ML20006E860

Forwards FEMA Rept of full-participation Exercise Conducted on 890725-26 at Facility for Info

ML20006E860
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	02/14/1990
From:	Charemagne Grimes Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	William Cahill TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
References
NUDOCS 9002260446
Download: ML20006E860 (4)

Text

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• O'T 3 (g j?y February 14, 1990 n

Docket Nos. 50-445 1 and 50-446 h / + Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr. Executive Vice President, Nuclear 4 Texas Utilities Electric Company 400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 z

SUBJECT:

FEMA REPORT ON THE JULY 1989 FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE AT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) report of the full-participation exercise conducted on July 25-26, 1989 at Comanche Peak, Based on the results of the exercise, the remedial drill (September 6, 1989), and offsite plan reviews, FEMA concludes that offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of Comanche Peak. FEMA states that the 44 CFR 350 approval it granted on July 15, 1985 remains in effect. Please continue to coordinate your emergency planning efforts with offsite authorities to ensure that the areas in the exercise requiring corrective action identified by FEMA are resolved in a timely manner. A schedule for correction of the areas requiring corrective action is included in the exercise report. FEMA's finding on off site preparedness will be included in the Safety Evaluation Report supplement supporting full-power operation for Comanche Peak Unit 1. Sincerely, (original signed by) Christopher I. Grimes, Director Comanche Peak Project Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

11 SIR UU.0N (w/ enclosure) DISIRIBUTION (w/o enclosure) Letter from FEMA dated (MCE.Nes ADSP Reading JPartlow 1/12/90 with Exercise NRC PDR DCrutchfield EJordan Report Dated 12/15/89 Local PDR TQuay BGrimes CPPD Reading CGrums FCongel cc: See next page RWarnick JHWilson FKantor MMalloy JLyons RHogan OGC MFields ACRS (10) 9002260446 900214 PDR ADOCK 05000445 DPowers PNV NTerc F SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE PAGE* j CPPD:NRR AD:CPPD:NRR C:PEBB:NRR D:CPPD:HR /m MMalloy: cm* JHWilso RErickson* CGrimes pU 02/13/90 02/rL/90f 02/13/90 02/g/90 l %\\ v

^ ~- -w w,T, k J. i , e. 4 g j( [,g,. g ' ,){ " t. d; ,g x 3 '4 h, f 1 ~ K k Docket'No'sJ 50L445~ rand 50-446.. A. .Mr. William J. Cahill,LJr. a, D" LExecutive Vice President, Nuclear. ~ 1 Texas _ Utilities Electric Company" 4 1400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 JDallas, Texas: 75201' '1

SUBJECT:

FEMA REPORT ON THE JULY 1989 FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE AT -COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. Enclosed for your,information'is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) report of the full-participation exercise conducted on ' July 25-26, 1989_'at Comanche Peak. [ Based on the results'of_ the' exercise, the remedial drill (September 6, 1989), b 1 f and offsite plan reviews, FEMA concludes that offsite radiological emergency u . plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that. . appropriate measures can be taken to protect.the health and safety,of the-u- public living;in the vicinity of Comanche Peak. FEMA states that the 1

44 CFR 350 approval it granted on' July. 15 1985 remains _in effect.'

+ U 7 f Please continue' to coordinate your emergency planning efforts with offsite. . authorities to' ensure that the areas in the exercise requiring corrective c j . 'f f caction identified by FEMA are resolved in a timely manner, A schedule for', ff L, (correction of the' areas requiring corrective action is included in the exercise report. L r D '( l

FEMA's' finding on offsite preparedness will bezincluded in>the, Safety. N

? o 4,. T'E t Evaluation Report supplement supporting full-power operatioii for Comanche L iPeak' Unit 1. iq M sg-3' 4.[ ' t Sincerely, 4 o L' ,j r s Christopher I. Grimes, Director y Comanche Peak Project Division l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-4 u

Enclosure:

DISTRIBUTION (w/ enclosure) DISTRIBUTION (w/o encibsure)

Letter from FEMA dated Docket File AD5F Keading JPartlow k_

1/12/90 with Exercise NRC PDR DCrutchfield EJordan ~ Report Dated 12/15/89 Local PDR TQuay BGrimes. CPPD Reading CGrimes FCongel cc: See next page RWarnick JHWilson FKantor MMalloy JLyons RHogan 0GC MFields ACRS(10) PD:NRR AD:CPP - R- . C: hRR D:CPPD:NRR MHalloy:cm JHWil on. M)RErickson CGrimes 02/ e/90 02/G/9 02/(3 /90 02/ /90 y l'

.. _.. ~ is .jeS E8 eof'o ~ i:m 1: g& + ; ' [ .t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o j 'c .. UNITED STATES y, j WASHINGTON, D. C,20666 ) k..../ February.14,1990 . Docket Nos. 50-445; 'and 50-446 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr. Executive Vice President, Nuclear Texas Utilities Electric Company 400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 Dallas; Texas 75201

SUBJECT:

FEMA REPORT ON THE JULY.1989 FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE-AT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Enclosed for your~1nformation is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) report of the full-participation exercise conducted on -July 25-26,1989 at Comanche Peak. Based on the results of the exercise, th'e remedial drill (September 6, 1989).. and offsite plan reviews, FEMA concludes that offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of Comanche Peak. FEMA states that the ~ .44 CFR 350 approval it granted on July 15, 1985 remains in effect. i Please continue to coordinate your emergency planning efforts with offsite authorities:to ensure that the areas in the exercise requiring corrective action identified by FEMA are resolved in a timely manner. A schedule for. correction of the areas requiring corrective action is included in.the. exercise report. FEMA's finding on offsite preparedness will be included in the Safety Evaluation Report supplement supporting full-power operation for Comanche Peak Unit 1.. Sincerely, ( p wh Christopher I. Grimes, Director l Comanche Peak Project Division l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1

Enclosure:

Letter From FEMA Dated y 1/12/90 With Exercise 4 Report Dated 12/15/89 cc: Sed next page i I 't- +. -~

. (

Mr. W. J. Cahill, Jr. -cc:

Jack R. Newman, Esq. H Mr. Robert F. Warnick Assistant Director Newman & Holtzinger for Inspection Programs 1615 L Street, NW Comanche Peak Project Division Suite 1000-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20036-P. O. Box 1029 Granbury. Texas - 76048 Chief, Texas Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health -l Regional Administrator, Region IV 1100 Vest 49th Street U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Austin -Texas 78756 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 . Arlington,. Texas 76011 Honorable George Crump County Judge Ms. Billie Pirner Garde, Esq. Glen Rose, Texas-76043 Robinson, Robinson, et al. l 103 East College Avenue Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President Citizens Association for Sound Energy 1426 South Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 E. F. Ottney-( P. O. Box 1777 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Mr. Roger D. Walker L Manager, Nucle.ar Licensing Texas. Utilities-Electric Company 400 North Olive Street, L. B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 4 Texas Utilities Electric Company-c/o Bethesda Licensing 3 Metro Center, Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland-20814 William A. Burchette, Esq. Counsel for Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW Washington,.D.C. 20007 GDS ASSOCIATES, INC. Suite 720 1850 Parkway Place Marietta, Georgia 30067-8237

.4: 4 4 c g.:

p. p' 3 Federal: Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 s

n JM 121990 Mr. Frank J. Congel Director. Division of Radiation Protection ard Emergency Pmparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.~ S. Nuclear Regulatory Ocnnission . Washington, D.C. 20555-

Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the exercise report of the July 25-26, 1989, exercise of offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans site-specific to the Coranche Peak Steam Electric Station. This was a full-participation qualifying exercise which included reentry, recovery and relocation as well as Ingestion Exposure Pathway activities. Participants included the State of ~ Texas, Somervell and Hood Counties, and the Cities of Stephenville and Cleburne. To meet the current criteria for a full-participation qualifyirg I. exercise, 35 of the 36 exercise objectives were demonstrated at this exercise. 'The one exception was the unannounced and off-hours operations objective which L will be demonstrated at an exercise or drill to be scheduled at a later date. L This exercise report was prepared by the Region VI office staff'of the Federal L Emergency Management Agency (FD4A). There was one. deficiency identified in the exercise resulting from the inability of the State Contamination control Field 7%ams, operating at the exercise traffic / access control points, to reliably comminicate with any other exercise activity location. Neither the primary system (cellular telephones) nor the backup system (hand-held radio units) provided an appropriate i ccrumunications capability. Following installation of a new, higher antenna and acquisition of more powerful field radio units, a remedial drill was conducted on September 6, 1989. 7he remedial drill damistrated that this problem has been resolved and that a reliable ocumnications capability now exists. In addition, several areas requiring corrective action and areas r+2-.-arded for inprovement were identified in the exercise. A schedule of correction for the areas requiring corrective action is included in the report. l Base 1 on the results of the exercise, the remedial drill, and offsite plan reviews, offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness are adequate to i; provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health ard safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Ctsnanche Peak Steam Electric Station, and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted by FINA on July 15,1985, remains in effect. SwM/sMz:{gg3

ii ' 'l .c i h If you-should have any questions, please contact Craig S. Wingo,- mief, 'hK:hnological Hazards Division, at 646-3026. Sincerely, / jnM6 '

ff.m A *

- / Dennis H. Kwiatkowski ~,, Assistant Associate _ Director' Office of Natural ard 'INx:hnological Hazards Enclosure 6 4 e 2.

4 c,. , '_.. c - g;. c a ',. .q i N l S FINAL-RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT 7 L Nuclear Power Plant: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station f Operator:- TU. Electric L Location of Plant: State of Texas j Somervell County [ Glen Rose, Texas j l- -} L Date of Report: December 15, 1989 Date of Exercise: July 25-26, 1989 i' Date of Remedial Drill: September 6, 1989

Participants:

S. tate of. Texas Somervell_ County j, Hood County-City of Stephenville City of Cleburne Hood General Hospital, Granbury -4 Walls Regional Hospital, Cleburne Harris Hospital, Stephenville 1-FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION VI' d Federal Regional Center (? 800 North Loop 288 ~ -Denton, Texas 76201 ~

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L' ;., + y;' ', i_ Y.P .'t f Ki Lyl i go 1c, l 1 5 p' 3 5 k g O C .? ' k.'. i{ } FINAL RADIOLOGICAL-EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT Nuclear Power Plant: ' Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station-i Operator: TV-Electric ~ Location of Plant: State of Texas Somervell County Li Glen Rose, Texas Date of Report: December 15, 1989-M l, Date of Exercise: July 25-26, 1989 0 Date of Remedial Drill: September 6, 1989

Participants:

State of Texas Somervell County 3 Hood County City of_Stepnenville -City-of Cleburne-Hood General Hospital,. Granbury L.e Walls Regional Hospital, Cleburne Harris Hospital, Stephenville - p c FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY-l REGION VI. Federal Regional ' Center 800 North Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201 (: .. =

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

~i . ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS v. vii-INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY 1 1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND 2-1.1 Exercise Summary 3 1.2 Federal Evaluators 1.3 Exercise Objectives.............-.......-... 5 1.3.1 State and Local. Exercise Objectives 5 1 1.4L On-Site Narrative Summary.................. 13 17

1.51 Off-Site Narrative Summary

. 1.5.1 -Off-Site Scenario Sequence of -Events......... 19. 1.6 Evaluation Criteria...................... 24 26 2 EXERCISE EVALVATION 2.1. Exercise Day 1 - Plume Exposure Pathway Activities 26 ,2.1.1. Texas State.0perations................ 26 2.1.1.1 State EOC.................. 26 1 2.1.1.2 Disaster District 6A E0C -28 2.1.l.3 BRC Operations at CPSES EOF......... 30 1 34-2.1.1.4 BRC Staging Area 2.1.1.5 State Field Teams.............. 36 2.1.1.5.1 Field Monitoring Team #1..... 36 2.1.1.5 2 Field Monitoring Team #2..... 37 2.1.1.5.3 Field Monitoring Team #3..... 39 2.1.1.5.4 Field Monitoring Team #4..... 40~ 2.1. l ~. 5. 5 Contamination Control Team #1 42-1 2.1.1.5.6' Contamination Control Team #2 44 2.1.1.6 BRC Mobile Laboratory 45 1 2.1.1.7 ' State'0perations At News Center......, 46 2.1.2. Local Government Operations 47 2.1.2.1 Somervell County *E0C 47 2.1.2.1.1 Somervell Co. School Evacuation Demo 50 2.1.2.1.2 Squaw Creek Park Evacuation Demo. 51 2.1.2.2 Hood County EOC............... 51 2.1.2.2.1 Hood County School Evacuation Demo 55 2.1.2.2.2 Hood General Hospital & Ambulance 1 Service 56-2.1.2.3 Stephenville Reception / Care Center 59 2.1.2.4 Harris Hospital & Stephenville FD Ambulance. 61-2.1.2.5 Cleburne Reception / Care Center 63 2.1.2.6 Walls Regional Hospital, Cleburne & Glen Rose VFD a Amb ul an c e.................. 65 2.2 Exercise Day 1 - Recovery / Reentry / Relocation Tabletop.... 66 2.3 Exercise Day 2 - Ingestion Exposure Pathway Activities 68 2.3.1 State E0C 68 2.3.2 BRC Staging Area................... 69 ] 1 i iii l 1 4

t L I ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS Access Control Point ACP i Argonne National Laboratory ALL American Red Cross ARC Areas Requirire; Corrective Action ARCA t Areas Recommended for Improvement ARFl Texas Bureau of Radiation Control BRC Chief of Field Operations CFO Counts Per Minute CPM Comaache Peak Steam Electric Station CPSES Division of Emergency Management L DEM Department of Health and Human Services DHHS Department of Energy . DOE Department of Health DOH Department of Transportation DDT Texas Department of Public Safety DPS Direct. Reading Dosimeter DRD Emergency Broadcast System EBS Emergency Coordinator EC ECL , Emergency Classification Level Exercise Evaluation Methodology EEM Emergency Medical Service EMS Emergency Operations Center EOC Emergency Operating Facility EOF Environmental Protection Agency EPA Emergency Planning Zone EPZ Emergency Room ER Emergency Response Facility ERF EW - Emergency Worker Federal Aviation Administration FAA Food and Drug Administration FDA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA Intensive Care Unit ICU Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEL Joint Information Center JIC Potassium lodide K1 Limiting Condition for Operation LCO Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA Monitoring / Decontamination rt/D Milliroentgens per hour mR/h Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC On Scene Commander OSC Protective Atticn Guide PAG Protective Action Recommendation PAR Protective Action Section PAS Public Information Officer PIO Reception / Care R/C Regional Assistance Committee RAC Radiological Defense RADEF Reactor Coolant System RCS Radiological Emergency Area REA Radiological Emergency Preparedness REP Regional liaison Officer RLO V

.. + b i INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY i On December 7, 1979, tht President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead role responsibility for all off site nuclear power facility planning and response. FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility i i Radiological Emergency Response Planning include: i Taking the lead in off site emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal i criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 (November 1980). Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions. .. Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) U.S.. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) - U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) U.S. Department of Interior (D01) U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 1 L l l I vii

r: a * +- ) e 1. EXERCISE BACKGROUND I The July 2E-26, 1989 full-participation, qualifying, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) was the third REP exercise at this facility. Previous exercises were evaluated in 1983 and 1984. Due to extensive on site construction delays, FEMA agreed to put the 1985 44 CFR 350 approval on hold and exempt this facility from off site exercising requirements until such time as the utility advised. that they were within 2 years of full power (above 5%) operation. To meet the current criteria for a full participation, qualifying exercise, 35 of FEMA's 36 exercise objectives, described in Guidance Memorandum EX 3, were required to be i demonstrated at this exercise. The single exception was objective 36, Unannounced and Off hours Operations, which will be demonstrated at a drill to be scheduled at a later time. The 1989 exercise was, effectively, divided into three phases: a Plume Exposure Pathway exercise on day one; a Reentry / Recovery / Relocation tabletop exercise immediately following the plume exercise; and an Ingestion Pathway exercise on day 2. Phase 2 and 3 activities were continuations of the Phase 1 play, using the data developed during the previous phases as a base for exercise activity. On, July 27, 1989,'following the exercise, three meetings were held in the vicinity of the nuclear facility - a morning meeting of the 34 member FEMA evaluation team to develop a preliminary exercise evaluation; an early afternoon 1 meeting with Federal, State, local and utility participants to present the preliminary findings; and an advertised, evening, Public Critique of the exercise, in the Glen Rose Citizens Center, to provide preliminary information about the exercise to the public and the news media. Section 2 of this report provides narratives, detailing the observed l exercise ottiv'ities, at each participating location, together with any Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) or Areas Recommended for l Improvement (ARFis) resulting from the exercise observations. A Deficiency, a l serious problem that could result in a threat to public health or safety, would result in a negative finding for that portion of the exercise. There was one Deficiency identified during this exercise. The State and the utility jointly, agreed to initiate corrective action on the problem l creating the Deficiency, and a Remedial Drill redemonstrating those exercise j objectives was scheduled within the 120 day time requirement. l A Remedial Drill, to demonstrate the corrections accomplished in the area of the exercise Deficiency, and the Area Requiring Corrective Action for Objective Number 4, Communications, was held on September 6, 1989. This Remedial Drill, evaluated by FEMA Region VI personnel, fully demonstrated the State's capabilities to reliably and continuously communicate with their Contamination Control Teams and their Field Monitoring Teams throughout the 10-mile EP2 around CPSES. Section 3 of this report provides, in tabular form, a summary of the Deficiency and Areas Requiring Corrective Action identified in the 1989 exercise. This summary provides space for State and local jurisdiction response to the identified issues, and a schedule for corrective actions.

3 3 r Peak fully participated in the 1989 exercise. Local elected officials: emergency l staff and volunteer personnel performed the emergency duties required by their plans and-the exercise scenario. All scheduled FEMA exercise objectives were met by the appropriate local jurisdiction participants. 1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Thirty four Federal Evalustors were assigned to the exercise activity I' locations listed below: Evaluator Acenev Evaluation Location (s) Gary Jones FEMA Overall Coordination RAC Chairman r Carl McCoy FEMA State EOC, Austin Travis Ratcliff FEMA State EOC, Austin Don-Fingl.eton FEMA Disaster District EOC, Waco Charles Hackney NRC BRC Operations at CPSES EOF and Ingestion Pathway Exercise Henry May EPA BRC Operations at CPSES EOF and Ingestion Pathway Exercise Bob Conley USDA BRC Operations at CPSES EOF, Recovery / Reentry / Relocation Tabletop and Ingestion Pathway Exercise Ernest Boaze FEMA BRC Staging Area (Granbury) I Brad Salmonson INEL BRC Field Monitoring Team and Sample Collection Team #2 Harry Harrison FEMA BRC Field Monitoring Team and Sample Collection Team *1 j L Marty Simonin ANL BRC Field Monitoring Team and Sample Collection Team #3 Lee Peyton FEMA BRC Field Monitoring Team P9 h Frank Wilson ANL BRC Hobile Laboratory (Granbury) Dana Cessna FEMA News Center and Ingestion Pathway Exercise Roy Smith FEMA News Center ) I 1

S 1 1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES l i Q. '1.3.1 State and Local Exercise Objectives and Explanatory Notes JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION I OBJECTIVE NUMBER AND TEXT State local (See Note A) .l. Demonstrate the ability to X X 1,2,3,4,9 monitor, understand and use i emergency classification l l 1evels (ECLs) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and i activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs. are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site l Area Emergency, and, General Emer,gency. 2. Demonstrate the ability to X X ALL fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field based emergency functions. (See Note B) 3. Demonstrate'the ability to X X 1,2,3,4,9 direct, coordinate and controi emergency activities. 4 4. Demonstrate the ability to X X ALL . communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. 5. Demonstrate the adequacy X X 1,2,3,4,9,15 of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to-support emergency operations. 6. Demonstrate the ability to X X 1,2,5,6,7,8,9. continuously monitor and 10,11,12,13,14, f. control emergency worker 15,16 exposure. 7. Demonstrate the appropriate X 7 equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurement. (See Note C) I

3:

7..

y L JURISDICTIONAL L RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION OBJECTIVE NUMBER AND TEXT State local (See Note A) t

15. Demonstrate the ability to X

X 1,2,3,4,15 j l-establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and n timely fashion. (See Note U)

16. Demonstrate the ability to X

X 1,2,7,9 make the decision to recommend the use of K1 to emergency workers and institutionalized persons based on predetermined criteria, as well as to dis-tribute and administer it once ~ the decision is made, if neces-sitated by radioiodine releases.

17. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, if the state plan This objective will not be so rpecifies, to recommend the

' demonstrated as it conflicts use of K1 for general public, with State policy. i based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases.

18. Demonstrate the ability and X

1,2 resources necessary to implemant approoriate pro-tective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EpZ population a (including transit-dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionalized persons). (See Note F) L19. Demonstrate the ability and X 1,2 resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions i for school children within the plume EPZ. (See Hote G)

20. Demonstrate the organizatior al X

X 1,2,7 ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated'and sheltered areas. (See Note H) l

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g JURISDICTIONAL [ RESPONSIBILITY LOCATIDN OBJECTIVE NUMBER AND TEXT State local (See Note A)

28. Demonstrate the appropriate X

16 lab operations and procedures l for measuring and analyzing l samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water and animal feeds (indigenous to the area and stored). (See Note N)

29. Demonstrate the ability to-X 9

project dosage to the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective measures bases on field data, EPA PAG and other relevant factors.

30. Demanstrate the ability to X

3,9 implement both preventative and emergency protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (See Note 0)

31. Demonstrate the ability to X

9 estimate total population exposures..(See Note P)

32. Demonstrate the ability to X

9 determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery based on estimated total population exposure, available EPA PAG and other relevant factors. (See Note Q)

33. Demonstrate the ability to X

1,2,3,4,9 implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery. (See Note R)

34. Demonstrate the ability to X

X 1,2,3,4,5,6, maintain staffing on a 7,9,15,16 continuous 24 hour basis by an actual shift change. (See Note S)

+ 11 l E. Delivery of follow up messages to the EBS station will be simulated. b F. During the exercise, any Special Facilities within affected areas will;be contacted (either actual contact for participating facilities or control cell contact for others) for information relating to transpor-tation needs. If contact is not made, default values will be used. i Simulated calls will be placed to individuals listed in the special assistance file as required by the scenario. For affected areas,.the EOC a will identify resources needed, place simulated phone calls to obtain them locally and request assistance, if needed. Any EOC without an affected area will demonstrate this objective by describing the process and providing a list of resources, phone numbers, etc. As required by ,1 scenario, the following resources will be dispatched (as a maximum): Five-t buses, two vans and one ambulance (may be simulated). They will drive to the appropriate locations, pause (to simulate loading time) and proceed to 4 the appropriate locations. For those vehicles arriving at the reception centers, drivers will simulate evacuees and be processed accordingly. l G. Since schools will not be in session, school activities will be simulated according to a mini scenario, distinct from the main scenario. All three school districts will be contacted, and district administrators will be prepared to describe the school evacuation process, including determining the availability of buses and drivers. Two districts will play further, at one pre-designated school in each district. Because the closed schools will not be air-conditioned, the school administrator and one teacher for each school will be prepositioned at district administrative offices until informed by controller message to proceed to the school. They will simulate school evacuation by providing information about evacuation procedures and by instructing two simulators.(simulating studcnts) to evacuate.' One school bus will be dispatched to each school, will board the simulated students, and will proceed to the relocation center. I k H. Each county E0C will demonstrate that it can determine the necessary number and location of Access Control Points (ACPs) and Traffic Control Points (TCPs) and, how it will man these points and actually set them up in-the field. Assistance from other sources will be simulated except for l pre-designated State players and equipment. ACPs and TCPs will be set up at the side of the road; normal traffic flow will not be impeded. Due to l the need to minimize time away from normal duty stations, only two ACPs and one TCP will be actually establish'ed. Any other ACPs or TCPs required by the scenario will be simulated. I 1. At least eight individuals and one simulated contaminated person &nd vehicle will be processed at each center. Decontamination will be simulated. The school relocation portion of the Stephenville Relocation / Care Center Plan will not be activated as school is not in session. - J. To minimize disruption of private organizations that normally provide congregate care, they will be contacted on the day of the exercise, but need not participate. K. Three ambulances will be used to actually transport simulated contaminated injury victims.

,a 13 S. An actual shift change will;be required during the exercise on day one, for shift personnel at all locations except State EOC, Disaster District EOC Waco (this does not include DEM and BRC personnel), hospitals, ambulances and EMS support organization personnel. T. Notification of local governments, proper use of communication channels, r coordination and provision of appropriate off-site support -to an on-site evacuation will be evaluated at the local EOCs. Controller messages to site personnel will specify the numbor of simulated evacuees and evacuated vehicles. The EOC will evaluate the impact and, if required by scenario, will simulate activities which would be required to control plant evacuation traffic. U. Rumor control at locations 14 will only be exercised as it relates to the overall coordination process with the News Center. This activity will not be + demonstrated as a separate or primary function since the News Center at he facility has primary responsibility for this function. 1.4 ON-SITE NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

This scenario is c'omprised of a reactor coolant system double ended cold leg shear Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), a loss of off site power and a complete loss of Emergency Core Cooling capability. This results. in the uncovering of the reactor core and subsequent fuel damage, a hydrogen burn in Containment, and an eventual radioactive release to the environment, initial Conditions The exercise will begin with the establishment of initial conditions at 7:30 a.m. Unit 1 is operating at 100% power with all plant parameters normal and stable. The unit is in its first fuel cycle operating at above 90% power for the last 73 days with 291 Effe:tive Full Power Days (EFPD) utilization of the core. The following equipment is out of service: Centrifugal Charging Pump #1 was taken out of service 37 hours ago for maintenance to the pump seals and inspection of the pump impellers. Maintenance personnel are currently working on the pump. ' Containment Spray Pump #3 was undergo'ing post-work testing when a phase to ground motor electrical f ault occurred. Analysis indicates that the motor must be replaced. It has been out of service for 25 hours. Containment Purge Exhaust valve 1-HV-5538 was removed from service two hours ago for inspection of its Seat. A cracked disc was discovered and must be replaced. The Spool Piece was reinstalled while the work order is being revised. Texas Electric Service Co. removed the DeCordova 138 kV transmission line from service yesterday for repairs on the DeCordova site breaker. It is expected to be returned.to service at 8:00 p.m. tonight. XST) is receiving power via the Stephenville 138 kV transmission line. t r -.

e. 1 m ( 15 Loss of Coolant Accident . Eventually, a double ended guillotine shear of the #4 Cold Leg occurs. Start-up transformer XST2 shorts out during initial loading of Safety injection (SI) equipment. Pressure rises in containment and the containment spray pumps 1 start. i Loss of Emeroency Core Coolino and Declaration of a Site Area Emeroency Five minutes following safety injection, the Train B diesel generator catches fire and trips causing a loss of all Train B emergency equipment. The fire brigade is dispatched and extinguishes the fire in ten minutes. The Train i A RHR and 51 pumps continue cooling the core with water from the Refueling Water Storage Tani (RWST). At H + O2:05, Containment Spray Pump #1 trips due to a bearing failure. The lube oil reservoir has drained down after its fill pipe cracked open due to stress and corrosion. The outboard radial / thrust bearing fails as a result of l the loss of lube oil. Eventually, all water in the RWST has been used and an RWST "Lo Lo Level' Alarm is received in the Control Room. Steps should be taken to switch to cold leg recirculation via Train A RHR pump taking suction from the containment sump and providing injection directly into the loops and providing suction to the - -Train A SI pump. At H + 02:35, a leak develops in the Train A RHR pump discharge piping. 1 The leak does not significantly affect injection to the RCS, but causes the RHR pump room to f.ill with steam. Radioactive steam is carried via safeguards ventilation to the primary plant ventilation systems and out the plant vent [' stacks. No'significant off-site doses are expected. At H + 02:45, the RHR pump motor shorts out due to the steam environment and cannot be restarted. Containment pressure begins to rise as the water covering the core begins to boil away. The Emergency Coordinator should declare a Site Area Emergency based on a reactor coolant system leak greater than the makeup capacity of the available centrifugal charging pumps concurrent with the failure of high and low pressure safety injection. L' The Site Area Emergency classification requires the notification of specific on site and off-site personnel and agencies that events are in progress or-have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. Some significant releases of radioactivity are likely or occurring. However, core degradation is not expected. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels except near the site boundary. Upon receipt of the Site Area Emergency notification, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Logistical Support Center (LSC), and the Corporate Operations Support Center (C0SC) in Dallas should be activated. County officials should activate the two county Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) in Granbury and Glen Rose, and the State should activate the l- !~

i 7 a 37 .t has been restored to the DeCordova 138 kV transmission line and is ready to supply XST1. With the restoration of power, Train B Emergency Core Cooling pumps and Containment Spray pumps may be loaded onto the bus to begin recovery. As containment pressure drops below 5 psig, containment purge valve 1-HV 5539 reseats, thus terminating the release. At H + 06:00, the emergency organization will be instructed to demonstrate shift change. The relief shift should come in and be briefed. Immediately following turn over, all facility managers ar.d supervisors on the offgoing shift will meet in the NOSF to hold a Recovery / Reentry / Relocation meeting. Eventually, the plume disperses in Somervell County. Players should now discuss long term recovery actions and critique their performance. The exercise .is terminated at the direction of the Exercise Lead Controller. 1.5 0FFSITE NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The Texas Department of Health. Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC), the Texas Department of Public Safety, as well as Hood and Somervell Counties will be participating in this full-scale graded exercise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency' (FEMA) and-the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will be evaluating the response of the participating organizations. The ' events occurring offsite of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) will be, for the most part, a result of the postulated release of radioactive effluents from a major accident occurring at CPSES. By approximately 7:45 a.m. (H + 00:15), the shift operations personnel at Comanche Peak will notify the State and local governments, and the NRC, that a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) has been declared. Upon receipt and verification of this notification, each dispatcher (Hood and Somervell Counties, and Waco) should initiate the appropriate notifications to key officials and/or agencies. By approximately 8:35 a.m. (H + 01:05), the shift supervisor should make the appropriate notifications that he has declared an Alert, and has turned over the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator to the Technical Support Center (TSC) manager. Key county and State personnel should at this time ascertain the availability of their manpower and resources to support any further response, if needed. At 10:05 a.m., (H + 02:35) a leak in the discharge piping results in a minor puff release. This release lasts for ten minutes. It is anticipated that once this puff occurs, a protective action recommendation (PAR) for evacuating J Emergency Zone 4C will be implemented. If the Hood County Judge does not elect to evacuate 4C, a contingency message will be passed to insure that this action i . is taken. This is necessary to accommodate Recovery / Reentry / Relocation decision making during the course of the exercise. l At approximately 10:30 a.m. (H + 03:00), the Comanche Peak Emergency Coordinator should make the appropriate notifications that he has declared a Site Area Emergency. Each county judge (Hood and Somervell) should initiate a

19 3 car wreck and should investigate the accident. This event will progressively involve players at the access control point east of Glen Rose, Somervell County EMS, and Walls Hospital, Cleburne. This event will be role played by two simulators, with additional data and details provided by the controllers at the various locations. All communications should be completed and the injured man transported to Walls Hospital. At 12:45 p.m., another car accident happens near the access control point west of Glen Rose. The accident will be similar to the above described accident, with two persons exiting the contaminated area and one of them being seriously injured. This event will progressively involve players at the access control point west of Glen Rose, Stephenville EMS, and Harris Hospital, Stephenville. This contaminated / injury event will be role played by two simulators, with additional data and details to be provided by controllers. The radioactive plume will be completely dispersed by 3:30 p.m. (H + 08:00). Off site recovery / reentry / relocation operations should be discussed at this time. De-escalation of emergency response activities by the State and counties should be coordinated with the appropriate CPSES personnel stationed at the EOF. 1.5.1 Off-Site Scenario Sequence of Events INITIATING LUiL MESSAGE NUMBER PLANT EVENT

SUMMARY

08:30 am 1 An evacuation of Somervell County school (H+01:00) children will be demonstrated as a mini-scenario unrelated to the main timeline. 10:30 am 5 A branching message is passed instructing (H+03:00+) the Hood County Judge to evacuate Emergency Response Zone 40. 10:30 am 5.1 An evacuation of Hood County school (H+03:00) children will be demonstrated as a mini-scenario unrelated to the main timeline. 11:15 am 6 A motorist reports that a tractor trailer (H+03:45) rig has jackknifed and overturned on the Brazos River bridge on Highway 67 east of Glen Rose. The overturned vehicle is blocking all lanes of the highway. The driver, who was thrown free of the cab, appears to have sustained only cuts and bruises. The motorist reports that he had to turn back since no vehicles can pass the accident. 11:15 am 7 This Contingency Message recommends (H+03:45+) evacuation of Emergency Zones 2A, 2C, 3B, and Glen Rose, and shelter Zones 3C, 3D, and 3F. l C.1

h 21-lNITIATING TIME MESSAGE NUMBER,

PLANT EVENT

SUMMARY

sirens due-to the noise-produced by the drilling operation. 12:25 pm 44 As Manny Bosworth and Burt Davis leave (H+04:55) the access control point east of Glen Rose, they are involved in a car wreck. The controller at:the access control point will indicate to the personnel that right after Bosworth and Davis drive off..they hear screeching-tires and a loud thump. The Glen Rose ambulance is to actually be dispatched to the accident-scene, and the injured party is actually to be transported to the hospital in Cleburne. 12:25 pm-45 Two evacuees (Greg and Lois Jones) arrive (H+04:55+) at the Cleburne Relocation Center. They were brought there by a DPS officer. They are not contaminated. 'They indicate to the Relocation Center staff that Greg's brother (Arlo Jones) went to town earlier today for an exhaust manifold for Greg's truck. They are afraid that he L will try and go back to their house, and they are wondering if there is any means to contact him. 12:27 pm 46 Access control point personnel respond to, I (H+04:57) the accident. 12:29 pm 48 Access control point personnel check (H+04:59) Davis' injuries. 12:29 pm 49 An off-site accident involving a con-(H+04:59+) taminated, injured party has been-reported to the Somervell County Sheriff's Department. Somervell Fire l -' Department ambulance is requested. 12:30 pm 50 M. A. Francis arrives at the Cleburne (H+05:00) Relocation Center. She (or he) is not contaminated, and wants to go and stay with relatives until it is safe to return l home. 12:30 pm 51 S. T. Reynolds arrives at the Stephen-(H+05:00) ville Relocation Center. She (or he) is not contaminated, and wants to go and 2 -w--- -m,.- + y

'j

* /

t 23 1 INITIATING

HM_L, MESSAGE NUMBER PLANT' EVENT

SUMMARY

d prepositioned at the Erath Co. Electric Co-op. parking lot. The ambulance will proceed to this location and respond to ] the " simulated" injuries. . 12i45 pm 68 Rick Morgan arrives at'the western access (H+05:15+) control point.. He wants to take a water pump to his nephew. Mr. Morgan has just come from a. junkyard in Dublin'and hasn't l ' heard anything about an accident at CPSES .(The nephew lives inside the area t affected by the release, and is at home with his wife and three small children. They have no telephone, and no trans-portation until the water pump is put back on their car), i 12:45 pm 69 Sara Balough arrives at the Relocation (H+05:15+) Center in Cleburne. She is-looking for her son, who was at the Tarrant Baptist Camp southeast of Glen Rose, a 12:45 pm 70 Wanda Sommers arrives at the-Relocation (H+05:15+) Center in Stephenville. She is looking for her son, who works at the Southern Concepts Inc. Home in Glen Rose. l 12:49'pm 71 A second off-site accident involving a (H+05:194)- contaminated, injured party has beentre-1 ported to the Somervell= County Sheriff's Department. Stephenville ambulance is requested, s 12:56pm-72 (This event will occur only if Mr. Jones (H+05:20+) was allowed into the exclusion area earlier.) Having earlier been allowed to enter the exclusion area to pick up some relatives, Arlo T. Jones is now coming back out. Both he and his vehicle are I contaminated. 12:55 pm 74 C. D. Turner tries to gain entry to the (H+05:25+) evacuated area. He was camping in i Dinosaur Valley State Park and had gone to Cleburne to do some shopping. l 1:10 pm 76 (This event will occur only if Mr. Morgan (H+05:40+) was allowed to enter the affected area in order to get his nephew.) (

{ g' = 25 FEMA - Region VI evaluated this exercise using the " Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (EEM) dcscribed in Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX 3. Federal evaluators were instructed to mark those sections of the EEM forms "Not Applicable" which did not correspond with the approved objectives of the exercise. Following the narrative for each jurisdiction or off-site exercise activity, any Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) or Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFis) are presented, together with accompanying ' recommendations. 1 An identified exercise Deficiency would cause a finding that off site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Such a Deficiency would be cause for a negative finding, and require that a Remedial Drill be held within 120 days to demonstrate that appropriate corrections had been made. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) if noted, represent instances where demonstrated performance, during the exercise, was evaluated and considered faulty. Corrective actions are considered necessary but other factors. indicate that reasonable assurance can be given that, in the event of a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. ARCAs should be relatively easy to correct in comparison to problems classified as Deficiencies. Unless otherwise specified, demonstration of these corrections will be required at, or before, the next regularly scheduled exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement are also listed, as appropriate, for each exercise activity location. r r l l

a.. 27-i Emergency classification levels (ECLs) were utilized throughout the i exercise to drive events, response and protective actions. There was some uncertainty with the exact time of the Notification of Unusual Event: The DEM received notification at 8:10 a.m. from the Disaster District office at Waco of the. 7:48 a.m. declaration of the Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. The message was confirmed at 8:10 a.m. The Texas Law Enforcement Teletype System (TLETS) at Waco was out of order from 7:10 until 7:45 a.m. Message #1 was received at 8:10 a.m. stating that the Notification of Unusual Event was declared at 7:48. Message #2, received at 8:33 a.m. stated that the NOVE was declared at 8:12 a.m. At 9:00 a.m., the EOC Director directed the DEM staff to " Call in the Council" based on his anticipation of the declaration of Alert status. The staff called all 27 members and representatives of the Emergency Management Council. Ten members were advised to report to the EOC. These members were assembled by 9:30 a.m. Seventeen members were advised to be available at their normal place of duty in case they were needed. Those advised to report included representatives from: Aeronautics Commission, Adjutant General's Department, Department of Agriculture, Air Control Board, American Red Cross, Department of Health, Department of Highways & Public Transportation, Parks and Wildlife Department, Department of Public Safety, and the Water Commission. The DEM Public Information Officer (PIO) was present in the EOC throughout + the exercise. Press briefings were simulated. The PIO indicated that briefings would be conducted for the media, who would assemble in the cafeteria of the DPS building, at hourly intervals. In addition, a briefing is held as each significant event occurs and with each change in ECL. A prescripted message is used for the initial advisory of the event. All subsequent messages are dependent upon scenario events. Copies of news releases were circulated among the EOC staff fqr comment prior to release. The PIO has maps and display boards i available for use in media briefings. The PIO is also responsible for rumor control. In the event that the PIO cannot satisfy the caller's questions, the caller is referred to the News Center. A shift change was demonstrated. Each agency representative was physically replaced with another person, Prior to the departure of the-first I shift, both the DEM coordinator and the BRC senior official gave a thorough briefing to the on coming shift. The EOC Director initiated a request to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to restrict air traffic over the event and contacted the State Railroad Commission to ask that they contact the Federal Railroad Commission to restrict rail traffic through the affected area. He also contacted FEMA for possible support. Helicopter support, additional monitors, and additional laboratory facilities through the university system, (for sample analysis) were placed on standby. With the declaration of the General Emergency, the Waco Emergency Management Council requested simulation of the i activation of the National Guard to assist in the evacuation. Twenty vehicles and 50 personnel were activated (simulated) and assembled at the Clifton Armory. l An additional 50 National Guardsmen and 20 tracked vehicles were later activated (simulated) to assist in monitoring. In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 3, 5, 14, 15, 26, 33 and 34 were met at this location.

N 29 situation at.the EOC. As necessary, appropriate department agency representatives were involved in the decision making which included ' State protective action implerentation. Furthermore, responsibilities were properly delegated to the appropriate department heads. Briefings were held, as necessary, to update the staff. These were primarily held when important information was received (e.g., change of ECL or PARS). Briefings also were held when new staff arrived, as part of a shift change, to get them familiar with the current situation. Copies of the plan were readily available for use and all key personnel had their own standard operating procedures (SOP).for their area of responsibility.

However, the staff, both the first shift and their replacements, appeared to be sufficiently knowledgeable of their duties without t

the SOPS. Message logs were kept for all incoming and outgoing messages. A message handling system was effectively used to reproduce and distribute all incoming messages to the department heads. The EOC has numerou.s methods of communication by virtue of being a Texas DPS Highway Patrol facility. Communications included the utility hotline, commercial telephones, teletype, radio, telecopier, VHF and UHF ham radio capability as well as a new methodology for sending hard copy via ham radio l (SIMTEC & AMTR) which was successfully tested during this exercise. The primary communications methode commercial telephone, is manned on a 24-hour basis by Texas DPS personnel. All communications appeared to work effectively during the exercise and could adequately handle communications with limited delays. The EOC had direct communications with the CPSES EOF, the State EOC, and other l appropriate orgarf zations. Conferencing capability was readily available. i Media briefings would be provided, as necessary, by the EOC Public Information Officer (P10). Press releases were developed at the E0C for distribution to the media and included current, accurate, and timely information from the EOF, News Center, and State as well as information that was relevant to this specific location and its activities. Media briefings were held in a I secured area of the DPS facility, away from the EOC. Prescripted information was prepared by the appropriate staff and avoided the use of technical jargon. The briefing materials were reviewed internally before being authorized for release jointly by the PIO and Chairman of the Disaster District Committee. Any media requests that could not be handled at the EOC were referred to the News. Center. Rumor control would be handled by the News Center (P10). All calls l from citizens, however, were referred to the state rutnor control phone number. l The ability to identify the need for and call upon assistance from outside support agencies was demonstrated when Somervell County requested air monitoring equipment, and staff familiar with its use, to be dispatched to monitor releases from CPSES. The EOC requested assistance from the Texas Air Control Board and was informed that two people and equipment would arrive at the designated location within two hours. Federal assistance would not be directly requested l from this District E0C. Requests of this nature would be directed to the State l EOC in Austin for processing.

e 31 l By 9:50 a..m., plant conditions had degraded to the point that the CFO consulted with the EC about upgrading to a Site Area Emergency. He then contacted the Hood County EOC to alert them to the possibility of the need to evacuate areas downwind of the plant. Following the confirmed puff release, at 10:07 a.m., a decision was made to recommend the evacuation of Zone 2A rather than shelter this zone as had been previously discussed. l At 10:16 a.m., the CFO then advised Somervell County that, due to seriously degrading conditions and a wind shift toward the south, the evacuation of Zone 2A and sheltering of the population in Zones 4C, 4D and 3A was recommended. Following consultation with the utility staff, a General Emergency was declared at 10:50 a.m. 3 Dose projections made by the BRC staff, prior to 11:47 a.m., assumed iodine filter integrity and a functioning containment spray, even though the spray had been inactive since 10:00 a.m., and a hydrogen burn (which was presumed to have degraded the filters) occurred at 11:00 a.m. At 11:47 a.m., these conditions were factored into the BRC calculations and new dose projections were prepared. This lack of coordination between BRC computer parameters and plant conditions resulted in significant differences, by a f actor of 100, in dose projections between the utility and the State. On observing these differences, the BRC staff properly chose to use the more conservative projection in the development of their protective action-recommendations. At 11:54 a.m., based on projection of thyroid doses greater than 5 Rem, the CFO recommended sheltering of the population in Zones 3D, 3F, 3C and 2J and ..i the evacuation of the city of Glen Rose. At 12:15 a.m., a further recommendation was made to evacuate Zones 2C, 3B and 4C, At 12:18 a.m., plant conditions began to improve and at 1:28 p.m., all releases were terminated. All [ plume protective action decisions observed were judged to be appropriate to the conditions known at the time. i l Following the 11:00 a.m. report of a hydrogen burn, and the significant i release of radioactivity (known to contain radioiodine), the CFO recommended L that all emergency workers take Potassium Iodide (KI). This recommendation preceded the actual dose projection specified in state procedures. As noted above, prior to 11:47 a.m., state dose projections, including thyroid doses, were different from the utility projections by a factor of nearly 100. Despite this difference, the K1 recommendation, and its implementation, were properly and expeditiously executed. Command and control of the State Contamination Control Teams, operating at Traffic / Access Control Points, and State Field Monitoring Teams, operating ~ PZ, was adversely affected by numerous communications throuchout the 104.ne t probl ems. Team control, at the EOF, was never able to establish communication with the Contamination Control Teams and had only sporadic contact with the Field Monitoring Teams. The Monitoring Teams could, usually, receive i transmissions, from the EOF, on the BRC frequencies in the DPS radios in the team cars. However, they were often unable to obtain confirmation of contact on their transmissions back to the EOF. The backup systems for the field teams, BRC hand-held radio units, were never able to establish reliable communications.

p ] v r _,. 45 33 r !s e i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 89-)

Description:

Communications between BRC Field Team Control at'the EOF and the BRC Field Monitoring Teams, using the BRC-frequencies in the DPS vehicle radio, was sporadic. The-i field teams could, usually, receive transmissions from field i L team control, but were often unable to maka successful l i team to-control contact. The BRC hand held radio units, using the same frequencies, were even less capable of maintaining contact with team control. Other backup systems (i.e. law enforcement frequencies) could be used, but these multiple-relay systems were slow and could result in misunderstood i i L messages. (NUREG 0654 H.3) 1 Recommendation: Determine the root cause of the sporadic communications, between BRC Field Team Control and the I field teams, on the BRC frequencies, and initiate appropriate I actions to ensure reliable, continuous, field team communications. Note #1: A plan of action, containing both immediate and long l term initiat,ives, designed to correct this issue, has been developed through joint efforts of the BRC and the utility. This plan has been reviewed and approved by FEMA Region VI a and will be instituted by the appropriate entities. L Note.#2: The Remedial Drill, held on September 6,1989, also 1 demonstrated that a reliable, continuous communications capability now exists between the EOF and the State Field 3 Monitoring Teams. 89 2-Desi:ription: Plant conditions were not factored into BRC dose i . projections in a timely manner. More than one hour elapsed before the projections accounted for the loss of containment spray, and 1 some time elapsed before the loss of the High Efficiency l Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, due to the hydrogen burn was included. (NUREG 0654 1.10) 1 Recommendation: Provide additional training to dose projection personnel stressing the naed for timely updates'of the computer program with current plant conditions. l i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: s

== Description:== Telephones in the BRC operating. area are single line . units. If an' individual's line is busy, calls will frequently arrive on other units, making the individual " chase" the call. L Recommendation: Convert the BRC telephones to five-line units with l hold and transfer capabilities. Additionally, place telephone system instructions, i.e., outside line code, how to transfer calls, etc., at each telephone. ^

== Description:== The BRC EOF operation needs to display the implementation status of protective actions. l l ) P a en

35 concerned. A new sign in/out display board was utilized to track personnel as they came on duty and were dispatched to their duty stations, it worked very well and was an obvious enhancement for the proper tracking of personnel. The demonstration of emergency worker exposure control was excellent. All emergency workers were issued low (0-200 mR) and high (0-20 R) dosimeters, TLDs, and personal exposure records for recor9ing readings while in the field. All personnel zeroed their instruments and recorded the reading before leaving for their field assignments. Calibration equipment was available if needed. The issuance of K1 was simulated by givint, each of the emergency workers going to the field a copy of the instructions for its proper use. The recommendation for emergent.y workers to take K1 was given at 11:05 As per previous instructions, the emergency workers made their decision a.m. to take/not take K1 as it is voluntary and not a requirement. To aid the i emergency workers in making the decision, they were briefed on the possible side effects of KI prior to departure from the staging area. Those who chose to take KI recorded the time they simulated its taking for proper dose control. Demonstration of shif t change was well organized. All incoming shif t personnel were assembled well in advance of being dispatched. After signing in, they were.given a thorough briefing on the history of the emergency and current status including plume direction and other weather information. They were then dispatched to their respective assignments. In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 16, and 34 were met at this location. DEFICIENCIES: None. AREAS REQVIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

== Description:== The staging area received information from multiple sources at the EOF which, at times, was contradictory and created some confusion. Recommendation: Establish a procedure that establishes a single point (one person) of contact for the dissemination of information from the EOF to the E0C.

== Description:== The staging area failed to receive some facsimile messages from the EOF (messages #2 and #4). Recommendation: Establish a procedure whereby the telephone liaison between the E0F and the staging area calls the staging area to confirm receipt of all facsimile messages that are sent.

== Description:== Confirming facsimile messages following ECL announcements were delayed for an unreasonable length of time.

s. .. ?, 37 No ground deposition surveys were performed as conditions during this exercise, and State procedures, did not require them. Airborne iodine monitoring was done by collecting an air sample using a i calibrated sampler at the proper flow rate with particulate filter and a charcoal filter (simulating a silver zeolite filter).. The direct radiation from each type of filter was measured with a beta / gamma survey instrument, as the filters were prepared by appropriate bagging and labeling for transfer to the mobile analytical laboratory. Wisely and properly, no attempt was made by the-Field Monitoring Team to perform detailed analysis in field locations under these adverse field conditions. l f Simulated KI was distributed to the field monitoring teams prior to their deployment from the BRC staging area. The field team leader instructed -the teams to take K1 at 11:06 a.m. The field team simulated this action following this instruction. The field team was dispatched to a state roadside park on highway 144 to transfer the collected samples. After a period of waiting for the courier. field team #1 was dispatched to the staging area. In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,16, and 34 were met at this' location. DEFICIENCIES: None. 3 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 89 1 text in Section 2.1.1.3. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None. f 2.1.1.5.2 Field Monitoring Team 2 By prior agreement with FEMA, the field monitoring team personnel from the l Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) and Department of Public Safety (DPS) License end Weight Service were prepositioned at the BRC staging area in Granbury, i Field monitoring team 2 was comprised of one BRC health' physicist and one DPS trooper. The' BRC provided all monitoring equipment and supplies and the DPS provided a transportation vehicle equipped with radio communications.. Field monitoring team 2 was adequately briefed during the mobilization phase and the team members completed all appropriate equipment inventories and equipment operability checks prior to deployment to the field. At the direction of the I on-site E0F field team leader, team 2 was deployed to field monitoring location

64. Field team deployment was in accordance with the emergency plan procedures.

Field team 2 was issued a BRC hand held radio for use as a backup to the DPS radio that was used for primary field team communications. The DPS vehicle radio is a 32-channel unit which has the BRC Health Department frequency as well as all area law enforcement frequencies. Following deployment from the BRC staging area, the BRC team member contacted the staging area and requested that all communications from the field teams be relayad through the staging area to the on-site E0F during the 15 to 20 minute tr. nsit time to arrive at the assigned field locations. This relay request was prompted by the BRC team member's knowledge of " dead spots" en route to the field location, in the l. m m

4 j g y'=.,- 39 ) \\ instructions to take K1 to the field monitoring teams at 11:06 a.m. Field team i ~ 2 simulated ingestion of Kl'immediately following receipt of the instructions. .Fleid monitoring teams 2 and 4 demonstrated a shift change. Team 4 arrived at' location 64 at 1:32 p.m. and relieved monitoring team 2. Team 2 ) Y VC returned to the BRC staging area and_ turned in their monitoring equipment and-completed their exposure. record forms. j Insummary,FEMAexerciseobjectives 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 34 were met j at this location.- DEFICIENCIES: None. . AREAS REQUlk NG CORRECTIVE ACTION: 89 1 See ARCA 89-1 text in Section 2.1.1.3 4 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR !MPROVEMENT: None. 1 t x 2.1.1.5.3 Field Monitoring Team 3 This field nionitoring team, part of the BRC second shift, arrived at the P BRC staging area at-10:30 a.m. from their pre-staged position in Granbury. They 1 immediately initiated an inventory and operational check of their equipment. They also obtained appropriate dosimetry and K1 thyroid blocking agent. At 11:30 a.m., an excellent pre mission briefing was provided to all second shift BRC personnel prior to their deployment to operating locations < The team was then directed to stend by for further directions from Field Team Control at the EOF. At 12:47 p.m., the' team received a further telephone' briefing from Field Team Control and was directed to deploy to its first field location. s As the team was departing from the staging area, they attempted a communications check and discovered that their radio had lost it's programming. I The DPS. sergeant at the staging area re-programmed the radio and the team then departed. The team tried several times to communicate with the field team that they were replacing, and with Field Team Control at the EOF. Each attempt was unsuccessful. Following their arrival at the first assigned location, the roadside park located on State Road 144 north of U.S. Highway 67, they made several additional attempts at communication, moving north and south on highway 144 to locate e point where radio transmission was possible. During 'all movements, the team maintained .a' constant monitoring posture for airborne radiation. When communication was established, the team was directed to proceed to monitoring point 43, where a well drilling crew had been reported, and direct them to safer areas. On arrival 'at"the monitoring point, no crew was found. The team then . attempted to report to Team Control but was, again, unable to effectively communicate. After shifting location to monitoring point 33, the team was able to re establish communication. They were directed to stand by for later directions. The team read their dosimetry frequently during the exercise. They a also simulated consumption of K1 thyroid blocking agent in accordance with directions. ~

y 41 ] t include DPS team personnel should be communicated via telephone in order to remain in contact with the EOF.- Both field monitoring and sampling teams were provided with direct-reading dosimeters (0 200 mR and 0 20 R) and a permanent record dosimeter (TLD). The dosimeters were zerced and initial readings were recorded on 'an exposure record form. The BRC team member was very knowledgeable of radiological exposure control procedures. Personal protective clothing and equipment (e.g., respirators) were available. Although one team-member was to completely put on all necessary protective clothing, this event was simulated and adequately demonstrated through.the verbal description of how to don and remove the clothing. A respirator was also available for the Department of Public Safety officer who provided and drove the field monitoring vehicN. However, the respirators were. not stored in sealed bags in accordance with procedures. in addition, no smoke tubes were available to determine and test proper respirator fit. Field monitoring team 4 was provided with appropriate equipment for deter-mining field radiation measurements. They had both low and high range survey instruments along with a backup instrument. All survey instruments had been + recently calibrated during 1989, and were operationally checked, both with bat-tery and'with a radioactive soure.e. Upon departure from the staging area, the survey instrument was on and remained so until the team returned to the staging area. Ambient radiation monitoring was accomplished in accordance with their procedures. All survey readings were properly recorded and the information was eventually relayed to-the EOF due to communication problems. The team did encounter problems finding county road 318 off of route 56. Excellent initiative was displayed by the team members who informed their leader that county road 321 would end near the point where road 318 was indicated to i be present on the map. Whereupon, their leader concurred and requested a soil sample be taken at this point. State field monitoring team 4 described verbally the equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10 microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases. Team 4 represented a second shift team which was sent to an area about three miles from the reactor site. All necessary survey instruments were available to conduct radiological monitoring for airborne radiciodines. Team 4 was not directed, by Field Team Control, to demonstrate their ability to conduct airborne radioiodine monitoring, the team members instead adequately described the procedures they would follow. The State field monitoring teams have the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and should be able to promptly perform laboratory analyses. Field monitoring team 4 had all the necessary equipment to obtain particulate samples in the airborne plume. Their survey instrument and air pump had been recently calibrated during 1989 and were operable. However, the team was never instructed by their leader to obtain

4 43 ) radios. The team members expressed some concern over the poor communications - capability available to them. During the pre deployment briefing, the team was told that they should eretend to go to one location, the intersection of Highways 56 and 51, northwest of the CPSES, but really go to a different location, the intersection of State Roads 144 and 67 east of Glen Rose.

Then, they were told to actually establish the traffic control point in a roadside park approximately 1 1/2 miles north of that intersection. These instructions 1

proved to be a source of some confusion during the early stages of the exercise. The remainder of the pre deployment briefing was excellent as all information available at the staging area was provided to the departing teams. j The team departed the staging area at 10:05 a.m. still somewhat confused over their " pretend", "real" and " actual" setup locations. While en route to their destination, they attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish communications, with field team control, using both the cellular telephone and the hand held l radio. They arrived at the " actual" traffic control point location at 10:34 Following their arrival, they made numerous attempts to' contact BRC field a.m. team control to report that no law enforcement officer (State DPS Trooper) had arrived at the TCP. The State DPS trooper initially assigned to man this traffic / access control point reported to the County EOC, was issued dosimetry and departed for the TCP., While en route to the TCP, he was diverted to respond to a REAL emergency call. Thus the lack of law enforcement support at the TCP was the result of this diversion and was permissible under the exercise parameters. Several fragmentary, garbled, messages were overheard on the BRC hand held radio, including the declaration of General Emergency, recommendation to take KI and the evacuation recommendation for certain sectors. However, despite many attempts, no transmissions from the TCP were acknowledged, by any other operating site., The cellular telephone was, itself, a poor communications system as most calls could not be completed and, when calls did get through, they tended to breakup and lose clarity. When the second-shift DPS trooper l arrived, communication, via law enforcement radio, was possible but not utilized. However, this system relies on relaying information and is subject to misunderstanding and confusion. l-Following setup of the traffic control point, the first activity occurred when a car containing two workers from a simulated drill rig site arrived at the TCP. Despite some initial confusion caused by the absence of a TCP law l enforcement officer, the vehicle and personnel were appropriately handled, L monitored for contamination, and directed to report to the nearest decontami-l nation center. Shortly after their departure from the TCP, the site controller advised the team that there had been an accident approximately 1/2 mile north ' of their location. After some discussion, one team member was dispatched to the accident site to investigate. He quickly assessed the situation and returned to the TCP where the newly arrived second shift DPS officer made a radio call requesting an ambulance. The ambulance crew was briefed on the situation when they arrived at the TCP, and a member of the team accompanied them to the accident site for monitoring and contamination control support. The second shift contamination control team reported to the TCP at approximately 1:15 p.m. and was provided a briefing by the first-shift team leader. During the briefing, another player vehicle arrived with an individual l requesting access to the (simulated) plume area. The need for his entry was l. 1

a 45 t t to the accident scene, but to another scene closer to Stephenville, no further response to this accident activity took place at this TCP. A shift change of all TCP personnel was accomplished at approximately - ( 12:30 p.m. The second shift was thoroughly briefed and the first shift held a short critique prior to their departure from the TCP. In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 6 16, 20 and 34 were met at this location. Objective 4 (communications) was not met during the exercise but met during a remedial drill held September 6,1989. DEFICIENCIES: 89 1 See 89 1 text in Section 2.1.1.3. l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None, I t 2.1.1.6 BRC Mobile Laboratory The BRC Mobile Laboratory was located adjacent to the ' Hood County-Courthouse Annex (BRC Staging Area) in Granbury. All of the BRC State staff, including the laboratory staff, assembled at this location. The staff demonstrated adequate knowledge of the procedures for receiving - and analyzing environmental radiation samples resulting from a radiation release i at Comanche Peak. Because FEMA and the State agreed in advance that the laboratory staff could be prestaged in order to meet required timeliness, mobilization was adequately demonstrated. Dispatch of the laboratory staff in a real crisis would be from Austin, Texas. l The mobile lab communications consisted of a BRC radio-and a commercial telephone. At times, the radio was difficult to hear. The radio was not used by the laboratory other then to monitor field monitoring team activity so they could prepare for the reception of samples. After collecting air samples, the field monitoring teams sent them to the lab by courier. The lab checked the samples for contamination, logged them and placed them in proper counting cells for counting. The sampies were counted according to standard procedures. The data was then phoned to dose assessment at the EOF. Hard copies of the datt. were faxed to assure the correctness of the data transfer. The mobile lab adequately demonstrated a shift change by replacing the first shift with the second shift "in toto" at 12 noon. Both shifts were very knowledgeable about all aspects of the lab operation and performed their duties very professionally and enthusiastically. In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 34 were met at this location. I 1 m -n v-

47 l-contingent of "real world" electronic and print media representatives, were conducted during the exercise. The conferences were well orchestrated by two utility officials, one representing each shift. Information presented during each conference was first discussed and prioritized at a pre briefing among the various conference spokesper. sons. Rumor control activities at the News Center were directed by a rumor control manager,. who exhibited an outstanding degree of dedication and professionalism, along with a staff of 11 persons who responded to more than 300 calls during the exercise. Several of the exercise rumor callers reported being able to overhear exercise information being broadcast over the public address speaker system. Some of this information had not been approved for public release. The rumor control manager recognized this problem and instructed her staff to attempt to prevent announcements being overheard. We recommend that permanent steps be undertaken to minimize the possibilities of callers overhearing announcements of information not yet cleared for public release. A shift change in the News Center was expeditiously and efficiently demonstrated between 12:30 1:53 p.m. with key staff members from the outgoing staf f briefing personnel of the incoming staff, in summary, FEMA exercise objectives 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 and 34 were met at this location. DEFICIENCIES: None. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

Description:

Several of the exercise rumor control callers reported being able to overhear public address system announcements while they were on the telephone. Some of this information had not been cleared for public release. Recommendation: Undertake appropriate actions to minimize the possibilities of rumor callers overhearing announcements of information not yet cleared for public release. 2.1.2 Local Government Operations 2.1.2.1 Somervell County E0C The Somervell County EOC is located at the Law Enforcement Center in Glen Rose. Personnel manning the facility effectively demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use Emergency Classificatinn Levels (ECLs) through the implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. ECL notifications were received from CPSES over a dedicated ringdown telephone and the ECLs were appropriately posted on the EOC operations chart. mum iii

49 transportation was arranged by the County School Superintendent, who served as the transportation coordinator. Evacuation of students at a day care facility, two scout camps and for.the transit dependent was coordinated from the EOC. Reception centers were notified of the impending arrival of evacuees. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was demonstrated as a mini scenario, out-of-sequence exercise before the EOC had been fully activatt The staff demonstrated the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. DPS troopers and County Sheriff's deputies manned traffic and access control points in the County. Communications with personnel at these points was maintained by the She-iff's office, which also kept officers informed-of changes in protective actions. Traffic controllers responded to simulated impediments on the Brazos River bridge in a timely manner and removed the impediment. Personnel at the EOC properly demonstrated the ability to identify the need for and call upon the Federal Government and other outside support agencies for assistance. Although Federal assistance was not needed, assistance was requested for simulated equipment through the Disaster District 6A Disaster Committee and the Division of Emergency Management. The ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis was successfully demonstrated with an actual shift change. Briefing of the incoming staff was excellent. Coordination of the evacuation of the on site personnel through Somervell County was made with the Sheriff's office for traffic control assistance. The Somervell County Judge, the entire EOC staff and all the volunteers are to be commended for the enthusiasm and professionalism displayed throughout the exercise. In summary, FEMA exercise objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. 16, 18, 19, 20, 26, 34 and 35 were met at this location. Objectives 32 and 33 were met under Section 2.2. DEFICIENCIES: None. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 89 3

Description:

Two EBS messages failed to list protective action areas in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries, even though the public was advised to refer to the maps in previously distributed brochures. (NUREG 0654 E.7) Recommendation: All PAR areas should be described in EBS messages in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.

b - +._ 4

• 51 j

DEFICIENCIES: None. l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None. j ) 2.1.2.1.2 Squaw Creek Park Evacuation Demonstration Squaw Creek Park, located adjacent to CPSES, is a recreation area which includes a 3,600 acre lake. Recreational activities at the park include boating. fishing, scuba diving, swimming and camping. Access to the park is contro11ea by an operations center which can communicate with CPSES via radio and telephone. The operations center also maintains an internal radio. system and outside commercial telephone lines. Park visitors must register at the operations center security gate upon entering and exiting the area. The registration process at this location is halted once an alert is declared at the i pl ant. Throughout the exercise, evacuation alerting procedures at the park were thorough and professionally handled. Upon declaration of the Site Area Emergency at 9:23 a.m., evacuation pro-cedures were initiated. A siren system encompassing the entire shoreline of the lake can be heard all the way to the park operations center. Additionally, 3 two boats are assigned to run shoreline routes with sirens to alert any boaters of the need for evacuation. By using a DRS 100 device which can emit a beeping sound 25 feet underwater, divers are alerted.about the need to evacuate. The device is used at designated spots and at any spot marked with a diving flag or an empty boat.,Another siren system alerts inland visitors to the park about evacuation. g During the exercise, alerting at the park was completed by 10:05 a.m. Given the number of people at the park on the day of the exercise, evacuation l-would have been completed b;.10:15 a.m. Officials at the park effectively demonstrated planned procedures. 2.1.2.2 Hood County E00 The Hood County E0C is located in the Law Enforcement Building in L Granbury. There is a 24-hour dispatcher in a communications room to monitor the l-utility hotline and other backup communication networks. The Hood County EOC Sheriff's dispatcher received a call at 7:48 a.m. from the utility notifying them of an " unusual event" at the plar.t. The dispatcher. made a call to the Hood County Judge notifying him of the event. The dispatcher l began notifying EOC staff, by telephone, with an exceptionally well organized, t up to-date call-down list which was completed in 13 minutes. At 8:30 a.m., the l EOC received an Alert notification. The staff began setting up the EOC at 8:30 a.m, hooking up dedicated phone lines and arranging a staff working area. At 8:45 a.m., the Hood County Judge declared the EOC activated and held his first full staff meeting at 8:55 a.m. The EOC received a Site Area Emergency i

,..q .!= S3 L end was transferred to the Fire Station Emergency. Worker Decontamination Center for decontamination. The ability te make appropriate protective action decisions based on relevant f actors was demonstrated by,the Hood County Judge and his staff. Protective action recommendations received from the State and utility were reviewed by the EOC staff and used as a basis for decision making. Hood County - officials effectively coordinated activities and resources with the Somervell County E0C prior to-implementation of protective actions. During the exercise, Hood County formulated and acted upon two separate protective actions which included sheltering in Area 4D and evacuation of Area. 4C. The ability to initially' alert the public within the-10-mile EPZ and begin-dissemination-of an instructional message within 15 minutes of the decision was demonstrated at Hood County. A free play message which called for the evacuation of Area 4C in Hood County was interjected by the Controller at 10:19 a.m. This activation was . initiated out of sequence with the scenario in order to assure that later recovery and reentry demonstrations would occur. Initially, the injection of the controller message caused some confusion with the County afficials because the message contradicted the status of the ongoing emergency. Just prior to controller interjection, the E0C received from the utility a PAR which conflicted with the controller message. After clarific'ation of this discrepancy by the controller, the Judge made the decision at 10:33 a.m. to evacuate Area 4C, and authorized siren system activation.at 10:35 a.m. Concurrently, the judge directed his staff to generate an EBS message.and to contact WBAP Radio. Station to broadcast the subject message at 10:35 a.m. Thus, the 15-minute A/N requirement was adequately met. Proper procedures were followed to activate the sirens (simulated) and tne EBS message was relayed to the radio station. Somervell County E0C was notified of the implementation of the prctective action by the Hood County E0C and a hard copy of the EBS mess' age was transmitted to the News Center. The ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in timely fashion after the Alert was demonstrated by the County EOC. At 10:57 a.m., the decision was made, based upon PARS received from the State and utility, to shelter in Area 40. Sirens were activated by Hood County at 11:02 a.m. and the second EBS message generated by Hood County was transmitted to the EBS station at 11:00 a.m. EBS messages contained all required information, including familiar landmarks and boundaries for - the affected planning areas. The' EOC was equipped with a radio for monitoring EBS broadcasts. 4 The ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner was performed by the Hood Cour.ty E0C in the following limited manner: the-PIO generated Hood County news releases and transmitted them via the facsimile machine to the News Center at the Comanche Peak EOF. These news releases included information for the public complementing fBS information. Each news release was approved by the judge before dissemination. The News Center is responsible for dissemir dng all news releases to the public. Rumor control at the Hood County E0C was demonstrated when the judge received a call concerning a rumor regarding the sirens. He handled this appropriately by passing along the correct information. The judgewasvery

.m 1' v.$, N 55 t Objectives 32 and 33 were met under Section 2.2. DEFICIENCIES:.None. l / AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None, q AREAS' RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: t

Description:

Some organizations represented.at the EOC were not i . included in the periodic briefings conducted by the judge.- l Recommendation: It is recommended that all organizations represented i in the EOC participate in these periodic briefings giving their.- organization status. 7

== Description:== . Several improvements should be made to the displays to 1 enhance their effectiveness, j Recommendation: Suggested improvements would include an overlay for plotting the plumc on the EPZ map, a' larger and more readable EOC L operations chart.an ECL display placard showing current level, and-a t L , board or flip chart showing events and time (timeline chart). [ 2.1'.2.2.1-Hood County School Evacuation Demonstration ~ l A well formulated plan exists for guiding the Hood County, schools in j implementing ' protective action measures should an emergency occur.

The

( p Superintendent of Hood County schools received the message recommending evacuation at'10:35 a.m. He immediately summoned two assistants and directed l: ' them; to notify the 'other schools.of the impending evacuation. The k - Superintendent then called his transportation supervisor at 10:411a.m. and -instructed him to summon his bus drivers for the evacuation. He'then notified - the Granbury Police Department and requested assistance for traffic control, at 4" which time an officer was dispatched to Middle School. At 10:59 a.m., the bus arrived at Middle School where it was met by two simulated students, one teacher and one nurse with simulated medical records. The teacher-provided the bus driver a form reflecting the total number of students boarding his bus. If it was necessary to issue KI and/or dosimeters, this would be conducted by the Hood m County E0C staff. Each bus driver was issued a packet containing maps which depicted routes to the relocation center. Officials stated there were. sufficient buses to accommodate all students in the school system. Buses were not equipped with radios, but they have been ordered. Evacuation of the school was demonstrated by the Middle School principal. Four rooms were evacuated and once the entire school was empty, a physical room-by-room search was conducted by school officials. When total evacuation was completed, the bus departed the Middle School at 11:03 a.m. and arrived at the Cleburne Reception / Care Center at 11:50 a.m. Adequate sheltering was available and administered by the American Red Cross. l p + y

i s, 57 .i c a' functioning of the survey meters. He also recorded and announced the background radiation level. Survey. meters in use.were: 1) one Eberline ion chamber (used- - to alert staff of any high level radiation hazards in the room); 2) one Ludlum-model 177 : survey meter; and, 3) two Bicron portable' friskers. All units had been calibrated within the last three months. At the hospital, dosimetry was distributed to the decon room personnel by the buffer. zone assistant. The assistant was careful to record the dosimeter 10 numbers and match them with the social security number of the staff member-to whom they.were assigned. The assistant did not zero the units or record the-initial readings on the dosimetry log sheet. When asked about this by.an evaluator, she indicated that this job was done by the -utility during their routine checks of the supply cabinet. The dosimetry distributed consisted of a single O to 200 mR pencil dosimeter and a TLD badge. The ambulance crew did not know the authorized exposure levels but were supposed to ask at the plant. The same was.true for authorization to incur a-dose in excess of authorized limits. The HP from the plant stated that authorized-exposure for this mission was 50 mR. The HP collected dosimetry equipment for the ambulance crew and recorded readings on log sheets. .The dosimetry packets. made up for. the ambulance crew contained only one exposure record capable of holding 12 people, it is recommended that each staff member have their own exposure record to ensure that all exposure records are properly recorded in case the crew gets split up. The' patient arrived at the hospital at 12:58 p.m. The entrance to the decon room is separate from the regular ER entrance and was roped off and well marked with radiation danger signs. The ramp to the decon room was covered with herculite and taped. An HP from the plant performed the following functions to ensure contamination control at the entrance to the decon room: - Took area smears on ramp - Checked his feet - Checked patient area of ambulance and all areas touched by patient and Crew. After the gurney on which the patient had been transferred to the decon room had been brought back out, it was thoroughly monitored. The victim's shoes read 150 CPM and were rolled up with the ramp cover. The ambulance crew was thoroughly monitored beformand after they removed their anti-contamination clothing. Good technique was demonstrated by the plant HP. The crew checked clean and was allowed to place the gurney back in the ambulance. The crew was dismissed back to the EMS area. The HP monitored the ambulance including wheels, floor, and air filter. The HP declared the area clean. He then reported to the decon room to assist the other HP, who was also from the CPSES. The transfer of the patient from the ambulance to the decon room was very smooth. The decon staff consisted of; three persons who actually performed the decontamination function (ER director, head nurse and another nurse), an HP from the utility and a buffer zone assistant who recorded the vital signs as they were reported by the decon team. Once inside the decon room, the patient was transferred to the decen Extreme care was used and the transfer was accomplished with minimal gurney.

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59 p p o .. Des'cription: Ambulante ' dosimetry kits contained o'nly one dosimetry record document capable of recording the readings of 12 persons. j; Recommendation: Issue individual record documents so each .i emergency worker can record his/her own dose readings. 2.1.2.3~ Stephenville Reception / Care Center .The County Judge of Somervell County notified the Mayor of Stephenville of the need to activate the Reception / Care Center. The mayor, in turn, called the reception center manager and staffing began at 10:50'a.m. The first staff o arrived at 11:07 a.m, and the reception center was fully staffed at~11:30 a.m.. l r -The ' Red Cross-handles the congregate care, with ' the City of Stephenville-- handling the registration, monitoring and decontamination. The. Stephenville' R/C center & M/D station is located in a recreation-hall / gymnasium which is in a city park. A large covered pavilion is also located just east of the recreation hall and provides a very good assembly and waiting area for the evacuees until they can be monitored, decontaminated.(if required,), registered and processed. Access to the park can be easily i controlled. t Evacuees arriving at the Stephenville R/C Center & H/D station are directed by Stephenville police officers to the vehicle monitoring station. The Stephenville' Fire Department will then monitor the vehicles for contamination. + i The contamin'ated vehicles are parked in a designated area, to be decontaminated ,later. A fire department pumper truck is available -to wash down the ~; contaminated vehicles. The clean vehicles are sent to a designated parking area u near the recrea' tion hall. There is adequate parking for both contaminated and L 'non-contaminated vehicles. Evacuees are then directed to the: personnel monitoring station. Clean personnel are directed to the registration desk where their registration data L is entered into a computer. The evacuee is then directed to the Red Cross desk L where vouchers are. issued for food and housing at local restaurants and motels. The contaminated evacuees would be directed to either the men'.s or ladies' m shower facilities for decontamination. After showering, the personnel _are monitored again to ensure they are free of contamination. The decentaminated o personnel would then be issued temporary clothing and directed to the }' registration desk. With a few exceptions, the Stephenville R/C Center & M/D station is a very good facility to receive and register evacuees and then send them to local motels and restaurants for care. M The communications for the rectption center consisted of three telephones, l a facsimile machine, and police and fire department radios. This provided adequate communications for the reception center staff. A complete shift change was conducted at 1:00 p.m. by all staff, including the State BRC support personnel at the R/C Center. I l [lJ I..: 5

k' J y j %=u g,- - 61 V Recommendation: Training for local emergency workers should i be expanded to include information on the meaning of the allowable radiation dosages and the rationale for the. difference ' between the State and local-allowances, especially.for personnel operating outside the plume exposure EPZ., 1 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

Description:

. Monitoring of arrivir.g-evacuees, at the entrance door to the R/C Center,'could create _a " choke-1 1 point" that would restrict access to the center, even if multiple monitoring points were established. Recommendation:. The entire " flow" of evacuees, from their ' vehicles, through personnel monitoring, and into the R/C- ' Center needs to be reviewed, and more workable procedures established.

== Description:== Management of the flow through the male decontamination area in the R/C Center is very complex. t Since decontaminated men must exit the area through the-same narrow door by which they entered, there is a possibility of recontamination of their feet by stepping on contamination in the entranceway.. r ' Recommendation: Careful planning, and training of decontamination personnel.is required to minimize this potential problem. Opening a new exit from the men's room decontamination area l would be a permanent solution to the problem. a Descript. ion: The disposable gloves available at the R/C Center were too small and,'in some cases, split when -personnel _ tried to put;them on. Recommendation: _ Provide gloves in a range of sizes for use-at the Reception / Care-Monitoring / Decontamination Center. 1 2.1.2.4 Har'ris Hospital & Stephenville FD Ambulance The Harris Hospital in Stephenville'is-a well-equipped and well-staffed -facility. At.10: 25 a.m., the Somervell County Sheriff's Department notified the - hospital that :175-180 evacuees from Somervell County were being relocated to Stephenville and that the hospital would be receiving patients from this group. Hospital emergency room personnel immediately began preparing for receipt of injured contaminated individuals. Personnel immediately proceeded to dress out in protective clothing and the treatment area was appropriately prepared and marked within 16 minutes of the notification.

.4 y 63' . DEFICIENCIES:' None. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:.None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: None. o 2.1.2.5 Cleburne Reception / Care Center f The Cleburne Reception / Care Center (and Monitoring / Decontamination Station) at the Cleburne High School _ girls' gym was staffed and ready to receive evacuees by _11:10 a.m., although the actual calls and contacts made to mobilize the staff were not observed. Adequate staff were present from the police department (traffic control. and security), fire department (monitoring and decontamination), water department (monitoring and decontamination), Red Cross (registration and congregate care), ambulance crew (medical support), and animal control (to care for evacuees' pets). j l_ Communications systems available at the center included a cellular telephone and the police department's mobile command van, equipped with a self- ~ contained power supply and' radio contact to 16 agencies. Also, the Red Cross

registration desk-was equipped with a facsimile machine.

The facility had communic'ation links to all E0Cs, hospitals and other-participating agencies. No problems or delays in communications were observed during the exercise. All emergency workers were provided two direct-reading dosimeters, reading maximum exposures of 5 R and 200 R, and a TLD.. Proper instructions were.given to each worker to read and record any exposure detected. y l! The monitoring / decontamination station had enough capacity to accommodate the number of evacuees and emergency workers expected. There was ample parking space at the facility for both clean and contaminated vehicles in separate lots. Security personnel, signs, and barriers' were used to separate clean and i L contaminated personnel and equipment, l For this exercise, two vehicle monitors and six personnel monitors were mobilized for each shift; rosters indicated the availability of more monitors. Acceptable monitoring procedures for.both personnel and vehicles were g demonstrated. Monitors wore gloves and used survey meters with plastic bags over the probes. They monitored 'all areas of vehicles or persons thoroughly. However, some inconsistency was observed in the speed at which persons were monitored; times ranged from 1 minute 30 seconds to 6 minutes 40 seconds for clean individuals, and longer for contaminated individuals. Clean individuals were given a clearance tag and sent to the registration area. For contaminated ~ individuals or vehicles, records were kept of the levels and location of contamination. I Decontamination procedures were in accord with the plan, using men's and women's shower / locker rooms equipped with instructional

placards, floor coverings, bags for contaminated clothing and waste, soap, shampoo, cotton swabs, and towels for cleaning. Floor coverings were used between the initial monitoring area and the shower / locker rooms, and within the locker rooms, but not in the initial monitoring area itself. Procedures were reportedly in place.

but were not demonstrated during the exercise, for monitoring and control of

n.g ,h, l ( 8,. [ LAREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

Description:

Some' inconsistency was observed in the speed at which persons were monitored;-times ranged from'1! minute- ~ 30. seconds to 6 minutes 40 oconds for clean individuals, 1 and ~ longer for-contaminateo individuals. j Recommendation:. Continued practice and. refresher training should be.given to develop consistency in appropriate monitoring speeds. .J-Description: Floor coverings were not used in the initial monitoring area. Procedures were not demonstrated for monitoring and control of ground contamination in that area after contaminated individuals had passed through. Recommendation: Consider covering the initial monitoring area'for ease of. cleanup. 3 1 2.1.2.6 - Walls Regional Hospital, Cleburne and Glen Rose VFD Ambulance Service-Both the staff of Walls Regional Hospital and the staff of the Glen Rose VFD Ambulance Service were well equipped, professionally trained and generally !? knowledgeable regarding the demonstration of their duties throughout this f-exercise. U At 11:00 a.m., the Somervell County Sheriff's office alerted the' VFD Ambulance Service to be on standby. Three ambulance crew members arrived and were issued dosimetry kits. The ambulance --crew - did know their -radiation exposure. limits. At 1:00 p.m., the Sheriff's office called the ambulance service to request them to respond to an accident on Highway 144 involving a possible injured / contaminated patient. The hospital emergency department supervisor was also notified to prepare the area-for the possible reception of an injured / contaminated patient. f At about 1:10 p.m., the ambulance service crew arrived at the accident site, surveyed the area and the patient for contamination and administered medical care. The patient was immediately.and appropriately wrapped to prevent the spread of any contamination. The ambulance crew advised the hospital at 4" 1:25 p.m. that they were en route with the patient, who, besides being injured, had been verified as being contaminated. En route to the hospital, vital signs and contamination levels of the patient were transmitted to the hospital. Excellent communication was demonstrated with each transmittal. 'i Meanwhile, at the hospital, the receiving staff was donning protective [ clothing. Each person was issued a 0-200 mR dosimeter and a' film badge. The ambulance arrived at the hospital at 1:45 p.m. and both the ambulance crew and hospital receiving staff demonstrated an appropriate transfer of the patient from the ambulance stretcher to a hospital stretcher, The ambulance and crew were then properly monitored by hospital health physicists. No contamination was indicated and the ambulance and its crew were released. (

2 1-

• .y

?, 67 same ' time. Even within a specific s phase, action - items may. be undertaken simultaneously or otherwise modified to meet the situation. 'The four phases as ~ defined by the State of Texas are reentry, restoration, return and relocation. At the beginning of the exercise, the. participants were provided with-1 information such as plant status, areas evacuated, location of evacuees and information concerning where and what kind of. radiation' samples had been taken by field monitoring teams. They were also.given the preliminary findings of the mobile laboratory based on an analysis of the aforementioned samples. A. footprint of the impacted area was being determined. by the State Bureau of. Radiation Control. Considerable _ discussion was generated around the table from the local ) . judges, the State, FEMA and the utility. They examined each of the four phases and made inputs as to what each would be doing and what additional assistance . ould be' needed as the exercise progressed. w The issue of compensation to the residents of the effected area was ~well explained, including the role of the legal staff.at the plant, the American i Nuclear Insurers and the Price-Anderson accountant. Dur,ing the course' of the exercise,- the participants gave detailed attention to the following: -1. Decision making 2. Medical support' 3. Physical relocation 4. Accident assessment 5. Agricultural products handling 6. Animal, husbandry 7. Handling of displaced persons

8. - Alternate highway routes 9.

Communications problems The following impressions were expressed by the Federal evaluators:

1. The high level of c'ommitment on the part of the utility, i.e.,

offering space at the plant for a Federal Response Center'and a News Center, as well as the hiring of contractors for the clean up. 2. The strong emphasis that was placed on' the importance of public information. 3. The thoughtful discussions of long range issues such as: moving f arm animals l soil removal f security for evacuated areas psychological effects on residents clean up issues such as washing of buildings, applying fixatives,etc.

B i 1 . ;7 2.3.2-BRC' Staging Area. The staff manning the BRC Staging Area in Granbury demonstrated their ~ ingestion pathway' exercise objectives professionally and in a-timely manner. Written procedures. were followed and a sampling' plan was. initiated. Decisions were made based upon known releases,' equivalent dose projections and . laboratory analyses of samples collected. Samples included milk, water, vegetation and soil. Both preventive and emergency protective actions were formulated and implemented.- o Public information activities, including the writing and distribution of press releases developed from information provided by State field monitoring teams, were-adequately handled by two BRC representatives. Overall, personnel-manning the facility demonstrated a thoro' ugh knowledge and awareness of the significance of radiological data, procedures to determine if PAGs were exceeded and the appropriate ingestion pathway recommended actions. All' organizational expertise was represented to sustain a long.. term effort. 4 i Regarding equipment, it is recommended that the protective action status 1 display board be enlarged or modified to accommodate the numerous entries which 'l need to be posted during the ingestion: pathway phase of.an emergency, q l FEMA exercise objectives Nos. 29 and-30 assigned to the BRC Staging Area .for the ingestion pathway phase were met. The State and the utility are in the ]" process of developing' a report involving total population dose exposure which, when completed, will. adequately meet objective no. 31. The objective 31 report was received by FEMA Region VI on September 13, l '1989, j DEFICIENCIES: None. AREAS' REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None. l i -AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

== Description:== The protective action status display board is not l Jadequate to handle the volume of. status entries which must be L posted. Recommendation: Use of acetate overlays or flip charts. 2.3.3 BRC Field Teams l p 2.3.3.1 Sample Collection Team 1 j This sample collection team was made up of a Texas Department of Health, Milk and Dairy Products Division Regional Inspector and a BRC Health Physicist. For training purposes, a new Health Physicist assigned to the Arlington, Texas office of the Texas Department of Health accompanied the collection team. The i

m a a y 73 ~ received most of their. feed from pasture grazing and he also determined that the milk in'the bulk tanks was less than 24 hours old. The BRC team member collected a water sample from an open stock watering tank near.the dairy barn. A soil and a pasture vegetation sample were collected from the area where the dairy cows were grazing. - All samples were collected in accordance-with BRC ' procedures. Following sample collection, the BRC team ' Emember double-bagged the samples to prevent cross contamination.. 'The dairy sanitarian should have been involved in this procedure, e.g., holding the clean outer bag, open to receive the sample. The samples were labeled, indicating sample location, sample type, and collection date, ~ in summary, FEMA exercise objective 27-was met at this location. DEFICIENCIES: None. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

== Description:== The dairy sanitarian field team member did ,not adequately' assist the BRC team member during the sample collection and bagging process. Recommendation: Provide additional training, to all team members, on sample collection / bagging assistance techniques. 2.3.3.3 Sample Collection Team #3 l The field ' sampling team was provided with. direct-reading dosimeters (0-200 mR and Oc20 R) and.a permanent record dosimeter (TLD). The dosimeters were zeroed and initial readings were recorded on an exposure record, form. The BRC team member was very knowledgeable.of radiological exposure control procedures, u The State field sampling team demonstrated the use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples. of vegetation, food crops, milk, water and animal feeds. Field sampling team 3 was made up of Health Department personnel (e.g., one BRC and one Milk and Dairy person) who were sent from the staging area to two dairy farms. The farms were located north of 4 Meridian and north. of Cransfills Gap' where milk, surface water, animal feed, vegetation, and soil samples were to be collected. The team was provided with sampling equipment; however, some equipment described in procedure 10, page 44, for collection of milk samples, such as a funnel and special plastic gallon container, was not available. 1 L The other samples collected were in accordance with BRC procedures. The /- procedures do not include references to marking the sample collection location .so that the spot can be located later for additional sampling, if required, it l' is recommended that the BRC procedures be revised to require the team to monitor their environment (simply good health physics practice), and to require some form of marking of sample collection locations. l

.m L (4 'L.:,; 73c .t'" -{ r 3. TRACKING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT EXERCISE DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. Individual exercise site narratives, in Section 2 of. this report, have provided listings of Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Corrective Action, with' corrective recommendations, noted during the July 25-26, 1989 exercise. The evaluations ~ were based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set'forth in Section 11-of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1,..Rev. 1 (November 1980), and pre approved - FEMA exercise objectives, and have been approved by the RAC Chairman, FEMA Region VI. The FEMA Region VI Director is' responsible for-certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies and/or Corrective Actions noted' in the exercisewill be corrected, and that such corrections will be incorporated into emergency response plans as appropriate. l FEMA Region VI will request that the State of Texas, Hood andLSomervell L Counties, submit measures that they will, or intend to, take to correct those L problems noted in this report, if corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region ~ VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for scheduling and implementing the corrective actions be provided, if such - actions cannot be instituted immediately. On September 6,1989, a successful Remedial Drill was held to demonstrate that corrective actions had been accomplished. to remedy the communications Deficiency (89-1) and the overall Area Requiring Corrective Action on field; team ' communications (ARCA 89-1) identified in the exercise. L Table one'provides, by exercise operating location or. activity group, a

consolidated summary of. all Deficiencies and/or Areas - Requiring Corrective Actions.

As previously noted, there was one Deficiency identified during the July 25-26.1989 exercise-which was corrected in a Remedial Drill conducted September 6, 1989. The Table is designed so that space is available-to add: (1) i: the proposed corrective actions that will be undertaken by the State or local jurisdiction, and (2) the projected, and actual dates of completion of these actions. 1 L l l

L ~ d ~,. ,._g 3 h 4e"- s; _ g* - f Y zl ~ q. l z no~ liet e ._ 9 eet tl a cpD A m Q-o -C dd ~ nn eay c eee t nu - 6 aoq d ti e er' Std t et cA ebf .f A rmi o f t er eo g t p ~~ nv 'np ioin aet t o mS e t ci e i cet ded era h e rn gt m leoi e e vCm w#R E r n "Ai9 t e ^ A ot "C r6 e R u9 M mD FI Ad1 F n d o ei st e oet pl a o pD rm P o-C-o' d' es po" r .Pen ) o g t.i ( t c l A e ce _.f" av ti t d c ne arr ) o - SC ( e ta - t S .. g 7 '4 5 e 3 - 6 c N 0 ne ~ ,Cr F e f 2 Rf t e H g MR 'I !? - e d.e ev si) Ait s ~ Mcc( 4 E r eo F ejN sb EO e g s-nC n f iC c f s sdne i A f a_ rR n O CenS i - er on mnon-l/ o I RhoB d sli o aaiie eAi T Bt M e ibe ei e,t t c e r st t cni ntdhSo mah gMt C D ont uam saon eE c A NS -n RF e AM eel t F pd n u acade cen e,n r E A e e Dsl e h cieli o Tect shr V FE w,i g urnt t i nseo OT tl T neeot ei at o I o df eit c eiC T E eo i h ec t w l eeb r w C C b rCst w ef t r eegpem f t R u ,svot A r E ENI no ,i oaeea e e Ft rrl e mi c n iheoia - o R i snB n rf R TR o O O oCes iecrt i hc f pet / ns C TT n i h msdt een t tiCd pr ) d on AI o t mt aea rwo a dR nCa d aG el e e, B 'd nio C N i aa eird c d n Sere t ati I SO t cedTc l ,t . n N nl t i o, e o e a e fei. n ct NM p iTn neeyuel e m o sA a R O i n agelil bt o mu reerhi n ,s D. r ud nocft er s C e d I ITt c nl,i gi enmt o e wt t t e n en U ( i

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~ 7 z.:,. m- - g g eyx W. j'M y-.' '$e' , n-t ,.a '- ' TAftt.E I (Cont'd) i ,e FEMA Deficiencies and/or Areas Regeiring Esercise proposed. FDEA Ewelmation of State end Actual: Corrective Act ion - with FDtA/RAC - Ob jective MtmEC 0654 State (S) and f.ocet (L) resposed - Completion Local Corrective Actions and Completion Secomumendations for Coerection No(s) Reference' . Corrective Actions-Date Determination of Adequecy .Date AREiS REQUIRINC CURRECTtTE ACT!ON [COiiF ) O 87-2 Desc ri pt ien t Plant conditions were not 10 1.10 1 Apprsweiste corrective action FFMA Realen TT accepts the m f actored into BBC dose pro-will ta initiated and reestte State proposed' corrective jections in a timely meaner. demonstreted at the next actions. Results *All be More than one hour elapsed schedeled eserciso.

• • atested at the nest esercise.

' bef ore the projections I secounted for the loss of the containment spray, and some time elapsed before the toss of the NEPA filters. doe to the hydrogen emple-sion. was included. Recomumendat ien t .~ provide additional training to dose projection personnet -4. stresetag 'he need for 1 timely updates.7 the com- " 4 poter progree with current plant conditions. n V W a s .e s

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FEMA ProposeJ FEMA Eweleetion of State end Actual-t 1: Deficiencies endfor Arecs Regelring Esercise Comptation 1,ocal Corrective Acttone and 'Completies ~ l~ Corrective Action - with FEMA /RAC 0%)ective NURFC 0654 State (S) and I.ecel (t.) Proposed l, R4coan=*ndetions for Correction No(s) Reference 1 -- Corrective Act ione. ' Date, t> termination of Adequacy. Date- .a KEEAS RfQUIRINC CORRfCTIVE ACTIO98 (C6 sin) Recossmendation: Ensure that dosimeters are correctly zeroed or initial readings are recorded. STEPHEWWILLE RECEPTION / CARE CEllTER 87-5

Description:

1.ocal Emergency teorkere are 21 J.12 Appropriate corrective action I FEMA Region VI accepts the > ellowed, by their proce- -will be initiated'end results State and local proposed dures, e sessiseum esposon of "demometrated et the nest-corrective act ioers. I 25 ree. None of the person- 'echeduled esercise. Resette witt be eweleeted et the nest esercise. nel knew the meaning of this number related to e reading on their instrumente. Also, State personnel, et the R/C -.4 Center ere required to E@ report when their espeeeres. reach 200 mR, and to leave the eres et esposures of IR. This difference could cause confusion. a. -Q,- l e / ' ' A [ Q u -.s_,-; 4

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' TAl!I.I! 1 (Cont'd) -e p.,.,, 1 q u. y y_ ,~ . FEMA Froposed . FEMA Evelection of State end Actuel Corractive Action -- with' FEMA /RAC. Ob ject ive. IIUREC 0654 State ($) and Local (L) Proposed Completion 1.ocal Corrective Actiong and _ Compl et t es " a neficiencies and/or Areas Regoiring Esercise Ricon=endations for Correction No(s)- Reference Corrective Actions-- Date Determination of Adequacy Date il s.g alfas REQUIRINC CORRECTIVE ACTlost koiiT 0) Rec omunende t ion: Review the procedures for conteeinstion control of personal belongings, and enswee that ett monitoring personnel receive contiewed training and practice in correct procedores. 81-7. Descriptient Some sospling equipment for 27 1.8 Appropriate corrective action FEMA Region VI accepts the-will be initiated and results Stele proposed corrective milk. described in State actione. Resette will be -.y.. procedures, wee not incloded ' demonstrated at the nest ' evelveted at the neat y C in the team egoipment hit. schedoled logestion pathway esercise. esercise. Rec omunendet ionI An - All equipment necessary for conducting milk sempting ehould be provided to field esepling teams. l. l-1 P l '. ~ m . - -.~. .v.~ a:,:.. +,. ;, _a ,;.=:. w, =. ,m.m,~_-.---...,,..-.

it V '{' 'q'> 3r ' 1,: 1 . TABLE 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met as of September 15,'1989, at the Comanche Peak Station I With one exception,:all 36 FEMA Exercise Objectives,.for the initial six year. exercise cycle,-were met at either the-1989 exercise or the subse-s quent Remedial Drill. The single remaining-objective to be met ist 36' Demonstrate the ability to carry:out emergency State and locals response fonctions (i.e., activate EOC's, mobilize. Not met staff that report to the EOC's, establish communications linkages and complete a telephone E call-down) during an unannounced /off-hours drill .or exercise. L l t p L r i 9 A. f ,'.f 5

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-a. , ? re - TADt2 3 (Cent'af) - ~ ' rege 4 of 9' .g -' Objective Jurisdictionet D ficiency or Ares 3 .et this' - Responsibitity Seguiring Correctice - Dste Ob kttive Het NUREC 0654 Eserciee' Date of Action (By Tracking. 3 FEMA Objective Number and Description _ seference (Ves/No) ~ 5 tate Local Esercise ' Number end Date).. State Local (el ORJECTIVE 13 - (Old Oh). No.14425) E.S. E. 7,. Y I. I F/26/89 ARCA $9 F/26/89 F/26/99. - F/26/89 FMEECENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION C.4.b - Somervel1 Co. E.0c - tv=onstrate the abifity to coordi-(S&L) nate the forestation and disseelne-tion of acevrete information and instructions to the pobtic in a timely fashion efter the initial start / notification has occurred ORJECTtvE 14 - (Old Ob}. No. 24) C.3.e. C.C.e Y I I F/26/59 , F/26/09 i F/26/89 MEDIA BRIFFINCS (54L) Demonstrate the ability to brief the

• edia in en accurate, coordinated sad timely meneer i

OeJECTtyt 15 - (Old obj. No. 26) C.4.c (S&L) e I I - 7/26/89 F/26/89 - 7/26/89 I RUMon CONTRot (. Demonstrate the ability to establish i and operate rumor controt in e l. coordinated and timely feehton ' l oeJECTtyt 16 - (old Ob). no. 21622) J.to... J.to.f Y -I I F/26/s,. 7/26/89 F/26/89 Et FOR EMERCENCY WORMERS (S&L) Demonstrate the ability to make the ]( decleien to recesmeend the ese of El 4 to emergency workers and lootite-tionatised persons, so well se to l, distribute and administer it once I the decision hee been made l l W W w= 9 ,,,.m-, w ,m.-#- 4--e,.u. g p um o

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_2 a,* - t ; "..~ : 7._.. _ _ " ~.,, ..~- .3: '~ ~, y :. ;, s c :.. + ~ m TAftl.E 3 (Cont *J ' p.g, g,g 9, . j 7, - .m .g. ~ c ~ :, objective ' Joel od ic'tional Deticiency er Arce - ..tiete Objectl=e seet et this Responsibility Requirine Carrective puREC 0636 Esercise Bate of Action (By Tracking ( TEMA Objective Number and Description Reference (Tee /No) State' Local _'EmerCise Number and Dete), State .14cel{oI esJECTIVE 21 - (Old Obj. No. 27)- J.12 (L) -Y-R F/16/87 ARCA 89-).'Ff26/89 !7/26/99 6ECISTRATION. Moultoaluc ANO DECON. Stephenwitte RfC Center. APCA 89-6 Demonst rate the adequacy of preced- .F/26/89 Cleboene eres facilities, equipment, and R/C Center-personnet f or the registration, radiolemicel monitoring and l decontamination of evacuees ORJECTIVE 22 - (Old Obj. No. 20) J.10.h (L) T I 7/26/89 7/26/09 ConcRECATE CARE OF EVACUEES Demonstrate the adequacy of facili-l I ties. equipment and personnel for l the congregate care of eveceees 06JECTIVE 23 - (Old Obj. po. 30) L.4 (L) Y I 7/26/09 7/26/09 EMERCENCY MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION r l Demonstrate the edegsscy of vehiclee equipment procedores and personnet f ar trenoporting conteminated, iujured or esposed individuelo OBJECTIVE 24 - (Old obj. too. 31) L.1 (L) Y x' 7/26fe9 7/26/89 ME7tCAL SERVICES FACILITIES f go ' Demonstrate the adequacy of hospitet Iacitities, etelpment, precedeces and personnet f or handling con-teminated injured er esposed individoeto l 4 d I h ' I. ,,,. -... ~, _... _;.2__.-,,

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/ ' TAftt2 3 (ContM) - - -~- " c-~* ~ Fece 8 of 9 g.. .. e. ~ ' chjective Jeriodictional ikficiency er Aren at this Responsibil it y Requirine Corrective Date Ob ketive net NUREC 0656 Emercise . -Date of Act ion (By Trachirg. ~ FEMA Objective Number and Descriptism Reference . (Tes/No). -St at e '- 'tecal Esercise .Numher and Date) : State ,t.ocet(el 09JECTIVE 29 - (Old Obj. No. 11) 1.10; I.tl, T l I.$- 7/26/89 -- F/26/89 INCEST 10N t105E P903ECTION' J. 1 i'Mannetrate the abilit y to project (S) dsteite to the public f or ingestion pathway esposure and to determine tpyrepriate protective messores based on field data. FDA PACS and other relevant factore 08JEcitVE 10 - (Old Obj. No. !!)- J.9 J.lt Y I 7/26189 F/26/09 INCESTION PROTECTIVE ACTION INFLE. (S) Demonstrate the ability to implement. ~ both preventive end emergency pretsetive actions for ingestion pathway hasards 083ECTtTE 31 - (Old Obj. No. 33) N.4 (5) Y -I 7/26/e9 7/26/89 - TUTIL POPtft.ATION E2po$URE Demonstrate tne ability to estimate totst popetation esposure OestCTtwa 12 - (one obj. no. M) n.1 (sst.) Y -x .x 7/26/s9 - r/26/e9 - t/26/e9 N CONTROLLES REENT9Y AND RECOWERf "~ Demonstrate the ability to eteretse 'ppropriate messeres f ee cesstretted reentry end recewery based on utimated population espesure. EPA PACS asd other relevant fetters g a ..3 c a s 9"+ n_. gN-'p-wwg .+a9 Jaisi-9N- y %U-Y 89 g .me#,9 g'* fi g.

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