ML20004F945

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Interim Deficiency Rept,Originally Reported on 801024,re Inadequate Documentation of Electrical Equipment to Verify Qualification Levels for Harsh Environs Resulting from Abnormal or Accident Conditions.Switch Wiring Modified
ML20004F945
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/19/1981
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8106260322
Download: ML20004F945 (3)


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TENNESSIE VALLEY A UTH O.0 FY cum ;cc.u. 7::m zcsm.r e 400 Chestnut Street Tower I.!

June 19, 1981 CD S

g 2519stmh Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement gE "'% Q p-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- Recion II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street 4

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL l

EQUIPMENT - CPEN IIEM 50-328/81-20-04 l

The subject open ites was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector l

- R. W. Wright on October 24, 1980, in acoordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR's SQN EB 8023 through SQN EB 8042 (excluding SQN EB 8034), SQN EEB 8045R1, SQN EB 8051, SQN EB 8007R1, and SQN NEB 8031 through SQN NEB l

8034. Information concerning these items was submitted on November 25, 1980, and January 23, February 18, March 25, April 14, and April 28, 1981.

I

' Enclosed is further information concerning two items. SQN EEB 8031R3 and SQN EB 8036R2 are the only items that have been modified since our last report. ' We expect to submit our next report by August 21, 1981.

l If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at l

-FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure oc:

Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosatission l

Washington, DC 20555 l

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$g 8106260 322.

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. n ENCLOSURE.

SEQUOYAH. NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2

- ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL ' EQUIPMENT OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04 4

-Description of Item

Durng the review of-qualification records for electrical equipment requimd by NUREG-0588, a number of components were identified as having.

inadequate documentation to veri?y their qualification Llevels for the harsh environments resulting from abececal or accident conditions at the plant.-

- A listing of the subject _ components was included in our last report.-

Interim Progress Since SQN EEB 8031R3 and SQN EEB 8536R2 are the only items that have been modified since our last report, the interim progress on only those two items is listed on the attachment to this report.

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ATTACHNENT

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NCR No.

-Component No..

Model No.

Manufacturer Corrective Action / Resolution SQNEEB8031R3 FIS-67-206 288A ITT Barton See response to SQNEEB8023R1.1

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FIS-67-209.

FIS-65-554A/B

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These switches have been "FIS-65-44E/F.

-determined to be'not quali-FIS-65-25A/B-

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fied 'for the potentially.

' FIS-65-25C/D harsh environment in which' FIS-65-31A/B they are located.' Based on FIS-65-55C/D.

the results of a safety j.

FIS-65-44A/B evaluation, it was con-

FIS-65-44C/D cluded. that the. components

-FIS-65-25E/F were not required to operate FIS-65-31C/D

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in the event' of an accident.

lFIS-70-81:

.Therefore, TVA has modified

-PSID-313-305

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the switch wiring (reference PSID-313-340~

engineering change' notice

- L5124) to remove. those func-

'tions'that,: assuming failure of the switch in the harsh environment, could adversely affect the safety of plant operation.

' SQNEEB8036R2.FS-30-184 :-

1627.

F. W. Dwyer See response to SQNEEB8023R1.

FS-30-185 FS-30-192' FS-30-193-FS-30-157

-FS-30-194

. FS-30-195 FS-30-196

'FS-30-197 JFS-30-186 FS-30-202 FS-30-207 FS-30-201-FS-30-187

-FS-30-200 Due to their location in the FS-30-207 plant, these flew switches are not qualified - for the postulated accident environment.- Therefore, TVA will either relocate the switches in a more suitable environment er replace these components with qualified equipment before unit 2 initial criticality.