ML20005C132
| ML20005C132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1981 |
| From: | Maurin L LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| W3P81-25, NUDOCS 8111180434 | |
| Download: ML20005C132 (64) | |
Text
r LOUlSIANA P O W E R & L i G H T! P O BOX 0008
- m ottanONOt s1mtr NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174. (504) 366 [J45 M.DCL E SOUTH unums svstEM November 16, 1981 t,y y,yy,y Asst. Vice President Nuclear Operations W3P81-2568 3-A1.01.04 Q-3-P43
'Q% If' Mr. Robert L. Tedesco TU Assistant Director for Licensing 2
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'l uf Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co:rmission d'Op I /g
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Washington, D. C, 20555
SUBJECT:
Louisiana 1ower & Light Company "C'r [
Waterford SES Unit No. 3 9,
6/
Docket No. 50-?82 g
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Installation of Fire Dampers in b
Safety Related Duct Work
REFERENCE:
LP&L letter W3P81-2344 dated 11/10/81 L. V. Maurin letter to D. G. Eisenhut
Dear !!r. Tedesco:
In accordance with an agreemtnt made at our October 20th meeting in Bethesda regarding Fire Protection, enclosed you till find a report addressing the installation of fire dampers in safety related ductwork at Waterford 3.
This re; art presents the results of our indepth study to satisfy a staff position that fire barriers be provided in and on safety related ductwerk which passes through fire zones.
Barriers will also be e.rovided for non-safety related ducts penetrating essential Iire zones.
We propose to add approximately 70 qualified fire dampers in safety related duct at penetrations throughout the Reactor Auxiliary Building as a result of our study.
In order to meet accident and safe shutdown requirements, as well as consideration for inadvertent closure, a large number of thece dampers must be of multiple door design and installed in parallel with position indication provided on local panels.
The fire damper report will be incorporated into the FSAR as Appendix 9.5.1B to the Waterford FSAR whta our safe shutdown analysis is submitted to NRC in mid-December, 1981 as Appendix 9.5.1A.
We also plan, at that time or shortly thereafter, to update all of FSAR Section 9.5.~1 for consistency.
$O01 s
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8111180434 811116 PDR ADUCK 05000382 F
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W3P81-2568 Mr. Robert L. Tedesco Page 2 LP&L would welcome the opportunity to meet with the NRC staff in the near future to discuss any questions they. night have regarding the enclosed report. Early resolution of this problem is important to us because of the critical schedule impact associated with the above men-tioned design changes. We have already initiated accelerated procurement of all fire dampers we believe to be required per our study and have integrated these into our construction schedule.
Since the installation of at least nine dampers will involve removal of small bore pipe and/or conduit already in place, and since we are aware of installation problems experienced at other plants, we are concerned about being able to implement this part of our fire protection program prior to fuel load in October, 1982.
Therefore, in accordance with the referenced letter, LP&L will identify any anticipated schedule impact to the NRC as soon as possible after final staff approval of our fire protection program.
Very truly yours, h13n L. V. Maurin ~
LVM/EJS/sm cc:
S. Black, V. Benaroya, P. Sears, E. Blake, Central Records, Nuclear Records (2)
APPENDIX 9.5B INSTALLATION OF FIRE DAMPERS IN SAFETY - FRATED DUCTWORK i
i i
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1252W-1 APPENDIX 9.58
_INSTALIATION OF FIRE DAMPERS IN SAFETY - RELAT TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
SUMMARY
II.
DISCUSSION III.
DESIGN OF DUCTS AND PENETRATIONS IV.
REVIEW OF FIRE DAMPERS IN SAFETY-RELATED AIR H A.
Air Handling Units AH-25A and AH-23B B.
Air Handling Units AH-12A and AH-12B/ Emergency Filtratio Units S-8A, S-8B C.
Air Handling Units AH-13A and AH-13B/ Exhaust Syst em E-41 A, E-413 D.
Air Handling Units AH-30A and AH-30B E.
Emergency Exhaust System E-23A and E-23B/ Normal Supply S Normal Exhaus t E-22 n
F.
Exhaust Systems E-29A, E-29B; E-30A, E-30B; E-31 A E-52
, E 31 -h ; a nd E-4 6 C.
Exhaust System E-28A and E-28B/ Supply System S-3 V.
DETECTION OF FIRE DAMPER CLOSURE VI.
CONCLUSIONS 9.5B-1
1252W-2 APPEhDIX 9.5B LIST OF TABLES Table No.
Title 9.58-1 Waterford-3 compliance to hRC Position on Fire Dampers 9.5B-2 Sununary of HVAC Duct Penetrations Provided with Fire Rated Barriers 9.5B-3 Fire Damper Failure Modes and Ef fects Analysis 9.5B-4 HVAC Safety - Related Duct Penetration Schedule i
l 9.5B-ii
1252W-3 APPENDIX 9.5B LIST OF FIGURES Fig. No.
Title 9.53-1 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (AH-25) 9.5B-2 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (AH-25) 9.5B-3 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (AH-25) 9.5B-4 Control Room Air Conditioning System (AH-12.5-8) 9.5B-5 RAB H&V Equipment Room (AH-13,E-41) 9.53-6 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (AH-30) 9.5B-7 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (AH-30) 9.5B-8 Controlled Ventilation Area System (E-23) 9.5B-9 Controlled Ventilation Area System (E-23) 9.5B-10 Controlled Ventilation Area System (E-23) 9.5B-11 Controlled Ventilation Area System (E-23) 9.5B-12 Controlled Ventilation Area System (E-23) 9.5B-13 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (E-29, E-30, E-31, E-46) 9.5B-14 RAB Cable Vault and Switchgear Area (E-29, E-30, E-31, E-46) 9.5B-15 RAB Cable Vault Switchgear Area (E-29, E-30, E-31, E-46) 9.5B-16 Jiesel Generator Area Ventilation (E-28) e
- l l
9.5B-iii
1251W-1 APPENDIX 9.5B INSTALLATION OF DAMPERS IN SAFETY-RELATED DUCIWORK I.
SUMMARY
Ihis Appendix presents the results of an indepth study performed to meet NRC reqbirements pertaining to the provisions of fire dampers at safety related duct penetrations through rated fire barriers.
This study focuses only on safety-related HVAC duct penetrations because of the unique problems their installation presents as set forth in Sections II and IV of this report.
However, wherever it has been determined necessary to install fire dampers in safety-related duct penetrations, non-saf ety related duct penetrations through those same areas will also be provided with fire dampers.
A review was performed of the Waterford-3 safety-related HVAC systems using sketches which depict each safety-related system including the air handling units, all duct penetrations through fire areas or fire zones, and duct penetrations through floors and ceilings. These review drawings are presented in Figures 9.5B-1 through 9.5B-16.
The body of this report presents, in narrative form, and by extensive reference to these figures, a discussion of our rationale for installing or not installing fire dampers at duct penetrations. The 3-hour fire dampers will be installed in all firewalls, except 1-1/2 hour fire dampers will be installed in limited cases of round penetrations (see Table 9.5B-4).
Table 9.5B-1 presents a tabulation of NRC requirements for dampers and delineates where NRC requirements have been met or where an acceptable alternative has been proposed. Table 9.5B-2 presents the results of this study in tabular form indicating which safety-related duct penetrations will be provided with fire dampers.
Table 9.5B-3 presents a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the fire dampers which we propose to install.
Table 9.5B-4 indicates the penetration schedule: giving the penetration number, the duct size, the elevation and the related sketch for each penetration in Figures 9.5B-1 through 9.5B-16.
Each duct penetration through a floor at a given elevation is indicated as to whether the duct proceeds down through the floor or is a penetration in the ceiling of that elevation.
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9.5B-1 l
1251W-2 4
II.
DISCUSSION The issue of fire dampers at safety-related duct penetrations was the subject of several meetings between the NRC staff, LP&L and their consultants in July, September and October 1981. These meetings culminated in a statement of the staff's position via an October 9, 1981 telecon to LP&L. This position is summarized in Table 9.5B-1.
Waterford-3's response to this position is the subject of this study.
In it we address not only the fire protection concerns of the staff, but our concerns regarding effects of either heat activated or spurious closure of the dampers on other essential systems.
The Waterford-3 HVAC design dealt with single f ailure considerations via its seismic Category I ductwork design and its 100 percent redundant air handling, exhaust, and filtration units. This design assumes no blockage or obstruction of the ventilation path through the ductwork. Installation of fire dampers poses the question of their inadvertent or deliberate (ie, fire-caused) closure and the consequent effects on required ventilation flow to safety-related areas and/or equipment. Such impairment of flow is of particular concern for a postulated scenario of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) accompanied by a single failure, where the single failure is inadvertent closure of a fire damper. As discussed in detail in Section IV, these issues are addressed by selective use of multiple section fire dampers, and some minor changes to duct work design and routing. Operator knowledge of spurious closure is also an important consideration. This is addressed by providing local position indication for each safety-related damper. This, combined with the visual surveillance requirements, per the Standard Technical Specification, will ensure that the operator is aware of any unexpected closure.
Ihe Waterford-3 > ystem of multiple section fire dampers ensures that immediate and passive closure to seal off a fire area. This will enhance isolation of a major fire pending automatic and/or manual fire suppression activities.
Closure of a fire damper will also prevent any hot gases from a fire or the heat from a fire impinging upon the duct work, from being transmitted to adjacent or downstream areas containing safety-related equipment.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section IV and summarized in Table 9.5B-3, this system of fire daepers will not adversely effect the capability of the plant to be brought safely to a cold shutdown condition in the post-fire condition or to be operated safely and, if necessary, shutdown af ter inadvertent closure during normal operations.
9.5B-2
1251W-3 III. DESIGN OF DUCTS AND PENETRATIONS The HVAC ductwork is designed, installed and tested to be leaktigte and is constructed of minimum 16 gauge (1/16") steel. All duct penetrations through rated fire barriers or walls are sealed to provide a fire rating consistent with the rating of the fire barrier.
Tnis sealant plus the leaktight construction of the duct itself provides a significant barrier to smoke and/or product s of combustion.
All supply and return duct work is provided with a minimum one inch non-combustible insulation suitable for temperatures up to 250F.
Additionally, all supply ducts and return ducts which are run concealed outside of equipment rooms are provided with a fire resistant vapor barrier facing. All ducts run within equipment rooms are installed with UL approved internal liners meeting NFPA Standard 90A, and have a flame spread and smoke development rating less than 25.
Factors inherent in the duct and penetration design, therefore, will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the fire dampers in isolating and containing any potential fires.
t l
b 9.5B-3
1270W - 1 IV.
, REVIEW OF FIRE DAMPERS IN SAFETY-RELATED AIR HANDLING SYSTEMS A.
Air Handling Units AH-25A and AH-25B AH-25A and AH-25B are two redundant, 100% capacity units which serve the cable vault, electrical penetration areas A and B, Switchgear Areas A and A/B, relay rooms A, B and A/B, the CEA MG set room and battery rooms A, B and A/B. The air handling units, duct runs and penetrations are shown in Figures 9.5B-1 through 9.5B-3.
i)
Elevation +46.0 ft.
Figure 9.5B-1 shows the air handling units for system AH-25 located on elevation +46.0 f t in a mechanical equipment room (MER-RAB 3) located next to the Control Room envelope (RAB 1).
As previously described in FSAR Subsection 9.5.1 Section VIII and as discussed more fully in Part IV B of this Appendix, the Control Room envelope Fire Area (RAB 1) includes the Centrol Room Proper (RAB 1A), the Control Room HVAC mechanical equipment room (RAB 1B), the corridor and operator living quarters (RAB IC) and the plant computer room (RAB ID).
The 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated wall between RAB 3 (HVAC machine room) and the computer room and corridor, constitutes part of the Control Room envelope. The envelope around RAB 1 provides the Control Room and its related areas with a total 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier separation from all other areas of the plant.
AH-25 provides conditioned air via supply ducting which passes through (i.e., does not serve) the computer room and Control Room and continues down through Penetration 8.
The other branch of supply duct from AH-25 passes down through floor Fenetrations 2 and 5 of RAB 3.
The air for the air handling units comes from the outside air intake Penetration 4, and from return air Penetrations 1 and 3.
Penetrations 1, 2, 3 and 5 are discussed later in the text for elevation +35.0 feet on Figure 9.5B-2.
Penetration No. 4 is the outside air intake. No fire damper will be provided at Penetration 4 since this outside wall penetration is located sufficiently above the ground ( ~62.5 f t) such that an exposure fire at ground icvel will not impact the outside air intake.
Penetration 6 is a 38 x 38 inch duct penetrating the wall between the AN-25 MER and the computer room; the bottom of this duct is at elevation +61'8" or approximately 16 feet above the MER floor.
The duct is insulated, as described in Part III of this Appendix. Smoke detection is provided for both Fire Areas RAB 3 and RAB ID.
As indicated on Figure 9.5B-1, a part height wall (with fire door) will be installed between the air handling units AH-25A and AH-25B.
In addition complete sprinkler coverage will be provided by an automatic suppression system as part of the SSA modifications. These measures preclude an exposure fire in one air handling unit from affecting the redundant air handling unit. Although the in situ combustibles are negligible (see 9.5.1 Section VIII), and normal access is limited to maintenance of the air handling units, Penetration 6 will be provided with a multiple fire damper to assure total separation of the Cont rol Room envelope.
9.5S-4
1270W - 2 The insulated duct between Penetration 6 and Penetration 7 passes through (but does not serve) the plant computer room approximately 16 feet above the floor and is located in a ceiling plenum. The suspended ceiling is constructed of non-combustible materials with a flame spread rating of no greater than 25.
Only lighting cables, in conduit, and the duct are in the ceiling plenum and access is only from the floor. The computer room (RAB ID) is not an essential area, (although protected via a sub floor space Halon system) and therefore a fire in the computer room which would af fect the essential areas of the Control Room (RAB 1A) would be no worse than a fire in the Control Room itself. Therefore credit is not taken for the wall separating the Control Room from the computer room, and at Penetration 7 through that wall, no fire damper is required.
In the Control Room, the insulated duct continues its run through the ceiling plenum about 15 feet above the Control Room floor, then enters into a fully enclosed duct chase. The duct chase is constructed to provide a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated enclosure, extending from the Control Room floor to ceiling. The duct will be provided with a multiple fire damper in the chese wall at a location above the Control Room suspended ceiling. This configuration essentially makes the chase an appendage of Fire Area 4 (the Cable Vault - located below) therefore no damper is required at the floor slab (Penetration 8).
Closure of dampers at Penetrations 6 or 8 is discussed below.
ii) Elevation + 35.0 ft.
The fire areas of concern at this elevation are the cable vault ( RAB 4), electrical penetration area A (RAB 6), electrical penetration area B (RAB 5), the relay rooms and isolation panel areas (RAB 7).
Per the SSA modifications additional part height walls will be provided to further subdivide the area containing the Isolation Panel and an automatic suppression system will be provided for the entire relay / isolation panel area. Pre-action automatic suppression systems are already provided for the cable vault and elect rical penet ration a rea s.
As indicated on Figure 9.5B-2, the ventilation flow continues from Penetration 8 (shown on the previous figure) to a short run of duc t which serves the cable vault, while another run continues through the cable vault and serves the electrical penetration area A through Penetration 9, electrical penetration area B through Penetration 11, a continuation of the duct run through Penetration 12 through the floor of electrical penetration area B, and a continuation of the duct through Penetration 10 in the cable vault. Also, the supply air from the air handling units (shown on the previous Figure) continues from Penetration 2 into this elevation through a penetration duct chase (enclosing Vertical Penetrations 1, 2 & 13, 3 & 14, 5 & 15) and supplies air to the corridor and vestibule area, and to the relay rooms B, A/B, and A and the Isolation Panel Area. Ductwork fro:
9.5B-5
i 1270W - 3 4
Penetration 5 will be redesigned to provide an alternate means of air supply to the relay room areas via Penetration 34.
The corridor (alongside the relay rooms), and HVAC chase have been combined as part of Fire Area RAB 3 HVAC mechanical equipment room.
In order to separate the cable vault (fire area RAB 4) from the electrical penetration fire areas (RAB 6 and RAB 5) and Switchgear Area B, a
(
multiple fire damper will be installed at Penetrations 9,10,11, and 12.
a Should a fire occur at Penetrations 6, 8, 910, or 11, ventilation flow would be stopped downstream of these penetrations.
For a fire i
at Penetration 6 or 8 which causes the multiple fire damper to close, the cable vault and the electrical penetration areas at +35.0 f t.
i would be deprived of supply air, and a restricted air flow condition would exist at Switchgear Area B and the battery rooms all at elevation +21.0 feet. Cable in the cable vault and in the electrical penetration areas is qualified for in-containment environmental conditions. Thus this transient can be survived with no loss of functional adequacy. Should a fire detector alarm in these areas the operators would assume that the dampers have closed, and take immediate steps to reventilate these areas by opening the doors to other areas, and reducing heat loads (i.e., lighting load). The se steps in conjunction with the continuous operation of the return air portion of AH-25, would keep any temperature excursion to a minimum.
A preliminary review indicates that although air supply from AH-25 may be restricted to the "B" Switchgear Areas through Penetrations 6, or 8, or 10 and 11 - a portion of this restricted air would supplement air provided to the Switchgear Area via alternate duct branches (i.e., Penetrations 13 and 15). This air flow in conjunction with the air flow from AH-30 (which provides both supply
~
and return air to the Switchgear Area A) would limit the temperature increase to approximately 10 F/ hour for approximately the first 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, assuming of fsite power available which gives maximum heat i
loads. This review takes into account credit for the redundant AH-25 unit and its automatic initiation upon a temperature increase in Switchgear Area B beyond 104 0F.
Although no credit has been taken for the redundant units of AH-30, prior to exceeding the design ambient temperature (104 F), these redundant units would i
automatically initiate operation and provide supplemental cooling in order to further limit the temperature increase in Switchgear Area B.
As an additional means the operator could take any one or more of l
j the following actions in order to re-establish an adequate cooling:
a) start smoke exhaust fans E-48 (see FSAR Subsection 9.4.3.5.2.2),
b) shed unnecessary heat loads (i.e., lighting loads),
c) open perimeter doors (i.e., 3 doors in Switchgear Area and/ door in penetration area leading directly to outside air),
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d) introducing portable air ejectors, or in the worst case, t
9.5B-6 n
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1270W - 4 e) rely on the operation of one Switchgear Area while shedding the load of the other switchgear network.
In no case would the capability to safely shutdown be negated.
Duct work emanates from Penetration 2 to Penetration 31, and the added duct from Penetration 5 to Penetration 34 supplies air to the relay rooms and the isolation panel area. A multiple fire damper is provided at Penetration 31 and 34.
No fire damper is required at Penetrations 1, 2, 3 or 5 since these penetrations and the vertical duct work associated with these penetrations are located in a fire-rcted duct chase which is not normally accessible during plant operations and considered part of RAB 3 as explained previously.
Penetrations 13,14, and 15 are discussed at elevation +21.0.
A fire closing Penetration 31 would not starve ventilation air to the relay rooms and the isolation panel, since supply is provided to this area by the supply duct from Penetration 5 to Penetration 34.
Return ducts, leading back to the air handling units on the floor above, are shown for the duct going into the duct chase through Penetrations 16,17 and 18 and then through Penetration 1 up through the ceiling. Multiple fire dampers will be installed at Penetrations 16, 17 and 18 to prevent heated air from a fire at any of these locations being returned to AH-25.
The closure of the multiple fire damper at Penetration 17, for a fire in the cable vault will not affect the return air through Penetration 16 and 18.
A fire at electrical penetration area A (RAB 6) which closes the damper at Penetration 18 vill not af fect the return air supply from the electrical penetration area B or from the cable vault at Penetration 17.
The design of the air handling units AH-25A and AH-25B has been reviewed to ensure that a single failure of a fire damper in Penetrations 16, 17 or 18 still provides sufficient return air to the air handling units so as not to result in loss of function of the air handling unit.
l Return air is also indicated in relay room A, B, A/B and the isolation panel area through duct work going through Penetration 32, into Penetration 3 and on up to the air handling units. A multiple j
fire damper will be installed at Penetration 32; should a fire occur in either the relay rooms, isolation panel area, or the corridor area, closure of this damper will prevent hot air from returning to AH-25.
System AH-25 function is not lost for a postulated single failure of the multiple damper at Penetration 32.
As'previously noted the corridor / vestibule and duct chase are all assumed as one fire area and an extension of RAS 3; the fire dampers proposed for Penetration 16, 31 and 32 preclude a fire in the vestibule or corridor from affecting the electrical penetration area B or the relay rooms and isolation panel areas. Since RAB 3 now encompasses i
the HVAC machine room and the HVAC chase no dampers will be provided at Penetrations 1, 2, 3, and 5 - which penetrate the chase ceiling /HVAC machine room floor.
9.5B-7
1270W - 5 iii) Elevation +21.0' At this elevation the fire areas under discussion include the remote shutdown panel area (RAB 9), the battery rooms (RAB 11, 12 & 13),
Switchgear Area B (RAB 8B) which is expanded to include the non-essential areas of the CEA M/G set room (RAB 14), the H & V panel room (RAB 26) and the vestibule; Switchgear Area A (RAB 8A) which includes the non-essential computer battery room (RAB 10) and switchgear area A/B (RAB 8 A/B). Based on previous commitments to NRC with respect to other open items and as discussed in FSAR Subsection 9-5.1 and Appendix 9.5A, part-height fire barriers will be provided which separate Switchgear Area A/B from Switchgear Area B and from Switchgear Area A.
Switchgear Areas A, B, A/B and the electrical penetration area will also be provided with full sprinkler coverage by an automatic suppression system.
As indicated in the discussions for elevation +35.0 ft above, a multiple fire damper will be installed at Penetrations 10 and 12 to preclude heated air from entering elevation +21.0 f t.
The restriction of air flow by closure of the multiple fire damper at Penetration 10 will affect the CEA M/G set room and the battery rooms at elevation +21.0.
Loss of the CEA M/G set room ventilation is considered tolerable since the CEA M/G set is considered non-essential. Loss of ventilation to the battery rooms is considered tolerable since each battery room has redundant exhaust systems which will continue to function and provide sufficient ventilation to these rooms.
As discussed previously restricted air flow to Switchgear Area B would not negate the capability to safely shutdown.
Since RAB 14 is combined as part of Fire Area RAB 8B no dampers are provided at Penetrations 19, 20, and 33.
Figure 9.5B-3 indicates that from Penetration 10, the duct run extends into and feeds the CEA M/G set room, Switchgear Area B, and each battery room. For the battery room outlets (RAB 11, RAB 12 and RAB 13), a single fire damper will be provided at the ceiling penetrtions of each battery room.
As discussed at Part IV F below, each battery room is served by two redundant exhaust fans; these exhaust ducts are provided with flow switches which monitor an alarm in the control room.
A duct run extends from Penetration 12 and feeds into the Switchgear Area B as indicated on Figure 9.5B-3; Penetration 12 is provided with a multiple fire damper.
A duct run extends from Penetration 13 (which was in the duct chase on the floor above) and supplies ventilation to the hot shutdown panel (LCP-43), the vestibule, and to Switchgear Area B.
A multiple fire damper will be installed at Penetration 27 into the remote shutdown panel room. Therefore, a fire in Switchgear Area B will close this fire damper and protect equipment located at LPC-4 3 ;
9.5B-8
1270W - 6 however, it should be pointed out that during normal operation, LCP-43 is de-energized and a fire in Switchgear Area B would not require evacuation of the Control Room and access to LCP-43.
Similarly, a fire in the Control Room which would require access to LCP-43, would not affect any of the duct runs associated with Penetration 2, 13 and 27 which serves LCP-43 air handling units AH-25A and AH-25B. The vestibule is considered for the purposes of this review as an extension of fire area RAB 8 and, therefore, no fire dampers are proposed at Penetrations 28 and 29.
At Penetration 14, return air is directed up two floors to the air handling units, first passing through the duct chase on elevation
+35.0 ft.
A multiple fire damper will be installed at Pentration 14 in order to preclude hot air or smoke from entering the air handling units. Supply air duct work located in the HVAC chase (at elevation
+35.0 f t) penetrates the swtichgear area ceiling (Penetration 15) and passes through the switchgear area entering the computer battery rom through ceiling Penetration 25.
The computer battery room is considered a non-essential area and has been combined as part of the "A" switchgear area (RAB 8A) therefore no fire pamper will be provided at Penetration 25, although a fire damper will be provided at the switchgear area ceiling (Penetration 15).
This completes the review of dampers in safety-related duct work for the air handling units AH-25A and AH-25B. With the provision of multiple or single fire dampers at selected locations a outlined above, the fire protection system provided for these area is considerably enchanced and the design meets the intent of the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Delineation of the proposed fire damper installation commitments versus the NRC position's stated in Opened Item No. 29 of October 9, 1981 are given in Table 9.5B-1.
Failure mode and effects analysis for these fire dampers are included in Table 9.5B-3.
9.5B-9
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1266W-1 B.
Air Handling Units AH-12A and AH-12B/ Emergency Filtration Supply Unita S-BA. E-8B As indicated on Figure 9.5B-4, the Control Room envelope (RAB 1) includes Fire Zones RAB 1A (Control Room Proper), RAB 1B (AH-12) mechanical equipment room, RAB IC (corridor and living space) and RAB ID (plant computer room). Fire dampers are not required for penetrations in walls which separate fire zones within a fire area.
A ceiling plenum is created by the suspended ceiling located approximately 9 ft. from the floor in the Control Room proper, corridor and living space and the Computer Room.
Fire Area RAB 1B ir-the mechanical equipment room which houses the Air Handling Units AH-12A, AH-12B, S-8A and S-8B.
The Supply Air Units (S-BA and B) serve no purpose during normal operations; these units are for use during a radiological emergency when the norms 1 outside air intakes to AH-12A and AH-12B are closed on a hig). radiation signal or SI AS.
The emergency supply units provide emergency outside air through either outside air intake located at Penetration 10 or 11.
Emergency outside air supply to the air handling units penetrates the corridor and living room quarter vall through Penetrations 15 and 16.
No rmal outside air is drawn thru the air shaf t communicating with the elevator machine room (RAB 3A) through Penetration 1 in the east wall; the air shaf t extends down to elevation + 7.00 f t. and is not normally accessible. Supply air during normal operation is directed through Penetrations 2 and 3 (120 x 36 inches) into the control room and through Penetration 4 to the computer room. Air flows between the computer room and the Control Room through a transfer grill (Penetration 5).
Return air from the Computer Room and the Control Room (RAB 1A and RAB ID) is directed back to the air handling units AH-12A and AH-12B through the control room walls at Penetrations 6-7 and 8-9 (94 x 42 inches). The corridor and living quarters are provided with supply air via Penetration 2 located above the suspended ceiling, within the corridor plenum. The path for return air from these areas is via the transfer grills provided in the Control Room walls (Penetrations 12, 13, 14 and duct penetration 17) all located above the suspended ceiling.
A part-height fire partition wall in accordance with NRC requirements as a related Open Item 30B of October 9, 1981, will be provided between the two air handling units which will preclude a fire in one air handling unit from af fecting the other air handling unit; in addition this area vill be provided with full area sprinkler coverage by an automatic suppression system. Additional smoke detection capabilities will be provided in the corridor area to supplement the existing smoke detection located in Control Room, Computer Room, Hechanical Equipment Room and the living quarters area.
The supply air duct from AH-12 runs from the air handling units 15 f t above the floor in a ceiling plenum space above both the corridor area and the Control Room; and is insulated along its length.
The l
9.5B-10 t
1266W-2 leak-tight construction of the duct, the non-combustible duct insulation, the non-combustible ceiling material, the fire rated sealant around all duct penetrations and the thickness of the duct material and elevation of duct run (see Part III of this Appendix) will all serve to preclude the air inside the supply duct from overheating from a fire in the corridor (RAB IC). Therefore no fire dampers are proposed for Penetrations 2 and 3.
Furthermore, the corridor and computer room are non-essential areas and a fire in a non-essential area is considered no worse for plant shutdown than a fire in the essential area (Control Room proper); thus no credit is required for the walls separating the non-essential areas and no fire dampers are required at Penetrations 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Similar arguments preclude the requirement for fire dampers at the return air Penetrations 6, 7, 8 or 9, and 15 and 16.
If a fire caused heat or smoke ingress into the Control Room proper during normal operation, the operators could shut down AH-12, manually suppress the fire while cooling the Control Room by opening the doors to the outside.
Operation of AH-12 with either normal or emergency outside air could then be reestablished. In any case if evacuation of the Control Room were necessary, plant shutdown would be assured by the alternative shutdown capabilities provided by the Auxiliary Control Panel (LCP-43) located in RAB 9 at elevation +21 f t. (see FSAR Appendix 9.5A).
A multiple fire damper is provided at Penetrations 1 and 10 to preclude ingress of fire from the roof areas at elevation +69 f t, A multiple fire damper will be installed at Penetration 11 to separate Fire Area RAB 1 from RAB 2.
The addition of these dampers ensures that the 3-hour fire barrier envelope (RAB 1) is maintained separate from the rest of the plant.
Single fire dampers will be installed at each Penetration 12, 13, 14 and 17 (transfer grills) to provide further assurance that the Control Room proper remains unscathed.
Ihe design of AH-12 and S-8 is being reviewed to ensure that their functional performance remains adequate assuming the single active failure of a damper closing during normal operation or during an accident.
Should a fire cause closure of the normal outside air i
intake damper at Penetration 1, the Control Room can be operated with air from the emergency outside intake at Penetration 11, or the Control Room can be placed into an isolated recirculation-only mode.
This completes the review of dampers in safety-related ductwork in l
the Control Room envelope. The installation of dampers in the specified locations, plus the fire detection, fire suppression and additional fire protection features added to this area as a result of the Fire Hazards Analysis and Appendix R reviews, all provide added t
~
assurance that the Control Room envelope (RAB 1) is adequately protected from the effects of a postulated fire.
In addition to the above, the Control Room proper is continuously manned and a trained fire response team is continuously staffed on every shift.
i 9.5B-11
1270W - 7 C.
Air Handling Units AH-13A and AH-13B/Exhaus t Units E-41 A and E-41B AH-13 and E-41 systems each consist of 2-100 percent capacity units which serve the H&V Mechanical Equipment Room (RAB 2).
Figure 9.5B-5 indicates the layout of air handling units AH-13A and AH-13B and exhaust systems E-41A and E-41B.
AH-13 A is located below AH-13B and indicated in Section C-C of Figure 9.5B-5, and the Exhaust
~
Fans E-41A and E-41B are located as shown in the figure. Supply air for AH-13A and 13B enters the air handling units directly from an air plenum originating at elevation +91.0 ft through elevation +69.0 ft to elevation +46.0 ft.
Outside air intakes are provided for the duct chase through Penetrations 7 and 8 above elevation +91.0 f t, through Penetration 6 at the elevatien +91.0 ft floor slab, and through Penetration 3 at the elevation +69.0 f t floor slab, with additional outside air intakes for Penetrations 4 and 5 at the elevation +69.0 f t level and Penetrations 1 and 2 above the elevation +46.0 ft level and thence to the air handling units. Each air handling unit has its own separate duct work supplying air directly into fire area RAB 2.
A one hour fire berrief will be installed which separates air handling unit 13A froc air handling unit 13B such that a fire in one air handling unit will not affect the other redundant air handling unit. A full area automatic suppression is being provided for RAB 2 as part of the SSA modifications. Air from fire Area RAB 2 is exhausted through the exhaust fans E-41A and E-41B through duct work which extends through the ceiling of the area to elevation +69.0.
The exhaust fans are separated by a sufficient distance from each other and no fire barrier is required between the two units.
Since the exhaust duct from E-41A and the Exhaust duct of E-41B merge into a common exhaust path through Penetration 9, heat from a fire at either exhaust unit or along the duct run will be exhausted through Penetration 9 and then through louvers L-22 at elevation +69.0 f t at atmosphere. Since RAB 2 does not connect to other fire areas via Penetration 9 or Louver L-22 no fire dampers are provided at these penetrations.
The air plenum as shown on Section C-C (Figure 9.5B-5) is considered part of Fire Area RAB 2 and is not normally accessible during normal
(
operation. Since this air plenum is considered part of RAB 2, and connects RAB 2 with the atmosphere and with no other fire area; no l
fire dampers will be provided in the louvers and Penetrations 1 through 8.
This completes the review of requirements for fire dampers in safety-related duct work for AH-13A and 13B and Exhaust System E-41A and E-41B.
i 9.51.2
g 1270W - 8 D.
Air Handlina Units AH-30A and AH-30B Air handling units 30A and 305 are shown in Figures 9.5B-6 and 9.5B-7 with the air handling units located on elevation +7.0 f t and duct work extending up to the Switchgear Area A on elevation +21.0 f t.
The Fire Area under consideration is comprised of Fire Areas RAB 27, 28, 29A and 29B with the exception of the cable tray chase (located beside the 1&C Room ) which is totally enclosed at this level by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barrier.
The walls separating the mechanical equipment room from the electrical equipment area are not considered essential for fire protection and no dampers are required at Penetrations 1 and 2.
Supply air from Penetration 1 to the electrical area, communication equipment room and 1&C room passes through Penetrations 3, 4 and 5 and no dampers are required since these areas are considered part of the common Fire Area RAB 27.
The supply air proceeds upward to Switchgear Area A through Penetrations 7, 8, 9,10 and 11.
Return air from elevation +7.0 f t passes through Penetration 5 to AH-30.
No damper is required at Penetration 5.
At elevation +21.0 f t, shown on Figure 9.55-7, the "A" Switchgear Area is cooled by supply' air from the air handling units AH-30A and B coming from the Penetrations 7 through 11 in order that a fire in the electrical area below, or a fire at the A switchgear, will not force heated air onto the switchgear equipment. Closure of one of these fire dampers by a single active failure or by a single spurious closure will not affect cooling Switchgear Area A equipment.
In the i
event of a fire at Switchgear Area A of such magnitude as to close all fire dampers at Penetrations 7 through 11, the redundant Switchgear Area B and Switchgear Area AB will perform the safety-related functions. Return ducts for air handling units AH-30A and 30B are provided in Switchgear Area B.
However, these return ducts are separated sufficiently and have intervening electrical cabinets between them such that a fire at one return duct should not affect the other return duct. A single fire damper will be installed in both Penetrations 12 and 13 to preclude hot air being returned to the air handling units on the floor below.
t This completes the review of damper installation and safety-related duct work related to Air Handling Units 30A and 30B.
)
4 9.5B-13
1269W-1 E.
Emergency Exhaust System L-23/ Normal Supply System S-6 and Normal Exhaust System E-22 2xhaust system E-23A and E-23B serve no purpose during normal operation since this system is required only to exhaust and filter any radioactivity caused by a raciological accident. Ho wever, some duct work in E-23 is shared by a normally operating supply system S-6 and a normally operating exhaust system E-22.
The duct wort for the (nrt normally operating) exhaust system E-23 is shown on Figures 9.5B-8 th rough 9.5B -12.
Turning to tigure 9.5B-12, it should be noted t' at the normally operating supply system S-6 acts to feed supply air (via normally open isolaticn valves) into the ECCS area, the vault area, the valve galleries A and B and the shutdown heat excha rgers areas A and L through Penetrations 18, 19, 2 0, 21 a r.d 2 2 ; e xha u s t f ro c t he se areas is fed (via normally open isolation valve s) through the normally operating exhaust system L-22 via Penetrations 13, 14, 15, 16 a r.d 17 and through Phnetration 11.
Figure 9.5B-12 shows arrows indicati ng all exhausts a t every penetratf or.
These arrows depict the emergency operation only of system E-23A and E-23B; during normal operations supply air is sent into the area on the south side and normally operating exhaust is via penetrations located on the north side of the ECCS area. The ECLS area is locatec at elevation -35.0 f t; the suptly system S-6 is located on elevation +69.0 f t, while the exhaust system E-22 is located on elevation +4 6.0 i t..
Isolation valves on both the supply and exhaust ducts isolate the normal supply and exhaust from the emergency exhautt ducts on an SI AS.
These isolation valves a re indicated on Figures 9.5B-11 and 9.5E-12.
Per previous commitments t o NRC, fire dacrers will be installed at all non-saf ety duct penetrations, thus the non-safety duct rcuring is not shown. The remainder of the Figure t, Figura s 9.SB-8 th ru 9.5B-11, indicate t he emergency exhaust duct routing through the plant up to the emerEe rcy exhaust units E2 3A a nd E23B a t +46.0 f t.
Single fire daepers are installed at all ducts penetrating the walls at elevation -35.0 f t (Penetra ticns 11 through 22). The HVAC System E-23 has been reviewed for the case of a LOCA plus a postulated single failure of a fire damper at any location; it has been determined that the Exhaust System l
E-23 design will function as required since a single active failure will not precluce the operability of a t least one train of E-23.
Similarly, the normal operating supply and exhaust systems have been j
reviewed to ensure that closure of a fite damper does not icpair l
cooling of the ECCS area. The high pressure safety injection pumps and the containnents spray pucps are not required f or hot standby or cold shutdown. The only equipment required for saf e shutdown are valves located in the valve galleries A and B, the shutdown heat exchanger A or B and the LPSI pump (s) A or B; this equipment is required for the cold shutdown condition only.
i Not e tha t room chillers are provided in the safety injection pump j
rooms shich are interlocked to operate upcn pump actuation; thus loss of ventilation to the LPSI pumps which are required for shutdown cooling is accomecdated by the roce chillers. Similarly, roor chillers are provided in shutdown heat excharger areas A and B and will operate when a shttdown heat e>. changer (using the LPSI peeps) is in operation.
9.5B-14
126 9W-2 As indicated previously, exhaust system E-23 does not operate excert under accident conditions. On receipt of an SI AS, both 100*/. capacity exhaust systems E-23A and E-235 will be actuated and the operator can select one train to continue running and keep the other unit in s t endby. E-23A exhausts the ECLS area / valve galleries / shutdown heat exchangers via ductwork which leads into Pene tration 11 (Figure 9 5B-12 ) a nd the nc e upwa rd t o E-2 3A a t e lev a t i on +4 6. 0 f t. The duct routings and penetrations for E-23A, from elevation -35.0 f t. to elevatior. +46.0 f t. are showr. on Figure s 9 5E-12 through 9.5B-8.
Although these duct runs are inactive during normal operation and the duct work / penetration design should preclude any fire f rom af fecting contiguous areas (see Part III), single fire dampers will be provided a t Penetra tions 11, 8, 6, 4A a nd 4.
Similarly, for system E-23B, a single fire damper will be provided at Pe ne tra tions 12,10, 7, 5, 2, 3 a rd 1 ( Figure s 9 5-12 th rough 9.5B-8).
This completes the review of installation of fire dampers in saf ety-related ductsork for the emerge.ncy exhaust s; st et E-23.
e 9.5B-15
126 9W-3 F.
Exhaust Sys tems E-2 9, E-30 and E-31/Lxhaust E-46 a nd E-5 2 The exhaust systems referred to previously for the battery roocs (see Figure 9.5B-3), plus a separate exhaust system for the computer battery room are shown on Figures 9.5B-13 through 15. The redundant exhaust fans for the battery room, E29, E30 and E31 are located in Fire Area LAB 3A elevation +69.0 f t as shown on Figure 9.5B-15; Syster E-52 e xhaust s RAB 3A i tse lf. The battery room exhaust begins at elevation +21.0 f t (Figure 9.5B-13) through Penetrations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, passes through the cable vault and electrical penetration-area at elevation +35.0 f t through Fenetra tions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 a nd 14, and enters a duct chase and is routed to the exhaust fans located at elevation +69 0 f t as indicated in Figure 9.5B-15.
The air is exhausted into the atmosphere through Penetration 16.
Similarly, the exhaust f or the non essential computer battery root (which is considered as part of Fire Area RAB BA) originates at elevation +21.0 f t (Figure 9 5B-13) through Fenetrations 7 and 6, pa sses through ti.e relay room "A" at elevation +35.0 f t' (as shown on Figure 9.5B-14) through Penetration 15 and enters the exhaust fans on elevaticn +46.0 ft; then to the atmosphere through Phnetration 17 as shown on Figure 9.5B-15.
This review is performed fror the exhaust pcint of origin, Figure 9.5B-13.
The e xhau s t f or bat t e ry room B i s loca t ed a t the room ceiling at Penetration 5 and goes into a normally inaccessible duct space between a thick concrete slab over the three battery rooms and the ceiling of elevation +21.0.
The exhaust duct for battery room B goes through the ceiling at Penetration 5 Ba t t e ry Room AB i s s er ved by exhaust Penetration 3 and the duct run penetrates the ceiling at Pene tration 4.
Battery Room A is served by the exhaust duct I whi ch is joined with the exhaust duct penetration 2 goirs on upward to the exhaust fan unit. Single fire dampers are installed in Penetrations 1 through 6 shown on Figure 9.5B-13.
The battery room exhaust c ont i nues through the cable vault as shown on Figure 9.5B-24 f rom Penetrations 2, 4 and 6, and is routed 'through the cable vault wall through Pene trations 9,10, and 11, through the elec trical Pene tration a rea B through Penetratf or.s 12,13 and 14 into a duct chase (Fire Area RAL 3A) which then goes to the exhaust units. Single fire dampers are installed at Penetrations 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 shown on Figure 9 5B-14.
The battery room exhaust ductwork continues as shown on Figure 9.5B-15 up to elevation +69.0 f t where it is exhausted to the atmosphere. The exhaust units shown on this F1gure are sufficiently separated such that a fire af fectirs one redurdart exhaust unit (for example E-30) should not affect the other redundant exhaust unit s; therefore, no fire barriers are required between the exhaust units themselve s.
Loss of one redundant ezhaust system (for example E-30) would af fect only one battery room (for exacple Battery Room B) and the other battery rooms would remain functionirg.
Note that loss of an exhaust unit would not affect supf y air to the affected battery l
No damper is proposed for the exhaust air outlet at Phnetration room.
16 since the louver is located at a sufficient distance above the RAB roof area.
9.5B-16 o
126 9W-4 The non safety computer battery room duct originates at the ceiling of the battery room (Pene tration 7) elevation +29.5 f t, as shown on Figure 9.5B-13.
This duct exterds from Penetration 7 througl. ti.e Switchgear A area to the ceiling of the Switchgear Area (Phnetration 8), proceeds through the relay room to Penetration 15 and enters the exhaust unit E-46 at elevation +46.0 f t.
Si nc e thi s non-s afe t y battery room has been incorporated as part of the Switchgear Area (see
~ ~.
discussion on AH-25 unit s) no fire dampers will be provided at Penetration 7.
Penetration 8 (located in the switchgear area ceiling) between the switchgear area and relay room and Penetration 15 (between relay room and fan room at elevation +46.0 f t) are provided with single fire dampers.
On Figure 9.5B-15 no fire damper is required f or Penetration 17 since this is an outlet to the atmosphere.
This completes the review of installation of fire dampers in safety-related duct work for exhaust systers E-29, E-30 and E-31.
l l
r I
9.5B-17
12 71W-1 C.
_ Exhaust System E-28A and E-28B/ Supply System S-3 (1) Exhaust System L-28A and E-28B Penetration 2 is located in the ceiling of Emergency Diesc1 Generator Room A and provides a suction to exhaust fan E-28A located a bove at elevation +4 6. E-28A then discharges t o atmosphere via the penthouse at elevation +69.
Pene tration 1 on the ceiling of Emergency Diesel Generator Room B similarly provides exhaust through E-28B to another penthouse on the roof. ( Se e Fi gure 9 5B-16).
In lieu of fire dampers the duct work and exhaust fans for each diesel generator exhaust from the cellf rg penetrations to the penthouse are enclosed in a 1-hour fire rated enclosure. An automatic suppression system is also provided in each Emergency I
Diesel Generator room.
In addition a full area automatic suppression system is provided f or RAB 2.
Penetration 5 (See F1gure 9.5B-10) provides supply f rom an OA1 located on the roof to Emergency Diesel Generator Room B.
It is provided with a 3-hour multiple fire damper. The duc t f rom t he I
room penetration to the outside air intake is enclosed in a 1-hour barrier. Therefore, the fire damper in Pbnetration 5 can only be expected to close, as a result of a fire in the Emergency Diesel Generator Room itself.
(ii) Supply System S-3 Penetration 6 and 7 provide supply air f rom the Containment Atmosphere Release System (CARS) makeup fans to the c ontainment. Each penetration is provided with a single fire damper. The CARS system is designed as a backup to the containment purge system and to the permanent containrent hydrogen recombiners. This system will not normally be utilized. Closure of these deepers as a result of a fire will, theref ore, have no effect on saf e shutdown capability.
9.5B-18
1251W-4 V.
DETECTION OF FIRE DAMPER CLOSURE As discussed earlier in this study, the ability of an operator to detect a spurious closure of a fire damper is an important consideration.
The present Standard Technical Specification surveillance requirements only call for a visual inspection of the dampers every 18 months.
The large number of dampers and-the difficulties of access would make any more frequent inspections a sever'e operational problem. However, it is the opinion of Louisiana Power &
Light Co. that additional verification is required.
If one of the single dampers were to close inadvertently, temperatures in the serviced areas would rise. This could be detected by the existing room temperature indications available for all essential areas on the Control Room panels and on the plant computer. The slow rise of temperature in many areas, particularly during periods of low outside temperature, however, would delay the operator's awareness of the closure.
The room, in this case would be maintained below alarm setpoint temperatures for a prolonged period.
If one of the sections in the multiple dampers were to close inadvertently, the effects on room temperature would be minimal or non-existent.
The design margin in the capacity of the air conditioning system would be suf ficient to overcome this additional pressure drop and maintain the room temperatures.
It is because of the above described difficulties in promptly detecting an inadvertent closure, that local position indication is provided for fire dampers and each section of multiple dampers in safety-related duct.
This feature not only provides operational advantages but precludes any possibility, however remote, of a damper closure going undetected and remaining undetected for prolonged periods.
9.5B-19
127 2W-1 VI.
Conc lu sions This study has defined those locations where fire dampers will be installed in safety-related ducts penetrating rated fire barriers.
In certain insta nce s, essential Fire Areas were expanded to include adjacent non-essential Fire Area s.
A fire in the newly incorporated area does not increase the severity of a fire in the previously defined fire zone.
The basic objective is always te Isolate any potential fire and ensure that saf e shutdown capability is retained f or any postulated fire.
At the same time, the effects of closure of these fire damper in safety-related HVAC systems, and the effects of consequent partial or total loss of normal ventilation has been considered. This a spect of the study is discussed in Section IV and summarized in a f ailure Modes and Ef fects Analysis (Table 9.5B-3).
Although non safety related duct penetrations were not discussed in detail in thi s repo rt, Table 9.5B-1 summarizes our compliance to the NRC's requirements (which included saf ety and non-saf ety peretra tions).
In all cases where a specified fire area is discussed vis-a-vis safety-related duct penetrations, non safety duct penetrations will be installed with dampers consistent with the rating of the fire area foundary.
The Waterf ord-3 system of fire dampers, in conjuncticn with the suppression and detection systems, will ensure that a fire is quickly isolated and suppressed, while ensuring the capatility to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition.
9.5 B-20
1268W-1 TABLE 9.55-1 unTERFORD-3 (DNPLIANCE TO NRC FOSITION ON FIRE DANPDS (NRL Open Itee #29 of IO7576Ydecon wt th t}76a~acoT
- 29. It to our positten that 1 1/2-or 3-hour rated fire deepers or doors be installed in ventilation penetration of rated fire barriere.
(3-hour tirr, door dampero required in 3-hour rated walls) as indicated in Attachment II.
"ATTACI9 TENT 11" NRC POSITION WATMFORD CONFORMANCE FIRE AREA PENETRATIONS RAB 1A All penetrat tone i
As indicated in FIBure 9.55-4, the Control Room envelope (RABI) includes
- Fire Areas IA (Control boa proper); RABIB (sechanical equipeent rece);
RAB 18 All penetret tone in south and east wall e.
RABIC (Corridor and living spaces); and RABID (plant coop.ater room).
1he Control Room envelope is outrousaded by a 3-hour barrier. Fire dampero are not restuired for penettettone in wolle which esperate fire mones within a Fire Area.
All ducts penetrettg the outer perteeter of the Control Roos envelope
- w
( RAB I A. IB, IC, ID combined) are provided with fire deepers.
?
u 3
All oatoide air intahee are provided with multiple f t re deepers, For added protection air trenefer paths (via transfer grille) between the corridor /living quarters and Control Rooo proper are provided with fire
- deepers, RAB 2 All penetrettone of floor and east well.
Te a RAB 3 All penet ra tions of floc,r.
the corridor, veettbule and NVAC duct chose on EL+35 (see FtBure 9.55-3) have been incorporated into RAB). Three andditional areas contain no ado t t ional esfet y-relat ed equipment. Penetration 6 le provided with a multiple fire deeper.
RAB 3A All penetrations of floor.
There are no floor penetratione. Three docte enter teto the WTAC duct chase whict. t o considered part of RAB 3A.
M&V duct spac e a t Om l L-I IA All duct penetrations Te e RAb 4 All p,netrat ions Tee RAB 5 All penetrations Te e.
($re Table 9.53-2 for Penetretton 8)
RAB 6 Al l pe ne t r a t ions Tee I
i
1268W-2 TABLE 9.58-1 (Cont 'd)
ERC POSITION WATERFORD ODMPLIANCE FIRE AREA PENETRATIONS RAB 7 All penetrations. also all penetrations be-Yes tween relay room and cor ridor.
RAB 8 All penetratione except exterttr building walle. Ye s: RAB 8 now includee Suttelgear Areas A. A/B and B; the f an room (RAB 26). CEA M/g set roce (R%B 14), vestibule, and coeputer bettery room
( R AB 10) Se e rig. S.55-3.
RAB 9 All penetrations Te e RAB 11 All penetratione Yes RAB 12 All penetrations Te e RAB 13 All penetrations Yes RAB 15 All penetrations Celling duct at penetration I to E-283 to Penthouse (See F1Bure 9.5b-16) to enclosed in a 1 1.our barrier with area suppreeston in lieu of a deeper ya erstes, all other penetrations beve fire deepers.
u.
[RAB16 All penetraticce Celling duct penettetton 2 to E-284 to menthouse (see F1Bure 9.53-16) is ha enclosed in a I bour barrier with an area suppreselon system in Iteu of a deeper. All other penetratione except the OAl have fire deepers.
RAB 17 All penettstions Te e RAB 18 All penetrat ione Tee RAB 2 3 All penettettone of floor and cet!!ra.
tie s.
See Ftture 9.58-10; the ett for EDC B (t o the prethouse, t o conaldered part of RAB 23.
A multiple fire deeper is provided a t Pen. 5 R AB 2 5 All penetrations of cellt rg.
Yes RAS 26 Aj ! penetrationd of west well t o sho tch ear room This non-safety f an room was incorporated into RAB 8.
Therefore deepero not t
provided on west well.
RAB 27 Al l pene t ro t t on s Te e RAB 27 now i nc lude s the elec t ri ca l equipeent a re a ( RAS 28). I&C Boos (RAB 294) and comeunicatione Equtgeent Bone C BAB 290). All duct penetratione In the perteeter of tht e e res ( RAB 27 incluelve) are provided with fire deepers.
LA328 All penetratione See RAB 2 7 above.
RAS 29A All penetratione See RAS 27 a bove.
R*J 298 All penetret tone See RAB 2 7 above.
RAS 31 All penetrations of floor and ceiling and all Tee well penetratione in nearby safe shutd?wn cable rout t na e.
+
126 W-3 TABLE 9.58-1 (Cont'd)
NRC 70StTION letTERFORD G)prLIANCE I
FIRE AM A FENETRATIONS RAB 38 All penetrettone of cefitre at el -4.00 f t and Yes south e all on el -35.00 f t RAB 33 All penetrations of south well Yes RAB 34 All penetrations Ye s i
RAB 35 All penetrattone Yes RAS 36 All penetrattone
. Ye o RAB 38 All penetrattons Teo RAB 39 All penetrattons Tee m
l O
I l
4 i
i
1253W-1 TABLE 9.5B-2
SUMMARY
OF SAFETY-RELATED HVAC DUCT PENETRATIONS TO BE PROVIDED WITH FIRE DAMPERS MULTIPLE (M)
SYSTEM PEN. NO.
SINGLE (S)
FIGURE RAB Cable 6
M 9.5B-1 Vault and Switch-8 M
9.5B-2*
gear Ares (AH-25) 9 M
9.5B-2 10 M
9.5B-3 11 M
- 9. 5 B-2 I
12 M
9.5B-3 13 M
9.5B-3 14 M
S. B-3 15 S
- 9. 5 B-3 16 H
9.5B-2 17 M
- 9. 5 B-2 18 M
9.5B-2 22 S
- 9. 5 B-J 23 S
9.5B-3 24 S
- 9. 5 B-3 27 M
9.5B-3 31 M
9.5B-2 32 M
9.5B-2 34 S
9.5B-2 Control Room Air 1
M 9.5B-4 Conditioning Sys-10 M
- 9. 5 B-4 tem (AH-12) 11 M
9.5B-4 12 S
- 9. 5 B-4 13 S
9.5B-4 14 S
9.5B-4 17 S
9.5B-4 RAB Cable Vault 7
S 9.5B-7 and Switchgear 8
S 9.5B-7 Area (AH-30) 9 S
9.5B-7 10 S
9.5B-7 11 5
- 9. 5 B-7 12 S
9.5B-7 13 S
9.5B-7 Controlled 1
S 9.5B-9 Ventilation Area 2
S 9.5B-10 System (E-23) 4A S
9.53-9 4
S 9.5B-9 5
S 9.5B-9 Fire Damper is installed in chase above contrcl room suspended ceiling, not at floor slab (see Section IV A(i))
l l
9.5B-24
)
1253W-2 TABLE 9.5B-2 (Cont 'd)
MULTIPLE (M)
SYSTEM PEN. NO.
SINGLE (S)
FIGURE controlled 3
S 9.5B-10 Ventilation Area 6
S 9.5B-10 System (E-23) 7 S
9.5B-11 (Con t 'd) 8 S
9.5B-11 9
S 9.5B-10 10 S
9.5B-11 11 S
9.5B-12 12 S
9.5B-12 13 S
9.5B-12 14 S
9.5B-12 15 S
9.5B-12 16 S
9.5B-12 17 S
9.5B-12 18 S
9.5B-12 19 S
9.5B-12 20 S
9.5B-12 21 S
9.5B
'.e 22 S
9.5B-12 RAB Cable Vault 1
S 9.5B-13 and Switchgear 2
S 9.5B-13 Area (E-29, E-30, 3
S 9.5B-13 E-31, E-46) 4 S
9.5B-13 5
S 9.5B-13 6
S 9.5B-13 8
S 9.5B-43 9
S 9.5B-14 10 S
9.5B-14 11 S
9.5B-14 12 S
9.5B-14 13 S
9.5B-14 14 S
9.5B-14 15 S
9.5B-14 Containment Atmo-6 S
9.5B-16 sphere Removal 7
S System 9.5B-16 Diesel Generator 5
M Ventilation (E-28)
- 9. 5 B-10 A
9.5B-25
i TAsta 9.58-3 FAltFRE M00R5 AND FFFECTS ANALTSIS FOR FIRE DAMPERS Il3 SAf sTT-RELATTD tRfCT PTNETRATIONS (I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(3)
System Pen Effects of Fire-related Effects of SAF of (Ftzures)
M M
Cloeure on Serviced Areae Coppensettna Prowletene Fire Desser (closure)
%,ensettaa Provtetene RAB Cable Voult end Switchgear Area (AM-25)
P9.55-1 6
I taae of norest supply air to:
Due to low heat toed,F.
tt will take over Increased eyetem-wide Isote 1 A - Cable Vault 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> to reach 149 Cables are all Pressure drop qualif ted for in-conreineent destan envirorumental conditions 3 - Elec Pen Area A See P9 belew C - Elec Pen Area b See P9 below D - CEA M. Set Room See F10A below E - Battery Aoome See PtOB betrw Partial lose of norest cooling to See til below Switchaear Area B e
o h
F9.53-2 O
I See PS above.
r9.53-2 9
I laae of normal supply air to Cabtre and penetret tone in tbte eroe Increased pressure drop Hote 1 Elec Pen Aree A a re quit fied to in-containment de-sign teele environewntes conditione and wt11 therefore continue to func.
tio unti1 fire caveing cloeure (cable veutt) la evapressed. Also door to Elec Fen Arme B con be opened for additionet cooitna.
F9.53-3 10 I
lose of normal supply air A - CEA MC Set poem A - CFA MC Set will fall in safe Increased peesoure drop Mote I (trip) mode 5 - Ba t t e ry Rooma B - The only heat load are from lights reeutting in slow teep stee with no ventilation.
Ene-ever. exhaust Fene E-29. E-30 end E-31 will continue to oper-ese to provide ventilation both for hydronen and cooling con-olderettone Partlet lose of eveply str to:
C - Switchseer Aree B C - Cooling via FI2 and P11 to one t f ect ed.
fwitchgoer Areas A.
A/R us.ef f ected.
a A
TABI2 9.53 3 (cont'd)
(t)
(2 )
(3)
(4 )
(5)
(6)
System Pen effects of Fire-related (7)
(a)
Ef fects of EAP of fffautes) g g*
- g Closure on Serviced Areas Compeneettna Provisione.
Ptre Deeper (Cleeute)
Caseenaattna Proviolone P9.SB-2 11 1
Loss of normal supply air to See P9. Also door to Elec Pen Area A Increased prespues drop,
pote'l Elec Pen Area B.
can be opened for additional cooling.
Partial lose of supply air to P13 would be unaff.cted by fire closing Switchneer Area a PLO and/or Pil. Cooling via PI) would be evellebte until fire puppressed.
F13 also supplying cooling to switch-gear Ares A/B. AM-30 espplytag cool-inB to switchgear Area A.
Cooling via PI) =111 he proportionately in-creased due to Pl! closure. All equip-ment in Elec Pen Equip. Ares qualif ted to et least 300"F.
i P9.5B-3 12 2
Perttet lose of supply str to PIO and Pl3 would be unaf fected by lacreased pressure drop Note !
evitchgear Aree B end Elec Pen fire closing Pil and would supply Equip. Aree a cooling to erese untti fire to sur-preseed. All eget pment in Eleg pen e
Y Equip. Area a qualt fled to 300 f.
0 P9.5B-3 13 I
A - Perttet lose of eupply air A - PLO end Pl2 would be eneffected Increased preesure drop pote I to Switchgear Arese B and by fire cloetna F13 and wteld A/B provide cooling to Area B.
Area A provided odequate cooling via AM-30 B - Loss of supply att to Aux B - LCP-4 3 required only whee Con-Control Panel (LCP-41) trol hoom evetuated. Fire cloetna F13 will not require control room evacuation.
P9.5B-3 14 K
Loos of return str frne Cooling to Switchaear Aree B via FIO Increased pressure drop Rote 1 Switchgear Area A/B and A and Pl2 unaf fected. Cooling to suitchgear Area A via AM-30 unaf fected.
e FD.50-3 15 x
Loss of narsel supply air to Moneeseettet Loss of cooling to poneesential Computer Bat te ry Room Cnspu t e r Be t t e s y Room PD.53-2 16 I
Loss of return otr fran A - Cable Vault A - See P6A. Also door to Relay Room A/B enujd be opened to Incrossed preseure d op N'I' I provide path for return ett B = Elec Pen Aree A and B B - See P9 Also deer to
,u Am.
m
i i
1 TAsiz 9.58-3 (Cent'd) i (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(3)
System Fen Ef fecto af Fire-related Effects of SAF of l
(Flaure s )
g g
M Closure on Serviced Arese Compeneettaa Prov' stone Fire Despar (Closure)
'Carseneettna Provfetone I
pg,33 2 17 I
loss of return air from cable See F6A. Ateo if fire to in Elec Pen increeeed pressure drop Qte 1 i
vault Aree B, door to Relay Room A/B could j
be opened to provtJe path for return
)i I
F9.53-2 18 I
lose of return att f rom Elec See F9 Incrossed pressure drop Hote 1 Fen Area A j
F9.33 3 22/23/24 3 lose of supply air to Bettery See Flos loss of supply air to Redundant Battery toome not Room B, A/B or A Battery Room 3, A/S or A affected. Eshavet fan for affected room util still fune.
i i
tion end provide adequate ventilation.
lose of suPP y otr to auxtllery IIF43 required only when Contral incrossed pressure drop pote I l
F9-58-3 27 x
control panel (IIF43)
Room evacuated. Fire cloetna Fi7 to IIF43 e
'w util not require Control Room evacu.
l atton.
j 4
4 o
i l
F9.53-2 31 I
lose of supply air to Relay Cooling to Relay Room A vii F5 not increased pressure drop pote 1 l
Roome A, A/8, 5 affected. Also if fire to in core to Relay Roome A, A/S, B 6
ridor door to cable vault can be
)
opened to provide additional cooling.
l l
F9.53-2 32 I
lose of return str from Relay Supply att rio either F31 or F-5 or inereeeed pressure drop Note 1 Roome A, A/B, 3 both would be avellebte depending on fire locetton.
F9.59-2 I
Fertial loss of normel supply Cooling to Relay Roome 9. A/S un-1rcreased pressure drop Mote 1 i
ett to Relay pbom A aftected. Cooling to Relay Room A via F31 unaffected and adequate, j
rytrol Rwie A t e Cc ndit toning System (AM-12) l i
F9.584 I
I Ines of supply att to AM-12 CRACS can be placed in emergency Decreased Intake to Effect on system to etnor.
operating mode (via emergency out-AM-12 Operator has option to place side ett intake 10 or 11)
Control Room in rectreutation mode via F10 or Fil.
4
'a TABLE 9.58-3 (Cont'd) l (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(g)
Effects of Fire-related Effects of EAF ef system Pea (Finore s )
h M.,
g Cleeure on Serviced Arese Compenestina Provt alone Fire Demper (Closure)
Componecting Provisions non.
F9. 53 -4 10 I
Mone.
F10 only used siter SEAS er Mi Radiation signal. Duct le norestly teolated by redundant va l ve s F9.5B-4 11 I
Mons.
S** FID None F9.58-4 12/13 x
Loos of air flow frna corridor Supply str via Control hoom duct un-Perthel Ince of retura closure of any single duct 14/t7 areas wie well louvers ef fected and will be suf fletent, air flow f rom corridor wf it have no ef fect on Cont col areas via well touvere.
Room temperature, e
j We
___A_
TABLE 9.53 3 (cont'd)
System Fen (6)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(e)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Ef fects of Fire-related Ef fects of SAF of fFinutes) 33, SFD MFD Closure on Serviced Areas Compensatina Provietone Fire Deeper fClosure)
.Capensatina Provietoes RAS Cable Vault and Switchaear Area (AM-30)
F9.58-6 7/8 I
Imes of ouPP y air to 3,itchgear Supply ele to Switchgear Areas A/B, a lacreased eyeten pressure Closure of any stesle duct will l
9/10/11 Area A unaffected. Assuming fire to not in drop have no effect on room tempere.
switchgear Area A itself, ecue cooling ture.
will att!! be provided to A via F13.
I F9. 58 - 6 12/13 I
Imee of return air fram evitch-Supply air to Switchaear Area A/B via Fertial lose of reture Suf f tetent espply att to Bettch.
gear Area B and lose of supptf FI) not effected. Some coottog pro-att from Switcha m Aree 5 gear Area A will be provided ett to Switchgear Area A vided to Settchgoer Area A via F13.
and partial lese or supply even with closure of either Assuming fire in Melt, cooling via AH-25 air to Switchgear Area A.
F12 or FI).
not effected.
s 1
1
TAst2 9.58-3 (Cont'd)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Systee Fen Ef fects of Fire-related (7)
(a)
(Fisures)
No.
SFD MFD
_ Closure on Serviced Areas Compeneettaa Provietone Fire Deeper fClosore)
- Compensattaa Provistene Effects of SAF of Cont rolled Vent-IIstice Area Systee (3 21)
F9.58-9 i
I 2
I 3
I 4A I
The CVAS to not used during normal operation.
roces and the containment penetration stee which cantaine rectrcelation stb oump water linesIt to designed to provide poet-seeldent fil 4
g served by thte system are moraally cooled wie the RAB permal Ventilation System (nonsofety). (See FSAR Swbooet ten 6.3.1).
Areas S
3 All ducts f rem that system 6
I Fenetratteg fire barriere will be provided with fire deepers. Closure of these deepers, however, heat eetuated or Ined-8 7
I vertent wait have no ef fect on sete shutdown stace the ESF rooms are provided with local coolere.
IDCA plus safety Fil O
I or Fit to sceoummodated by evellability of redundant trete.
9 I
10 I
11 I
.y 12 I
e, 13 I
14 I
15 I
16 I
17 I
18 I
19 I
20 I
21 I
22 I
a
TA912 9.58-3 (Cont'd)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(e)
System Fen Effects of Fire-related Effecte of SAF of (ytaures)
A SFD MFD Cloeure on Serviced Ateme Compensattaa Frovietone Fire Dauper (Closure)
Compensattna Frovisions N
Diesel Cenerator 5
I less of emergency cooling caps-only fire in diesel generator recus None Diesel generator roome normally ventilation blitty for diesel generator Steelf will cause closure since tr.take cooled by nonsafety RAS normal (E-29)
- room, duct chase enclosed in three hour bar-ventilation erstem.
rier (see Flaure 9.58-16) with auto-F9.St-16 mette suppreesten. Cooling for re-dundant diesel not effected.
RAS Cable vault and Suttchgear (E-29. E-30. E-11, E-46)
F9.58-13 1,3,5 I
lose of exhaust air fran Bettery The only heat loads in the Battery 14ee of normat enhaust pedundant batteries. Also F9 Sa-13 2,4,6 I
Roeme A. A /B or 8 t o E-2 8 Booms are lights.
If, in worst from either Rettery supply not effected; operator L.
F9. 3-14 9,10,11 x
case, fire were to close 1, 3 and 5, Boom A, A/B or 8 con open door out to Suitchgear T'
F 9. 5D-14 12.13.14 i
eatingulehtng of lights by operator Aree A/B to provide return path g
would enable temperature of room to if destrod.
etablltae for the three hours. Bat =
tery Room roof through which these penettettone are made to rated at
) heure, F9.55-13 8
I I4ee of enha; set air f rom com-Noneesential Moneesesittel F9. W 14 puter Battery Room to E-46 l
e f
A
mA,
a s
n.
e d
TAtt2 S.58 3 (Cont'd)
(1)
(2)
-(3)
(4)
(5)
System ren Ef fects of Fire-related (6)
(ytpree)
Em sto two
_ closure on sereteed areas (7) comoeneettna Provtetone Effects of SAP of (g)
Contatement Atmosphere
_ rire peneer (ctosure)
_ tommeneettan Provisione gelease (CARS)
System F9.55-16 6
I None
/
CARS le destaned as a backup to the y
g contatrument purge system and the con-telneent hydrogen reccabiners. It to therefore not normally actuated either during normal operettone or post-accident.
i NOTE 1:
Due to conservettre design of system, tecrease in static head caused by tr.edvertent closure o"f one eettien of e multiple d to mainteln design rom embtent t empe ra tu res.
eeper, will not degrade capabtitty of system i
I l
.m.
A
1253W-3 TABLE S.5B-4 PENETRAT10N SCHEDULES RAB CABLE VAULT AND SWITCHGEAR AREA VEhTILATION (AH-25)
Pentr.
Fi gure No.
Duc t Size Elevation No.
1 16x18 At. FL. EL+4 6 'O 9.5B-1 2
40x24 At. FL. EL+4 6 ' O 9.5B-1 3
90x24 At. FL. E L+4 6 'O S.5B-1 4
96x60 (g EL 62'-5 3/4 9.5B-1 5
20x20 At. FL. E L+4 6 'O 9.5B-1 6
38x38 BOD EL. 61'-8 9.5B-1 7
40x40 BOD EL. 5 9'-6 9.5B-1 8
40x40 At. FL. EL+4 6'O 9.5B-1 9
16x8 BCD EL. 3 5'-6 9.5B-2 10 30x26
, At. FL. EL+3 5 '-0 9.5B-2 11 24x28 BOD EL. 3 5'-1 1/2 9.5B-2 12 24x24 At. FL. EL+3 5 '-0 9.5B-2 13 30x24 At. FL. E L+3 5 '-0 9.5b-2 14 80x24 At. FL. EL+3 5 '-0 9.5B-2 15 18x20 At. FL. EL+35'-0 5.5B-2 16 18x18 BOD EL. 4 3 '-0 9.5B-2 17 16x12 (L EL. 4 0'-4 5.5B-2 18 36x8 (g EL. 44'-2 9.5B-2 19 30x30 yg EL. 30'-9 9.5B-3 20 30x16 BOD EL. 30'-4 9.5B-3 21 Deleted 9.5B-34
1253W-4 TABLE 9.5B-4 (Cont 'd)
RAB CABLE VAULT AND SWITCHGEAR AREA VENTILATION (AH-25)
Pentr.
Figure No.
Duct Size Eleva tion No.
22 8x8 At. SL AB EL+2 9 '-6 9.5B-3 23 8x8 At. SL AB EL+2 9 '-6 9.5B-3 24 8x8
- At. SLAB EL+2 9 '-6 9.5B-3 25 16x16 At. SLAB EL+29 '-6 9.5B-3 26 Le leted 27 10x4-BOD EL. 32'-4 9.5B-3 28 24x16 BOD EL. 30'-8 9.5B-3 29 24x16 BOD EL. 3 0'-8 5.5B-3 30 Dele ted 31 20x12 BOD EL. 41'-4 9.5B-2 32 24x12 q EL 43'-0 9.5B-2 33 36x30 g EL 30'-9 9.5B-3 34 10x8 BOD EL. 4 3 '-0 9.5B-2 f
9.5B-35
m 1253W-5 TABLE No. 9.5B-4 (Cont'd)
CGNTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM (AH-12)
Pentr.
Figure No.
Duet Size Elevation No.
1 1
22x14 BOD EL. 61'-6 9.5B-4 2
120x36 BOD EL. 60'-6 9.5B-4 3
120x36 BOD EL. 60'-6 9.5B-4 4
40x28 BOD EL. 57'-6 9.5B-4 5
48x30 (g EL. 61 '-11 9.5B-4 6
94x42 BOD EL. 60'-0 9.5B-4 7
94x42 BOD EL. 60'-0 9.5B-4 8
94x42 BOD EL. 60'-0 9.5B-4 d
9 94x42 BOD EL. 60'-0 9.5B-4 10 12x6 BOD EL. 56'-6 9.5B-4 11 12x6 BOD EL. 64'-0 9.5B-4 12 22x22 BOD EL. 60'-5 9.5B-4 13 22x22 BOD EL. 60'-5 9.5B-4 i
14 26x12 BOD EL. 58'-2 9.5B-4 15 12x6 BOD EL. 60'-5 9.5B-4 16 12x6 BOD EL. 59'-2 9.5B-4 17 24x10 Cg EL. 57'-1 9.5B-4 i
9.5B-36
1253W-6 TABLE 9.5B-4 (Cont'd)
RAB H&V ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM (AH-13, E-41)
Pe ntr.
Figure No.
Duet Size Elevation No.
I 96x46 (L EL. 63'-0 3/4 9.5B-5 2
96x46 q[ EL. 63 '-0 3/4 9.5B-5 3
120x36 At. FL. EL+69 '-0 9.5B-5 i
4 96x96 (g EL. 75'-0 9.5B-5 5
96x96 (g EL. 75'-0 9.5B-5 6
180x60 At. FL. EL+91'-0 9.5B-5 7
96x96 Qg EL. 96'-6 9.5B-5 8
96x96 (g EL. 96'-6 9.5B-5 9
60x54 At. FL. EL+69 '-0 9.5B-5 10 95 1/2x107 1/2
([ EL 79'-0 9.5B-5 11 95 1/ 2x107 1/2 g EL 79'-0 9.5B-5 12 48x96 CL EL 61'-0 9.5B-5 13 48x96 Q,EL51'-0 9.5B-5 9.5B-37
1253W-7 TABLE 9.5B-4 (Cont'd)
RAB CABLE VAULT AND SWITCHGEAR AREA VENTILATION (AH-30)
Pentr.
Figure No.
Duct Size Elevation No-1 48x20 BOD EL.15'-0 9.5B-6 2
26x10 BOD EL. 15'-0 9.5B-6 3
20x6 it EL 16'-2 9.5B-6 4
20x6 (g EL 16'-2 9.5B-6 5
18x18 BOD EL. 15'-10 9.5B-6 6
Deleted 7
16" Dia.
At. FL. EL+21 '-0 9.5B-6 8
16" Dia.
At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-6 9
16" Dia.
At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-6 10 16" Dia.
At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-6 11 16" pia, At. FL. EL+21 '-0 9.5B-6 12 48x16 At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-6 13 48x16 At. FL. EL+21 '-0 9.5B-6 9.5B-38
1253W-8 TABLE 9.5B-4 (Cont 'd)
CONIROLLED VENTILATION AREA SYSTEM (E-23)
Pentry Fi gure No.
Duc t Size Eleva tion No.
1 16x8 At. FL. E L+4 6 '-0 9.5B-B 2
14x18 At. FL. EL+4 6 '-0 9.5B-8 3
14" pt.,
At. FL. E L+3 5 '-0 5.5E-9 4
12" Dia, q[ E L. 3 6 '-3 9.5B-9 4A 6"
Dis.
g EL. 3 8'-2 9.5B-9 5
6" Dia.
(g E L. 4 2 '-10 9.5B-9 6
18" Dis.
At. FL. EL+35'-0 9.5B-9 7
14" Dia.
At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-10 8
16' Dia.
At. FL. E L+21 -0 9.5B-10 9
18x14 BOD EL. 40'-8 9.5B-10 10 18" Dia.
AL. FL. El+21'-0 9.52-10 11 36" Dia.
At. FL. EL-4 '-0
- 9. 5 B-11 12 16" Dia.
At. FL. EL-4 '-0 9.5B-11 13 16" Dia.
yg EL. -9 '-2 9.5B-12 14 12" Dia.
([ EL. -9 '-2 9.5B-12 15 16" Dia, qL EL. -9 '-2 9.5B-12 16 16" Dia.
([ EL.
-9'-2 9.5B-12 17 28x12 BOD EL. -9 '-6 9.5B-12 18 12" Dia.
q[ EL.
-8'-7 9.5B-12 19 16" Dia, q[ EL. -17 '-1 9.5B-12 9.5B-39
1253W-9 i
TABLE 9,5B-4 (Cont'd)
Pentr.
Figtre No.
Duct Size Elevaticn No _
I 20
- 16"_ pia,
( EL. -19'-4 9.5B-12.
21 30" Dia.
( EL. -14 '-1 9.5B-12 22 16" Dia, g EL. -11 '-6 9.5B-12 1
b 9.5B-40
1253W-10 TABLE 9.5B-4 RAB CABLE VAULT AND SWITCHGEAR AREA VENTILATION (E-29, E-30, E-31, E-46)
Pentr.
Figure No.
Duct Size Elevation No.
I 8x8 At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-13 2
8x8 At. FL. E L+35 '-0 9.5B-14 3
8x8 At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-13 4
8x8 At. FL. EL+35'-0 9.5B-14 5
8x8 At. FL. EL+21'-0 9.5B-13 6
8x8 At. FL. EL+35 '-0 9.5B-14 7
10x10 At. FL. EL+21 '-0 9.5B-13 8
10x10 At. FL. EL+35'-0 9.5B-14 9
8x8 BOD EL 36'-0 9.5B-14 10 8x8 BOD EL 36'-0 9.5B-14 11 8x8 BOD EL 36'-0 9.5B-14 12 8x8 BOD EL 41'-6 9.5B-14 13 8x8 BOD EL 41'-6 9.5B-14 14 8x8 BOD EL 41'-6 9.5B-14 15 18x18 At. FL. EL+4 6 '-0 9.5B-14 16 30x24 Gg EL 76'-9 9.5B-15 17 48x24 qi EL 64 '-0 9.5B-15 9.5B-41
1253W-11 TABLE 9.5B-4 (Cont'd)
DIESEL GENERATOR VENTILATION (E-28)
Pentr.
Figure No.
Duct Size Elevation No.
1 72x72 At FL EL 46'-0 9.5B-16 2
72x72 At FL EL 69'-0 9.5B-16 3
72x72 At FL EL 46'-0 9.5B-16 4
72x72 At FL EL 69'-0 9.5B-16 5
96x72 BOD. EL 36'-0 9.5B-10 6
12x6 At. FL. EL+46'-0 9.5B-16 7
12x6 At. FL. EL+46'-0 9.5B-16 l
t l
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