ML20004F176
| ML20004F176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1981 |
| From: | Cerne A, Gallo R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004F166 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-81-05, 50-443-81-5, 50-444-81-05, 50-444-81-5, NUDOCS 8106160581 | |
| Download: ML20004F176 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000443/1981005
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Region I
50-443/81-05
Report No.
50-444/81-05
50-443
Docket No.
50-444
CPPR-135
Category
A
License No. CPPR-136
Priority
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Licensee:
Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire
1000 Elm Street
Manchester, New Hamoshire 03105
Facility Name: Seabrook Statien, Units 1 and 2
Inspection at: Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspection conducted: April 6-May 8,1981
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5/88l
Inspectors:
.A1WO
A.C.Cerne, Sr. Resicent inspector
cate signeo
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date signed
cate signed
6N Oh,
5 l21 ,S(
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Approved by:
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R.M.Gallo, Chief, Projects Section 1A,
date signed
Division of Resident and Project Inspection
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Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Insoection on Aoril 6-May 8,1981 (Recort No. 50-443/81-05)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the resident inspector of work activities relative
to structural steel erection and welding, pipe welding and support erection, equipment
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support installation, and component installation. The inspector also performed plant
inspection-tours and revi1wed licensee action on previously identified items. The inspec-
tion involved 75 inspector-hours, including eight off-shift hours, by the NRC Resident
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Inspector.
Results: 0f the four areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were identified in one
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area, as follows: Failure tt consider specification and code recuirements for weld ISI
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in the approval of a pipe suoport installation (paragraph 6b); and Failure to utilize
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a properly qualified Weld Procedure for the welding of a flued head to a containment
penetration sleeve (paragrarh 6a).
Unit 2 Insoection on Acril o-May 8,1981 (Recort No. 50-444/o1-05)
Areas Insoected: Roetine inipection by the resident inspector of work activities
coserved during plant inspution-tours. The inspector also reviewed licensee action
on previously identified it
s.
The inspection involved six inspector-hours by the
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NRC Resident Inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Yankee Atomic Electric Comoany
F. W. Bean, QA Engineer
B. B. Beckley, Manager of Nuclear Projects (PSNH - Manchester)
D. L. Covill, QA Engineer
J. DeVincentis, Project Manager (Framingham)
W. J. Gagnon, QA Engineer
D. E. Groves, QA Engineer (Framingham)
J. H. Herrin, Site Manager (PSNH)
D. A. Maidrand, Project Engineer (Framingham)
G. F. Mcdonald, Jr. , QA Engineer (Framingham)
W. J. Miller, QA Manager (Framinghus)
J. W. Singleton, Field QA Manager
United Engineers and Constructors (UEIC)
A. H. Ayers, QA Engineer
R. H. Beaumont, QA Engineer
R. L. Brown, Assistant Liaison Engineer
F. A. Cromer, Field Piping Engineer
J. A. Grusetskie, Assistant Liaison Engineer
R. A. Hopley, Field Engineer
R. A. Kauntz, Welding Superintendent
D. C. Lambert, Field Superintendent of QA
R. C. Lesnefsky, Supervising QA Engineer (Philadelphia)
D. A. Mehta, Lead Structural Engineer (Philadelphia)
R. A. Mills, Assistant Liaison Engineer
J. J. Murphy, Field Engineer
R. R. Thomas, Office Engineer
Cives Steel
J. J. Corson, Field Representative
F. W. Hake, Inc.
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R. O. Davis, Project Manager
R. Ellis, QA Engineer
Pittsburgh DesMoines Steel Co. (PDM)
W. A. St1ger, QA Manager
Perini Power Constructors (PPC)
G. T. Hamond, Structural Engineer
A. G. Schroeder, Lead Structural Inspector
Royal Insurance
J. C. Anzivino, Authorized Nuclear Inspector
Pullman-Higgins (Pullman)
R. G. Davis, Field QA Manager
R. R. Donald, Field QA Supervisor
C. Gaskell, QA Welding Engineer
D. R. Geske, QC Supervisor
J. Godleski, QA Records Supervisor
P. Grasewicz, Lead Hanger Engineer
M. MacCrae, NDE Supervisor
C. Scannell, Chief Field Engineer
R. Fawe1I, Project Manager
C. E. Walker, Liaison Engineer
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2.
Plant Inscection-Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector observed work activities in-progress, ccmpleted work and
plant status in several areas of the plant during general inspections
of the plant. The inspector examined work for any obvious defects or
noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions.
Particular
note was taken of the presence of quality control inspectors and quality
control evidence such as inspection records, material identification,
nonconforming material identification, housekeeping and equicment
preservation. The inspector interviewed craft personnel, supervisien,
and quality inspec+ ion personnel as such personnel were available in the
work areas.
No items of nonccmpliance were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inscection Findinos
a.
(Closed) Infraction (443 and 444/79-08-03):
Corrective action verifi-
cation. The inspector reviewed Revision 7 to the YAEC QA Manual
Procedure 8.1.
Utilization of a form entitled, " Summary and Status of
Corrective Action", has been directed to track the status of audit
findings requiring corrective action to ccmpletion. Distribution of
this summary to managemer.t for review is required on a periodic ba.is
as an aid in the evaluation of overall program effectiveness.
Res-
consibility f'or the conduct of necessary corrective acticn has been
procedurally defined. The inspector has no furtner questiens on this
item,
b.
(Closed) Unresolved item (443/81-03-03): Questions on crossover leg
support adequacy. The inspector reviewed a representative sample of
the Cives shop drawings, which had been approved by UE&C, for the
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crossover leg supports. The designation of certain weld joints as
single bevel groove, instead of yea groove, welds was verified to be
in conformance with AWS Standard 01.1.
Requirements for the use of
groove weld backing strips and .ne substitution of stiffeners for a
middle flange were discussed with engineering, vendor, and QA personnel.
The Engineering Change Authorizatior in question has been revised to
ECA 01/1775C to clarify acceptable as-built conditions. The adequacy
of the records identifying method and sc:cpe of NDE has been audited
by licensee QA personnel and further fo' low-up and corrective action
have been generated by licensee QA ;rogram controls.
An additional question regarding the applicability of those portions
of the pertinent UE&C Specification (12-5) that require further NDE
of built-up girders has been answered to indicate final weld NDE
has been acccmplished in accordance with specification requirements.
Based upon the evidence of engineering acceptance of the as-built
configurations of the crossover leg supports to tnclude design
review of vendor modifications, this item is considered resolved.
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c.
(Closed) Unresolved item (443/81-03-04): Conflict between the RPV
support installation and the ASME Code. The licensee determined that
the installation requirements of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III,
Subsection NF, through the Winter 77 Addenda, apoly to the questioned
RPV support connections. The inspector verified that plate washers
have been installed, quantitative torquing values have been defined,
and a method of locking the nuts has been engineered and provided.
The current configuration and RPV suppcrt installation meet Code
requirements and the inspector has no further questions on this
issue.
4.
Evaluation of Potential 50.55(e) Item (Unit 1)
The following item reported by the licensee as potentially reportable under
ICCFR50.55(e) was subsequently evaluated as either not "significant" or
not capable of having " adversely affected the safety of operations" and
therefore as not reportable under those regulatory requirements.
Fillet welds for structural steel conr.ections to insert plates do not
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meet minimum AISC size specifications: The adecuacy of existing welds
was verified by testing, both by micro-etching test coupons for soundness
and by Magnetic Particle Examination of a sample of procuction welds.
While test results did indicate structural and design adequacy, field
welding to upgrade the weld sizes to minimum AISC requirements was
also accomplished.
The inspector reviewed licensee and A/E reports on the above issue and
specifically evaluated the justification for the eventual decision of
nonreportability with regard to 10CFR50.55(e). He has no further questions
on this aspect of this item.
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5.
Structural Steel Erection and Weldina (Unit 1)
The inspector randemly examined several bolted and welded connections
on the annulus structural steel within Unit 1 containment. He witnessed
welding in progress, reviewed the Perini Weld Data Card records, and
discussed with the welders, preheat and weld size requirements. QA hold
points for the inspection of in-process and final weld criteria were noted
and construction controls over the welding sequence, care of the base
metals, and knowledge of the proper quality criteria were evident. The
inspector witnessed Magnetic Particle Examination (MPT) of scme full
penetration structural connection to embed welds and discussed both
technique and final MPT Report documentation with the technician.
The above structural welding and NDE were evaluated with regard to the
specified requirements in the following documents:
AWS Standard D1.1-75
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UE&C Procedure WS-3, P.evision 1
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Perini Field Civil Construction Procedure, FCCP-156, Revision 4
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- High-strength bolted connection configurations were spot-checked against
AISC requirements. Details for scme W24 structural pieces connecting
several beams to the concrete embeds at elevation 0 were checked against
the governing UE&C Drawing F102324, Revision 3, and the Cives installation
drawings (UE&C Foreign Print FP 15109-20, Sheets E101, E104, and E121).
The Perini documentation control over the Structural Steel Installation
Summaries which log the bolted connection status for the W24 pieces was
examined and discussed with the responsible structural engineer.
The as-built condition of two bolted connections on azimuths 50*and 110'
and elevations -14 and -16 respectively were examined with regard to the
disposition requirements of Perini nonconfonnance report, NCR 1471,
Revision 1.
The inspector questioned whether the modifications dictated
by the NCR were in fact necessary at the 110* azimuth location. After
recheck by QA personnel, the existing configuration was detennined to be
in agreement with original design requirements and Revision 2 to NCR 1471
was issued to clarify this finding. With regard to the NCR disposition
in general, the inspector verified that the directed allowance for slotting
the holes in the structural members had taken into account a reduction in
the allowable shear stresses which could be tolerated in these friction-type
connections. He had no further questions on these issues.
With regard to the above areas of inspection on the annulus structural
steel welding, NDE, and bolting, no items of nonccmpliance whre identified.
6.
Safety-Related Picino (Unit 1)
a.
Weldino
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The inspector observed in-process welding on the following pipe spools:
1-CS-369-07, Field Weld F0704
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1-CS-421-01, Field Weld F0102
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1-SW-1802-05, Field Weld F0505
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1-SL-X15-01, Field Weld F0101 (flued head)
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Field Weld Process Sheets and Weld Rod Stores Requisitions were checked
to verify identification, documentation, and inspection of criteria
procedurally required for quality welding. Actual welding conditions
and conduct, the sequence of operations, and the use and documentation
of purge dams were all spot-checxed. The inspector noted the presence
or availability of QC welding inspectors and checked their inspection
verification of hold point items on the weld process sheets.
For a completed weld of a Class 1 Valve (LC-V-459) into its piping
line (1-RC-97-02, Field Weld F0201), the inspector reviewed the folicwing
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drawings to determine confonnance to code class boundary specifications,
weld end prep configuration details, and NDE requirements per ASME
B&PV Code, Sections III and V.
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UE&C Drawings 0800097 (Revision 5) and 0805000
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Pullman Isometric RC-97-02 (Revision 1)
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Dravo Sketch E2936-1297 (Revision 1)
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For field weld F0102 (CS-421 Line) listed above, which installed a
Tufline Valve (V-266) into its pipe line, the inspector noted
special techniques being utilized to maintain the valve body below
a certain temperature during the welding. He verified that these
techniques were procedurally defined and controlled by Pullman Field
Instruction FI-77, Revision 1.
Welding Procedure Specification (WPS)
controls for all the above welding were examined and the WPS and
procedure listed below were reviewed for conforaance of the actual,
essential welding variables to precedures qualified in accordance with
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the ASME B&PV Code,Section IX.
WPS 24-III-8-XI-12
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WPS CL1-1-BR-2
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WPS 81-III-8/1-08-12
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Pullman General Welding Standard, GWS-III
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Inspection of all the above areas and welding items resulted in no
items of noncompliance, except as noted below.
The inspector noted that the welding of flued head penetration X-15
to its containment liner penetration sleeve was procedurally controlled
by WPS 81-III-8/1-08-12. This weld specification was qualified for
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dissimilar metal welds (P-No.8 to P-No.1 material) for thicknesses
up to 5/8" on the carbon steel side. The Procedure Qualification
Records (PQRs 310 and 311) for this WPS actually qualified the welding
up to 4", but sin.* no impact (notch-toughness) testing was done on
the coupons, the 5/8" thickness limit applied to all material for which
special impact testing was a requirement.
The inspector determined through a review of UE&C drawings F101496,
F101497, F805575, and F805578 that the carbon steel sleeve to which the
flued head penetration was being welded was actually 0.937" thick.
This sleeve was classified in UE&C Specification 248-43 (Revision 5)
as part of the containment liner and therefore under the jurisdiction
of the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Division 2.
Since ASME III,
Division 2 requires impact tests of the base metal weld heat-affected
zone of P-No.1 material for procedure qualification of welding on
carbon steel thicknesses greater than 5/8", the inspector informed
the licensee that this failure to use a properly qualified procedure
for the welding process on flued head penetration X-15 represented
a noncompliance with regard to 10CFR50, Appendix'B, Criterion IX
(443/81-05-01). This noncompliance was discussed with the licensee
Field QA Manager at an exit interview on May 6,1981 and the inspector
learned that a licensee hold had been placed on all affected flued
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head welding.
In checking into'the impact test requirements for the containment
penetration sleeves, the inspector was able to verify by examination
of the material certifications that the sleeve material itself, supplied
by the Kawasaki Steel Corporation in Japan, had been impact tested
and met all relevant material specifications.
In general, the inspector
reviewed the availability of containment liner material certification,
assembly, and test records from the Japanese supplier and found both
traceability and proper documentation.
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b.
Pice Succorts
The inspector checked the in-place ccndition, either final accepted or
still in process, of the following pipe supports and compared them with
their Pullman detail drawings:
775-RG-3
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775-SV-14
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775-RG-15
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MS-1201-A12
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The inspector checked hanger material and weld dimensions, identification,
and configuration. Where welding was in progress, he examined the Pullman
Hanger Field Weld Process Sheets and Weld Rod Stores Requisitions for
documentation of the correct weld joint status and usage of specified
weld material. The welders were aware of and had available the field
instruction governing the increase in fillet weld sizes based upon
obtuse angled hanger joint configurations.
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Upon review of Pullman hanger drawing MS-1201-A12 (Revision 5A), the
inspector noted that the hanger being field welded was designed to
support piping in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system (1-RH-158-
2-601-t").
The hanger installation had been additionally authorized
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by UE&C Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 19/0205A which allowed
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the harger to be placed directly between two circumferential pipe
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welds 6" apart, while exempting line 158 from in-service inspection
(ISI) requirements. However, UE&C Specification 248-1 (Revision 4)
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indicates in the material section for this line that the design
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pressure and temperature parameters exceed those allowed by the quoted
exemption. Both 10CFR50.55a and UE&C Specification IS-1 designate
ASME B&PV Code,Section XI requirements to be defined by the pertinent
articles (IWC for the class 2) of the Summer 1975 addenda to the 1974
Code for this RHR line.
IWC 1220 (a) exempts components in certain
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systems from ISI based upon design pressure and temperature considera-
tions, and not upon the less conservative operating pressure and
temperature parameters invoked in the approval of ECA 19/0205A.
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Specification IS-1 (Revision 6) additionally indicates that the design
of pipe hangers and supports shall be reviewed such that no pennanently
installed part shall be closer than 15" to the nearest circumferential
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weld, so as not to interfere with ISI access. However, the installation
of part of MS-1201-A12, as reviewed and approved by ECA 19/0205A,
violated these requirements. The inspector informed the licensee
Field QA Manager during exit interviews on May 1 and 6,1981 that this
procedural violation represented a noncompliance with regard to
10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V (443/81-05-02).
c.
Miscellaneous
The inspector examined the field condition, material type, configuration,
flow direction, and shop weld and NDE records for pipe spool piece
1-CS-366-1-2501-3"-3 and checked these items against criteria delineated
in UE&C Specification 248-1 (Revision 4) and Dravo Sketch E2936-1226
(Revision la). He also observed the pre-installation condition and
status of Limitorque Valve (1-SI-V-0047) within Unit I containment.
The resolution of a Pullman NCR 327 regarding repair of cracked cemert
linings in installed service water piping was discussed with
management personnel. The inspector verified inspection of these
repair operations through review of the Field Process Sheets and
discussion with QA personnel.
No items of nonccmpliance were identified.
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7.
Unit 1 Comconent Installation
a.
The inspector witnessed the movement of the Unit 1 RPV through the
construction opening for the equipment hatch into containment and the
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lifting and placement of the RPV onto its final supports within the
reactor cavity. QC inspection and QA audit of this activity were
verified. Certification and inspection records for the 525-ton crane
load test and the MPT of crane hook for the containment polar crane,
which was used for the final lifting and setting, were examined.
The following documents were reviewed to verify that the rough set
of the Unit 1 RPV had met all procedural requirements:
Hake Field Control Procedure No. 449.2 (Revision 1)
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Hake Field Control Procedure, FGCP-6 (Revision 1)
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Hake Quality Assurance Procedures, QAP-8 (Revision 5) and QAP-9
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(Revision 4)
Hake Drawings 449-RV-1 thru RV-10
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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b.
Polar Gantry Crane
The inspector examined portions of the completed installation and
checked the material certification and testing records, and the receiving
inspection report for the Unit I containment polar gantry crane
(Mark 1-MM-CR-3), fabricated by Whiting Corporation. While the polar
crane is classified as non-nuclear-safety with regard to its operability,
it has been designed and has been designated for erection such that
the seismic requirements of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, position C2
are satisfied. Specifically, the inspector checked material, NDE,
and specified QA requirements against UE&C Specification 257-2 (Revision
7) and UE&C Procedures MPS-2 (Revision 3), WS-3 (Revision 1), and
QAS-2 (Revision 4). Erection to include bolt' type and torquing, and
QC inspection records was evaluated against UE&C Specification 263-4
(Revision 2), Hake Field Control Procedure 449.1 (Revision 3) and
UE&C Procedure QAS-4 (Revision 1).
The inspector detemined that a requirement for impact testing of the
crane bolting material, imposed by Specification 257-2, had in fact
been waived prior to delivery of the crane, by engineering discussions
between UE&C and Whiting. ECA 08/1162C was written and acproved
on May 6,1981 to clarify this waiver and eliminate this bolt impact
testing requirement frem the crane specification.
The inspector has no furthe questions regarding construction of the
polar gantry crane for Unit I at this time. No items of noncompliance
were identified.
8.
Unit 1 Ecuicment Succorts
a.
Pressurizer
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The inspector examined the in-place condition of the embedded plates
and anchor bolts for the Unit 1 pressurizer (1-RC-E-10) supports
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located at elevation 0 within containment. Anchor plate and bolt
size, configuration, and the dimensional relationship to the concrete
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interface were checked, as was fillet weld size and completeness.
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The following drawings were reviewed for inspection criteria:
UE&C drawings F101406 (Revision 4), F101413 (Revision 9), and
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F101418 (Revision 9)
Westinghouse drawing 1101J83 (UE&C FP50050)
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No items of nonccmpliance were identified.
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b.
Control Room Ecuioment Supoorts.
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The inspector examined the design, condition, welding, and configuration
of C6 channels embedded in the Control Rocm floor, elevation 75 in
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the Control Building, both before and after concrete placement.
Material thickness, method of anchoring, and weld sizes were all spot-
checked. Anchor channel fabrication records, to include chemical and
physical test reports, weld red certification, and QA inspection, were
inspected. The inspector reviewed UE&C drawings F101347 (Revision 3),
F101351 (Revision 4), and F101699 and evaluated all the inspection
items with regard to criteria delineated in the following documents:
UE&C Specification 18-1 (Revision 5)
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UE&C Procedure WS-3 (Revision 1)
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AWS Standard D1.1-75
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No items of nonccmpliance were identified.
c.
Regenerative Heat Exchanger
The inspector examined the installed, but not finally accepted, condition
of the Unit 1 Regenerative Heat Exchanger 1-CS-E-2 on its wall supports
within containment.
Bolt minimum edge distances, fillet weld sizes,
and dissimilar metal welds on the supports were checked, as was the
preventive maintenance record on the heat exchanger itself.' Material
certifications and the code data report from the fabricator (Atlas),
hydro-test and air bubble inspection reports, weld red certifications
and NDE reports were all reviewed.
In evaluating the overall installation of the Regenerative Heat Exchanger
on its supports, the folicwing documents were examined:
'JE&C Specifications 248-51 (Revision 7) and 263-2 (Revision 2)
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UE&C drawings F101418 (Revision 9) and F805051 (Revision 6)
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Atlas drawing D-4313-7 (UE&C FP50257)
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Pullman Procedure IX-39
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ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Subsection NF and Appendix XVII
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The inspector also reviewed the handling of a nonconfonning condition
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involving the misplacement of the embedded wall support anchor bolts,
which was identified and dispositioned by Perini NCRs 59/1388 and
59/1388 (Revisien 1). While final installation of the heat exchanger
supports appears to have been accomplished in accordance with the NCR
disposition requirements, the inspector raised the following questions
regarding the installation process and existing as-built condition.
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Why no torque requirements were impo.ged on the ASTM A-193 high
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strength anchor bolts as required by ECA 01/1875C?
What justifies the final configuration of the long-slotted bolt
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holes, which were made in the support plate and documented per
Pullman FCR 1609A, in apparent conflict with AStiE III, Subsection
NF requirements .for the direction. of the slots?
These questions were discussed with the licensee Field QA Manager at
exit interviews on May 1 and 6,1981. Pending clarification of the
apparent conflict with ASME III, NF and the apparent nonconformity
with procedural requirements fo* torquing, 'this item is unresolved
(443/81-05-03).
9.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance,
or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in Paragraph 8c.
10. Manacement Meetinas
At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were
held with senior plant management to discuss the scope and findings of
this inspection.
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