ML20005A781
| ML20005A781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/09/1981 |
| From: | Barnes I, Ellershaw L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005A744 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900735 NUDOCS 8107010253 | |
| Download: ML20005A781 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
D 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND E'FORCEMENT REGION IV
-Report No. 99900735/31-01 Program No. 51300 Conpany: Southern tolt & Fastener Corporation P. 0. Box 7196 301' Montgomery Lane Shreveport, Louisiana 71107 Inspection Contiotted: January 19-23, 1981 V.
Inspector:
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- 0. E. Ellershaw, Contractor Inspector Date CdeponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Approved by:
7-9-ei I. Barnes, Chief Cate ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Sumary Inspection conducted during January 19-23, 1981 (9990073S/81-01)
Areas Insoected:
Implementation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B Criteria, and applicable codes and standards including: followup on a 10 CFR Part 21 report, followup on a construction deficiency report; followup on a potential construc-tion deficiency report; heat treatment, ano procurement source selection.
The inspection involved 3S inspector hours on site.
Results:
In the five areas inspected, two nonconfomances and no unresolved items were identified.
Nonconfomances:
Equipment Calibration - Records did not exist to substantiate tnat required calibration had been performed on impact testing equipment (See Notice of Nonconfomance, Item A.1), and a plug thread gage with an cut of tolerance condition was returned from a calibration subcontractor and placed into ser/ ice (See Notice of Nonconfomance, Item A.2. ).
Procurement Source Selection - Material has been procured fecm vendors and used
'for ASME Section III Code applications, without performance of either the sureey activities or product testing required by NCA-3800 in Section III of the ASME Code (See Notice of Nonconfomance, Item B.).
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2 DETAILS SECTION (Prepared by L. E. Ellershaw)
A.
Persons Contacted
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- R. L. Alexander - Manager, Quality Assurance
- M. B. Cummins - Chief Inspector
- K. Day - Quality Assurance Administrator
- W.'G. Gow - Metallurgist C. Moore - Cutting Department Leadman
- G. E. Mouser - Heat Treatment Department Supervisor
- B. 011ta - QA Document Reviewer
- W. F. Patterson - QA Coordinator
- J. A. Wood - Manager, Purchasing
- Denotes those persons attending the exit meeting.
B.
Follow-up on Potential Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) 1.
Introduction Georgia Power Company (GPC) notified Region II of the Office of'Inspec-tion and Enforcement, on August 14, 1980, of a possibility that hold down bolting material would not meet the required tensile strength.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to determine the acceptability of the hold down bolting material, as supplied by Southern Bolt & Fastener Corp. (SBF).
3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of the SBF customer's (Bristol Steel and Iron Works) pro-curement documents (P0 8-F0316 and PO 9-F0316, both dated September 18, 1979) for the supply of 24 Heavy Hex Head Bolts and Nuts, ik" X 2\\", 8UN.
b.
Review of the invoked specification MS316-193.1, Revision 0, "High Strength Alloy Steel and Stainless Steel Bolting Material, ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF. Class 1. Component Supports."
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3 c.
Review of the imposed material specification, ASME SA-193,
-Grade 87.
d.
Review of SBF's heat treat charts for normalizing and tempering, dated December 8, 1978.
e.
Review of SBF's Metallurgical Lab Report No. 2160 and the Certified Mate ial Test Reports, Nos. 8483 and 8484.
f.
Review of Shop Order 1874-030.
g.
Review of SBF's purchase order (07771, dated November 3,1978) to their material supplier (Armco, Inc.).
h.
Discussion with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings-a.
Nonconformance See Notice of Nonconformance, Item A.1.
Bristol Steel and Iron Works Specification MS316-193.1, para-graph 2.6, specifies the requirements for Charpy V-notch in. pact testing.
In addition, it states that the impact testing equip-ment shall be calibrated in accordance with ASME Section III, subsection NF-2360.
The only available calibration records showed that the impact test machine had been calibrated by a calibration subcontractor on March 25, 1980, and that the temperature measuring equipment had been calibrated on August-26, 1980, by a different subcon-tractor. These records do not show whether or not the equipraent was out of tolerance or if any adjustments were required.
The impact tests were performed by SBF prior to the calibration date.
b.
Unresolved Item None.
c.
General The licensee (GPC) informed Region II by letter dated Novemoer 15, 1980, that this item is now considered to be non reportable.
The cause for initiating the potential CDR was based upon the fact that this bolting material was from a heat of material, in which a particular heat treat lot did not receive the correct I
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heat' treatment.
This heat treat lot (No. 36) was subsequently shown as not meeting the material specification physical. test requirements._ This is further addressed in paragraph 0.3.c.
The bolting material supplied to GPC was from a different heat treat lot, identified as No. 350.
All physical test results complied with the requirements of the applicable specifications.'
C.
Follow-up on a Construction Deficiency Report 1.
Introduction Region IV of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement was notified by letter on December 27, 1979, by both Kansas Gas & Electric (KGE) and Union Electric (UE) of a potential significant deficiency, concerning out of-tolerance conditions in threaded nuts and studs supplied under SNUPPS purchase order by Southern Bolt & Fastener Corp. (SBF) for the steam generator lateral supports at the Wolf Creek and Callaway sites.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to establish the causes of the problem, ascertain the generic implications, and to assess the corrective action and the actions taken to preclude recurrence.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of SNUPPS Purchase Order ho. 10466-C134A.
b.
Review of the specified ASA standard, Bl.1-1960.
c.
Review of the manufacturing and inspection records relative to the particular studs and nuts involved.
d.
Observation of current manufacturing and inspection processes.
e.
Discussion with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Nonconformances None.
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5 b.
Unresolved Item None.
7 c.
General The problem became evident during fit-up attempts at the sites.
when the nuts could not.be rotated along the full length of 'the threaded studs, owing to a binding condition.
Evaluation of the problem Dy SBF revealed two situations working concurrently, which resulted in the binding problems.
The threaded studs exhibited excess material in the minor dia-meter, which was identified to have been caused by the use of dull or worn threading dies (chasers) during the manufacturing process. The studs had been inspected prior to shipment with calibrated go and no/go ring gages, as required by ASA Bl.1-1960, and found to be acceptable. These gages do not detect variations other than significant deviations of thread form elements.
The Go Gage checks minimum pitch diameter and minimum major diameter.
The No/Go Gage checks the maximum pitch diameter. Neither gage checks the minor diameter. Paragraph 22a. in Section 5 of ASA Bl.1 states in part, "... For referee purposes, the dimensional acceptability of threads at the maximum material limits shall be based on gaging with 'Go' thread plug and ring gages...."
The'3h" hex nuts also exhibited excess material in the minor diameter. During the threading operation, the nuts were checked and some were found to be out of tolerance across the flats and not synnetrical. To correct this the nuts were put back through the milling operation which removed the excess material from the flats. The re-milling caused the hole to become eccentric to the hexagon.
The maximum allowable minor diameter for a 54" hex nut is 3.390".
Because of the eccentricity, an out-of-tolerance minor diameter dimension of 3.425" was created.
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6 Therefore, with the minor diameters being out-of-tolerance on the studs and nuts, it eventually led to a fit-up problem at the sites.
SBF's corrective action consisted of using dressing dies, at I
the sites, to remove the excess material from the studs.
The nuts that would not fit up are being replaced.
Tension tests were conducted on threa of the most out-of-tolerance nuts, combined with three randomly selected studs.
They were performed to obtain information on the ability of the out-of-tolerance nuts to support the design loads.
The results showed that the worst case condition exceeded the maximum design load by a factor of 1.49.
In addition, a statistical analysis was performed in which it was determined that the minimum e'xpected thread shear capacities
'for stud / nut combinations are 912 kips at the Callaway site and 968 kips at the Wolf Creek site.
The maximum design load was established at 334 kips, thus there is nearly a 3:1 margin of safety.
The measures taken by SBF to preclude recurrence incli;ded the purchase of equipment which will provide much tighter control over concentricity and threading operations.
In addition, a training program Les established for the equipment operators and the quality control inspectors.
D.
Follow-uo on a 10 CFR Part 21 Report 1.
Introduction A 10 CFR Part 21 Report dated June 16, 1980, was submitted to the NRC by NPS Industries, Inc. (NPSI) regarding fastener materials supplied by SBF either not being properly heat treated, or the wrong materials were furnished.
This information was provided to NPSI by S8F on June 11, 1980.
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7 2.
Objective <L The. objectives of this part of the inspection were to ascertain that the rer.ponsible organization had implemented the requirements in accordance with 10 CFR Parc 21 and had:
a.
Met'the requirements for reporting the deficiency.
b.
Performed or caused 'to be performed, an evaluation of the con-dition, including making an assessment of generic implications.
c.
Assigned responsibility for effecting corrective action and preventing recurrence.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Verifying that the requirements for reporting " reportable deficiencies" have been posted, and that procedures have been initiated to provide for the reporting process.
b.
Review of 10 CFR Part 21 report and associated documents including:
(1) Purchase orders and invoked specifications from NPS to SBF.
(2) Purchase documentation from SBF to their subcontractors, relative to the order in (1) above.
(3)
Review of SBF's manufacturing documentation including the heat treat records associated with this order.
(4) Review of mill material test reports and S8F's laboratory and material test reports.
(5) Review of furnace uniformity survey reports and instrument calibration records.
c.
Discussions with cognizant personnel.
3.
Findings a.
Nanconformance None.
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b.
Unresolved Item None.
c.
General NPSI placed the following furchase orders with SBF:
P0X 9541N dated November 7, 1978; P0X 9542N dated November 7, 1978; P0X 9461N dated October 20, 1978, and P0X 9478N dated October 24, 1978.
All purchase orders (PO) from NPSI specified washers to be ASTM A-325 material, nuts to be ASTM A-194, Grade 2H, and bolts to be ASTM A-540, Grade B23, Class 3, except P0 P0X9461N which specified bolts to be ASTM A-490 material.
The P0s did not impose ASME Code requirements nor did they reference 10 CFR Part 21.
All material tests reports showed chemical analyses and physical test results as meeting the material specifications.
The problem was established to be two fold, in that some wrong material was used, and some of the correct material used did not receive a complete heat treatment.
SBF identified that certain bolts furnished to NPS do not meet the material specification requirements.
Heat treat lot No. 359 was determined to have contained a combination of AISI 1020 and E4340H material.
The correct material, E4340H (ASTM A-540), responded to the heat treatment whereas the AISI 1020 did not.
The cause of the problem is thought to have occurred in pro-duction at a point somewhere between the production order release and the forging operation.
The exact origin of the material cannot be determined due to the time lapse since the heat treat-ment took place (1978).
SBF identified and located samples of all other materials heat treated in Heat Treat lot No. 359 and reverified through testing, their validity.
SBF, prior to the discovery of this nroblem, had already made changes in the QA program, in that a sample of all stock material received is submitted to their lab for chemical analysis and physical testing verification prior to the material being released from the receiving hold area.
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The second problem dealt with certain ASTM A-490 bolts which were not heat treated properly.
NPSI returned a bolt to SBF for verification purposes.
The ensuing physical testing results failed to meet the material specification requirements.
A review of the manufacturing records showed that this bolt r.
is from heat no. 69784 and was heat treated in heat treat lot no. 36. There were a total of 205 pieces from heat no. 69784 which were heat treated in lot'no. 36, of which 98 were supplied to NPSI.
There was also two other orders made up of other heat numbers processed in lot 36.
SBF has tested the " blanks" still in stock from the other heats, and verified that they were not affected. Therefore, it was determined that all pieces from heat no. 69784, and identified as being heat treated in lot no. 36, are suspect.
Subsequent to the inspection, SBF com-pleted their review of accounting for all bolts in heat treat lot no. 36.
SBF notified NRC and South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., that 35 bolts from heat treat lot no. 36 had been delivered to the Virgil C. Summer site.
SBF is replacing the 35 bolts and will test the returned bolts to dete,mine whether or not the bolts had been properly heat treated.
The cause of this problem was determined to be operator error.
The first step of the heat treating process was to normalize for three hours and air cool to room temperature.
The next step was to austenitize for four hours at heat, and then quench and temper.
By reviewing the heat treat charts, the time for the various steps was determined.
After the normalizing step took place, and the parts were being cooled to room temperature, a shift change occurred.
The new furnace operator evidently failed to place all pieces back into the furnace for austenitizing and subsequent quench and temper.
The sample test pieces did get placed into the oven, because it was their successfully passing the subsequent physical testing, which led to the release of the entire lot, including those that were not fully heat treated.
SBF has taken steps to preclude recurrence.
Prior to heat treatment, material identification, including test cars and
.I quantity, is verified and recorded.
This information is entered on the heat treat charts and the Production Order.
After heat treatment, the material is placed in a Hold Area.
This is a Hold Point specified on the Production Order.
The heat treat charts are reviewed by the lab and QA.
After acceptanca by the metallurgical lab and QA, the Hold Point is signed off by QA, and the parts are released from the Hold Area.
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10 E.
Heat Treatment j
1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that r~
.SBF had implemented the requirements for the control of heat treat-ment in accordance with the QA Manual and applicable NRC and ASME Code requirements.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of QA Manual Section 100.0, " Thermal Treatment,"
Revision 3.
b.
Review of heat treat charts and heat treatnent reports for items identified in paragraphs B. and D. above.
c.
Review of heat treat charts and reports for production order no. 2757-050.
d.
Review of records of furnace uniformity surveys and furnace instrument calibrations.
e.
Discussions with cognizant personnel.
3.
Findings a.
Nonconformance None.
b.
Unresolved Item None.
F.
Procurement Source Selection 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that SBF had implemented the requirements for procurement source selection in accordance with the QA Manual and applicable NRC and ASME Code requi rements.
2.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomolished by:
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Review of-QA Manual Section 60.0, " Procurement of Materials and Services," Revision 2.
b.
. Review of purchase requisitions and purchase orders, and comparing against the Approved Vendor List (AVL).
c.
Revics of saven vendor audit files.-
d..
Discussions with cogniiant personnel.
3.
Findings a.
Nonconformance See Notice of Nonconformance, Item B.
A review of various purchase orders placed with material suppliers -
qualified by SBF to ASME Code, NCA-3800, revealed that even though the purchase orders were placed with a particular supplier,
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the material was actually received directly from mills or ware-houses that have not been qualified by SBF, nor do they hold ASME Quality System Certificates, nor were they qualified by.SBF's cus tome rs.
The following examples were identified.
SBF has placed purchase orders with. Crucible Specialty Metals in Arlington, Texas (Sales Office / Warehouse).
This facility has been surveyed and audited on an annual basis by SBF since 1977. However, some of the material received, has come from other Crucible warehouses; e.g. Cleveland, Ohio-and Charlotte, North Carolina.
SBF, in some cases, verified chemistry cnly from one sample per received lot, and in other cases didn't verify anything.
SBF has also received staininss steel from Crucible. Specialty Metals Division in Syracuse, New York since at least 1977, and the records show that their first survey / audit of Crucible -
Syracuse was performed on October 7,1980.
SBF performed a chemical analysis on just one bar from each heat received.
SBF placed a purchase order with Republic Steel Corp. in Houston, Texas, and the records show that Republic - Houston has not been surveyed or audited by SBF nor was each piece of stock material tested by SBF.
b.
Unresolved Item
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Exit Interview The scope and findings of this inspection were summarized at the conclusion of the inspection on January 23. 1981 with the management representatives denoted by an asterisk in paragraph A and the following:
T. M. Brooks - Vice President, Manufacturing K. Brown - Treasurer T.. Jenkins - Documentation Clerk B. Mathias - Manufacturing Sales M. W. McGaugh - Inspector J5. Page - Nuclear Sales P. Ross - Operations Supervisor C. Tackett - Vice President W. Williams - Inspector J. Wisby - Sales Management acknowledged the stacements made relative to the findings.
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