ML20005A667

Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure to Radiograph Reactor Pressure Vessel & Bypassing Hold Points on Concrete Pour, Initially Reported 801223 (Failure) & 810109 (Bypassing). Instruction Manual Issued to All Const Employees

ML20005A667
Person / Time
Site:	Phipps Bend
Issue date:	06/10/1981
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8106300573
Download: ML20005A667 (4)

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l 400 Chestnut Street Tower II i June 10, 1981

[ CD Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director j/

Office of Inspection and Enforcement .

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission , i JUN 2 919815 Cj Region II - Suites 3100 FO. v.s.suana eb/

101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 h4. , p " '" " A

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Dear !!r. O'Reilly:

PHIPPS BEND NUCL3AR PLANT UNIT 1 - REPORTABLE DEFICIE!!CY - FAILURE TO RADIOGRAPH RPV PEDESTAL WELDS A'ID BYPASSINO HOLD POINTS 04 CONCRETE POUR - PSRD-50-SS3/81-04 On December 23, 1980 the deficiency involving the failure to radiograph reactor pressure vessel pedestal welds was initially reported to NRC-0IE, Region II Inspector, W. B. Swan as NCR PBNP-175. On January 4, 1981 the d?ficiency involving the bypassing of hold points durine concrete pours ris initially reported to NRC-OIE, Region II Inspector, R. W. Wright as NCR PBNP-184 The first and second interim repor*s on the subject deficiencies were - submitted on January 22. and March 31, 1981, respectively. In ecmD11ance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the final raport on the ' subject deficiencies. If you

.have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AtTTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager

'Juclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)

Offics of Inspection and Enforcement ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingtran, DC 20555

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81063005D S phhh W3

SNCLOSURE PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 FAILURE TO RADIOGRAPH RPV PEDESTAL WELOS BYPASSING HOLD POINTS ON CONCRETE POUR 10CFR50.55(e) -

NCR'S PBNP-175 AND PBNP-184:

REPORT NO. 3 (FINAL)

On December 23, 1980, TVA informed NRC-OIE, Region II Inspector, W. B. Swan, of.a potentially reportable condition under 10 CFR 50.55(e) regarding the failure to. radiograph reactor pressure vessel (RPV)

- pedestal welds for Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant unit 1. On January 9, 1981, TVA informed NRC-0I,E Region II -Inspector, R. W. Wright, of a potentially reportable condition under 10 CFR 50.55(e) regarding the bypassing of hold points on a concrete pour'to the same unit. This is the final .

report on these conditions.

Description of Deficiency

.The deficiencyfinvolves the T-bar weld joints between the upper and lower segment of the RPV pedestal. These weld joints did not receive a ten percent radiographic examination as required by GE/CFBraun specification 300-05 and shown on GE/CFBraun drawing SK-016.

Also, the exterior and interior girth welds were not radiographed in accordance with GE/CFBraun specification 300-05. This is due to an inconsistency between the radiographic locations shown on GE/CFBraun drawing SK-015 and TVA's weld joint numbering system. *

-The omission of required radiographic examination was reported to

' GE/CFBraun on nonconformance report PBNP-175. The apparent cause was determined to be lack of coordination between affected personnel.

The welds are inaccessible such that the specified NDE cannot be performed because concrete has already been poured for the RPV pedestal.

This pour was performed even though some hold points (including NDE) were not properly dispositioned.

The bypassing of hold points specified for this phase of construction was reported on NCR PBNP-184 and was caused by a failure to follow established Q* procedures.

Safety Implications i'

All welds were dispositioned by the technical engineer (GE/CFBraun) to use as is. Since this condition did not result in any hardware deficiencies and the structure is adequate to perform its intended safety function, the safety of operations of the plant could not have been adversely affected.

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, , o Corrective Action A review of all available documentation and examination records has revealed the following:

'The T-bar weld' seams were subjected to (1) a fitup inspection which was documented as acceptable, (2) inprocess visual examinations conducted by the Quality Control Walding inspectors throughout the weld process, and (3) magnetic particle examinations of the completed weld joints wt ,h were documented acceptable. Quality Control Wetding inspectors were assigned full-time duty to welding activities on the RPV pedestal T-bars while this welding was being performed.

The entire interior and exterior girth seams were subjected to (1) a fitup inspection which was documented as acceptable, (2) visual and magnetic particle examination of the excavation cavity which was documented as acceptable, (3) a final visual and magnetic partical examination of the completed weld seam which was documented as acceptable, and (4) inprocess visual examinations throughout the welding. In addition, all available radiographic examination documentation on the interior and exterior girth seams was reviewed.

Based on this information, GE/CFBraun di'spositioned NCR PBNP-175 to "use-as-is." No corrective action was required to the reactor oressure vessel pedestal itself. The probable cause of this deficiency was attributed to lack of coordination between the Quality Control-Welding engineering section, the Quality Control-Welding inspection section, and the radiographic film reviewers. To ensure that the involved parties identified above understand their responsibilities concerning weldments requiring ten percent radiogPaphic examinations, an instruction memorandum was issued by the Quality Control-Welding Unit Supervisor to delineate these responsibilities.

Corrective action for nonconformance report PBNP-184 entails the following:

1. Previous instructions had been issued to site personnel concerning the requirements of quality control procedures and the penalties for not adhering to these procedures. An instruction memorandum to all construction employees has been issued which referenced previous ir.structions and specifically addressed the inportance of adherence to quality control hold points.

2. A policy statement has been issued which describes implementation of

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a program initiated to list Quality Control Investigation Reports (QCIR's) and Work Releases against concrete pours which contain embedded items.. ~This program requires a daily report to be generated which indicates concrete pours that have outstanding QCIR's or work releases against them.

A11' corrective action has been completed.

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