ML20004F756

Submits Documentation of Util Commitments at 810515 Fire Insp Exit Critique & 810527 Meeting in Bethesda,Md Re Fire Protection

ML20004F756
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	06/18/1981
From:	Colbert W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EF2-53791, NUDOCS 8106220284
Download: ML20004F756 (7)

Text

m s-e t

,/ f if h.

Detroit-4

-\\

s.s-..

s u

m,:m.t. Pace ;an 49226 h

q\\

D A

w '.., I s (3t3r 237-9C00 N

i (

N

-- I' W

m

<. s y

T/

?

June 18, 1981 (o

cp/

EF2 - 53791 Mr. L. L. Kintner Division of Project Managarent Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission Washington, D. C.

20555

Reference:

Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 MBC Docket No. 50-341 Subjact:

Fire Protection Commitments Based on your verbal request, this letter documents the comitments made by Detroit Edison at the Fire Inspection Exit critique of May 15, 1981, and the meeting in Bethesda of May 27, 1981.

A.

Ccmitments from the May 27, 1981 meeting:

In the Cable Spreading Ecom, Auxiliary Building elevation 630'-6", Ediw n will a.

Change the gaseous CD suppression system to a gaseous Halon systcm,2 b.

Add a dry pipe sprinkler system, manually operated and c.

Provide a one-hour fire barrier on both divisions-of shutdown cable trays Other comitments regarding the remote shutoown panels are documented in the June 15 letter to you.

B.

Comitments made frcxn the Fire Inspection of May 12 through May 15,1981.

i 4

act

\\

y GI 6' 8106220 M

'l F

p w

• Aw

~

p' y

'Mr. L.:L. Kintner JJune 18, 1981 EF2 - 53791 Page 2 NBC Fire Protection Review Findings Edison Position 1,

The following areas contain redundant divisions that are within the fire zona area of influence. General area auto-matic sprinklers and a one hour rated barrier on one division should be pro-vided to insure integrity of at least one division.

a.

A:viliary. Building elevation 677'-5" A three hour rated C.ontrol Room Ventilation Equip-barrier will be pro-ment and Standby Treatnent Rooms, vided for the Division 1 cir-Zone 14, F.H.A. page II 9B 4-49, cuits in the Division 2 coordinates G-H and 12-13.

areas b.

Auxiliary Building elevation 659'-6" Edison Engineering analysis Ventilation Equipment Area, Zone 13, required F.H.A. page 49B 4-47, in the north-east wrner.

c.

Auxiliary Building, elevation 643'-6" One tour barrier will be Miscellaneous Booms, Zone 11, F.E.A.

provided on trays and page #9B 4-44, coordinates G-H and between MCC's

11. This applies to both cable trays and the MCE Control cabinets. The existing autcmatic carbon dioxide suppression is acceptable in lieu of autcmatic sprinklers.

d.

Auxiliary Building elevation 631',

One leur barrier will be cable tray area, zone 8, F.H.A.

provided page #9B 4-40.

The cable traya M.ted in the NE corner of rocm co-ordinates H-11.

The existing auto-matic carbon dioxide suppression is l

acceptable in lieu of autaratic sprinklers.

e.

Auxiliary Building, elevation 613'-6" One hour barrier will be Cable Tunnel, zone 5, F.H.A. page provided l

1. 9B 4-35.

l.-

f.

Reactor Building, elevation 613'-6" One trur barrier will be second floor, zone 6, F.H.A. Page provided

1. 98 4-15.

Southeast corner E - F and 10 - 11. The Mea has an existing automatic sprinkler system.

.~

m

.1 I

)

+

,k

.l l

M. L. L. Kintner June 18, 1981 EF2 - 53791 i --

Page _3_.

Edison Position g.

Reactor Building, elevation 613'-6" Analysis indicates these second floor, zone 6, F.H.A. page circuits are control cir-

1. 9B 4-15. SoutNest corner m-cuits for cold shutdown ordinates B - C and 11..

valv', no protection or sups.ession required h.

Auxiliary Building, elevation 613'-6" A three hour rated barrier relay room, zone 3, F.H.A. page # 9B will be provided witout 4-32.

suppression i.- Auxiliary Building elevation 613'-6"

.One hour barriers will_be

' relay room, zone 3, F.H.A. page # 9B provided for <20 feet.

4-32.

Te existing atecmatic carbon Bypass switches required to dioxide fire suppression is accept-bypass leak detection trip

- able in lieu of autmatic sprinklers.

r

j. Au:;iliary Building, elevation 603'-6" One hour barrier will be mezzanine and cable tray area, Zone 2, provided F.H.A. page #9B 4-30.

The area has an existing autmatic sprinkler system.

k.

Peactor Building, elevation 583'-6" Valves in this zone area first floor, Zone 5, F.H.A. page # 9B are mld shutdown valves -

4-11.

West side outside containment no protection necessary.

1.

Auxiliary Building, elevation 538'-6" One hour barrier will be cable tray area, Zone 2, F.H.A. page provided

1. 9B 4-30.

Both the north and south ends. The area has an existing auto-matic sprinkler system.

m.

Auxiliary Building, elevation 551' and One hour. barrier will be 561' basement, Zone 1, F.H.A. page provided

1. 9B 4-28. The area has-an exist--

ing autmatic sprinkler system.

2.

The applicant will document that the fire Edison will correct any danpers are installed as per the manu-damper installation facturers' instructions or will anchor ret in accordance with the frameof the damper to the wall.

manufacturers instructions e

..m

p S

Mr. L. L. Kintner~

June 18, 1981 EF2 - 53791 Page 4 Edison Position

3.. The diesel fuel oil supply valve, Icck will be provided located at the elevated fuel oil tank, should be locked open or electrically supervised.

4.

The cable tray supports sinuld have the Cable tray supports will be same fire resistance as cable tray it-protected as requested self.

5.

Snoke detection should be provided An additional snoke detector for the Auxiliary Building, elevation willbe provided 613' northeast corner in the stair-way adjacent to the relay rom.

6.

Auxiliary Building, elevation 630'-6" Edison will protect cable cable spreading room, Zone 7 F.H.A.

spreading rocm as per the page t 9B 4-30.

Provide an May 27, 1981 meeting.

auxiliary shutdown syst m for all The shutdown of the control cabling independent of the cable room will be as defined in spreading rocm. This would effectively the May 27, 1981 meeting ard bypass the control room also.

letter of June 15, 1981.

7.

The remote shutdown panel struld be Fermi 2 having 2 remote shut-electrically isolated from the con-down panels precludes the trol roca, cable spreading room, and need for electrical isolation relay rcm.

8.

The applicant should provide documenta-Documentation will be provided tion on the flame spread, fuel contri-buted arxl smoke developed ratings of all interior finish in the cont:.ol room.

9.

Spurious operation of valves and equip-Will be addressed in response ment should be considered in applicant's to question 021.32 analysis of tne effect zone of fire influence.

10. A second feed frm the undergrc nd A second feed willbe provided fire main should be provided for the to the RHR Cmplex-RHR Building.

-i i

-Mr. L. L. Kintner June 18, 1981 EF2 - 53791 Page 5 C.

Res"Its of the Analysis Requested at the May 15, 1981 Exit Critique.

The following analysis will be provided in.respense to Question 021.32 but are provided per your verbal request.

a.' Critique Item #1-g - Reactor Building, elevation 613'-6" Southwest corner coordinates B - C and 11.

The interaction tray identified as the foreign division in this area is also known as the swing bus. This tray con-tains control cables to valves which are used for shutdown cooling only. The following valves are included:

Ell F010 (RHR Cross tie)

E1150 F015 A, B (RHR injection)

Ell 50 F017 A, B (RFR injection)

B3105 - F031 A, B (Recirc Line Discharge Valves)

Relay Control for E3105 - F031 A, B The RHR cross tie valve E1150 F010 is rormally open and is not used for the reactor shutdown. If it should close, there would be no affect on the' shutdown using the RHR system. The Rhd injection valves are not used until sh,ut-down cooling for cold shutdown is required. If both injection valves inadvertently opened while the reactor was at pressure, the swing check valves Ell 50 F05C A or B would prevent back flow. If the valves failed to open when called upon for cold shutdown, the valves can be manually opened.

The Recirculation Pump discharge valves are open and are closed when the PHR system is put into shutdown cooling.

There is no problem if these valves. inadvertently closed as there is no flow in the Recirculation System once the reactor is scramed. If the valves carzot be closed, the Recirculation System irloard valves B3105 F023 A, B can be closed ard accomplish the same o)jective. The irtoard valves are not powered by the swing bus.

This analysis indicates that the swing bus circuits can be damaged in a fire without preventing hot or cold reactor shutdown.

~

g

-Mr. L. L. Kintner.

June 18, 1981 EF2 - 53791 Page 6 b.

Critique Item #_1 Auxiliary Building 613'-6" Relay-Boca. Evaluation of relay rocm panels.

The relay roca analysis indicates there are two sets 'of panels used for shutdown that have both divisions separated by less than 20 feet. The panels are Hll P609 and P611, the Paactor Protection System panels,and panel P614, the HPCI, RCIC steam line leak detection panel, i:

The RPS cabinets are included as shutdown equignent because the reactor must be scramed to shutdown. Ioss of the RPS cabinets would cause a scram aa the RPS circuit integrity n.st be intact to keep the control rods out. In addition, the RPS MG sets can be tripp2d that will de-energize the scram circuits and cause a scram.

The steam leak detection cabinets are used for isolation of the HPCI and RCIC steam lines in the event of a steam line break. This cabinet irxludes trip contacts in both the HICI

-and BCIC systems.

If the circuits in this cabinet open circuit, there u.ald be no affect on the HPCI or :CIC control circuits (which are located in other divisional relay cabinets). If the circuits in Hll P614 are grounded, the circuit fusing would de-energize the leak detection circuits; bcwever, the HPCI and RCIC turbine control circuits would not be affected. A hot short in certain circuits in Hll P614 could inadvertently pick up the trip relay. To correct for this potential problem, a bypass switch will be added at the relay cabinets (Hil P618 for RCIC, Hll P617 for RCIC) to isolate the steam leak detection trip contacts. The leak detection is-not needed in a fire scenario.

c.

Criticue Item #1-k - Reactor Building elevation 583'-6" west side outside cortainment.-

This zone contains valves W F019A, Ell F015 B and Ell F006..

These valves are shutdown cooling valves and are not reeded until the reactor is put into cold shu'Aown. Damage to thece valves can be overo:xne as the valves can be operated manually. Inadvertent operation of valves Ell F015 A or B was discussed in Critique Item #1-g above. If valve Ell F008 should inadvertently open, the valve inside contairraent Ell F009 would provide isolation. No further protection is required..

i

.l l

i

g; n,3 - / a.

9, g.

.r.

t n

i s fi~l

.m r. T a o : c

e-e. -

, 4. +.

1 L%

L L.: Kintner '-

June 18, 1981i EF2.53791'

.Page.7 s

.r

c, Sincerely,

?

.Y$$[Y",

W. F. Colbert Technical Director

- 7 Enrico Fermi 2

.WEC/RCA/dk I

oc:

B. Little L

I h

5

.1 y~

t k

r j^

l I

i I

a o -

i t

.y 3

5:

j t

Yc:

?

4-c..

, -....., -........ +

,-.,,,m+..

,,,...n

.,m,.

--,,cs.me.

,,em,.

s.,m--w<v-,---.=w.#,=,-~wwwi-

-