ML20006A049
| ML20006A049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1990 |
| From: | Bright G, Cotter B, Harbour J Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| CON-#190-9698 89-584-01-OLA, LBP-90-04, OLA-4, NUDOCS 9001250138 | |
| Download: ML20006A049 (40) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
. E OF SECRETARY OCMCIING & S[eVICL Before AdministrEtive Judges:
!iRANCH B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman Glenn O.
Bright t
Jerry Harbour j SERVED JAN I31990 2 #N 221990 In.the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-250-OLA-4 50-251-OLA-4 i
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT (Pressure-Temperature COMPANY Limits)
(Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 ASLBP No. 89-584-01-OLA and 4)
January 16, 1990 i
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Ruling on Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Proceeding) f Licensee Florida Power and Light Company moves for Summary Disposition of the remaining contention in this challenge by Intervanors, the Center for Nuclear Responsibility and Joette Lorion, to amendments to the licenses for the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 nuclear power
-plants.
The challenged amendments changed the technical specifications governing combined pressure and temperature (P/T) limits for the operation of the two units.
Licensee's
. motion, filed pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 2.749 (1989), is supported by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff 9001250138 900116
-PDR ADOCK 05000250 O
PDR op L. -
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(Staff).
For the reasons set out within, we grant the motion.
i I.
BACKGROUND A.
Procedural
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i.
r Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are 760-Mw pressurized-water reactors'which began full power operation in 1972 and 1973, I
h respectively.
The reactors are operated in accordance with Technical Specifications approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Because the reactors operate under high pressures and temperatures that, inter alia, affect the steels making up the reactor vessels, pressure-temperature (P/T) limits were specified for the first 10 years of effective full-power operation.
By the end of 1988 the two units had not quite achieved 10 years of effective full-power operation.
During 1988 Licensee applied for license amendments for p
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 in anticipation, in part, of the expiration of the P/T limits for the first 10 years and the need to establish new P/T limits applicable up to 20 years of effective full power operation.
Amendments No. 134 to License No. DPR-31 for Unit 3 and 128 for License No. DPR-41 were issued on January 10, 1989, following Staff issuance i
s
,JV of a. Safety Evaluation and a Final Determination of No Significant Hazards pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 50.91(a) (4)
(1988).
The amendments incorporated revised P/T limit curves governing the service life for each Turkey Point unit up to 20 effective full power years (EFPY).
Following a 1988 petition to intervene and oral c
argument, Intervenors were admitted to the proceeding along with two of their three contentions as modified by the Board.
Florida Power and Licht co., 29 NRC 493 (LBPs89-15, 1989).
By letter to the Board dated September 8,
- 1989, l
following an exchange of information between the parties, Intervenors withdrew Contention 3 which concerned the
)
' revised P/T limits as they might be affected by the copper
~,-
1 content of weld material.
The remaining contention at issue here, contention 2, questions whether Licensee's calculation and prediction of the P/T limits for the reactor vessel materials of Turkey Point Unit 4 meet the Commission's requirements for such l
programs.
Contention 2 reads as follows:
L That the revised temperature / pressure limits that have been set for Turkey Point Unit 4 are non-conservative l
and will cause that reactor unit to exceed the L
~
. requirements of General Design Criterion 31 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, which requires that the reactor l
coolant pressure boundary be designed with a sufficient margin to insure that, when. stressed under operating, l
maintenance, testing, and postulated accident i
conditions, (1) the boundary behaves in a non-brittle manner and (2) the probability of a rapidly propagating fracture.is minimized.
-petitioners contend that the new i
pressure / temperature limits could cause the reactor vessel to exceed these requirements because the Licensee has based its calculation of the predicted RTNDT for Unit 4 partly on surveillance capsule V test results from Turkey Point Unit 3 rather than predicting the RTNDT for Unit 4 based on Unit 4 capsule V surveillance capsule data -- a practice which is not i
scientific, not valid, and could cause.the Unit 4 reactor to behave in a brittle manner which would hake the chances of a pressure vessel failure and resultant meltdown more likely.
Petitioners contend that predictions.of RTNDT and pressure / temperature limits derived from the shift in nil-ductility transfer should be based only on plant-specific Unit 4 data, especially in light of the fact that the only tests ever performed on Unit 4 weld specimens demonstrated that the weld material in the Unit 4 vessel was 30% more brittle than that of Unit 3.
Because Unit 4's weld material is more embrittled, Petitioners contend that the FPL Integrated Surveillance program does not meet the Requirements of 10 CFR Appendix G Parts V.A and V.B [ sic), and 10 CFR Appendix H [ sic), including Appendix H Parts IIC and IIIB [ sic).
Finally, Petitioners contend that the surveillance capsule V for Unit 4 should be tested to establish the new pressure / temperature limits and should the testing indicate that the RTNDT for Unit 4 has passed the 300-degree Fahrenheit screening criterion set by'the NRC, Unit 4 should be shut down until~it is demonstrated that the Unit 4 reactor pressure vessel can maintain its integrity beyond this limit.
Petitioners' Amended Request for Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene, pp.
7-8.
Appendices G and H referenced in the contention are appendices to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, u
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- f. so.
i i,
b i
In our earlier decision, we rejected, as an impermissible attack on a commission rule, that portion of Contention 2 that challenged the Turkey Point Integrated l
surveillance Program approved in 1985 pursuant to the Commission's rules under 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix H, 1 II.C. (1989).
Florida Power and Liaht connanv, 29 NRC 493, 503 (LBP-89-15, 1989).
We also rejected any issue with respect to pressurized thermal shock as being outside the scope of the notice of hearing.
Id. at 503-504.
Consequently, Contention 2, as admitted, was limited to i
whether Licensee's conduct of its integrated surveillance i
program satisfies regulatory requirements.
Two subissues subsumed in that question are:
(1) whether the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program has an adequate contingency plan; and (2) whether a " difference of less than 5% in the operating time between the two units is simply not significant and cannot form a basis for the contention."
Lt.
The ultimate question Intervenors ask is whether Licensee's testing program gives adequate assurance that the materials making up the beltline (roughly the midpoint) of the Unit 4 reactor vessel at Turkey Point will be tough enough over the life of the plant to function safely under
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. the pressure, temperature, and irradiation to which those beltline materials vill be subjected.
1 B.
' Technical The purpose of P/T limits is to insure that the reactor coolant's pressure and temperature during normal operation (including reactor heating, cooldown, and inservice and hydrostatic testing) are restricted so as not to pose the threat of brittle fracture of the reactor vessel.
Resistance to brittle fracture, also known as fracture toughness or ductility, is a function of the metal's chemical composition, temperature, and neutron irradiation.
Fracture toughness decreases:
(1) with decreases in temperature; (2) with increases in neutron fluence, and (3) with increases in copper and nickel content.
Neutron fluence means-the total number of fast neutrons-that have impacted on the metal as a result of operating the reactor.
Only the effects of temperature and neutron fluence remain at issue here.
As the reactor operates, neutron fluence causes the temperature characteristics of the metal making, up the reactor vessel to change.
Fou'r principles of the metallurgy of reactor vessels L
that b' ear on this dispute over the P/T limits for Unit 4 are the concept, calculation and prediction of:
(1) Charpy V-l
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notch tests; (2) the Reference Temperature for Nil Ductility f
Transition. (RT,); (3) Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART);
and (4). neutron irradiation.
These concepts form _the underpinning for the calculation of P/T limits which, as noted, are specified because, if pressure becomes too great, the metal making up the reactor vessel may become subject to t
the risk of brittle fracture if the operating temperature-is I
below a specified range.
Curves that plot the P/T limits are set out in the challenged amendments.
- Egg, e.g.,
Fig.
I 3.1-la through 3.1-Ic of Amendments 134 and 128.
I Charov V-notch Test.
The effect of changes in temperature on the fracture toughness of steel are measured by a standardized test known as a charpy V-notch test.
The energy of a hammer absorbed in fracturing a metal specimen gives a measure of the metal's fracture toughness.
Charpy tests performed over a range of temperatures have established that fracture toughness has three levels, an u
" upper shelf" at higher temperatures where metals exhibit tough, ductile behavior, a " lower shelf" at lower temperatures where metals exhibit brittle behavior, and a
- transition range of temperatures between the upper and lower shelves where the metal's behavior turns from ductile, or L
fracture resistant, to brittle.
l --
i
! I Reference Tammerature for Nil Ductility Transition.
t For typical reactor metals, the transition occurs within a i
. temperature range from 150 to 200* F.
Affidavit of Stephen i
A. Ccilard on Contentions 2 and 3, 11 7-12 (Collard Affidavit).
The Reference Temperature for Nil Ductility Transition (RT.,) is a standardized temperature selected to identify that transition, a somewhat arbitrarily defined boundary at which a giv'en rttal's behavior changes from L
ductile, or fracture resistant, to brittle.2 Adiusted Reference Temeerature (ART).
One measure of
[
l the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel's metal is the vessel's ART.
ART is the change in temperature of the reactor vessel calculated as a function of fracture toughness and change in fracture toughness plus a margin of i
' Mr. Collard is a metallurgist and Section Supervisor for the Codes and Programs Section of Materials, Codes and Inspections for Florida Power and Light Company.
Mr.
- Collard, B.S.,
Metallurgical Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn (1967), has completed post-graduate study in metallurgy.
He has 22 years' experience in failure analysis and metallurgical failure analysis with Consolidated Edison Company and Florida Power and Light
- company, 2
The RT is defined by the American Society y
of Mechanical, Engineers (ASME) Code,Section III NB 2331 as the greater of 1) the NDT, or 2) the temperature corresponding to 60'F less than the temperature where a sample exhibits 35 mils lateral expansion and can absorb 50 ft-lbs of impact during a charpy V-notch test.
Collard Affidavit, 1 13.
. safety.
Elliot Affidavit, 1 7.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission prescribes a method for calculating ART in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, " Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials" (May 1988).
Neutron Irradiation.
The final concept that bears on this dispute is the effect of neutron irradiation described in the Collard Affidavit:
When fast neutrons (i.e., neutrons with energies equal to or greater than 1.0 Million Electron Volts (MEV)) collide with atoms within a metal, the neutrons dislocate-the atoms within the metallic lattice.1/
These dislocations reduce the fracture toughness and increase the RT of the metal.
These effects become more pronounced"hith increases in the total neutron fluence (i.e., cumulative number of f.sst neutrons striking an area over time).
The shift in RT,
caused by irradiation is defined in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G.II.E as the temperature difference between the fracture toughness curves for an irradiated and unirradiated metal, when measured at 30 ft-lbs of absorbed energy.
In general, the incremental impacts of neutron fluenceonferriticsteelsarggreapestwhenthe fluence is on the order of 10 n/cm (neutrons per sqgare c9ntimeter).
When fluences are on the order of 10 n/cm, the neut'ron radiation damage tends to reach a saturation point and little additional damage occurs with increasing fluence.
1/
Neutrons with Ir.ss than 1 MEV (including so-called
" thermal neutrons") generally are insufficiently energetic to dislodge atoms from a metallic lattice, and therefore their existence may be neglected in considering notatron radiation impacts on metals.
In general, the energy spectra of neutrons escaping from reactor cores do not vary greatly among commercial reactors.
In a plant
S 4
- .such as Turkey Point which has reactors with the same' designs and fuel loading patterns, the neutron spectra on the reactor walls of the two units are. essentially identical.
Collard Affidavit, 11 14-15.
C.
Regulatory Requirements The NRC'regula' tory scheme establishing metallurgical requirements for reactor pressure vessels and a testing methodology for insuring that those requirements are met is set out in 10 C.F.R. Part 50 (1989).
Briefly, General Design Criterion 311(GDC 31) (one of some 53 criteria set out in Part 50, Appendix A) describes the design criteria i
'for fracture prevention of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, which includes the welds at the reactor vessel l'
beltline.
GDC 31 requires that L
i
... when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions (1) the boundary behaves in a nonbrittle manner and (2) the probability of rapidly propagating fracture is minimized.
The design shall-reflect consideration of service temperatures and other conditions of the boundary material under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions and the uncertainties in determining -(1) material properties, (2) the effects of irradiation on material properties, (3) residual, steady state and transient stresses, and (4) size of flaws.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, IV, Criterion 31 (1989).
.1 1
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To meet the foregoing criteria, 10 C.F.R. S 50.60(a)
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requires that.
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... all lightwater nuclear power reactors must meet the 0
fracture toughness and material surveillance program f
requirements for the reactor coolant pressure boundary set forth in Appendices G and H to this part.
f
. Appendix C, " Fracture Toughness Requirements", specifies requirements for ferritic materials, i.e.,
various carbon, i
stainless and alloy steels, over the life of their service as a pressure containment boundary.
To satisfy these fracture toughness requirements, Appendix G requires that I
e the material be tested in accordance with procedures set out in Appendix H.
The Appendix H tests must show that certain predicted fracture toughness values will be satisfied at the and of the service period, in this case 20 effective full power years (EFPY),
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix G.
Both Appendices rely on and incorporate by reference standard codes and procedures of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the American Society for Testing and Materials.
Appendix H authorizes use of an integrated surveillance program (ISP) for testing materials "for a set of reactors that have similar design and operating features."
Appendix H, 1 II.C.
Under the ISP, irradiated test materials from
A
. one reactor may be used to predict the fracture toughness of the materials in both reactors.
The ISP must be approved by the NRC Staff, and it must have a contingency plan
... to assure that the surveillance program for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operation at reduced power level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected.
Appendix H, 1 II.C.3.
Licensee $s technical specifications for the Turkey Point units require it to calculate P/T limits for those reactor vessels based on the Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) for the vessels using the method described in Appendix G to the American Society for Mechanical Engineers Code.
The methodologies used to calculate both ART and the P/T limits for Turkey Point contain a number of conservatisms, intended to establish a large margin of safety.
333, aanerally Regulatory Guide 1.99 Rev. 2 (May 7
1988).
It is worth reiterating the significance of these technical and regulatory requirements.
They are summed up in the Staff's Safety Evaluation of Licensee's requested P/T changes at page 6:
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@i 1The fracture toughness of the steel in a reactor pressure vessel wall is determined primarily by the
'following~ factors:.
(1) the particular material K
(composition and. metallurgical h19 tory),-(2) the accumulated' irradiation level (neutron-fluence) to a.
H
- which the: material-is exposed, and (3) the temperature
.of the material...In a reactor pressure vessel, 0-significant loadings result from.the. internal pressure
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and1 thermal 1 gradient through the. vessel wall-thickness
/
- during heatup and cool down.
Since the fracture toughness of the. vessel material decreases with 6ecreasing temperature,-P/T limita are required during
' normal' reactor operation.and tests to control operational stressesito the reactor vessel.
.Further. dure,:because'the fracture toughness of the vassel ne,arial decreases with' increasing neutron irradiation:(i.e., time duration of operation), a
' material nurveillance program =isfrequired.to monitor
. changes?in-the' fracture; toughness properties of the t
reactor vessel' beltline material over the. lifetime of the vessel.- The P/T limits are periodically revised to take11nto account additional test data from the j
surveillance progtum on the changes in the fracture toughness properties ~due to irradiation.
D.
Turkey Point Unit 4 The Turkey Point vessels, as they pertain to Contention 2, are described as follows:
~
..The designs of the reactor vessels-for Turkey
-Point. Units 3 and 4 are identical.
The reactor-vessels are cylindrical in shape, with hemi-spherical domes at each and'of the cylinders.
The reactor vessels are
~
approximately 40 feet high and 14 feet in diameter.
The. reactor vessels are constructed of carbon steel almost eight. inches thick, with a.156' inch (minimum) stainless steel cladding on the inside wal].
The Turkey Point reactor vessels were manufactured by welding together several cylindrical
'shell forgings.
Therefore, unlike most reactor vessels in this country, the Turkey Point reactor vessels only 1
+
av li -
m have circumferential welds and do not have any longitudinal welds.
The internal designs of the reactor vessels for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are also identical.
Each reactor vessel has a reactor core with space for 157 fuel assemblies.
Additionally, each reactor vessel has a thermal shield between the reactor core and the reactor vessel wall.
The purpose of the thermal shield is to reduce the impact on the reactor vessel wall of neutrons escaping from the reactor core.
Each of the reactor vessels for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 contains surveillance capsules.
These capsulas contain specimens of the material from the reactor vessel shall forgings and reactor vessel welds.
The capsules are located near the inside wall of the reactor vessel along the beltline region (i.e., mid-plane) of the reactor core.
Therefore, the neutron fluence received by the capsules is representative of the fluence received by the reactor vessel.
The capsules are periodically removed and tested to predict the impact of neutron irradiation on the materials in the reactor vessel wall.
Since 1985, the individual survedilance programs for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 have been integrated into a single program, and the results of this program have been used to predict the fracture toughness of the reactor vessels for both units.
Collard Affidavit, $1 3-6.
The most limiting, i.e.,
vulnersble, of the pressure vessel material at Turkey Point Unit 4 io the material making up the welds at the beltline.
Since start up in 1972 and 1973, the two Turkey Point units have had differing operational histories.
The capacity factors (that is, the equivalent percentage of time during the year that the reactors were operated at full power) for the two units have varied during certain years.
For example, Unit 3's capacity factors durir.g 3981, 1984,
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e.
1986, and 1987, respectively, weret (1) 16.1 percent; y
(2) 52.6 percent; (3) 75.9 percent; and (4) 15.3-percent.
The capacity factors during the same years for Unit 4 were:
'I t
(1) 78.5 percent; '(2) 81.8 percent; (3) 29.7 percentf and (4)~ 45.1 percent.- Collard Af fidavit, 1 68 ; 'Intervenors '
4 Response,:p.
21.-
In addition, in 1981, Unit 4 had two overpressurization events in which the pressure in the reactor coolant system exceeded the technical specification limits in one instance by_700, psi-and in another by 325 psi.
Collard Affidavit,-
1 69.
The levels were substantially below the reactor
+
-- vessel's design pressure of 2,485 psig and normal operating pressure of 2,335 psig.
Elliot Affidavit, 1 25.
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II.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 4
T 3
A.-
Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition 3
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" Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition of o
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-Intervanors' Contentions" (Licensee's motion) asserts that I
1 11tszconduct'of'the; Integrated Surveillance Program for i
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Turkey Point complies with regulatory-requirements and is 1
[3;
-conservative.
Licensee esserts that:
(1) Neither its-t Integrated Surveillance. Plan nor the difference in operating i.
Ltime between-the two units can form a basis for-a p.
contention; and (2) it has an adequate contingency plan.
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' Licensee's motion is supported by the Collard Affidavit.
We Y~
find Mr. Collard' competent for this purpose pursuant to 10 p
)
C.F.R. lS 2.'749 (b) ' (1989).
Egg fn.
1, supra.
b 1
5 U
Licensee: asserts that the calculation of P/T limits for
- periods up to 20 EFPY are based upon test'results from all j
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surveillance capsule material removed'from the vessels up to' u
w I#
3 We inadvartently directed Licensee to file a Reply to Intervenors' Response to Licensee's Motion for Summary '
L Disposition.
Because our rules do'not provide for such a reply (133 10 C.F.R. 2.749; Lona Island Lichtina Co., 26 NRC 201, 204 (LBP-87-26, 1987), raconsid. denied, 26 NRC 302 (LBP-87-29, 1987), we have not considered Licensee's Reply.
This' decision. relies solely on the record of the case prior to Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition, the Motion itself with supporting documentation, Intervenor's Response and supporting documentation, and the NRC Staff's Response and supporting documentation.
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h[
-h m Y 1985.and that that data is: sufficient for predicting the
- fracture toughness of the vessels.-
Licensee asserts that:
T.!/:
"In determining the effects of-neutron irradiation, the total amount of neutron fluence (and not'the rates or
-duration of accumulation) is what is~important."
Licensee's Motion,.p. 14.
Mr. Collard has calculated that the neutron fluences.in the two units differ by less than 3 percent.
Collard Affidavit,;p. 43, Table 5.
Consequently, Licensee asserts-that any-differences in operating history during-particular years are insignificant.
similarly, a 3 percent-difference-in total amount of neutron fluence is asserted to
'be insignificant and certainly not sufficient to require the
.use of:the material in the Unit 4 surveillance capsule V at this time.
. Licensee asserts further that two overpressurization events that occurred in Unit 4 in 1981 are outside the scope of'this proceeding because they occurred prior.to NRC
. acceptance of the Turkey Point surveillance program in 1985.
In addition, Licensee notes that NRC concluded in a March 1984 report that the two overpressurization events did not affect the structural integrity of the Unit 4 vessel.
Collard Affidavit, 1 69.
Licensee asserts that Intervenors' insistence that only Unit 4 data can be used to calculate the RT for Unit 4 is ug l
I
- l l
a1 challenge 1to Licensee's NRC-approved Integrated Surveillance Program used since 1985 in determining the P/T L
limits for Unit 4.
Licensee's Motion, pp. 17-18.
Licensee argues that Intervenors' assertion in regard to Unit 4 Capsule T,is' based on 1976 tests predating the Integrated t
Surveillance Program and, therefore, the assertion is
.outside the scope ofithis proceeding._ on the other hand, Licensee asserts that.the similarity in fluence and chemical composition of the Units 3'and 4 welds renders the 1976 Unit'4 test to be of.little significance.
Rather, Licensee continues, the higher Unit 4 test result is explainable by scatter in the test data or the difference in flux lot.for the Unit 4 weld material test specimen.
Collard Affidavit, 11 41, 43.
i l
Finally, Licensee asserts that in any event all the surveillance capsule data, including-the 1976 data from Unit 4, was_used to calculate the Turkey Point Unit 4 limits
-thereby insuring the conservatism of the ultimate calculation.
Collard Affidavit, 11-41, 43.
To test its assertion, Licensee had Mr. Collard perform a calculation to determine the possible impact on Unit 4 P/T limits without using the results of the Integrated Surveillance Program.
Mr. Collard's calculations showed that the results are "almost identical".
Collard Affidavit at,11 71-74.
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With respect' to tho' adequacy of: its contingency plan, 1.
Licensee asserts that Appendix A simply' requires ~that test' material;to predict fracture toughness will be available in the'eventTof an extended outage of a given reactor.
I 1
JLicensee asserts that-that contingency pertains primarily to
'l single unit plants which can be required to have comparable-irradiated material available from another source.
- However, z
Turkey Point is-made up of two units and, therefore, 4
comparably irradiated material is available from either reactor in the-event one of them experiences reduced power
' levels or(an extended outage.
s B.
Intervanors' Response "Intervenors' Rasponse to Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition'of Intervenors' contentions" (Intervenors' l Response): attached 24 exhibits.
Intervenors' response also includes "Intervenors' Statement of Material Facts as to
-Which There Is a Genuine Issue To Be Heard with Respect to Intervanors' Contention 2"- (Intervenors' Statement), and
. Attachment A, a letter dated October 18, 1989 signed by Dr.
George C. Sih, Professor of Mechanics at Lehigh University (Sih Letter).
Neither this letter nor the one included as Appendix 11, also from Dr. Sih and dated October 10, 1985, is in the form of an affidavit.
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LIntervenors' Response was completed with the electronic L
filing of!ther" Affidavit'of Joette Lorion on Contention No.
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Ms. Lorion is Director of the Center D
2" (Lorion Affidavit).
i L
for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc., and a professional research consultant.and analyst who provides research data p
.to writers,- lawyers and other professionals on a variety of L
.(Ms -Lorion' states that she has prepared the topics.
. responses to Licensee's motion and the accompanying
. exhibits.
Lorion' Affidavit, 11 4-5.
However, Ms. Lorion 1:
does not claim any' expertise in metallurgy, or in materials
~
q or mechanical engineering.
Nor does she provide any indication of training or specific experience, other than her-intervention efforts, that would qualify her to address the-technical issues in this proceeding within the meaning of-10 C.F.R.
2. 74 9 ( b~) (1989).
We cannot find her to be
-competent for subsection (b) purposes.
Intervenors assert that Licensee's calculations of RT,g and P/T limits are not conservative for Turkey Point Unit 4.
Intervenors contend that predictions of those
-limits should be based solely on plant specific Unit 4 data W
because-the only tests performed on Unit 4 capsule test materials in 1976 demonstrate that the weld material in the Unit 4-vessel is 30 percent more brittle than that in Unit 3.
Intervenors' position has four principal bases.
c-97 4
b b
E 5
4. '.
i First, Intervenors-assert that the loading history, u
Lthat is, the-configuration of.the fuel' assemblies in the cores of the two reactor-vessels, differs over a period of time. ' Second, Intervenors assert that the initial test
~
t results onlthe material withdrawn-from-Unit 4 in 1976 were h
[too high and did not agree with predictions.
- Third, Intervenors assert that'the different capacity factors in 4-a -^
of 16 years of operation would result in a different RT j
et
'for Unit 4.
In this regard, Intervenors contend that Licensee's measurements do not consider the effects of
" strain rate," and therefore are questionable.
" Strain rate," as.the Intervenors would apply it here, means the i
rate of deformation of either a sample undergoing Charpy V-notch testing, or~ local deformation rates "in the reactor vessel where defects nrevail.H Sih Ltr., pp. 1-2 (Emphasis added).. The first applies (by.Dr. Sih's own words) to the q
methodology for Charpy V-notch testing and calculations of ART and RT
,,-a methodology already defined by ASME and ASTM Codes-(incorporated by reference in Part 50), and the second 4 In support of this disagreement, Intervenors rely on
-their Exhibit-11, a letter from Dr. George Sih dated October
- 10, 1985 (apparently at p. 2).
Nowhere in this letter does Dr. Sih refer to, nor show any awareness of, fuel core design changes in the reactors.
It is tiot clear whether Dr.
Sih is referring to possible differences in core loadino histories or to structural loadina histories.
A fair reading of this letter suggests that he is referring to plant-specific differences in structural loading histories resulting from postulated pressurized thermal shock, an issue not within the bounds of this proceeding, i
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Lapplies to hypothetical ~ damage conditions beyond regulatory requirementsafor determination of P/T limits.
- Finally, i
Intervenors assert that Licensee does'not'have a wr'itten
' contingency plan as' required by Appendix H to account for' any difference.in capacity factors or to predict RT, in the event one of the units has an extended outage, i
.i C.
NRC Staff's Position The.NRC Staff' supports Licensee's Motion.
Staff's
~
l response"is-supported by the Affidavit of Barry J. Elliot.5 We' find Mr.'Elliot competent within the meaning of 10 C.F.R.
t
- Sf2.749(b) (1989).
. Staff, agrees with: Licensee that the Turkey Point
-Integrated-Surveillance Program has been properly conducted and meets the requirements of Appendix H to 10 C.F.R.
Part
- 50. : -Staff'also agrees that the procedures for materials y
5 Mr.-ElliotLis a Senior Materials Engineer in the L
Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch of the.NRC's Office-of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation.
Mr. Elliot, B.S.,
Materials Engineering, Rensaleer Polytechnic Institute (1988), has~ twenty years experience in materials testing, failure analysis, non-destructive examination test procedures and fusion weld procedures.
He has conducted
. reviews of the Turkey Point Integrated Surveillance Program and Licensee's report documenting surveillance data from Turkey Point Unit 3-Capsule V.
He assisted others in the preparation of the Safety Evaluation for the two license amendments at issue here.
If, 7
so
.n
- a
+
.l
\\ }'t
- samplingland-calculations have been performed'in.accordance
~
with; Regulatory. Guide.l.99, Revision 2, and agrees further p
that Licensee has a= contingency pl n that meets the-requirementsfof Appendix H.
Staff Response at'8-12.
l Nb:~
p..
Finally-Staff agrees withILi'censee that the i
calculation of total accumulated neutron irradiation 5
u"=
(neutron fluence) provides a more accurate measure of p.
p irradiation ~ damage and' fracture toughness than does a L
comparison of'the operating times and power levels of the
^
twoLunits.- 'Hence, Staff concludes that the-small difference U
1 in' operating times.of:less than 5 percent cnd the differences'in capacity factors and power-levels of the two units.are-insignificant and do not invalidate Licensee's calculations-and predictions based on the surveillance data,
.for RT,7;.and P/T limits for. effective full power operation
.up to 20.EFPY.
-J'_
4
h1 I.
d-) 2 1
a D.
Controlling = Law
(
fLicensee's Motion for summary disposition is filed pursuant to'10;C.F.R.-SL2.749 (1989).'
Section 2.749
. o
The-rule, in essence modeled after1 Federal Rule of
. CivilJProcedure 56f(ggg: Alabama Power Co.,
7 AEC 210, 217 (ALAB-182, 1974)), provides in pertinent part that (a) Any party to a proceeding may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for a decision P
-by the presiding officer in that party's favor as to.all or any part of the matters involved in the
.;p proceeding.
There shall be annexed to the motion a separate,'short and concise statement.of the material facts as to which the moving party contends that.there is.no-genuine issue to be
~'
heard..
Any other party may serve an answer
-supportingLor' opposing the-motion, with or'without affidavits, within twenty - (20) days after service
.of the motion.
There shall.be annexed to any answer opposing the motion a separate, short and concise. statement of the material facts as to which it is contended-that there exists a genuine issue to be heard.
All material facts set forth' in the statement required to be served by the moving. party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the' opposing party.
The opposing party may within ten days after service respond in writing to new facts and arguments presented in any statement filed in support of the motion.
No further supporting statements or responses thereto shall be entertained.
^
(b) Affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
The presiding officer may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary decision is made and supported as provided in this section, a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer, his answer by affidavits or (continued..)
I 1
g sh * "
j,.
4 y-authorizes any. party to move for a decision "in that party's
. c faverfastto allfor any part of the_ matters, involved in the proceeding."' The purpose of-the. summary disposition
_ procedure?is to avoid holding hearings on issues where there is no genuine dispute of material fact.
Statement of Policy gn Conduct of Licensina Procaadinos, 13 NRC 452, 457 (CLI-
,,* 8',
1981).
-ggg, Houston Lichtina and Power Co.,
11 NRC 542, 550--(ALAB-590,'1980).
Section 2.749 requires the moving party to file a statement of material facts as to which'"there is no genuine 4
i; issue toobe heard."
Those facts which are not controverted a
s will be deemed:to be admitted.
If the motion is supported
'(... continued) as'otherwise provided in this section must set J
-forth. specific facts' showing that there is a genuine issue of-fact.
If no such answer is filed, the decision sought, if appropriate, shall be rendered.
(d)_The presiding officer shall render the
,g decision sought if the filings in the proceeding, A
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material J.act and'that'the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.
i
~ '
~ _. -.
1 i
, 1 1
- by affidavit, subsection (b). requires that-the opposing party may = not: rest-on nere allegations or denials but must state specific? facts'to show that there-is a genuine issue
- ofl fact.- ' Absent such-a showing,-the decision sought shall be
- issued..However,. case law makes clear that the movant hasLthe burden of showing the absence of'a genuine iss'ue as toyany_ material fact.= Cleveland Electric Illuminatina Co.,
a S
- 6 NRC 741,.753-(ALAB-443, 1977).
Here, movant has filed an affidavit-in support-of its burden to establish the ebsence of a genuine. issue of material fact, a burden which remains even if.the opposing evidenticry material.is inadequate.
Seerld., citina, Adickes v.
S.
H.
Kress'& Co.,
398 U.S.
- 144,
- 159.(1970).. Conversely, the rule makes absolutely clear that Intervenors may not rest on " mere allegations or denials", but must answer setting forth " specific facts showing there-is>a genuine issue of fact."
10 C.F.R.
. S: 2.749(b); Vircinia Electric and Power Co.,
11 NRC 451, 453 (ALAB-584, 1980); gag clso First National' Bank of Arizona v.
Cities Service Co.,
391 U.S.
253, 289-290 (1968), reh'a denied,.393 U.S. 901 (1968).
L l-D 1
\\
l-l l
i
p ][
'~ ~
j si l
( );z;%.,'
.. s a u-1 '
y
(.
i j
III.- DECISION i.
ls A.
Undisputed Facts a;
i We have:gone to some length to. describe both the
^
!' subject matter of this dispute and the regulatory framework within-which it takes place because we'have concluded that, y
in essence, the matters raised by Intervanors are either explained by, Licensee or' constitute an attack on the methodology of the Commission's testing program for reactor i
vessel materials.
In short, Licensee's obligations in assessing margins'of safety for the pressure boundary are controlled by-the' requirements of Part 50. -In determining whether Licensee's work in this area adequately protects the public' health =and safety, they, and we, are bound by that regimen.3 The-undisputed facts include the following.- At the beginning'of' operation, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 each had eight reactor surveillance capsules containing material i
- specimens and dosimeters.
In each unit, five of the eight capsules contained material specimens of the shell forgings of the reactor vessel; the. remaining three capsules contained material specimens of the shell forgings, tha reactor welds, and material in the heat affected zones around the welds.
Collard, 1 37.
In 1985, the NRC issued
1 a
?
+,
l license amendments authorizing Turkey Point to conduct an'
' integrated surveillance program.
Under this program,_the
. results of, tests of the surveillance' capsules from each unit are combinedLto predict the, fracture toughness of the reactor vessels for_ Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
- Collard, 11 6,144-45.
u
- The fracture toughness of the Turkey Point reactor
.vesselst material is primarily dependent upon chemical Oi composition,- temperature, and neutron irradiation.
The fracture toughness of these metals decreases with decreases in temperature, with increases in neutron fluence, and with
Collard,-11 7-16.
~ The' purpose of Pressure / Temperature (P/T) limits is to ensure that, during normal operation, the pressure and temperature of the reactor coolant.are maintained within
' limits 1 sufficient to ensure an adequate margin against postulated brittle fracture of the reactor vessel.
- Collard, mi' 11_7-8.
To'date, three capsules containing weld specimens have been removed from Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, namely Capsule T.from Unit 4.and Capsules T and V from Unit 3.
Wald material is the critical material for purposes of calculating the Turkey Point P/T curves.
Collard, 11 27, mm__._.sm._s<.
A-----.-
- - ~ ' - -
m, YlO s
'[
s R ;id t
W:
i n
- i :,
~
'f o t
- h
-)
s Eg:
4 2.,
The measured results from all surveillance capsules are
'i it,
las follows:'
w Table 2 Results'of Charpy V-Notch Tests.for Wald Capsules by From Turkey Point Unita 3 and 4
,a t
Date~of Capsule' Delta f'
- c, M
Cansule Test Fluence'(n/cm 3 2
H
?
3 T'
1975 5.68 x 10" 155'F "E
4 T.
1975-76 6.05-x 10" 225'F 3
V 1985-1986 1.229 x 10" 180*F
- (Measured at.30 ft-lbs)
- Collard'Affidav'it, p. 30..
a lT' EThe. measured:resulta:from Capsules T and V from Unit 3 fell
.within'the predicted. bounds.. Collard, 1 43.
+
1 I
Li~censee has conducted its materials testing program in accordance'with Commission requirements as set out in Part 50 and Appendices G and H thereto.
Collard Affidavit 11 t,
l:;
37-49.
The results of.the Turkey Point Integrated tij.,
-Surveillance Program have mat the Commission's regulatory L,.'
requirements.
Elliot Affidavit, 11 15-17.
- 3. ;,
i e
. ~..
+
!E
- b 8
~30-flf!: ;j y
B.
Discussion t
l' Nevaitheless,'Intervenors challenge measurements and predictions of Unit 4's reactor vessel pressure boundary 1;
safety on the grounds that the results are non-conservative l
and not; scientific'because the results and-predictions are p
i F
not. based on data derived from surveillance capsule V in Unit'4.
~Specifically, Intervenors assert that Licensee's 1
[
.'ISP'does not satisfy regulatory requirements because:
(1)' the 1976 test data results from Unit 4 exceed-the bounds cof,the methodology-and require that future measurements for F
Unit:4.be made solely from Unit 4 data; (2) Licensee failed oto consider. matters such as strain rate, differences in core s
cloading and annual capacityLfactors between Unit 3 and.
Unit 4,-- and the effect of :the 1981 pressurization events in
~
= Unit'4 thereby invalidating Licensee's test results; (3) Licensee-erred in relying on Unit 3 data alone under the ISP;1and (4). licensee does not have an adequate contingency plan as required by Appendix H.
We are tempted to (and could well) decide this case in Licensee's favor on-the basis of the absence of a sworn affidavit by a qualified affiant in support of Intervenors' opposition to Licensee's motion, concluding that Licensee is entitled to a decision pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.749 (b) for
. failure to oppose the motion as required.
Vircinia Electric y
y
((d A
Q,
?l q i
I Power Co., 11 NRC;451 (ALAB-584, 1980).
However, we find
{
'that Licensee'has-carrried its burden of proof on the merits ni and~there remains no " genuine issue to be heard...
10
[,
- c.F R.~.S'2.749f(d); Public service Co. of New Hannahire, 17 NRC'1170,11174,-fn.4 (LBP-83-32A, 1983).
That conclusion is cinescapable from an analysis of-the pleadings.
i Intervenors' first basis for objection, the 1976 results from the Unit 4 surveillance capsule, simply misapprehends the significance of the measured result in the i
context-of'the methodology.
The Elliot Affidavit explains 1
1 1
in respect;to,the Unit 4 Capsule T surveillance sample
{
v i
results that the measured increase in RT of Unit 4 Capsule ag
~
' T l(225'F) is within the' range of scatter expected for the
.j data., While it exceeded the mean expected value of'172*F,-
j Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev.
2, provides that the measured
' values for the-increase should fall within two standard i
' deviations of the expected mean value, or within 172' i 56*F (i.e., 116' to 228'F).
Hence, the results from Unit 4-Capsule T provide credible data for inclusion in the integrated surveillance program.
Elliot Affidavit, at 11
~18-20, pp.-9-11.
See Collard Affidavit, 1 75.
- Moreover, the results from Capsule T have been included in subsequent predictions for pressure boundary safety under the Turkey Point ISP which uses data derived from both units.
Collard Affidavit, il 53, 56.
Consequently, the 225' degree
,Y
. ~..
, 4 t
f u
- n i4
- ~
i measurement in 1976'does not constitute a genuine issue of material fact.
l 1
Similarly, Intervenors' concern with failure to
' calculate strain rate, differences in core loading and annual capacity factors, or the: significance of the 1981 5
Unit 4-overpressurization events are matters either that are 3
not required.by the Commission's testing regimen under Part 50 or are accounted for by the ISP testing methodology
+
authorized atl Turkey Point.
Collard Affidavit, 11 59-70, t
= 75.. 'While'it appears that Intervenor's concern with strain
,.1 L'
rate'in fact relates tcr fracture toughness requirements for
- the dangereof Pressurized Thermal Shock, a matter'which has tbeen excluded?from;this proceeding (233, 10 C.F.R. 50.61 L(1989);;. Florida Power and Licht, 29 NRC 493, 503-504 (LBP-89-15,71989);- andLfn.
4, sunra), the simple fact' remains y
- that nowhere in.the methodology-for measuring and predicting p
fracture toughness for normal operations and postulated accidents is there any requirement to measure strain rate in y
the reactor vessel.
Similarly, there is no requirement for making separate calculations for the difference in types of fuel. assemblies loaded in the cores of essentially similar reactors.7' Finally, there is no requirement under Part 50 I
l 7 As Intervenors note, the changed fuel loading patterns are part of Licensee's program to reduce flux (and thus total fluence) on the reactor vessel walls.
Intervenors' Response, p. 19.
t i
jl pes";'
1 Lai 1
(. =7 1
D; '
w W:
' and the-Appendices and' codes upon which it is based for-
' calculating' fracture toughness based on periodic' differences inifluence_resulting from different annual capacity factors.
l'(~
3 l
As, Licensee'sl motion.and Staff's response make clear,
' the foregoing considerations are subsumed in the calculation i
of total fluence made at the time the surveillance capsules 1
are recovered ~for testing under the ISP..That calculation takes'into account.the entire history of measured results
- l since both units began operation, 133, aanerally, Collard and.Elliot Affidavits..
s
'Intervenors' assertions that the difference in v
operating-times and' capacity factors of the two reactors is i
significant is essentially a challenge to the Integrated
+
Surveillance' Plan (ISP).
Assertions regarding the o
significance.of different operating histories prior to acceptance of the ISP in-1985 go to matters already settled t'
at that time by NRC'S authorization of the Turkey Point ISP.
- Hence, these assertions-are beyond the scope of this proceeding and are not litigable.
We consider only those assertions regarding differences in operating times of the reactors since 1985, and those pertain only to whether the contingency plan should be implemented.
Appendix H to Part 50 provides that reactors k
- - - _ _ _ _. ~------ _.
p 8,
g{f4 i
~34-1 VE in the ISP must:have "similar" design and operating N
features.
It'does-not require idantisAl operating features.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix H,.II.C.1'(1989)'.
Averring that
- l they are important1only to their effect on total fluences, the operating differences are not disputed by the Licensee.
H L
}
-Licensee attests that, in 1985, the difference between totallfluence and EFPY for Units 3 and 4 was less than 10 L
fpercent..Since then, total predicted fluence through'the E
L and of.1990 has. decreased to.3 percent.
Collard Affidavit, k
11 59-62.
Because the difference in operating features h
between?the two Turkey Point reactors was acceptable in i
1985,'we find,..a fortiori, that a smaller difference today p
remains acceptable.
-There is rx) evidence that Licensee has done:anything
'other:than satisfy the requirements of the integrated surveillance program approved.for use at Turkey Point in 1985 pursuant to Appendix H..
That ISP specifically authorizes. reliance on the data from Unit 3 surveillance capsules.
Intervenors' objections to the nonconservatism of that procedure have been adequately answered by Licensee which has demonstrated that the procedure takes into account the differing procedure Intervenors would require.
In short, Intervenors, as noted above, would modify the E
}
{ { ;'
['I ' [
7,
a no.
1 L
pf ' -
I E
i l commission imposed methodology that Licensee is' authorized
'#and obligated to follow.
Those differing requirements can-p' only;be' imposed by:the commission and are beyond the
. jurisdiction of-this Board.
Consequently, Intervenors' remedy is.not a challenge to the Turkey-Point license amendments, butJrather, a petition for rule making seeking i
to revise.the testing program methodology.
Thus, if applicable to. contention.2 at all, Intervenors' objection to 4
i Licensee's reliance on Unit 3 surveillance capsule' data from 1977.to date'for predicting fracture-toughness for both g.
.unitsJis,'in the last analysis, a-challenge to the ISP methodology Licensee is required to follow.and must be
' dismissed as an attack on a regulation.
10 C.F.R. 5 2.758 (1989).
LIntervenors final objection, the lack of a contingency t-plan, is readily disposed of.
The Appendix H requirement for a' contingency plan is, on its face, satisfied by the existence of-two similar units each-with surveillance capsules installed.
Intervenors appear to feel that a separate, written statement titled " Contingency Plan" is
' required.
Intervenors' Response, p. 22.
However, we find no requirement for any such separate written statement beyond the description of the.ISP in the Turkey Point Technical Specifications.
Intervenors will have to settle for that.
The hallmark of Intervenors' position in this I
e :__:_
e
,w t
j;; :
ls.g case:is that:the." facts" upon which they rely are simply "not susceptible of the interpretation which (Intervenors) g sought' to give them. "~ First National Bank v.
Cities' Service
'.G9.a., ADIA, at 289.
~IV.
CONCLUSION g::.e f'
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
$ 2.749 (1989), the Board finds that Licensee;has met its burden of proof on Contention 2,
'l
_ that.there :is. no~ genuine issue of material. f act, and that
-Licensee'is' entitled to decision as a matter of law.
The i
.37 Board'is satisfied that the public health and safety will be.
. protected under Licensee's conduct of its integrated
' surveillance program.
Any matter raised by the parties but not addressed herein was found by the Board either to be
. irrelevant or not of significance to the outcome of this
.' decision.
m E
ORDER t
-For all the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is this 16th day of January,-1990 o
ORDERED
qub Nk?F W
a r
' N 4 s
i, I
h l '. -
That Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition of-
'Intervenor's Contentions is granted and License Amendment No.l134-for Turkey Point Unit No
~3 and License Amendment No.E128_for Turkey' Point' Unit No. 4 shall remain in full ~
k force and 'effect;-
?
?
\\'
2..
_That'this proceeding is dismissed, and i
s
- 3.:
That, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.760 (1989) of the Commission's Rules'of Practice, this Memorandum and Order shall become effective immediately.
It will constitute the r
final decision of'the Commission forty-five (45) days from the date of issuance, unless it is appealed in accordance twith 10 C.F.R.15~2.762 (1989)s or the Commission directs O.
L s Any party may appeal from this Decision by' filing a notice of appeal within ten (10) days after service of this Memorandum and. order.
Purnuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 2.762 (1989),
-each appellant must file a brief supporting its position on l appeal within thirty (30) days after filing its notice of.
appeal (forty;(40) days if the Staff is the appellant).
Within thirty (30) days after the period has expired for the filing _and service of the briefs of all appellants (forty
'(40) days in the case of the Staff), a party who is not an
' appellant may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the appeal of the other party.
A responding party shall file a single, responsive brief 2D12, regardless of the number of appellant's briefs filed.
4
---r
<r-
y, y
y 4
. (\\
~
'I.
o s
4-otherwise.. 3,gt A112--10 C.F.R. SS 2.764, 2.785, and 2.786 (1989).
[-
ATOMIC-SAFETY AND LICENSING
- BOARD 2 -__ Q,
hY Glenn O.
Bright Q
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
&f.
tt
. c.
Jesty Harbour ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE I
a d 6 1k rn B.' P a u l=- C o t t e r, J7.f Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JJDGE Bethesda, Maryland January'16, 1989 e
' h kd l t
3MDC
>\\
UNITED STATES OFTAMERICA vf *c NUCLEAR-RESULATORY COMMISSION i
l IP 1.
i-l' In-the Matter of t-
-FLORIDA. POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY l
Docket No.(s) 50-250/251-OLA 1
'(Turkey Point Plant. Unit Nos.-3 & 4) l' g -,~
l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i
1-hereby. certify that copies of the foregoing LB M60.(RULING ON MOTION...)
nave been served upon the following persons by U.S. eall, first classi except as'otherwise.noted and tn accordance with the requirements of to CFR Sec. 2.712.
2 t,
4
' Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Robert M. Laro.' Chairman-Richard F. Cole
- Atomic; Safety land Licensina board Atostc Safety and Licensing-Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory-Ccastssten U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commtssion
'Wasnington, DC 20555 Washington, DC. 20555 Administrative Judge Mitti.A. Young, Esquire Enneth A. Luebke Office of the General Counsel 1
5500 Friendship Boulevard, Act. 1923N U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission L Chevy.Chasei: MD 20815 Washington, DC 20555 4
h.
- Joette
- Lorien Director
' Center _for. Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Road, A30F.21~l.
[
Miami, FL 33143 s
7 Dated:at Rockville, Md. this 18 day of January 1990 Office of the Secretary of the Coastssion
'*HAS-BEEN SERVED BY FEDERAL EXPRESS IN ADDITION TO A MAILED COPY.
i-.
'~
- of :
- q L.<, o '
,-.y Pf' UNITED' STATES OF= AMERICA 4
?'
NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION l* g InJthe Matter'of I
4 FLORIDA POWER AND. LIGHT COMPANY I
Docket No.(s) 50-250/251-OLA-4.
1-1 Turkey l Point-Plant, Unit 1Nos. 3 & 4) !
I I
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 4
1.hereby certify-that copies of the' foregoing LB M60 (RULING ON MOTION...)
- have been served upon.the.following persons by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted'and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712.-
y At'omic Safety and L'icenst'nq Appeal Administrative Judge Board; B. Paul Cotter,.Jr., Chanrman U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomte Safety and Licensing Board
- Washington, DC-20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
' Washington, DC 20555
-Administrative Judge Administrative Judge
- Blenn 0 11right-Jerry Harbour
-Atomic Safety.and' Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
'U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission
-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington,.DC 20555 Janice E. Moore, Esquire Patricia Jehle, Esquire 0'fice of the General Counsel Office ofLthe General Counsel-f
.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ~ Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cor.aissior.
Washington, DC-20555 Washington, DC 20555 Harold F Reis, Esquire Joette Lorton, Director Attorney for-FP6L Center for Nuclear Responsibility Newman % Holtzinger, P.C.
7210 Red Road, #200 1615'l Street, N.W., Suite 1000 Miami,'FL 33143
' Washington,~DC 20036 Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.
Executive Director Nuclear Energy Accountability Project 1202 Sioux Street Jupiter, FL 33458 Dated at Rockville, Md. this 22 day of January 1990 W.'...............
-Office 0cf the Secretary of the Commission
..