ML20005A511
| ML20005A511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1981 |
| From: | Clayton F ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 NUDOCS 8106300410 | |
| Download: ML20005A511 (6) | |
Text
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Malting Address Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th street Post Othce Boa 2641 Birmingnam. Alabama 35291 A
Telephone 205 783-6081 fr. L. Clayton. Jr.
Senior Vice President
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Flintridge Bunding try soutNm entr.c sys:em June 24, 1981
- i ~g Docket No. 50-348 es
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p -;pM, q{.9 Mr. Darrell G. Eiselhut, Director J
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Division of Licensing J}?,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comminion Washington, D. C.
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Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
In response to ycur December 22, 1980 letter, subject " Control of Heavy Loads," Alabama Power Company submits the enclosed response.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Yours very truly,
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.s F. 'L. Clayton, Jr.
FLCjr/ JAR:rt Enclosure cc:
Mr. R. A. Thomas Mr. G. F. Trowbridge Mr. J. P. O'Reilly w/ enclosure Mr. E. A. Reeves w/ enclosure Mr. J. 0. Thoma w/ enclosure Mr. W. H. Bradford w/ enclosure 3o30
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6 ENCLOSURE RESPONSE TO STAFF POSITION GENERAL REQUIREMENTS-FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS 1.
Staff Position:
Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify
~ ll overhead handling systems from which a load drop way result in a
damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal
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(taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis).
_ Response:
a.
Inside Containment:
The polar crane handles the reactor head, upper internals, RV missile shield, reactor coolant pumps and motors, and the polar crane load block.
If any of these heavy loads were dropped, it could result in damage to a system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal. However, safe load paths with corresponding exclusion areas have been developed for each of these heavy loads.
b.
Auxiliary Building:
All floors underneath the following crane and hoists: drumming station bridge crane, auxiliary building equipment hatch monorail hoist, decontamination room monorail hoist, blowdown drum storage area bridge crane and the spent fuel pool bridge crane, are capable of withstanding the drop of their design loads without precluding safe shutdown capability provided certain lifting height limitations are observed. The definition of the safe load pathways for these areas is limited to a lift height restric-tion. The only exception to this identified during Alabama Power Company's review of NUREG-0612 is that, if the Demineralizer Hatch Monorail Heistwere used during normal plant operation and dropped a hatch cover through the open hatch area at elevation 155', the falling hatch cculd potentially break through or damage the floor at elevation 139' causing damage to the lower fluor elevations. The probability of the demineralizer cover dropping through the open hatch and damaging the lower elevations is remote; however, Alabara Power Company will revise plant procedures to minimize the time the hatch cover is positioned over the demineralizer during lifting operations and require special precautions, c.
Diesel Generator Building:
.The diesel generator building contains three hoists on underhung bridge cranes and two hoists on monorails. However, these hoists are used for maintenance only (one per diesel) when the diesel is not on standby.
In addition, the diesels are separated by concrete walls, making it physically impossible for a hoist to drop a load on an adjacent diesel generator.
e hi ENCLOSURE Page 2 2.
Staff Position:
Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separatn from
. any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system cr component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.
Response
A heavy load drop from the new fuel monorail hoist, new fuel bridge crane, spent fuel cask crane, tendon surveillance areas, or the various
- maintenance monorail hoists would have no consequence to safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment due to physical separation.
External portable maintenance cranes could drop loads onto the river water intake structure, service water intake structure, and outside buried service water piping. However, due to system redundancy, a heavy load drop on these structures or piping will not preclude a safe shutdown.
3.
Staff Position:
With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the containment and the spent-fuel-pool area and those load-handling systems indentified in 2.1-1 above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.
The following specific information should be included in your reply:
a.
Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.
e
Response
Drawings for the polar crane in the containment building are provided which identify safe load paths, spent fuel and safety-related equipment.
The drawings only address modes 5 and 6 for all leads except the polar crane load block, since tnis is the only heavy load which can be handled during all 6 modes, b.
A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.
Response
A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths will be included in the September 22, 1981 response.
c ENCLOSURE Page 3 c.
A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the. load identification, load weight, its designated lif ting device, and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identifiad in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2).
Responsa:
1 The heavy loads now being-handled by the polar crane and the external maintenance cranes, and the load weight are presented in Table 1.
The loads handled by the cranes in the auxiliary building have been enveloped by a lead cube, numerically equal to the capacity of the crane and representing every possible piece of equipment which may be dropped. The handling of all heavy loads will be governed by a written procedure, scheduled to be completed by October 1,1981, which will provide guidance for handling heavy loads in areas where safe shutdown related equipment is located.
d.
Verification that lif ting devices identified in 2.1.3c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI 330.9-1971 as appropriate.
For lifting devices where these star.dards, as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.b.1(5), are not
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n.et, describe any propcsed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.
Response
The lifting devices identified in 2.1.3c will comply with the inspection criteria and operator qualification recuirements of ANSI N12.5-1975 or ANSI 330.9-1971 as appropriate by October 1, 1981.
Equivalency in terms of load-iandling reliability for any proposed alterr.atives will be discussed in the September 22, 1981 response.
e.
Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient inforration should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed al ternatives.
Response
Crane inspection, testing, and mainteqance procedural requirements will be revised to incorporate the basic requirements of Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976 by October 1, 1981. As noted in NUREG-0612, certain frequencies of tests cannot be met due to inaccessibility.
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ENCLOSURE Page 4 f.
Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA
-Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI.830-2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
Response
Crane design complies with the guidelines of CPAA Sr.ecification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1967 which was the current standard when the cranes were designed.
g.
Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.
Response
Any exception taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct will be identified in the Septenber 22, 1981 response.
O e.
TABLE 1 Tabluation of Heavy Loads Design.ited Lifting Device load Identifi;atica Load Weights (Lbs)
Polar Crane Load Block 9,000 Reactor Vessel Missile Shield 140,000 lipper Internals 110,000 w/ lifting rig Reactor Vessel Head 118,200 Reactor Coolant Pump 77,300 Drumming Station Bridge Crane Crane capacity was chosen as 12,000 the leavy load to envelop every possible piece of equip-Auxiliary Building Equipment ment which may be dropped.
20,000 Hatch Monorail Hoist Decontamination Room 6,000 Monorail Hoist Hot Machine Shop Bridge Crane 6,000 Demineralizer Hatch Monorail 20,000 Hoist Filter Hatch Monorail Hoist 10,000
""III Blowdown Drum Storage Bridge 10,000 Cll )
Crane Q
"3C:I External Maintenance River water pump & motor 20,800 Cranes (Mobile)
Service water pump & motor 20,800 Service water strainer 31,300
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