ML20005B527
| ML20005B527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1981 |
| From: | Gollob R, Mills R, Worley C ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005B513 | List: |
| References | |
| 8879-PE-PR07, 8879-PE-PR7, NUDOCS 8107080333 | |
| Download: ML20005B527 (35) | |
Text
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Enclosure (2) to CE-18074-940 PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR 3
-REACTOR COOLANT GAS V$NT SY. STEM FOR OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT 3;
,, FORT CALHOUN UNIT NO. 1 8879.PE-PR07 Revision 00 This document is the property of Combustion Engineering, Inc.
(C-E) Windsor, Connecticut and is to be used only for the purposes of the agreement with C-E pursuant to which it is furnished.
M!/ O d['[
Date:
Prepared by:
oto.
Coonizant Engineer Y/d///
Approved by:
ME Date:
Supervisor
((/((/
Date:2M2///
Approved by:
/
Project' Manager Issue Date. 9I18;d QA Status: Verified l
The safety related design information contained in this docurnent has been rcviewed and satisfies (where applicab'2) the ite:ns contained on chec'.s listis)
/
,and of Ine Q sty Assurance of Desi n Mancal. This senea is su certified.
ladepe.5 dent Revierter b,hu -
i Date MO! I C8107080333 810701 Docurnent Rev. flo. 66 l
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t RECORD OF*REVIS10tlS Prepared by Approvals No.
Date Para. Nos. Involved I' I CD All R. B. Gollob C. A. Worley R. R. Itills 2
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. Table of Contents 1
Introduction 1
2 System Status and Surveillance 1
3 Normal Plant Operations 2
4 Emergency Plant Operations 6
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List of Figures Figure Title Page 1
System Schematic 12 2
Response to System Valve Leakage 13 3
Pressurizer Pressere with Non-Condensible 14 Gas Present 4
Vent Duration for Reactor Ve.;sel (2250 psia) 15 5
Vent Duration for Reactor Vessel (1000 psia) 16 6
Vent Duration for Reactor Vessel (250 psia) 17 7
Flowrate - Steam from Reactor Vessel 18 8
Flowrate - Hydrogen from Reactor Vessel 19 9
Vent Duration for Pressurizer 20 10 Flowrate - Steam from Pressurizer 21 11 Flowrate - Hydrogen from Pressurizer 22 12 Pressurizer Vent - AP vs. Vent Time (CCP on) 23 13 Pressurizer Vent - AP vs. Vent Time (CCP off) 24 14 Reactor Vessel Vent - AP vs. Vent Time (CCP on) 25 15 Pressurizer Level vs. Time - Pressurizer Vent 26 (CCP on) 16 Pressurizer Level vs. Time - Pressurizer Vent 27 (CCP off) 17 Pressurizer Level vs. Time - Reactor Vessel 28 Vent (CCP on) 18 Containment Hydrogen Concentration 29 19 Response to Accidents, 30 P'
9
_ _ - - - _.. - _ _ - - - ~ _ _. _ - _ ~ - _ - - -
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,r 1,0 Introduction Procedural guidelines for use of the reactor coolant gas vent system are provided in this section.
The procedures have been divided into three basic sectionsi system status and surveillance, normal operations, and emergency operation.
In addition to presentatio.n of the operational guidelines, the emergency operation includes a discussion of the plant response to the use of the RCGVS using the layout of the RCGVS (Figure 1) and basic RCGVS parameters.
2.0 System' Status and Surveillance 2.1 RCGVS Standby Mode
- 1. Description of Operation During normal plant operations, the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System is in a standby moce. All solenoid isolation valves (RV-101,102,103,104, 105, 106) are key-locked closed with appropriate administrative controls in force to prevent inadvertent system operation.
- 2. Initial Conditions
- 1) RCS fluid boundaries are intact with RCGVS refueling spool-piece in place.
- 2) The plant is in any mode of operation except refueling.
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- 3) The following interfacing systems are available for use with the RCGVS should the system be equired.
Electrical Power for the Valves Ouench Tank (OT)
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Hydrogen Purge System and H2 Analyzers
- 4) The RCGVS pressure instrument (P-138) is operational.
- 5) All RCGVS solenoid valves are key-locked closed with administrative controls imposed.
Power may be removed frcm the valves.
- 6) The reactor vessel vent manual valve and the pressurizer vent manual valve (RC-100 and RC-126, respectively) are opened. Manual valve RC-350 is opened.
- 7) Manual Drain Valves (RV-200, RV-204) are locked closed.
- 8) Itanual Drain Valve RV-203 is 1/4 turn open, with line downstream directed to a floor drain.
s Operational Recuirements:
- 1. The leak tightness of the RCGVS isolation valves is verified by periodi.cally monitoring the RCGVS pressure indicator (P-138).
- 2. The standby status of the system is verified by assuring that the administrative controls remain in force.
3.0 '
Normal Plant Ooerations 3.1 RCGVS Response to Valve Leakage During Normal Operations
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- 1. Description of Operation While in standby, P-138 indicates that leakage has occurred past one,,,
of the 4 solenoid valves.
Operator response to the leakage includes verification that leakage is' occur ~ ring, quantification of the' leak rate, and eventual repair of the leaking valve.
A flow chart to summarize operator response is provided as Figure 2.
~2. Initial Conditions
- 1. Same as Status and Surveillance I
- 2. P-138 indicates valve leakage by a pressure increase (and eventual l
alarm).
- 3. Operational Reouirements
- 1. Conduct a RCS leak rate determination in accordance with established plant procedures and compare with a leak rate determination made
.. prior to the pressure increase.
No difference indicates that either i
the pressure indicator is faulty or that the leakage has be~en contained l
by the second isolation valve.
An increase in the leak rate indicates l
that not only is leakage occurring, but it is also leaking past the j
second isolation valve.
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9 2.'If there is no change in the RCS leak rate and P-138 indicates roughly the> same pressure as the RCS, then the most likely situation is that a first isolation valve leaks, but the leakage has'been contained by.the second valve.
In this event, no actio'n is necessary other than to repair the leaking valve when the p'lant conditions permit'."
- 3. If there is no change in RCS leak rate, but P-138 does not indicate a
RCS pressure, then instrument malfunction is possible.
No action is necessary other than to repair the instypment when plant con-ditions permit.
Alternatively, the pressure increase may be due to expansion of fluid between the solenoid valves due to containment ambient' temperature rise.
This is unlikely as the line is not normally solid, but can be inferred if the pressure change correlates with con-tainment ambient temperature fluctuation. In this event, the downstream
' valve should be temporarily opened to relieve the pressure and the line
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drained when plant conditions permit.
- 4. If there is a change in RCS leak rate then both isolation valves are leaking.
If the leak rate is less than technical specification limits, then operation can continue, but the RCS leak rate determiaation should be monitored to assure that the rate does not increase.
Contain-men.t activity and quench tank parameters should be monitored to determine if the leakage is being directed to cont'ainment or to the quench tank.
The leaking valves should be repaired at the earliest opportunity and if leakage reaches technical specification limits, the plant must be shutdown to repair the valves.
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1 3.2 RCGVS Use in RCS Venting Prior to Refueling
- 1. Description of Ooeration
,The RCGVS may be used to vent the RCS when the RCS is being pumped down to remove the reactor vessel head for refueling.
This is done by aligning first the pressurizer vent and later the reactor
, vessel vent to the QT or containment while the RCS fluid is being pumped out of the system.
- 2. Initial Conditions
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Same as Status and Surveillance except the reactor is in cold shutdown in preparation for head removal.
- 3. Operational Requirenents
- 1) Obtain administrative approval to operate the RCGVS valves.
- 2) Initiate RCS draining and line up the pressurizer vent to either the Q~
or containment.
If the QT is used, assure sufficient fl is supplied to the tank.
2
- 3) When the pressurizer empties, open the reactor vessel vent to allcw removal of fluid from the reactor vessel head.
- 4) After drain-down is complete, close RCGVS valves and remove the refueling spool-piece from the system.
1 3.3 RCGVS Use in RCS Venting Post-Refuelino
- 1. Description of Oceration' The RCGVS may be used to vent the RCS when the RCS is being refilled follow-ing refueling.
This ir, done by alignin.g the RCGVS to vent first the reactor vessel head and then the pressurizer to the QT ff the~ pressure' in the QT
_:=n be keot lower than the r'upture disc pressure by removal. of the gas to the Gaseaus Waste Vent System.
Otherwise, vent to the containment.
- 2. Initial Conditions
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Sar.e as Status and Surveillance except the RCS is partially drained frco refueling,with the system ready to be refilled. Administrative controis of the solenoid valves may not be in force.
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- 3) ' Operational Requirements
- 1. Obtain administrative approval (if required) to operate the RCGVS valves and repower the valves.
- 2. Align the system to vent the reactor vessel head to the quench tank, completely open drain val've RV-203 to allow possible leaLage to drain to floor drain, and conmence system fill.
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- 3. When quench tank level indicates liquid flow (or, alternately, a vent system drain may be monitored fur flow) close the reactor vessel isolat? 1 valves and open the pressurizer isolation valves.
- 4. When the pressurizer is full, close all RCGVS solenoids, return RV-203 to 1/4 open positica, and establish administrative controls in preparation for startup.
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4.0 Emergency Plant Ooerations This section describes the operation of the RCGVS in response to a plant accident which has created a non-condensible gas bubble in the reactor coolant system.
The specific accident which caused the bubble to be formed will not be discussed; instead it will be assumed that a bubble exists regardless of the-specific accident scenario.
It is also assumed that means to detect the presence of the bubble exists.
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4.1 Determination of Venting Path and Duration
- l. Desc.ription of Operation The first step in the use of the RCGVS under post-accident conditions is the establishment of the need to vent, the determination of the vent-ing duration, and the enoice of the venting path.
Detection of the gas bubble establishes the need to vent, and the venting duration and path are determined based upon the bubble size and RCS parameters.
- 2. Initial Conditions
- 1) Same as Status and Surveillance except an accident has occurred which could lead to bubble formation.
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- 2) The RCS fluid boundary may not be intact.
- 3. Operational Requirements l.
Establishing the need to vent:
a.
For the reactor vessel, if a gas bubble,no matter how small, is detected in the reactor vessel by oP, heated-junction thermocouple, or some other suitable means, then there is a need to vent the reactor vessel, b.
The presence of a non-condensible gas in the pressurizer steam bubble can be indirectly ascertained by a departure from saturation conditions.
For a given pressurizer temperature, the pressure.will be higher than saturation by an amount de-pendent upon the steam / bubble volume and amount of gas' present in the stear. space. The effect is illustrated 4n Figure 3.
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This method, however, is on*y useful for large gas volumes and provides an indirect indication of the volume of gai
,and how long the pressurizer should be vented to remove the gas.
Further, since gas is present in the space even during normal plant operations, the objective of venting the pressurizer is not to remove all gas as is the case for the reactor vessel, but to remove enough of the gas so that the a pressurizer can continue to function efficiently to maintain and control plant pressure. The procedural guidelines.to acccmplish this objective are as follows:
- 1. If a bubble is detected in the reactor vessel, it will be assumed that some hydrogen has collected in the pressurizer as well even if the gas volume cannot be definitely measured in.the pressurizer.
- 2. In th'is case, or if hydrogen is identified in the pres urizer independent of its presence in the reactor vessel by depart-ing from saturation, sluggish pressure control, or sampling; then there is a need to vent the pressurizer.
2.
Determination of Venting Duration a)
For the reactor vessel, the vent duration is selected to be long enough to remcve the entire gas b,ubble from the vessel head.
The bubble size is determined by reactor vessel level indication,and with this information and the RCS temperature and pressure conditions, the venting duration is determined by referring to Figuies 4 through 6 as appropriate.
The venting times are based upon system vent flow rates illustrated in Figures 7 and &.
b)
For the pressurizer, the vent duration is selected as long enough to remove a sufficient amount of the gas from the pressurizer steam bubble to prevent the 5as from interferring with RCS pressure control.
This is done by venting the pressurizer long enough to remove the mass equivaknt.of the steam bubble.
Steam bubble size is given by pressurizer level instrumentation and with this and the pressurizer temperature and pressure, the venting duration is determined by referring 7-
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to. Figure 9.
This vent duration is also sufficient to remove
.an equivalent volume of hydrogen, should the bubble be pure hydrogen. The -)enting ' times are based' upon sys' ten vent flow rates illustrated in Figures 10 and 11.
c)
The venting process will result in a pressure decrease within the RCS,the extent of which is influenced by the venting lo-
' cation, charging pump availability, and the initial pressure and temperature conditions.
Figures 12 through 17 present the impact of a timed vent upon system pressure and pressurizer level for the venting process.
Dependent upon initial conditions and the duration of venting required, it may be necessary to temporarily secure the venting process before the selected venting duration has elapsed to restore pressurizer level and plant pressure.
3.
Selection of Vcnting Path The RCGVS removes gas from the RCS by venting the RCS either to containment or to the QT. The ' choice of which riath to use is based upon the following guidelines:
- 1) With only one power source available, vent through the powered solenoid valves.
- 2) With power available to both valves and the QT I
rupture disc blown, vent to the QT if there is water in the tank to take advantage of the cooling provided by this water.
If there is no water in the QT, vent to atmosphere as this location should provide more cceplete mixing with the containment atmosphere.
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' 3)
With power available to both valves and the QT rupture disc in-tact,.small quantities of gas may be vented to the QT and thus I
not enter the containment atmosphere.
Larger quantities of gas are vented,directly to containment.
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4.
Venting of hydrogen to containment, either through the direct path or through a ruptured QT rupture disc, will cause an increase of containment hydrogen concentration.
Figure 18 illustrates the impact of the venting.
It is obvious th'at if large quantities of hydrogen must be vented, hydrogen may approach coinbustible leveTs'.
If combustib1[e levels are reached, the operator will have to make a decision to continue venting or to secure venting until containment hydrogen levels deci, ease. The decision should be based upon.the following:
'l.
Venting the reactor vessel -hould take priority over con-tainment hydrogen limits due to the potential for interruption of core cooling with hydrogen in the vessel.
2.
Venting the pressurizer should not take priority over contain-ment hydrogen limits unless the pressurizer bubble is inter-
. ferring with the ability to maintain present pressure control.
4.2 Venting the Reactor Vessel to the Containmer.t, This section and the following sections describe operator actions to vent the RCS via the various vent paths in the event of an accident.
A summary flow path for the venting process is. provided in Figure 19.
- 1. Description of Operation The RCGVS is initially in standby and the need to operate the system to remove a gas bubble from the reactor vessel has been identified.
After obtaining administrative approval to operate the system, the reactor vessel is vented to containment for a time period determined by system pressure, temperatures, and bubble size.
- 2. Initial Conditions Same as Status and Surveillance except
- the RCS fluid boundary may not be intact
- an accident has occurred which has created a bubble in the reactor vessel
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- the bubble size has been determined and the containment vent path chosen
- 3. Operational Requirements 1.. Permission to use the RCGVS is obtained, and power restored to the system (if applicable).
- 2. Using the bubble size and RCS temperature and pressure, determine the vent duration to remove the bubble.
- 3. Assure that there is sufficient water in the pressurizer to conduct the vent without uncovering pressurizer heaters.
It may be necessary
- ~ ~ to raise pressurizer level prior to venting or to secure venting temporarily and reestablish level if large bubbles are to be re-
, moved.
Chargin'g should be in operation during the vent to minimize pressurizer level changes.
Pressure will also drop during the vent-
. ing process.
The effect of the vent on pressurizer pressure and level is illustrated in Figures 14 and 17.
Pressurizer heaters should be energized during the vent to minimize the pressure drop.
- 4. Monitor containment H2 concentra'tions, if not already accomplished.
5.' Vent to containment by opening the containment isolation valve and
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then one of the two reactor vessel isolation valves.
.6. Secure venting after the predetermined time has elapsed by closing the reactor vessel isolation valve and then the~ containment isolation valve.
- 7. Evaluate the effectiveness of the vent on bubble removal and repeat if necessary after returning RCS pressure and pressuri cr level to desired levels.
4.3 Venting the Reactor Vessel to the Quench ank (QT)
- 1. Description of Operation
~
This operation is identical to the previous section except the vented gas is directed to the QT. This path is used primarily if the c'on-tainment path is unavailable or the rupture disc has already been ruptured.
It may also be used for small bubble volumes.
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- 2. Initial Conditions
. Same as vent to containment except for the vent path
- 3. Operational Requirements
- 1. Same as the vent to containment except for the verit path.
- 2. During venting to the QT, monitor quench tank instrumentation and (assumin'g the containrr vent path is available and with the a
rupture disc already ruptureg) terminate venting to the QT by e
redirecting vent flow to cont it if tank water level decreases to the point where it is no lon'g oviding cooling for the vented gas.
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4.4 Venting the pressurizer to the Containment or Ouench Tank
' Description of Operation This operatica is identical to the previous operations except that the pressuri-zer is the source of vented gas. The effect of the vent on the pressurizer pressure'is illustrated in Figures 12-13 and 15-16.
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Probably leaking valve.
Probable instrument. mal-Continue to monitor leak rate.
Shutdown and repair Monitor containment & QT to leakino valves.
Repair when plant conditions function.
determine leakage path.
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Repair when plant con-i Repair valves when plant ditions pemit.
conditions Ee.rmit.
If pressure rise correlatt
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temperature change, vent t I
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Drain line whei plant conditions permit.
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'. ' Response to System Valve Leakage 8
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PRESSURIZER PRESSURE
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SATURATION.
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400 450 500 550 600 650 TEMPERATURE, OF
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'. FIGURE 4
.. VENT DURATION OF HYDROGEN vs RV.. TEMP.
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= 100 FT B
t t
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I 100 200 300 400 500 600 700' RV: TEMPERATURE, UF
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" FIGURE 5 VENT DU' RATION OF HYDR 0 GEN vs RV TEMP.
AT P = 1000 PSI A V
B = Bubble Volume a
30 3
V
= 1000 FT 8
25 g 20
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Q 15 V
= 500 FT B
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- 100 M 5
B 0
i 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 TEMPERATURE, OF e'
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e FIGURE 6 VENT DURATION OF HYDROGEN vs RV.> TEMP.
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B = Bubble Volume 3
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STEAM (REACTOR) i 2500 T-7000 2000 i,,
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m T - SAT a-
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m m
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1000 l-500 4
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FLOWRATE, LBMIHR L.
-l FIGilRE 8 HYDR 0 GEN. (REACTOR) 0 T=400 7 2500 0
T=550 7 0
T = 700 F 2000 0
T = 250 F w
2 1500 us
=
=
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W 1000 L
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1000 2000 3000 4000
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FLOWRATE, SCFM v
ruuncs VENTING DURATION FROM PZR AT P = P SAT e
V
= Bubble Volume 8
100 3
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= 1000 FT 90 B
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a f-p A
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= 500 FT B
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f f
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400 500 600 700 TEMPERATURE,0F s%
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4 FIGURE 10 I
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STEAM (PZR) l j
1 4
l 2400 i
l 2000 i
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m 1600 a
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400 j
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i 4b0 8b0 l$00 1600 2000 2400 2$00 3200 3600 4000 FLOWRATE, LBMIHR L-1
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.r FIGURE 11 HYDR 0 GEN (PRESSURIZER) 4 2400 2000 1
< 1600
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w 5 1200 m
m w
CL~ 800 400 16b0 2$00 2dOO 28b0 3200 4b0 8b0 1200 FLOWRATE, SCFM n
FIGURE 12
,PRESSURIKER VENT - AP vs VENT TIME 1
G CCP ON - STEAM)
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t 700 600 500 P;-225
, 400
<1 300 P1 =1000 200 P.
250' 100
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news su PRESSURIZER VENT - AP vs VENT TIME (CCP 0FF - STEAM) 400 350 300 P = ?250 250 n.
200 r
150 100 P = 1000 50
/ P = 500 15 30 45
~60 TIME, MIN.
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FIGURE 14 REACTOR VESSEL VENT - AP vs VENT TIME
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. (1 C C P 0,N - H Y D R 0 G E N )
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' P '= 2250 c.
150 100 P.=1000 l
50 P = 500
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10 15 VENT TIME, MIN.
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_, VENTING FROM PRESSURIZER
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= 1000 11000 P = 250 900 800
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, 30 45 60 TIME, MIN y
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FIGURE 16 PRESSURIi'ER LEVEL vs TIME - PRESSURIZER VENT (CCP OFF - STEAM) t e
e 700 P =500 680 P = 1000 e
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620 l
600 t
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15 30 45 60 VENT TIME, MIN.
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FIGURE 17 Vg vs~ TIME IN PZR WHEN VENT HYDROGEN IN RV Vf - fi""1 li4"id v 1""*
i" 700 pressurizer s_
600 500 g 400.
e P=500 y
300 200 P=1000 P = 2250 100 f'
t 5
10
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FIGURE 18
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CONTAINMENT HYDR 0 GEN ' CONCENTRATION l' '
i 3500
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2500 g 2000 V)
N ts.I E
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a 1000 500 t
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CONCENTRATIb (.Il2)
gu,m 19 - ItCGVS Accident ResponsS 1
Accident Occurs v
~
Monitor For Bubble Formation
,_Jectieck_B.@b.Je Status as I Necessary
~
P-
,le 5
I Bubble in Reactor Vessel?
Y No Detemine bubble siz/ es N
Eittier non-condensibles in pressWizer or previous e and vant duration vent of RV7 L
\\
Determine vent sink Yes Mo b
No\\
u Energize pressurizer heaters, establish Determine yent duration need to vent I
charging flow, verify pressurizer level -
j.
Determine vent size b
Obtain adMnistrative approval Energizer pressurizer heaters, verify pressurizer level, to. vent charge if necessary 4:
1 J.
m Energize H2 recombiner Obtain administrative approval to vent L
L Proceed with vent Monitor H c ncentration 2
(next page) 1 1
~
At exposure limits J
No s
l Proceed with Vent 1.
With adequate RCS pressure control, (next page)
Do not vent until H2 concentration 1
4 is acceptable, ori 2.
with inadequate RCS pressure control.
or if vent path is to intact QT.
proceed with vent.
j (next page) l' k $
l
}*
b I Vent to QT for timed intsrval Vent to containment for timed interval.
~ )
b
- Monitar QT Conditions S
Near rupturu disc setpoir.t?
No Yes (Operator Option)
. Continue Vent 1.
Secure Vent and Switch to
~
containment vent, or, l
.l I
i 2.
Continue vent through
~
i, rupturgd repture disc.
c v
)
E 1
s
- Secure vent after timed interval
[
Bubble Status as necessary L
f g
j g
e
'l 8
G
-3 8
g.
g
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1
, s j=
s 1
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i