ML20004E798
| ML20004E798 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Counsil W CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-15-20, TASK-RR LSO5-81-06-024, LSO5-81-6-24, NUDOCS 8106150275 | |
| Download: ML20004E798 (8) | |
Text
k UNITED STATES a
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, "g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g,
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- g' June 9, 1981 Docket flo. 50-213 LiO5-81-06-024 Mr. W. G. Cou'sil, Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Operations Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Corp.
Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101
Dear Mr. Counsil:
5UBJECT: SEP TOPIC XV-20, RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FUEL DAMAGING ACCIDENTS (INSIDE Af10 OUTSIDE CONTAlf1 MENT) - HADDAM f1ECK Enclosed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic XV-20. This eval-uation incorporates comments provided to us by your letter dated May 13, 1981. We now consider this evaluation to be final.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility.
This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relat-ing to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely,
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Dennis M. Crutchfield, C ef Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing l
Enclosure:
1 As stated cc w/ enclosure:
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'Mr. W. G. Counsil HADDAM NECK PLANT.
DOCKET NO. 50-213 CC Day, Berry & Howard U. S. Environmental Protection Counselors at Law Agency One Constitution Plaza Region 1 Office Hartford, Connecticut 06103 ATIN:
EIS C0ORDINATOR l
JFK Federal Building Superintendent Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Haddam Neck Plant RfD #1 Resident Inspector Post Office Box 127E Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 c/o V. S. NRC East Haddam Post Office Mr. James R. Hinnelwright East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Russell Library 119 Broad Street Middletown, Connecticut 06457 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 Connecticut Energy Agency ATTN: Assistant Director Research and Policy De" it Department ning and Energy Poliyy 20 Grand Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Director, Technical Assessment Division l
Office of Radiation Prograns (AW-459)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Crystal Mall #2 F
Arlington, Virginia 20460 e
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Ef1 CLOSURE
!!ADDN4 FLECK XV-20 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUEt!CES OF FUEL DNIAGif;G ACCIDENTS I.
IflTRODUCTION The safety objective of tilis topic is to assure that the offsite doses from fuel damaging accidents as a result of fuel handling inside and outside con -
tainment are well within the guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50, " Contents of Applications:
Technical Information," requires that each applicant for a construction permit or operating license provide an analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility.
A fuel handling accident in the fuel handling and storage facility resulting in damage to fuel cladding and subsequent release of radioac+1ve material is one of the postulated accidents used to evaluate the adeqt -.y of these structures, systems, and components with respect to the pi,olic health and safety.
10 CFR Part 100 provides the acceptable dose consequences for siting of nuclear power plants.
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS l
Topic II-2.C. " Atmospheric Transport and Diffusion Characteristics for Accident Analysis" provides the meteorological data used for calculating f
the offsite dosa consequencer.
1 The review of the fuel damaging accidents did not consider fuel damage as a result of drops of the spent fucl cask or other heavy objects which can be carried either over an open reactor vessel or the spent fuel pool. Review of the drops of casks and heavy objects is covered in two SEP Topics, IX-2,
" Overhead Handling Systems-Cranes" and XV-21, " Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accidents."
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES Accidents resulting from the movement of fuel inside and outside containment were reviewed following the assumptions and procedures outlined in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 15.7.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.25. The dose to an individual from a postulated fuel handling accident should be well within 1
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.2 the exposure guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
"Pell within"'the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 has been defined as less than 100 rem to the thyroid.
(Whole body doses are also examined but are not controlling due to the decay of the short-lived radioisotopes prior to fuel handling.) This is based on the probability of this event relative to other events which are evaluated against 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines.
The review considers single failure, seismic design and equipment qualification only when the potential consequences might exceed the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 in the absence of containment isolation and effluent filtration.
V.
EVALUATION The assumptions used in the. evaluation of the fuel handling accident are listed in Table 1.
The fuel handling accident inside containment was considered in an earlier NRC evaluation as a result of i generic activity (Ref.1).
In Reference (1), we evaluated the potential consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident inside containment.
During fuel handling operations inside containment, the licensee operates the containment ventilation system in one of two modes.
In the first mode the containment is closed and the ventilation flow is directed through internal charcoal filters. These filters are safety grade (used for post LOCA dose mitigation) and would result in dose mitigation for fuel handling accidents inside containment
(
when this ventilation mode is utilized.
In the event a fuel handling accident were to occur in this mode radioactivity would not be released to the environment since the containment is closed.
In the second mode, the containment is purged during fuel movement operations. We have reviewed existing plant procedures and have determined that the purge discharge would be directed through the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)
J charcoal filters and, therefore, credit was taken for these filters as indicated in Table 1.
The radiological consequences at the exclusion area j
boundary (EAB) are given in Table 2.
The doses at the EAB are controlling due to the short duration of the accident and the lower atmospheric dis-persion factors for th low population zone.
We have also reviewed the potential consequences of a postulated fuel hand-ling accident inside the spent fuel building.
During fuel handling operations.
in the spent fuel building plant procedure NOP 2.15-3 requires that the spent fuel building ventilation system shall be in service when fuel is being handled.
i The radiological consequences at the EAB assuming cperation of the spent fuel building charcoal filters are presented in Table 2.
There ars.lo technical specifications or surveillance requirements for the charcoal filters.
However, the licensee is converting to Standard Technical t
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Specification (STS) which include provisions for the use and testing of charcoal filters. Therefore, since the STS will allow for the raonitor-ing and use of the filters, no further action within the SEP is neces-ary.
VI. CONCLUSIONS Based on the above evaluation, we conclude that the radiological conse -
quences of a fuel handling accident both inside and outside of contain-ment are well within the guidelines of ICCFR Part 100 and the SRP criteria are met.
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TABLE 1 ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR THE FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT
' Power Level 1862 Mvt Opera. ting Time 3 years Peaking Factor 1.65 Nunbar of Fuel Assemblics Damaged 1
Number of Fuel Assemblies in Core 157 Activity Release From Pool Regulatory Guide 1.25 Decay Time Before "oving Fuel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Filter Efficiency for Filter on Primary Auxiliary Building and the New and Spent Fuel Building Ventilating System 90 ".
0-2 hr., X/Q Value, Exclusion Area Boundary
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(ground level release) 1.0 x 10 sec/m
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TABLE 2 CALCULATED DOSES TOR TUEL llANDLING ACCittNTS Doses, Rem Thyroid Whole Body Exclusion Area-Boundary Doses from:
- 1) Accident in Fuel Handlir.g Buildin9 21 0.7
- 2) Accident Inside Containment 21 0.7 E
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REFERdNCES 1.
Letter. D. L. Ziemann to W. G. Counsil dated December 20, 1979, Transmitting the Safety Evaluation for Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containnent.
2.
Letter, W. G. Counsil to D. L. Zicmann, March 25, 1980, "Haddam Neck Plant Fuel Storage Building."
3.
Letter, H. G. Counsil to D. M. Crutchfield, May 13,1981, "Haddam Neck Plant SEP Topic XV-20; Radiological Consequences of Fuel Damaging Accidents" O
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