule..
C"CL has satisfied all of the requirements of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 at BSEP and has received a staff Safety Evaluation 3
Report ("SER") approving each such item.
It is CP&L's under-standing that BSEP is the only commercial nuclear power plant in the United States for which a complete-SER has been issued.
In making these improvements, including those related to safe f
l shutdown equipx:r t which is the subject' of Section III.G, CP&L has spent approximately $15,000,000, 34,000 engineering man-hours and 550,000 direct construction labor manhours.
fSeeAttachmentA.
"See Attachment B for a description of the types of modifications installed at BSEP in response to Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 for fire protection improvements for safe shutdown systems.
H:nsrzble Joseph M. Hsadric March 6, 1981 B.
Description of Undertaking by CP&I. Necessary to Ascertain Compliance with Section III.G. of Appendix R and to Prepare Plans and Schedules, Design Descriptions and Technical Justification for ExemptionsSection III.G of Appendix R entitled " Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability" requires that fire damage be limited so that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage and provides four alternatives for meeting that requirement.
In addition,Section III.G. requires that systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown be capable of being repaired within seventy-two (72) hours.
According to the schedule established in $50.48(c), CP&L would be required to complete by March 19, 1981 all of its analy.nes of BSEP systems to determine to what extent its previously completed and approved fire protection modifications meet the requirements of Section III.G. ; to develop technical justifi-cations to support requests for such exemptions from Section III.G 5
as CP&L believes to be warranted following the analyses ; t, determine whether any modifications will be necessary to achieve compliance with Section III.G; to develop all plans and schedules for any modifications necessary to satisfy Section III.G.2, and SIn a February 19, 1981 meeting with CP&L, the NRC technical staff indicated that exemptions should be available for many plant areas based upon the recent and extensive SER review.
Hsa:rgble Joscph M. Hradric March 6, 1981 to prepare and submit design descriptions for an alternative or dedicated shutdown system to satisfy Section III.G.3, if such a system is necessary.
It is essential to understand the complexity of the tasks at hand which have already been initiated and which will require substantial human and financial resources. Specifically, CP&L estimates that it will require until September 1, 1981 to properly meet its obligations for submittal to the Commission of plans and schedules for any modifications necessary to meet Section III.G.2 requirements and of technical justification for any additional exemptions from Section III.G.
CP&L estimates that it will require until December 1, 1981 to prepare design descriptions of any alternative or dedicated shutdown systems necessary to meet Section III.G.3.
During the first phase of its program, CP&L, through United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., an architect-engineer, must perform a review of all areas which potentially do not 6
satisfy Section III.G criteria. An engineer cognizant in both 6The program of analysis and design described below has been formulated upon certain key assumptions which CP&L believes to be correct based upon interpretations of Appendix'R which the NRC staff has communicated to CP&L. First, at a meeting between CP&L, the staff indicated that, as used in Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R, " associated circuits" are:
Any circuits that have a power source in common with the alternative or dedicated shutdown equipment when the power source to the alternative or dedicated shutdown equipment is not protected from electrical failure in the circuits of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices.
[ Footnote continued]
i I
Ecn2reble Jessph M. H;ndrie March 6, 1981 nuclear and fire safety disciplines will evaluate the effects of fires involving transient and in situ combustibles on safe shutdown ability. When conditions dictate, CP&L zust determine the feasibility of installing barriers and/or sprinklers in the area.
In order to prepare a conceptual design of any modifi-cations necessary to correct deficiencies, it will be necessary for CP&L to evaluate the numerous possible effects upon other safety related systems or equipment. CP&L must assure itself that none of those potential impacts will be adverse.
[ Footnote continued from previous page]
Any circuits that are connected to circuits of equipment which would adversely affect shutdown capability (e.g., RER/RCS Isolation Valves) if the equipment were to operate in a spurious or uncontrolled manner.
Any circuits that have enclosures (e.g., raceway panel or junction box) in common with alternative or dedicated shtudown system cables when the dedicated or alternative shutdown system cables are not protected from electrical failure in the circuits of concern by coordinated circuit breakers or sinilar devices.
In a letter dated February 20, 1981, to all power reactor licensees with plants licensed prior to January 1,1979 frcm Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Regulation, NRC, the term " associated circuits" is defined in substantially identical terms.
Second, the Staff has indicated that a " fire area" as that term is used in Appendix R means that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by rated boundary barriers which may include fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals or closures and fireproofed support members all having a fire resistance rating equal to that required of the fire barriers.
At the February 19, 1981 meeting the staff agreed with CP&L that, assuming the definition of " fire area" set forth above, the following principles are applicable:
In conducting the fire hazard-analysis, a fire area nay be sub-divided into one or more " fire zones" for purposes of hazard identification.
(A " fire zone" is considered to be the-zone of influence of the maximum credible fire.) Based upon this evaluation, protection will be designed to ' protect against the hazard in the zone. If a fixed type of system is required, it will be provided for the " fire zone" only.
H:nsrable Joseph M. Hrndrie Mmech 6,1981 It must be considered that the designing and installation of fire protection features in an operating plant present problems and considerations not encountered when such features are incorporated in the initial design stages of a plant.
Chief among these problems and considerations are 'the existing conditions and installations in the plant.
For example, before an automatic suppression system can be designed and installed, it is necessary to determine whether there will be interferences such as ventilation ducts and pipes between the system discharge devices and the hazard against which protection is being sought. Often this cannot be deter-mined from blueprints but, rather, requires onsite inspection by the designer. The presence of interferences may require a change in the des'.gn which will, in turn, have a direct impact upon the hydraulics and proper operation of the systems.
Other concerns when considering such a system are the protection of safety-related equipment from inadvertant operation or pipe rupture; the adequacy of floor drains; any impact upon the radioactive waste processing system, and whether the design, construction, preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance of the suppression system will create unacceptable exposure to radiation of personnel under AIARA principles.
The consideration of all of these factors when designing and installing such a system in an' operating plant requires substantially more time'than is required during a plant's initial design stages.
Han:rtble Jcstph M. Hindria March 6,1981 When considering the feasibility of installing barriers and in designing such modifications, it is necessary to consider issues such as impact of a barrier on ventilation; to insure accessibility to equipment for purposes of operation and for performing maintenance; to insure that the barrier will not have an adverse impact on safety-related equipment during abnormal conditions such as a seismic event and to consider the impact of a barrier on cable ampacity ratings.
Before recommending the rerouting of cables, CP&L must insure that the cable will be separated from safety-related and safe shutdown equipment; consider voltage drop; insure proper sealing of barrier penetrations; consider the core bore impacts upon structures; insure that cable tray and conduit loading limitations are not exceeded and determine whether rerouting will require a breach of secondary containment and, therefore, a plant outage.
The work described above will require approximately 1500 manhours.
When this work has been completed, CP&L expects to know whether it does, or can, satisfy Section III.G.2, or whether it must-install an alternative or dedicated shutdown system as required by Section III.G.3.
Assuming that compliance with Section III.G.2 can be achieved, in whole or in part, CP&L will proceed to phase 2 of its program.
H:nstable Joscph M. H:ndria March 6, 1981 In the second phase of the program, it will be necessary to identify all equipmert which could impair safe shutdown were it to operate in a spurious or uncontrolled manner, and to insure that redundant systems or equipment are available to prevent or mitigate such events. Having completed such analysis, CP&L will prepare conceptual designs of modifications it deems appropriate to correct any identified deficiencies.
This work will require approximately 1700 manhours.
In the third phase of the program, CP&L will review the existing coordination study to assure that all circuits are properly protected by coordinated fuses and circuit breakers.
This work will require approximately 500 manhours.
Aa allowance of approximately 4300 manhours has been made for pursuing re-review of safety systems, previous modifications and modifications scheduled for near term implementation based upon the criteria of Section III.G and upon the findings made in the first three phases.
Finally, CP&L will prepare a report which documents its studies. This report will provice; the necessary technical information upon which CP&L can base requests for exemption
Honsrtble Jcseph M. H:ndria March 6, 1981 from Section III.G if it is concluded that the existing fire protection system at BSEP is adequate and upon which to formu-late plans and schedules with respect to any modifications necessary to satisfy Section III.G.2.
Preparation of this report will require approximately 1000 manhours.
A total of 9,000 manhours will be required to complete all of the work above described.
For any plant area as to which it is determined that an alternative or dedicated shutdown system will be required, work beyond phase 1 will not be performed for such area.
- Instead, CP&L's effort will be directed toward preparing design descriptions of such systems. This will entail consideration of numerous factors including design objectives, performance goals and design criteria.
It will be necessary to develop plot plans and general arrangements showing locatica of proposed alternative or dedicated shutdown equipment and identifying the general route of dedicated cable and barrier separations.
In preparing design description:s, it will be necessary to prepare one-line drawings of electrical distri-bution and process flow diagrams. The design description must include descriptions of electrical controls and descriptions of
H:norable Jessph M. HIndria March 6, 1981 the essential function of each struct
'- system and component which will be involved in the shutdown system. Of great impor-i tance in the design process is the need to consider interface with safety-related systems and to establish criteria for those interfaces.
It is estimated that such work will* require approximately 15,000 man-hours.
CP&L had estimated that it will require approximately 16,500 manhours to complete all of its design descriptions.
CP&L has just learned, however, that the staff has recently specified the information that it will require in evaluating design descriptions of alternative and dedicated shutdown 7
equipment.
It will now be necessary for CP&L to analyze these information requests and to consider each of them when performing its analyses.
In addition to preforming this work, United Engineers and Constructors is also involved simultaneously in a number of other projects at CP&L's nuclear plants, several of which have been required by the Commission, and which require substantial commitments of manpower. These activities include seismic pipe support modifications; security system modifications; torus
.7The information sought is described in Enclosures 1 and 3 of the February 20, 1981 letter to licensees from Mr. Eisenhut.
H:nsrable Jeszph M. H:ndria March 6, 1981 integrity modifications; off gan system modification, environ-mental qualification of electrical equipment; annulus pressurization and CRD work. Such work in progress at BSEP for 1981 arising out of Commission requirements is estimated at 98,000 manhours and $3,400,000 dollars.
The same UE&C personnel who, because of their expertise, are essential to the proper completion of many aspects of these projects, must also perform the fire protection analyses described here.
Moreover, much of CP&L's own personnel resources has been tapped to perform tasks required by the Commission regarding emergency planning, environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment and TMI related modifications at its plants.
As an example of the demands which are being imposed upon CP&L's resources concurrently with the demands of the fire protection rule, CP&L expended 16,000 manhours in 1980 on work related to emergency planning and expects to require an additional 16,000 manhours for such work in 1981. During the first several months of 1981, CP&L must work at an intensive pace in order to prepare for its emergency exercise at its H. B. Robinson Plant and to ensure implementation of the revised emergency plans at both CP&L nuclear plants by April 1, 1981.
H:norabia Jes:ph M. H:ndrie March 6, 1981 Thus, some of the most critical months for performance of its responsibilities concerning emergency planning are the very months when CPE would be required to prepare its plans, schedules and design descriptions and exemption requests under the current schedule of the fire protection rule.
In addition, with respect to its obligations to respond to II Bulletin 79-01B regarding environmental qualification of electrical equipment, CPE has expended 21,500 manhours at BSEP as of January 1, 1981. CPE estimates that it will incur future expenditures of 151,500 manhours and $5.7 million at BSEP before it has completed this work.
CPE has also devoted substantial resources to fulfill its obligation to make TMI-related modifications. Through 1980, CP E has spent $4.6 million and expects to spend $9.5 mil', ion in 1981 at BSEP. CPE spent $4.3 million at the H. B. Robinson Plant in 1980 and expects to spend $4.6 million there in 1981.
In addition, CPE's 1982 budget includes $17 million for TMI-related work for both plants. Efforts to resolve the TMI issues will require substantial amounts of manpower at the BSEP 0
and H. B. Robinson Plants and in the CPE general office.
Taking into account the magnitude of the work involved in all of these projects and the finite number of people who are qualified *.o perform all of these necessary tasks, CPE estimates 8See Attachment C for a summary of the manpower commitments which
-CPE has made for work relating to the TMI modification program.
H:norsblo Jessph M. Hindrio March 6,1981 that it will be able to submit to the Commission its plans and schedules for necessary modifications to meet Section III.G.2 and its technical justification for exemptions from Section III.G by September 1, 1981. CP&L estimates that it will be prepared to submit to the Commission its design descriptions of.any necessary alternative or dedicated shutdown systems by December 1, 1981.
C.
Imposition of the 650.48(c) Schedules Upon CP&L Will Create Substantial Risk of Degradation of Safety at BSEP It is imperative that the Commission recognize the substantial risk to public safety that will be created if CP&L is compelled to meet the schedules presently established in 650.48(c). Every aspect of the program described in Part B above is essential to a proper evaluation of BSEP against the criteria of Section III.G of Appendix R.
It is physically impossible to comprers a project of that magnitude into the 30 days allotted in $50.48(c).
It should be obvious that to even attempt such a feat will require drastic shortcutting of many features of the program outlined. None of these elements can be slighted, however, if CP&L is to perform a sound, reliable analysis.
L I
H:n=rablo Jcseph M. H:ndris March 6, 1981 Pursuant to Commission requirements, CP&L may not install any modification at BSEP until it has performed numerous safety reviews. Unless CP&L is given adequate time within which to perform these reviews, there will be an inevitable risk of degradation of safety at the plant. Under present site procedures, required reviews include:
(1) A technical review which is performed by an independent engineer for the purpose of assuring completeness of the modification package and the technical accuracy of the design or design verification for safety related design documents in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11 and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
(2) A quality assurance review which is performed by CP&L QA personnel for the purpose of assuring that necessary hold points, controls and procurement requirements have been included in the modification package.
(3) An ALARA review which is performed by the plant ALARA specialist for the purpose of assuring that the design and installation procedures to be employed are such that radiation exposure of personnel will be maintained as low as reasonably achievable.
H:nsecbla J:s:ph M. H:ndrio March 6, 1981 (4) A fire hazards analysis which is performed by the Plant Fire Protection Engineer for the purpose of determining the impact of the modification upon fire protection capa-bility and to verify inclusion o'f appropriate fire prevention or control measures.
(5) A safety review which is conducted by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) for the purpose of assuring that plant nuclear safety will not be adversely affected by the modification.
(6) An inservice inspection (ISI) review which is performed by the inservice inspection specialist to assure that the applicable provisions of Section XI of the ASME Code have been met.
(7) Management reviews and approvals which are performed by the Project Engineer, the Engineering Supervisor, the Manager-Technical and Administration, and by the General Manager.
As noted above, CP&L is engaged, pursuant to Commission directives, in extensive improvement programs of great significance to public safety pursuant to Commission mandated schedules. These safety related programs must be pursued by CP&L simultaneous with the performance of its obligations under 9See discussion supra at pp. 13-15.
H:n:rtblo Jestph M. H:ndris March 6, 1981 the fire protection rule. Substantial work on TMI-related issues, emergency planning and environmental qualification of safety grade electrical equipment pursuant to IE Bulletin 79-01B have been ongoing throughout 1980 and must continue at least throughout 1981.
In addition, work is ongoing with regard to seismic pipe support modification; security systes modifications; torus integrity modifications; off gas system modification; annulus pressurization and CRD rework.
It would be Laprudent to require CP&L to perform all of this work, including its obligations under Appendix R, under the current NRC mandated schedules. When one adds the limits of CP&L's financial and human resources to the factor of time, one recognizes the risk that the public safety may be seriously impaired unless CP&L is permitted to perform all of its obliga-tions in accordance with a rational, achievable schedule of priorities.
The schedules set forth in $50.48(c) with respect to fire protection modifications are unrealistic and unachievable in the context of all other ongoing modification activities and, unless modified as requested by CP&L, will create a substantial risk of _ degradation of safety at BSEP.
H:ncerble Jaseph M. H:ndris March 6, 1981 CP&L aust emphasize that the fire protection systems currently installed at BSEP and approved by the staff in its SER are entirely adequate to protect the health and safety of the public. As was pointed out by the Commission as recently as October 29, 1980 in the context of the Fire Protection Schedules for Operating Nuclear Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 71569 (October 29, 1980):
Extensive fire protection measures have already been implemented at all operating plants.... No public health and safety interest would be served by forcing only those licensees unable to meet deadlines preceding the effectiveness of the final rule to shut down for the brie interim.
To the contrary, the fire protection measures already implemented give reason-able assurance that all operating nuclear plants may continue to operate safely even though the final rule will require additional fire protection measures at many plants.
Beyond these fire protection systems, there are significant 10 additional safety features installed at BSEP Clearly then, the granting of CP&L's request for an exemption from the schedules established in 550.48(c) will in no way adversely affect the health and safety of the public.
10See Attachment D for a summary of such safety features.
H:nserble Jesaph M. Hendrie March 6, 1981 To the contrary, for all of the reasons set forth above, to impose the current schedules upon CP&L will create an unnecessary risk that the safety of the public will be seriously impaired.
D.
Exemption from Provisions of 650.48 and Section III.G of Appendix R Related to Fire Suppression Systems in Control Room and Cable Spread Rooms is Warranted CP&L believes that the fire protection systems and equipment currently installed in the BSEP cable spread rooms and control room are equal in effectiveness to a fixed fire suppression system and, therefore, requests an exemption from the requirement to install fixed suppression systems in those areas.
In addition, CP&L requests the right to seek any further exemption from fire suppression requirements with respect to other areas at BSEP which CP&L believes to be justified after its completion of its analyses and preparation of its plans and schedules for necessary modifications.
The fire protection features which are presently installed in the cable spread rooms and the control room at BSEP and which are described below have been approved by the staff in its Safety Evaluation Report.
H:nsrtble Joccph M. H:ndria March 6, 1981 Cable Spread Rooms Cables installed are qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 for flame testing.
Cables are coated with fire proofing material to prevent propagation between cable trays.
Cable tray separation meets the requirements of IEEE 384 (1974).
Alternative shutdown capability is provided.
Fire Detection equipment is installed.
Fire fighting equipment is available in the immediate vicinity.
Transient combustibles are administrative 1y controlled in the area.
Control Room The control room is continually manned.
Fire detection equipment has been installed generally throughout the control room including in cabinets and other areas not readily visible to operators.
High risk areas for combustibles such as computer rooms have been separated from the control room by 3-hour fire barriers.
CO fire fighting capability is immediately available to 2
operating personnel.
In view of these approved fire protection features, fixed fire suppression systems in the cable spread rooms and the control room would not meaningfully enhance fire protection safety at BSEP.
Indeed, potentially serious conditions would be likely to arise in the control room as a result of effects of water upon sensitive equipment, and the likely interference with the operator's ability to react effectively to the ongoing emergency.
In this respect, installation of a fire suppression system may actually be detrimental to overall safety at BSEP.
H:nsetble Jes:ph M. Hrndrie March 6, 1981 E.
Additional Justification for Exemptions Requested CP&L believes that it was not, and is not, the Commission's intention in promulgating the fire protection rule to force any licensee to install a dedicated shutdown system regardless of the fire protection features at the particular facility. Yet such will be the inevitable consequence should the schedules of 950.48(c) be imposed. This is so because the 30 days allotted in $50.48(c)(2) for submitting plans and schedules for compliance with Section III.G.2 are simply insufficient to enable licensees to perform the analyses necessary to prepare such plans and schedules or to develop the technical justification to support an exemption from the various provisions of the fire protection rule. The unreasonableness of the schedules of $50.48(c), if rigidly imposed, becomes most apparent when one compares the incredibly short time licensees are given to install all of the modifications which could be necessary to meet Section III.G.2 with the 30 months subsequent to NRC approval authorized for installation of a dedicated shutdown system.
If the right to pursue the options offered by Section III.G.2 and the right to seek exemptions from the fire protection rule are to be more than illusory, the Commission must have intended to provide the staff a realistic opportunity to review each facility on a case-by-case basis, evaluating a particular licensee's technical justifications for exemptions; and to provide licensees sufficient time within which to develop sound plars, schedules and designs of modifications where further upgrading short of a i
H:n2rebis Jes:ph M. H:ndria tierch 6,1981 dedicated system is called for, especially in situations such as Brunswick where all prior Commission guidance has been followed and a complete fire protection system installed.
That~the Commission must have contemplated such an approach is particularly likely with respect to the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J and III.0, the "backfit" provisions, in view of the fact that under 10 CFR 950.109(a) backfitting is impermissible unless the modification will provide " substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety or the common defense and security". Such a finding, of course, can only be made by analyzing the particular conditions at a specific facility.
Unless such an opportunity is provided, we believe that the rule is clearly subject to being struck down as overly broad and a violation nf licensee's due process rights.
Finally, it is apparent from the record of the fire protection rulemaking that the schedules contained in 650.48(c) were established by the staff upon the assumption that a licensee would not be required to backfit any of the fire protection features of Appendix R to the extent that an SER has been issued for its facility. When the Commission decided to require backfitting to meet the provisions of Sections III.G, III J, and III.0, the Commission failed to adjust the schedules to take account of that requirement.
It would be grossly unjust to require the licensees to suffer the consequences of this failure.
Hansrtble Jossph M. Hsadria Msrch 6, 1981 III. TECHNICAL AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE RELIEF In the alternative, CP&L requests an exemption free 11 of the provisions of Section III.G.
CP&L believes that it is entitled to such an exemption on the ground that the fire protection measures prescribed in Section III.G would not, if installed at BSEP,
" provide substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety or the common defense and security" within the meaning of 10 CFR 950-109(a).
As CP&L has discussed at. length above, BSEP has been issued a complete staff Safety Evaluation Report for every fire protection measure required by Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
The SER stands as conclusiveproofthatth[fireprotectionsystemsandequipmentat BSEP provide the protection necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. CP&L is aware of no evidence to support a conclusion that compliance with Section III.G will substantially enhance fire protection capability at BSEP.
Before the Commission could require, by regulation or otherwise, the backfitting of the fire protection features described in Sections III.G, III.J and III.0 of Appendix R at BSEP, the Commission had an obligation to make a record of findings sufficient to support a conclusion that these modifications, if installed at BSEP, would provide " substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety or the common defense and
H:cer:ble Jtssph M. H:ndria March 6, 1981 security." To CP&L's knowledge, the Commission has made no such 11 findings with respect to BSEP as required by $50.109 It was the duty of the Commission to evaluate the impact the backfit items would have upon safety at any particular operating nuclear facility in light of the fire protection features already installed or committed to be installed at that facility.
In the case of BSEP for which a complete SER had been issued, CP&L submits that such a comparative analysis would have revealed that the Section III.G modifications would not provide substantial additional protection of the public health and safety.
In the absence of the requisite findings, imposition of the requirements of Section III.G upon CP&L would amount to a denial of CP&L's constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and would constitute a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's own regulations. The injury which CP&L would suffer as a consequence would be enormous in view of the extraordinary costs which would necessarily be incurred in connection with efforts to analyze, design, procure and install such modifications as might be necessary to meet Section III.G.
11Section 50.48 cannot fairly be said to have amended $50.109 in that the record shows no such intent and no opportunity was provided for comment on such amendment. The Commission, of course, is required to follow its own regulations whether acting by rule or by adjudication of individual rights.
H:nsrtble Jos:ph M. H ndrie March 6, 1981 Finally, since fire protection measures currently installed at BSEP are sufficient to protect the public health and safety, to require CP&L to meet the literal provisions of Section III.G would be inconsistent with ALARA principles and, therefore, detrimental to the safety of BSEP personnel. CP&L could not reach compliance with Section III.G without significantly increasing the man-rem exposure of plant personnel. Such an increase is total man-rem exposure is not defensible where, as with the fire protection modifications, the modifications at issue will not contribute significantly to safety.
For the reasons set forth above, CP&L should be granted an exemption from Section III.G of Appendix R.
Yours very truly, k
4 E. E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering & Construction SFF/jcb*
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of 1981.
M,%
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( Notary Public b!M!
My Commission expires:
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ATTACHME.VT A CHRONOLOGY OF ISSUANCES OF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND SER SUPPLE M S FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1,AND 2 BSEP Unit No. 1, FOL No. DPR-71, Docket No. 50-325 BSEP Unit No. 2, FOL No. DPR-62, Docket No. 50-324:
1.
The Fire Protection Safety Evaluaton Report ("FPSER") was included in license amendments No. 11 (Unit 1) and No. 37 (Unit 2) and was issued on November 22, 1977.
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2.
Supplement No. 1 to "FPSER" was included in license amendments No. 23 (Unit 1) and No. 47 (Unit 2) and was issued on April 6, 1979.
3.
Supplement No. 2 to "FPSER" was included in license amendment No. 28 (Unit 1) and No. 51 (Unit 2) and was issued on June 11, 1980. Supplement No. 2 contains staff approval of all outstanding fire protection items at BSEP.
ATTACIDfENT B DESCRIPTION OF FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT INSTALLED AT BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2,IN RESPONSE E APPENDIX A TO BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION (BTP) 9.5-1 In Response to Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 at a cost of approximately
$15,000,000, CP&L has made the following improvements at BSEP 1 and 2:
1.
Three-hour fire barriers have been added between opposite division trays and around conduits in selected areas.
These barriers extend at least 18" beyond the sides of the trays.
2.
Sprinkler heads have been added in areas where opposite division conduits cross trays or run in proximity to trays (5'-0" horizontal) in order to provide suppression for a
-defined fire hazard.
In addition, these conduits and trays have been wrapped with kaswool for approximately 3'-0" on either side of the crossing.
3.
All cables in the control building, cable spread rooms and the diesel generator building basement have been coated with a Flameastic or equivalent cable coating.
ATTAC}DfENT B 2
4.
Cables have been rerouted away from the fire area.
5.
Fuses have been provided for circuit isolation.
6.
Isolation switches, local control switches, rerouting of cables, and new isolated instrument loops have been provided for alternative shutdown equipment.
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1 ATTACHMENT C
SUMMARY
OF ENHOURS COMMITTED BY CP&L FOR TMI RELATED ACTIVITY H. B. Robinson Plant TMI Task Force Site Manager -
1 man full-time since October 1979 Project Managers -
1 CP&L engineer full-time Contractor Engineers -
8 engineers - November to December, 1979 7 engineers - January to March, 1980 8 engineers - April to June, 1980 7 engineers - July to December, 1980 5 engineers - January to March,1981 Future -
1 full-time CP&L engineer Brunswick Steam Electric Plant TMI Task Force Site Manager -
1 man full-time since October, 1979
ATTACHMLVT C <
Project Managers -
1 CP&L engineer from October 1979 to present (part-time - 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> / week) 1 CP&L operator from July 1980 to present (part-time - 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> / week)
Contractor Engineers -
4 engineers - November 1979 toJune 1980 5 engineers - July 1980 to February 1981 Future -
1 full-time and 1 to 2 part-time CP&L engineers 6 contractor engineers full-time General Office 1.
April to May 1979 10 CP&L engineers full-time (Corporate Investigative 3 contractor engineers part-time Team) 2 CPEL engineers part-time 2.
TMI Project Coordination June to September 15, 1979 - ICP&L engineer full-time September 15, 1979 to September 1980 -
3 CP&L engineers full-time September 1980 to present - 2 CP&L engineers full-time
ATTACHMENT C :
3.
Future -
1 CP&L engineer full-time 1 CP&L engineer part-time (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per week)
NOTE:
All of the above TMI man-hours are conservative as they do not include:
construction supervision and CP&L construction forces; cost control and procurement activities; plant maintenance, I&C, mechanics, health physics and other support personnel; middle and senior level management effort; clerical resources; manpower resources of vendors and A-Es in performing analytical studies and designing plant modifications offsite.
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ATTACHMENT D DESCRIPTION OF SAFEH FEATURES OF EACH BUII. DING / AREA AT BRUNSVICK STEMf ELECTRIC PI. ANT UNITS NOS.1 Ah3 2, A.
Cable Spread Rooms 1.
Cables installed are qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 for flame testing.
2.
Cables are coated with fire proofing material to prevent propagation between cable trays.
3.
Cable tray separation meets the requirements of IEEE 384 (1974).
4.
' Alternative shutdown capability is provided.
5.
Fire detection equipment is installed.
I 6.
Fire fighting equipment is available in the immediate vicinity.
7.
Transient combustibles are administrative 1y controlled La the area.
ATTACHMENT D
- B.
Control Room 1.
The control room is continuously manned.
2.
Fire detection equipment has been installed generally throughout the control room including in cabinets and other areas not readily visible to operators.
3.
High risk areas for combustibles such as computer rooms have been separated from the control room by three-hour fire barriers.
4.
C0 fire fighting capability is immediately available 3
to operating personnel.
C.
Diesel Generator Building 1.
Fire zones have been separated by three-hour barriers.
2.
Additional sprinklers have been installed in each diesel cell to meet fire code criteria.
3.
Additional fire detectors have been installed.
4.
Foam suppression systems have been provided for use in hazardous areas and on hazardous equipment.
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ATTACEMENT D.
5.
Diesel exhaust silencers were relocated outside the building to remove explosion hazard.
6.
Cables in the lower level have been protected from exposure fires by the installation of sprinkler systems.
7.
Safe shutdown cables have been protected at division crossings by barriers where appropriate.
8.
Cables are qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 for fire testing.
9.
Cables in the lower level have been coated with fire proofing material to prevent propagation between trays.
D.
Reactor Building 1.
Safe shutdown cables have protected from exposure fires by the addition of sprinkler systems.
2.
Cables are qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 for fire testing.
3.
Safe shutdown cables are protected by barriers and/or sprinklers at divisional-;rossings where appropriate.
ATTAClefENT D
~4" 4.
Cable tray separation meets the requirements of IEEE 384(1974).
5.
Based on original plant design bases, associated circuits are isolated by a coordinated protection system composed of breakers and fuses.
6.
Manual fire fighting capabilities have been provided in all fire zones.
E.
Service Water Building 1.
Fire detection equipment has been installed.
2.
Sprinklers have been installed in the upper level consistent with the requirement of the fire code.
3.
Cables in the lower level have been protected from exposure fires by the installation of sprinklers.
4.
Barriers have been provided for safe shutdown cables where required.