ML20005E013

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Forwards Diagnostic Evaluation Team Rept for Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2. Root Causes for Plant Performance Problems Includes Weak Corporate Leadership & Oversight & Involvement Coincident W/Period of Site Mgt Weaknesses
ML20005E013
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1989
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Maulden J
ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML20005E014 List:
References
NUDOCS 9001030123
Download: ML20005E013 (4)


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December 21, 1989 Docket Non:

50-313 50-368 4

Arkessas Power and Light Company ATTN:- Mr. Jerry L. Maulden, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Post Office Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Dear Mr. Maulden:

SUBJECT:

DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION TEAM REPORT FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE This letter forwards the Diagnostic Evaluation Team Report for Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO).

The onsite evaluation was conducted over the period August 21 through September 1 and September 11-15, 1989, by a team of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters and regional evaluators with team leadership and support provided by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data.

This is an NRC evaluation program that is intended to provide an independent assessment of licensee safety performance.

Following the conclusion of the onsite evaluation, the preliminary findings were discussed at an exit meeting on October 18, 1989, with you and other Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L) corporate and ANO plant managers.

The NRC effort involved a broad-based evaluation of overall plant operations.

It addressed the capability of ANO management and programs, and the policies, leadership,'and direction provided by AP&L to support and improve the operating performance at ANO.

Particular attention was directed in the areas of management and organization, operations, maintenance, surveillance and testing, and design and engineering support.

I note that many of the problems identified by the team also had been identified by ANO in its internal review following the Unit I refueling outage in late 1988.

However, it is clear that ANO had not completely identified nor fully addressed the root causes of those problems.

Based upon extensive evaluation onsite and through subsequent analysis, the team concluded that the root causes for AN0's performance problems were (1) weak corporate leadership, oversight and involvement coincident with a period of site management weaknesses, that had resulted in poor cooperation and teamwork among ANO organizations and a lack of accountability and ownership within the staff, (2) the lack of a clearly documented plant design-basis which adversely impacted corrective action programs, (3) inadequate maintenance and engineering support to the plant that adversely impacted plant performance, and (4) a sense of complacency regarding plant performance and a willingness to live with material and equipment problems, both of which resulted from various cultural issues and influences, including (a) a lack of outside experience with high l

industry performance standards, (b) a compliance versus safety approach to l

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problems, (c) weak self-assessment and performance monitoring, and (d) previous assessments by outside organizations which have not been sufficiently critical.

The team observed very few strengths, but several weaknesses in the functional areas evaluated.

Overall, the team concluded that the recent management changes and initiatives were having a positive effect, but that a number of areas needed increased management attention. These included (1) identification and resolution of equipment problems with the highest safety-significance and potential impact on plant operation and operator performance, (2) resolution of the plant design-basis and as-builL configuration problems, (3) establishment of resource commitments and priorities to more expeditiously resolve longstanding maintenance, engineering and materials control problems, (4) implementation of better perforniance monitoring, self-assessment and root cause analysis efforts, and (5) increased emphasis on teamwork, communications and accountability among ANO organizations.

The team evaluation results which include findings and conclusions and root cause analysis are provided in Section 2.0 of the enclosed report.

Section 3.0 of the report provides the detailed evaluation results.

Some of these items may be potential enforcement findings.

Any enforcement actions will be identified by our Region IV office.

It is important that you and AND management carefully review the enclosed report, with special emphasis on the areas identified above as requiring additional management attention.

Recent ANO initiatives have had a positive effect, for example, as in the site management team's focus on personal accountability and the improved teamwork and communications.

However, some initiatives were not fully implemented and other commitments had not been effectively communicated.

Also, I am particularly concerned about the poor material condition of the plants, which stems from longstanding maintenance and engineering support problems, and the apparent lack of comprehensive knowledge among man 3gers concerning the significance of these problems and their potential impact on safe plant operations.

It is important that you and ANO management assure that these problems, individually or collectively, would not adversely impact the plant response during an event.

Following your review, I request that you determine the actions needed to address each of these areas giving due consideration to the team's evaluation results identified in Section 2 of the report.

It is also requested that you provide my office with your integrated plans for improvement within 60 days of the date of this letter.

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'c Mr. Jerry L. Maulden 3-1 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this evaluation, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, if'

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J es M. Tay I

xecutive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Diagnostic Evaluation Report for Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2 cc w/ encl:

T. Gene Campbell, AP&L Niel Carns, ANO Early Ewing, ANO Nicholas, S. Reynolds, Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds Robert D. Martin, NRC/RIV Clay Warren, NRC/RIV t

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