ML20005D192
| ML20005D192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point, Harris, Point Beach, Turkey Point, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, South Texas, Comanche Peak, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1985 |
| From: | Thompson H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Asselstine, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005D193 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#385-372, TASK-AS, TASK-BN85-081, TASK-BN85-81 BN-85-081, BN-85-81, OL, NUDOCS 8508280025 | |
| Download: ML20005D192 (18) | |
Text
Cer. tral Files Only No to w
s UNITED sTA I ts j $3(/i i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION jy #
A W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%.),',. #
AUG 2 7 198_5 Docket Nos.: 50-400/401, 445/446 and STN 50-498/499 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM:
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.85-081 1
ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSES AND QA This Notification is being provided to the Comission in accordance with the revised Comission's notification policy of July 6,1984, to inform the Comission on all issues on the cases before the Comission. By copy of this memorandum, the appropriate ASLBs and ASLABs and parties to the proceedings are also being infonned of this new information.
The enclosed document (Enclosure 1) contains allegations by a former Westinghouse employee that certain incidents at Westinghouse constitute violations of either NRC regulations or Westinghouse quality assurance requirements. The allegations concern:
(1) lost calculation notes in support of FSARs; (2) non-disclosure of an unsafe plant condition-violation of single failure criteria; (3) thients of retaliation against employee for disclosure of item (2); (4) failure to report apparent safety violations to Westinghouse Safety Review committee; (5) discrepancies within Westinghouse QA procedures for reportin safety problems; (6) violation of Westinghouse QA Procedure; (7)g potential threatened retaliation against employee for presenting his concerns in writing; and (8)
Westinghouse QA violations regarding independent calculation checks and nonconservative computer input data.
Item (1) applies only to Diablo Canyon, while items 2 through 8 could potentially apply to all Westinghouse plants.
The following plants were specifically itlentified:
Indian Point 2 & 3 Turkey Point 3 & 4 Point Beach 1 & 2 l
Comanche Peak Ginna Beznau Italian Reference Plant Also enclosed is a letter from the Manager of Westinghouse's Nuclear Safety Department (Enclosure 2). The letter states that Westingbouse has begun an internal review of these allegations.
8508280025
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,WS 2 7 fggs J'
'l The staff has scheduled an ins'pection at Westinghouse in late August. We will inform the Commission and the. Boards of.the-resolution of these allegations, 1
-)
Original Signed bjf l
. Hugh L Thompson, Jr.
I Hugh L. - Thompson, Jr., Direccor Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated-l
.cc w/ enclosures:
SECY,(2)
OPE OGC i
. EDO.
Parties to the Proceeding l
ACRS (10)
{
- See next page~
i i
~ Atomic' Safety and Licensing Board For-I Comanche Peak (Bloch, Jordan, McCollom) j Seabrook (Hoyt, Harbour, Luebke)
Shearon Harris (Kelly, Bright, Carpenter)
South Texas (Bechhoefer,~ Lamb,'Shon) f Atomic Safety ar.3 Licensing Appeal Board For:.
Shearon Harris (twoore, Gotchy, Wilber)
F
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)Seik PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES:-
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.SBlack-GZech w/ comments _BHayes, HTh n
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'8/l?/85 noted. 8/21/85 8/25/85'
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A sa i
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION i
i Comanche Peak Units 182, Docket Nos. 50-445/446 i
Seabrook Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-443/444 Shearon Harris Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-400/401 South Texas Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-498/499 Atomic Safety and Licensing Herbert Grossman Jo Ann Shotwell, Esq.
Board Panel Robert P. Grtber Lanny Alan Sinkin Atomic Safety and Licensing Dr. Jerry Harbour Carole S. Sneider, Esq.
Appeal Panel Mr. Robert J. Harrison George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Brentwood Board of Selectmen Donald L. Herzberger, MD Dr. Mauray Tye Division of Consumer Cumsel Renea Hicks, Esq.
Ms. Ann Verge Docketing and Service Section Ms. Beverly Hollingworth Richard D. Wilson, M.D.
f Document Management Branch Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Robert A. Wooldridge, Esq.
Town Manager's Office Helen Hoyt, Esq.
Town of North Hampton Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Robert A. Jablon, Esq.
Phillip Ahrens, Esq.
Elizabeth B. Johnson l
Robert A. ?ackus, Esq.
Bradley W. Jones, Esq.
Charles Beciboefer, Esq.
Richard E. Jones, Esq.
Brian Berwick, 'sq.
Dr. Walter H. Jordan J
Peter B. Bloch, Esq.
William S. Jordan, III, Esq.
Mr. Glenn O. Bright James L. Kelley Mrs. Peggy Buchorn Dr. James C. Lan6, III William H. Burchette Dr. Linda W. Little Mr. Calvin A. Canney Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Dr. James H. Carpenter Mr. Angie Machiros Brian P. Cassidy, Esq.
Robert D. Martin Mr. Donald E. Chick Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Mr. Mendall Clark John H. McEachern, Esq.
Mr. Nicholas J. Costello James T. McGaugby Mr. W. G. Counsil Patrick J. McKeon Edward L. Cross, Jr., Esq.
Mr. Edward F. Meany Mr. James E. Cummins Jack R. Newman, Esq.
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
Mr. Travis Payne, Esq.
Mr. John F. Doherty Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Ms. Jane Doughty Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Mr. Owen B. Durgin Mr. David Prestemon i
Kim Eastman Senator Robert L. Pr2ston
)
Wells Eddleman Ms. Diana P. Randall
}
Mrs. Jaunita Ellis Daniel F. Read j
Dr. Harry Foreman Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
R. K. Gad III, Esq.
Steven Rochlis Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.
Billie Pirner Garde John Runkle Ms. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Alfred Sargent Ellen Ginsberg, Esq.
Melbert Schwarz, Jr., Esq.
Ray Goldstein, Esq.
Frederick J. Shon
m r
j i
' Branch service lists c c addressees receiving material on the following j
dockets for BN 85-081.
i COMANCHE PEAK DOCKET
- Mr. Robert E. Ballard, Jr.
f Mr. A.- T. Parker Mr.. David R. Pigott, Esq.
Mrs. Nancy H. Williams Regional Administrator, RIY W. G. Counsi' Mr. Dennis Kelley Mr. John W. Beck Mr.) Jack Redding t
William A. Burchette, Esq.
i Mr. James McGaugby i
' Nancy E.'Wiegers Mr. Homer C. Schmidt r
SEABROOK DOCKET i
Bruce Beckley I
D. Pierre G. - r:,,,teron, Jr., Esq.
i Regional Administrator, Region I-E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.
Resident Inspector Mr. John. DeVincantis Mr. - A. M. Ebner Mr. Warren Hall
~ Honorable Richard E. Suli! van Mr. William B. Derrickson i
Ms. Jane Spector Mr. Rob Sweeney 5HEARON HARRIS DOCKET Mr. E. E. Utley-Mr. David'Gordon, Esq.
Mr. Thomas S. Erwin, Esq.
j Resident Inspector t
Charles D. Barham, Jr., Esq.
i
~
Mr. George Jackson l
Regional Administrator, Region II SOUTH TEXAS DOCKET Mr. J. H. Goldberg Mr. J. T. Westermeir.
l Mr. E. R. Brooks Mr. H. L. Peterson Mr. J. B. Poston Resident' Inspector Mr. Jonathan Davis Mr. S. Head Mr. Mark R. Wisenburg Mr. Charlss Halligan_
Regional Administrator, Region IV -
I i
l
j Board flotification No. 85- 081 1
Allegations Concerning Westinghouse Analyses and QA 1
Branch service lists of addressees receiving material on the following dockets:
COMANCHE PEAK DOCKET Mr. Robert E. Ballard, Jr.
Mr. A. T. Parker.
Mr. David R. Pigott, Esq.
Mrs. Nancy H. Williams Regional Administrator, RIV W. G. Counsil Mr. Dennis Kelley
'4r. John W. Beck Mr. Jack Redding r
William A. Burchette, Esq.
Mr.. James McGaughy j
Nancy E. Wiegers Mr. Homer C. Schmidt SEABROOK DOCKET Bruce Beckley-D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq.
Regional Administrator, Region I E..,per Kinder, Esq.
Resident laspector Mr. John DeVincentis Mr. A. M. Ebner Mr. Warren Hall Honorable Richard E. Sullivan Mr. William B Derrickson Ms. Jane Spector Mr. Rob Sweeney SHEARON HARRIS DOCKET Mr. E. E. Utley Mr. David Gordon, Esq.
Mr. Thomas S. Erwin, Esq.
Resident Inspector Charles D. Barham, Jr., Esq.
Mr. George Jackson Regional Administrator, Region II i
+
Board Notification No. 85- 081 Page 2 Allegations Concerning Westinghouse Analyses and QA Branch service lists of addressees receiving material on the following dockets:
SOUTH TEXAS DOCKET Mr. J. H. Goldberg Mr. J. T. Westermeir Mr. E. R. Brooks Mr. H. L. Peterson Mr. J. B. Poston Resident Inspector Mr. Jonathan Davis Mr. S. Head Mr. Mark R. Wisenburg Mr. Charles Halligan 1
Regional Administrator, Region IV i
r i
i i
i
r Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15239 June 17, 1985 L
+
~
To:
)
- Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
s.
Until July 31st of this year, I will hold the position of Senior Engineer in the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions / Nuclear Technology Division / Nuclear Safety Department / Risk Assessment Technology section.
Since
~~
joining Westinghouse in 1980, I have been located at the Monroeville Nuclear
- Center, Monroeville, Pennsylvania, i
where I primarily perform accident analyses.
t Over the past year, I have either been involved in or have knowledge of incidents that I believe are violations of either nuclear regulatory law or Westinghouse quality assurance. requirements.
These incidents have been categorized and are shown as Items 1
through 8
on the i
attached sheets.
It is requested that you investigate these incidences and take appropriate action where necessary.
If I can be of further assistance, please call me.
s Sincerely, S $
9 O
Phones h
o?D
t i
1.
LOST DIABLO CANYON SAFETY ANALYSES f
During a group meeting held in late 1984 for the' Plant l
Transient Analysis and Operating Plant Analysis
- groups, it was stated by that almost all of the calculation notes that sonaort the Diablo Canyon Final Safety Analysis Report are mi Apparently these supporting analyses were lost wher
- t. <y were to be put on tape in 1974.
l To the best of my knowledge, these lost analyses have never been retrieved and no attempt has been made to inform the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions Safety Review Committee, the NRC, or the customer of this situation.
i Also present at the meeting were
_approximately
{
and twelve engineers and technicians from both groups.
I believe thi-is a safety violation since not keeping records that are required by a
licensed condition is a
violation of 10CFR50.71, Part C.
e O
I e
't
u 2.
NONDISCLOSURE OF AN UNSAFE PLANT CONDITION AND RETALIATION BY MANAGER I
During November of 1984, I was assigned _ the takk of performing an analysis to evaluate the impact of removing the flux rate signal device from the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant.
This device 'is used to initiate turbine runback to protect against departure from nucleate boiling
'in case a dropped rod or dropped bank accident occurs.
I Redundant' protection is provided by a rod-on-bottom signal device which also causes a
.urbine runback.
The rod-on-bottom device operates concurrently with the flux l
rate signal device to provide the redundant protection.
j l
I Before I started the Indian Point 2 task, I reviewed a
l m.
similar study that was done for the Turkey Point units (see j
CN-TA-82-104).
It immediately became apparent to me that deleting the flux rate signal device at' Turkey Point i
violated the single failure criteria as-specified in IEEE 279-1971 ' Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power l
Generating Stations'.
This is because the rod-on-bottom I
- device, by
- itacif, is not.totr ty' redundant.
When I
l informed
~~~ ~
of this violation, said i
1 do not disclose this information or we will be i
sued.'
(I presume meant Westinghouse would be sued
{
by Florida Power and Light (FPEL)).
After some further discussion on this matter, I dropped the issue because I
believed.
would retaliate against me if I pursued it l
further.
Independent of my finding, FP&L later recognized the i
same unsafe condition existed that' I called to t
attention in~ November 1984.
In early 1985 FP&L issued an i
LER to report this problem.
This time did not i
attempt to conceal the problem nor did inform FP&L that I had previously determined this problem to exist.
The l
Westinghouse response to the FP&L finding was documented in Letter NS-RAT-PTA-85-091 which provides recommendations on how FPEL should modify the existing hardware to make the system redundant.
On the 29th of January
- 1985, I
had my performance appraisal for'the year 1984 and was informed by l
that I was being terminated from Westinghouse on July 31, 1985.
'I believe a factor in my-termination was i
retaliation against me for uncovering this faulty l
Westinghouse recommendation of which wa s' the l
originator.
4 ICT REPORTING APPARENT SAFETY VIOLATIONS TO THE SAFETY REVIEW COMMITTEE A.
Analyses That Raise the Reactor Trip on Turbihe Trip Setpoint s
In Jan~uary 1985 a colleague, pointed _out to i
me that a
Comanche Peak plant specific study he had previously checked (CN-TA-84-97) to justify raising the setpoint for deletion of reactor trip on turbine trip above its then existing value was in error.
The error was the result of not transferring transient inlet temperatures to the THINC3 computer code where they can be used to calculate the departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR).
As a result, the initial (constant)
.let temperature is used to compute DNBR throughout the transient.
This is unconservative since in some cases analyzed the transient inlet temperature rises approximately 20 to 30 degrees Fahrenheit above the initial temperature.by the time the minimum DNBR is reached.
I reviewed our files and determined that approximately a dozen studies of this type had ber.n done previously and in only one of these studies (CN-RPA-78-66) did THINC3 use the correct inlet temperature history.
I wrote a memo on January 25, 1985 to informing of the nonconservative computational method currently being
- used, while pointing out that this error probably exists in several other studies and that the problem should be reported to the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions (WRD)
Safety Review Committee (SRC).
When I later spoke to regarding the note, criticized me for calling the problem to attention and said would take care of it.
No plan for resolution of this problem was quickly
{
set-up as required in Risk Assessment Technology (RAT) procedure NS-RAT-IG-9 nor was the WRD SRC alerted of this i
potential issue within the first two weeks as required by Item 10 of NS-RAT-IG-9. To the best of my knowledge, this problem has never been reported to the SRC and it has only been corrected in two cases.
B.
Dropped Rod Analyses for Turbine-Runback Plants In early 1985,
,, while working on a
study to justify an increase in the turbine runback 1
setpoiot for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 (see CN-TA-85-6),
discovered an i
error to exist in the dropped rod methodology as obtlined I
s
^
l P
3.
FEAR OF RETALIATION 4
I As noted in Item 2 shown on the previous page,~I was required to perform a safety evaluation for Indian Point 2,
similar to the one that _
had performed for the Turkey 6
Point Units.
In the Indian Point 2 analysis, I stated that the rod-on-bottom unit by itself was not completely single failure proof. (see Page 10 of CN-TA-84-202).
On the other hand, I did not disclose this fault in the customer report (NS-RAT-PTA-64-171) since disclosing it would result in either the Indian Point 2 and Thrkey Point units h a*/ing to i
undergo substantial modifications (to makc the rod-on-bottom signal device single-failure proof) or the flux rate signal device could not be removed from
- service,
~
which would negate the need for the analysis.
Furthermore, based on response to my-finding in the case of the Turkey Point Units, I feared retaliation by if I
disclosed this fault to Consolidation Edison of New York i
City.
I discussed this dilemma with two of my colleagues,
- and, to a
lesser
- extent, later checked my cale note.
i t
r 1
l l
O j
e
?
l 4.(Continued) in NS-TA-83-365 which yielded nonconservative results.
I Specifically the dropped' rod methodology calls for performing the analysis at i turbine runback safety analysis limit 44 less than the turbine runback
- setpoint, However, the safety analysis limit should be 44 more than the setpoint value.
This 8%
error was incorporated into the following plant specific safety analyses.
Point Beach 1 and 2 Turkey Point 3 and 4 Indian Point 2 and 3 Ginna l
Beznau informed me he reported this error to but, no plan of resolution of this problen was quickly Jet-up in accordance with RAT procedure NS-RAT-IG-9-nor was the WRD SRC alerted of this potential
~~'
issue within the first two weeks as required by Item 10 of NS-RAT-IG-9, To the best of'ay knowledge, the problem was never reported to the.SRC nor have any of the erronious analyses been corrected.
?
M 4
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5 NONUNIFORM PROCEDURES WITHIN WESTINGHOUSE FOR REPORTING POTENTIAL. SAFETY VIOLATIONS Infot1.ation provided by Westinghouse management shows three different sets of procedures that r,hould be followed j
in reporting potential safety violations to the i
Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions (WRD)
Safety' Review l
Committee.TSRC).
I In my opinion, the procedures that are specified by
{
first and second level managers (see B and C
below)
- can, and do, lead to intimidation as discussed in Item 2
and
" burying
- potential safety problems as discussed in Item 4 Also, I think it is the intent.of the NRC that
- one, and only one, set of procedures be used within Westinghc9:t e to report poter.tial safety violations.
A.
Posted in the-main lobby of the Monroeville Nuc'. ear 2
Center, Monroeville, Penna.
(1.)
Aeport violation to supervisor, or-f (2.)
Report violation to Manager's Representative on the WRD SRC, or-
-(3.)
Report violation to R.L.
- Wesemann, Secretary of the WRD SRC.
4 B.
Stated in the Radiological Assessment Technology i
Instruction Guidance Material I
(1.)
Report violation to supervisor, then
[
(2,*
Get supervisors. approval, then t
(3.'-
i Provide plan for resolution of the problem to the SRC.-
If the supervisor disapproves your request to report I
the i
potential safety ites, you may
^
t (4.)
Report directly to the WRD SRC.
i f
C.
Stated in undated memo provided to members of Plant i
Transient Analysis and Operating Plant Analysis Curing a
}
meeting in late 1984 and also provided in a Nuclear Safety Department handout to all members of the Nuclear Safety l
Department in early 1985.
(1.)
Get supervisors approval.
t 4
i Note:
I have asked for clarification regarding this issue j
in letter NS-RAT-PTA-85-0 47 The response to my request (see Letter NS-RAT-PTA-85-051) states the memo i
referr,ed to in Item C above was only intended to be a
" guideline",
but t
l there is nothing on the meno to indicate it was only l
intended to be a guideline.
~
4 i
I t
l f
s 6
VIOLATION OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCEDURES A.
C.>ansmittal of Preliminary Draft Reports Letter NS RAT-23-036 dated Noveber 29, 1983 states the requirements to be followed within the Risk Assesment Technology (RAT) section with regards to transmitting preliminary draft reports outside the RAT group.
The requirements are the following:
(1)
The transmittal letter should state the informatici t
is preliminary.
(2)
The report should be stamped ' PRELIMINARY".
(3)
First level manager's approval is required.
On December 16,
- 1983, a
preliminary copy of the Italian Reference Plant functional requirements were sent l
out (see Letter NS-TA-83-520) without any of the above
~.
requirements implemented.
Note that these functional requirems.,ts did not go through the normal in-house review but rather were to be reviewed by the customer (NIRA/SOPREN).
{
B.
Assigning a Competant Independent Verifier Within the 21sk Assessment Technology (RAT) Section Westinghouse Nuclear Technology Division procedure NTD-DPP-3B, Rev. 2 dated 7/24/81 and RAT section procedure NS-RAT-IG-2 state that the cognizant (or Appropriate RAT) manager shall assign an engineer to act as the independent (or RAT independent) reviewer.
This procedure is rarely if ever followed in the Plant Transient Analysis or Operating Pinnt Analysis groups.
in
- fact, I
requested that
~ ~
~
assign an independent checker to check one c f, ny calculations (CN-TA-85-29) when I
had difficulty in finding an independent reviewer.
returned th2 cale note later with an attached note stating that I
should find my own independent reviewer.
did check CN-TA-85-29 when I asked him to do so and recal,'. fed seeing the note that wrote when I
called the incident'to hxs attention on March 25, 1985.
O e
e 4
,w.__.
1
~
7.
THREATENED RETALIATION FOR SENDING WRITTEN MESSAGES On Thursday morning, February 14,
- 1985, called me into office and told me i
would terminate my employment with Westinghouse with two months notice if I
continued to harass What i
considered harassment included only the following items.
I i
1.
Writing Letter NS-RA?-PTA-85-047 which requested l
clarification on the correct procedure to use to report potential safety problems to the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions Safety Review Committee.
j i
2
'An informal memo dated 2/7/85 from me to asking why the normal in-house review and comment procedure was-not followed for the Italian Reference Plant's
.~
~
~
F'unctional Requirements (Letter NS-TA-83-520).
i 2
3.
An informal memo from me to I stating that I
planned to give the Italian Reference plant's Back-up Protection System Functional Requirements a
PRELIMINARY status until they were checked by the customer since this would conform with NS-RAT-83-03e.
i 4
An informal memo from me to 1
regarding a complaint by Consolidated Edison of l
New York City that Westinghouse had never called back when they (Consolidated Edison) requested a
meeting between Consolidated. Edison and Westinghouse a' month earlier.
I also erpressed my concern ~
that our good business j
relationship with Consolidated Edison was being strained because of this incident.
demanded that any future communication I
have l
with be limited to verbal communications.
e 4
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B.
POOR CALCULATION NOTE CH2CKING WHICH RESULTED IN QUALITY ASSURANCE VIOLATIONS AND NONCONSERVATIVE COMPUTER INPUT DATA r
A review was made of CN-TA-84-63,
'CGE Deletion of
~
Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip Below 50% Power (P-9)*
by i
4 and checked by Numerous errors i
were found to exist in the analysis. Most, if not "all, of these errors should have been detected by the independent reviewer.
The following errors were noted:
s.
The Model f51 steam generator is simulated in this study.
It does not have a preheater, but the input data (MODEPH=1) indicates a preheater exists.(One or the other of these inputs is in error.)
1
'The buoyancy calculations were b.
l to be turned off for conservatism (ECORE=ZRVO=ISGT=ZSGP=0) per page 9, but ICORE was in fact set to 120.0.
(This error is in the nonconservative direction.)
The transient vessel inlet temperature, as c.
computed by the LOFTRAN code, increases with time but this data nqver got into the THINC3 calculation of departure from nucleate
{
boiling ratio.
(This error is in the-nonconservative direction.)
d.
The front page of CN-TA-84-63 is not completely filled l
i l
out.
(Violates NS-RAT-IG-3 procedure.)
4 i
e.
The checklist shows CN-TA-84-63 t
and results near the front In fact Pose are not shown near the front of the ca e no e
- f..The Introduction section (page 3) atates four cases I
I were analyzed, but.only three cases are shown.
The Table of Contents on Page 2 is.not completed, 7
g.
b.
Information that should appear in the
' Analysis Method and Calculations
- or ' Input Listing' sections (pages 2
to
- 40) are actually put'into the Introduction ~section.
i.
No sample calculation is shown, but the checklist shows the cale note to contain one.
1.
The checklist page_is not numbered nor is the cale note number shown on the checklist page.
(If this page were separated from the cale note, there would be no Way to identify the cale note it came from.)
I I
i O
C t
B.(Continued)
~
L k.
The in'put listing for the third case is not. shown.
l (violates NS-RAT-IG-3 procedure) i 1.
The microfiche identification numbers are not on the cover sheet.
(violates NS-RAT-IG-3 procedure) i m.
The cover sheet requires a
managers signature, bdt there is none.
n.
Microfiche identification numbers
.are not shown anywhere in the cale note.
(violates NS-RAT-3 procedure) o.
The P-9 uncertainty already includes a
nuclear flux uncertainty.
It is not necessary to account for this uncertainty twice as is done in this analysis.
p.
The 2% uncertanty noted.; page 47 is a
nuclPar flux uncertainty, not a LOFTRAN uncertainty.
q.
On page 11, 5 lines from the
- bottom, the last term should be 4
degrees Fahrenheit uncertainty, not 4%
uncertainties.
r.
Use of GEND3 indicates a
Model D3 steam generator should be used.
The LOFTRAN input assumed the Model 51 steam generator. (One of the two calculations is in error.)
On page 16, DKSCRA=
.04 is not shutdown margin, it is s.
a trip reactivity.
t.
On pages 28 and 29, the statement is made that modifications were made for 52%
s
- power, but they were in fact made for 60% power.
On page 28, no numerical value is given for NORDER.
u.
v.
QFINTL requirtJ an input for eaca loop.
The proper input should be QFINTL=3*1.0, not QFINTL=1.0.
a i
w.
On page 56, third paragraph:
a rapid increase in i
coolant temperature
- probably was intended to be a
rapid increase in coolant pressure
- x.
On page 62, middle of second paragraphs the[ power operated relief valves are actuated, not the safety valves, i
i 8.(Continued) 6 I
i y.
On page 63, last paragraph:
pressure PORVS should be '-- pressurizer PORVS - *.
There is no indication where the two typos referred to z.
in Revision 1 are located.
They should be clearly marked i
by a bar in the right. margin along with the appropriate revision
- number, but I
don't see any such marking.
(violates NS-RAT-IG-3 procedure. )
A review made of analyses which justify raising the f
setpoint for reactor trip on turbine trip above the typical 10% power level has shown the independent
- reviewer, has never previously performed this type of.
analysis.
Therefore
. or should have i
disqualified from being the independent reviewer of this cale note.
J A
j l
l f
I l
1 1
1 S"
l i
Westinghouse Water Reactor
- ' T***r Som Electric Corporation OMsions seins PsfisDJss Prrepasa 15m July 12, 1985 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Taylor:
i This is to confirm our telephone conversation of July 11, 1985 i
in which we informed you that on that date we first became aware of a letter dated June 17, 1985 and sent to your office by
, a former employee of Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions at the Monroeville Nuclear Center.
l alleges in this letter cert.in practices and events in which he was involved while an employee which he believes were violations of either " nuclear regulatory law or.
Westinghouse quality assurance requirements", and requests your investigation and appropriate-action.
Please be assured that we shall cooperate fully in tnis regard, and that we have begun an internal review of the factual matters contained in
~ allegations.
Our preliminary review has revealed no actual safety deficiencies as a result of the alleged incidents and practices.
i
- Moreover, we have found no reason to believe that other employee has been inhibited from raising safety concerns or any through the established channels as defined in the company's policies and procedures.
Our continuing review will place highest priority on verification of the safety of licensed facilities..and our findings will be communicated as a?propriate i
to affected licensees and to your office.
j Please call me (412-374-4868) if I can be of further assistance at any time.
1 Very truly yours,
^w e_ _,
=
f P. Rahe, Jr., Manage'r Nuclear Safety Department 1
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