ML20004E528
| ML20004E528 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/19/1981 |
| From: | Barnes I, Foster W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004E516 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900334 NUDOCS 8106120293 | |
| Download: ML20004E528 (17) | |
Text
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O U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900334/80-01 Program No. 51300 51400 Company: Transamerica Delaval Incorporated Engine and Compressor Division 550 85th Avenue Oakland, California Inspection Conducted:
October 14-17-1980 Inspectors:
Ne i /i9 /r/
f-W. E. Foster, Contractor Inspector Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch lSw n /s 9 /rs I. Barnes, Chief Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Approved by: I8%
e /s 9/7/
I. Barnes, Chief Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Summary:
Inspection on October 14-17, 1980 (99900334/80-01)
Areas Insoected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria, and applic-able coces and standards; including follow-up on regional requests; and follow-up on a Part 21 report. The inspection involved forty-two inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
In the three areas inspected, the following violation, nine deviations, and two unresolved items were identified:
i 8106120$.b A
2 Violation:
Follow-up on regional requests practice was not consistent with paragraph 21.51 of 10 CFR 21 (See Notice of Violation).
Deviations:
Control of Measuring and Test Equipment:
Practices were not consistent with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, paragraphs 10.6.4 and 10.6.5 of Section 10, dated June 30, 1979, of the Quality Control Manual (See Notice of Deviation, Item A).
Follow-up on Identified Deficiencies in Diesel Generator Piping Welds:
Prac-tices were not consistent with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50; paragraph 7.1.1 of Section 7 of Quality Control Procedure I.P.-700 (See Notice of Deviation, Item B); paragraph NO-5521(a), subparagraphs (2) and (6) of Section III of the ASME Code (See Notice of Deviation, Item C); paragraphs NO-4321(a) and NO-4323 of Section III of the ASME Code (See Notice of Deviation, Item 0);
paragraph 5.5.4 of Section 5 of Quality Control Procedure I.P.-500 (See Notice of Deviation, Item E); paragraph 4.2.4 of Section 4 of Quality Control Pro-cedure I.P.-500 (See Notice of Deviation, Item F); paragraph 10.3.2 of Section 10 of Quality Control Procedure I.P.-500 (See Notice of Deviation, Item G);
paragraph 11.2 of C.F. Braun and Company's Specification 164-03 and drawing number 02-540-0787, Revision 0 (See Notice of Deviation Item H); and paragraph 4.3.1 of Section 4 of Quality Control Procedure I.P.-500 (See Notice of Deviation, Item I).
Unresolved Item:
Part 21 Report Follow-up:
Inspection Form and Attendant Reworx Tag aid not indicate inspection of rework (DetailsSection I, paragraph D. 4.c).
Follow-up on Regional Requests:
Battery rack seismically tested subseouent to the dates identified in the Seismic Report (DetailsSection I, paragraph B.4.d).
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OETAILS SECTION I (Prepared by W.E. Foster)
A.
Persons Contacted
- R. E. Boyer, Manager, Quality Assurance
- 0. R. Cady, Manager, Quality Engineering (NDE)
- B. Durie, Manager, Customer Services K. Kropf, Supervisor, Quility Control
- 0. H. Martini, Vice President and General Manager A. Nance, Engineer, Quality G. Spease, Senior Engineer, Quality
- G. E. Trussell, Manager, Engineering
- E. H. Wilson, Manager,_ Manufacturing
- Attended Exit Interview 8.
Follow-up on Regional Recuests 1-
Background
a.
Mississippi Power and Light reported a diesel generator jacket water thermostatic control valve problem to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II.
The problem was revealed during purge testing at Grand Gulf, Unit 1 and identified as a fracture in the valve body.
I b.
Duke Power Corporation reported a diesel generator battery rack problem to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II.
The battery racks at Catawba 1 and 2 were determined to be seis-mically unqualified.
The battery racks were manufactured by Nife, Incorporated, but supplied by Transamerica Delaval Incorporated -
Engine and Compressor Division.
c.
Mississippi Power and Light reported damaged generator stator coils, at Grand Gulf 1, to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II.
2.
Objectives The objective of this area of the inspection were to verify that adequate corrective actions and preventive measures had been taken, and generic considerations had been assessed regarding the problems addressed in paragraph B.l.
4 3.
Methods of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Reviewing the following documents to verify the objectives had been satisfied:
(1) Transamerica Delaval Incorporated - Engine and Compressor Division's Letters -
(a) Dated August 29, 1980; to Bechtel Power Corporation, Attention:
Mr. A. Zaccaria;
Reference:
Bechtel Request on Corrective Action For Thermostatic Valves, (b) Dated August 8, 1980; to Bechtel Power Corporation, Attention:
Mr. A. Zaccaria;
Subject:
Failure of Thermostatic Control Valve Body, (c) Dated June 30, 1980; to Duke Power Company, Attention:
Mr. Tom Webb,
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, (d) Dated July 11, 1980; to Bechtel Power Corporation;
Subject:
Damaged Generator Stator Coils, and (e) Dated July 10, 1980; to Bechtel Power Corporation; l
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Subject:
Damaged Giesel Generator Coils.
(2) Power Conversion Products, Incorporated letter, dated September 3, 1980, to Transamerica Delaval, Attention:
Karen Orr,
Subject:
Duke / Catawba Battery Rack Replacement.
l (3) Power Conversion Products, Incorporated TWX, dated August 25, 1980, to Transamerica Delaval, Attention:
Karen Orr,
Reference:
Battery Racks.
(4) Transamerica Delaval Incorporated-Engine and Compressor Division's TWXs-(a) Dated August 25, 1980, to Duke Power, Attention:
J. Voglewede,
Subject:
Catawba Standby Diesel Generator Battery Racks, (b) Dated August 11, 1980, to Power Conversion Products, Attention:
Don Ogden,
Reference:
Transamerica Delaval P.O... Duke Catawba,
5 (c) Dated August 1980, to Power Conversion Products, Attention:
Don Ogden,
Reference:
Transamerica Delaval P.O... Duke Catawba, (d) Dated July 14, 1980, to Duke Power, Attention:
Joe Voglewede, Tom Webb,
Subject:
Battery Racks, and (e) Dated July 7,1980, to Duke Power, Attention:
Tom Webb,
Subject:
Battery Racks-(5) Duke Power Company Memo to File:
CN-1301. 00,
Subject:
Battery Racks, By:
J. P. Voglewede.
(6) Drawings, Nos.
(a) 101776, Revision G, dated July 1,1980, entitled -
Jacket Water System Assembly, (b) 02-717-01-ES, Revision A, dated October 12, 1976, entitled-Pipe, Jacket Water By-Pass, Amot Valve to
- Cooler, (c) 02-717-01-FB, Revision B, dated May 17, 1977, entitled Pipe (Jacket Water Pump to Amot Valve),
(d) 02-717-01-EQ, Revision A, dated October 12, 1976, entitled Pipe, J.
W.- Amot Valve to Cooler Inlet, (e) 64-12305, Revision 1, dated August 26, 1980, entitled, Battery Rack for PCP for 92 cells MOP 24 and (f) Source Inspection Report for P.O. No. 62651... at Nife, Inc. for.. 4 sets Battery Racks.
b.
Reviewing Bechtel's Release Form No. G-321, dated September 15, 1977 for Jacket Water and Lube Oil Heat Exchangers and Piping to verify the equipment had been released for shipment.
c.
Reviewing Bechtel Power Corporation's Purchase Order No. 9645-M-018.0, Revision 13, dated January 17, 1978, to verify that 10 CFR l
21 had been invoked regarding the thermostatic control valves.
d.
Reviewing Structural Dynamics Research Corporation's Seismic Qualification Report No. 1532-1, Dated January 1 to March 30, 1979 to determine the results of battery rack test.
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e.
Reviewing Purchace Materials Specification Revision B, dated January 25, 1977, for Part No. 75017-116, Battery Rack and Accessories from Nife, Inc. to determine the requirements for source inspection.
f.
Reviewing Purchase Material Specification, dated July 28, and November 5, 1975, for Part Nos. 74033-101 and -102, Generator, Exciter and Voltage Regulator to determine the requirements for source inspection.
4.
Findings a.
Comments (1) The jacket water thermostatic control valves were manufactured by Amot, utilizing a cast iron valve body material.
Available records indicated that:
(a) incorrect flanges had been instal-led (on pipe spools), (b) the incorrect flanges had been replaced with correct flanges and (c) cause of failure had been variously ascribed in correspondence to be indeterminate, resulting from use of incorrect piping flanges, or a combina-tion of incorrect piping flanges and imposition of abnormal stresses on the valve bodies by site erection and test personnel.
Discussions with the QA Manager revealed that Bechtel would purchase replacement valves.
(2) The battery rack selected for the seismic test failed during the initial excitation of the set-up.
The battery rack was successfully tested after rework.
In the meantime, three battery racks had been shipped to the site.
Four new battery racks were manufactured, source inspected by Transamerica Delaval and a Duke Power Company repre-sentative, and will be shipped to the site.
A current order for the Cherokee Nuclear Station required supplying batteries, battery chargers, and battery racks.
Work is in progress to delete these items from the order.
l (3)
It appears that damage to the generator stator coils occurred l
at the site.
The generator on which the damage was observed, l
had been subjected to source inspecticn; however, available recoros were not definitive regarding visual inspection.
The damsged stator is to be returned to the manufacturer (Electric
(
Products) for rewind.
b.
Violation According to available records and discussions with cognizant personnel, circumferential fractures at the valve flange had been found in two Grand Gulf cast iron jacket water thermostatic control valves.
Transamerica Delaval investigation finally ascribed the failures to be a result of combination of imposition of abnormal
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7 stresses on the valve body by site erection and test personnel and installation by Transamerica Deleval of incorrect flanges on the connecting piping spools.
Raised face flanges were identified to have been installed on the spools and not the flat face flanges required by the applicable drawing.
Connection of these flanges with the valve flat face flanges would result in deflection of the valve flanges and consequent fracture of the non-ductile valve material.
In response to questions by the inspector, it was ascer-tained that torque instructions had not been provided to site per-sonnel.
No records were available to indicate that this deviation from drawing requirements had been evaluated under 10 CFR Part 21.
Three other users were identified during the inspection where installation of raised face flanges may possibly exist; i.e.
(1) Long Island Lighting, (2) Southern California Edison and (3)
Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte).
None of these customers had been notified as of the inspection with respect to verification of flange type used on piping spools.
See Notice of Violation c.
Deviations From Commitment None d.
Unresolved Item The Structural Dynamics Research Corporation's (SDRC) Seismic Qualification Report No.1532-1, dated January 1 to March 30, 1979, indicates the cattery rack (Section V.19) was tested June 12, 13, 1979.
l Additionally, Transamerica Delaval Incorporated-Engine and Compressor Division's Seismic Certificate of Compliance for this report is dated July 19, 20, 1979.
As a result of the discrepancies in dates, the NRC inspector was l
unable to determine whether or not acceptance of the Seismic Report l
included the battery rack.
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C.
Control of Measuring and Test Ecuioment 1.
Objectives l
l The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that l
measures had been established to assure that tools, gages, instru-ments, and other measuring and testing device 5 used in activities
.affecting quality had been properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified periods to maintain accuracy within necessary limits.
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8 2.
Methods of Accomolishment The preceeding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Reviewing ',he following documents to verify the objectives had been satisfied:
(1) Quality Control Inspection Procedures, No. I. P. 100, dated June 30, 1979, entitled-Calibration Manual, (2) Quality Control Manual, Section 10, dated June 30, 1979, entitled-Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment, and (3) Quality Assurance Manual, Section 12, dated September 30, 1980, entitled-Control of Measuring and Test Equipment.
b.
Observing the link rod dowel counterbore gage and a demonstra-tion of its use.
3.
Findings a.
Deviation From Commitment See Notice of Deviation, Item A b.
Unresolved Item None D.
Part 21 Report Followuo
===1.
Background===
Transamerica Delaval's Engine and Compre<<or Division filed a 10 CFR Part 21 report on September 19, 1.
regarding a potential problem in the link rod assembly of diesel generators manufactured i
by them. ~ The potential defect is that the dowel counterbore in the link rod may be too shallow and cause link rod bolt failure and result in failure of the diesel generator.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
(1) the report accurately described the problem and satisfied the reporting requirements; (2) the problem had been evaluated as required; (3) the generic implication had been assessed; and (4) the stated corrective action is appropriate, adequate and implemented or planned.
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9 3.
Methods of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Reviewing the following Transamerica Delaval Incorporated -
Engine and Compressor Division's letters and an attachment-Trsnsamerica Delaval Service Information Memo No. 349-to verify that customers had been notified and had been provided instruc-tions for detecting the potential problem; all letters were dated September 22, 1980, while the Service Information Memo was dated September 18, 1980:
(1) Mill Power Supply Company, Attention:
Project Manager-Catawba Nuclear Station,
Subject:
S/N 75017-20, OSRV-16, (2) Washington Public Power Supply System, Attention:
Mr. J. P.
Thomas,
Subject:
Engine S/N76031/32, (3) Mississippi Power and Light Company, Attention: Mr. N. L.
Stampley,
Subject:
Engine S/N 74033/36 and (4) Tennessee Valley Authority, Attention:
Mr. C. A. Chandley,
Subject:
Engine S/N 77032/35.
b.
Reviewing Customer Ser/ ice Reports, dated September 15-21, 1980 and May 22-28, 1980 (sic), regarding inspection of Engine S/Ns 75041 and 75042 located at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station to verify that the stated corrective action is underway.
c.
Reviewing Inter-0ffice Correspondence, dated September 18, 1980, To:
G. E. Trussell, From:
R. A. Pratt, to verify that the problem had been evaluated.
d.
Reviewing the following drawings to verify that the report accurately described the problem:
(1) No. 02-340-0380, Revision E, dated August 12, 1980, entitled-Connecting Rod Link, (2) No. 02-340-01-0C, Revision E, dated August 12, 1980, entitled-Link Rod Pin, and (3) No. 08-340-01-AD, Revision 8, dated August 15, 1980, entitled-Dowel Link Rod to Pin.
e.
Observing the link rod in the machine shop for familisrization with the hardware and a better definition of the suspected area to verify that the report accurately described the problem.
10 f.
Reviewing the following documents in the Machine Shop, to verify that preventive measures had been implemented:
(1) Inspection Form No. P-262 for Link Rod Assembly, Part No.
1A-6283, (2) Production Routing Sheet, Revision 06, dated February 13, 1980, for Part No.1A-6283, and (3) Rework Tag No. R-0959, dated June 13, 1980, on five Link Rods, Part No. 1A-6283.
g.
Observing a demonstration in the Machine Shop, of the gage which was developed to measure, accept / reject the link rod dowel counterbore.
4.
Findings a.
Comments Customers had been notified and had been provided with instruce tions for determining whether or not the dowel countercore was too shallow in the link rod.
In an effort to preclude recurrence, (3) affected drawings had been revised to depict decimalized dimensions, (2) a gage had been developed to measure the dowel counterbore, and (3) one-hundred percent inspection is being conducted on the dowel counterbore during manufacture.
b.
Deviations From Commit. ment None i
c.
Unresolved Item An Inspection Form, P-262, undated, located in the Machine Shop, for Link Rod Assembly, Part No. 1A-6283, indicated that five items had failed the 1.3777/1.3772 diameter and 7/8 inch depth and required rework.
The form did not indicate that rework had been accomplished.
Rework Tag No. R-0959 indicated the dowe? counterbore was shallow and required rework to drawing.
The tag reflected a completion date of July 25 (?), 1980, with a space for inspection acknowledgement, but no name, initials, stamp or number, had been entered.
As a result of the fc.egoing, the NRC inspector was unable to determine whether or not the counterbore had been satisfactorily reworked.
11 E.
Exit Interview 1.
The inspectors met with management representatives denoted in para-graph A. at the conclusion of the inspection on October 17, 1980.
2.
The following subjects were discussed:
' a.
Areas inspected.
b.
Violation icentified.
c.
Deviations identified.
d.
Unresolved Items identified.
e.
Contractor response to the report.
The contractor was requested to structure his response under headings of corrective action, preventive measures, and dates for each deviation.
Additionally, management representatives were requested to notify the Commission in writing if dates require adjustment, commitments require modification, etc.
3.
Management representatives acknowledged the comments made by the inspectors.
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12 DETAILS SECT *0N II (Prepared by I. Barnes)
A.
Persons Contacted R. E. Soyer, Manager, Quality Assurance D. R. Cady, Mac',ger, Quality Engineering 8.
Followuo on Identified Deficiencies in Diesel Generator Pioinc Welds
===1.
Background===
Improper welding by Transamerica Delaval (TD) of diesel generator ASME Section III Class 3 piping furnished to the WPPSS Units 1 and 4 facility was identified in early 1979, with subsequent transmittal of Nonconformance Reports to TD by United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C) on April 3, 1979.
The reported deficiencies included:
arc strikes, excessive undercut, lack of fusion, lack of penetra-tion, excessive penetration, undersize socket welds and porosity.
The identified deficiencies were subsequently resolved by return to TD of subassemblies containing unacceptable welds for performance of required repair and rework.
2.
Insoection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and L. ope of the reported deficiencies and determine any ger.eric implications.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding cbjectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of UE&C Specification No. 9779-53, Division 17, Section 17A, " Supplementary Requirements for Welding And Nondestructive Examination of Nuclear Pressure Components and Nuclear Power Piping."
b.
Examination of UE&C Nonconformance Report Nos.1-NCR-53-12 and 1-NCR-33-13.
c.
Review of TD Quality Control Nondestructive Examination l
Procedure No. 600-11, Revision 1, dated March 28, 1977,
" Visual Weld Inspection."
d.
Review of training and special process requirements in the QA Manual.
13 e.
Review of inspection, process control, nonconforming material control, welding and nondestructive examination requirements in Quality Control Procedure I.P.-500, "ASME Nuclear,Section III Class 3."
f.
Review of Quality Control Procedure I.P.-600, " Nondestructive Examination."
g.
Examination of nondestructive examination personnel qualifications and discussion with QA management on the qualifications and train-ing of welding inspectors.
h.
Review of Quality Control Procedure I.P.-700, " Quality Engineering Manual."
i.
Discussion with QA management on the formalized actions taken to precludo recurrence of similar welding deficiencies in ASME Section III componeats furnished to nuclear sites.
J.
Examination of in process Tank Lube Oil Sump Inlet Components for Shop Engine Nos. 2931 and 2957 with respect to:
(1) Compliance with Production Route Sheet operational sequence and instructions.
(2) Signoff of completed operations.
(3) Identification of welding and nondestructive examination
<crsonnel performing applicable welding and examination
.<1 rations.
(4) Verification of use cf welding personnel qualified in accordance with Section IX of the ASME Code.
(5) Compliance of fillet welds with drawing dimensional requirements.
(6) Compifance of welds with visual inspection criteria contained in Procedure No. 600-11.
(7) Use of welding procedures specified on the appropriate drawings.
(8) Compliance with QA program nonconformance and process control requirements.
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14 (9) Use of welding materials specified in designated welding procedure specifications (WPS).
k.
Examination of welding material storage and issue area with respect to:
(1) Control of welding material identity to the point of con-sumption.
(2) Electrode oven temperature control end segregattun of materials.
(3) Compliance with QA program electrode issue time requirements.
1.
Observation of shielded metal are welding operations on Job No. 94302, Shop Engine No. 2931, six (6) inch Schedule 40 piping subassembly with respect to:
(1) Compliance w'th Production Routa. Sheet instructions.
(2) Occumentation of welding operation and personnel.
(3) Conformance witn WPS parameter and welding material requirements.
(4) Qualification of perscnnel for operation performed.
m.
Examination of a two (2) inch piping subassembly Part No. 02-717-02YE, with respect to performance qualification status of welder.
4.
Findings a.
Deviations from Commitment (1) Paragraph 4.2 (page 17A-29) of UE&C Specification No. 9779-53, Division 17, Section 17A, required visual examination to be performed to a written procedure in accordance with Article 9 of ASME Section V, with acceptance criteria as specified in ASME Section III.
The applicable TD rpecification for visual examination, No. 600-11 Revision 1, provided, with the exception of permissible butt weld internal and external reinforcement, sufficient criteria to perform weld inspection consistent with the contract and ASME Section III Class 3 requirements.
Reinforcement criteria was also provided by the applicable TD weiding procedure specifications for butt welds.
15 The identified piping weld deficiencies at the WPPSS Unit 1/4 facility is therefore indicated, from the foregoing, to be related to a failure to implement existing inspection requirements.
Discussion with QA management failed to reveal any formalized corrective actions that had been taken to preclude recurrence of similar inspection failures.
See Notice of Deviation, Item B.
(2) See Notice of Deviation, Item C (3) Observation of shielded metal are welding operations on Shop Engine No. 2931, Shop Order No. 94302, Part No. 02-717-02 YR, showed the welding of the 6 inch Schedule 40 pipe being performed in quadrants using frem the 3G to 1G positions.
Examination of the performance qualification records for the welder indicated, however, qualification only in the 1G pesition.
Table QW-461.7 in Secticn IX of the ASME Code qualifies only for 1G and 1F welds, when a 1G qualification test is utilized.
Tables QW-353 and QW-452.3 in Section IX of the ASME Code qualify a welder for pipe outside diameters of 2 7/8 inches and over, when a performance qualification sample size of over 2 inches is used.
Review of the performance quali-fication records for a welder, identified as being employed for a 2 inch piping assembly, failed to show actual sample size used for the qualification.
The inspector was informed by QA management that all pipe performance qualifications had been made using a 6 inch diameter sample size.
(4) See Notice of Deviation, Itam E.
(5) Examination of the Production Route Sheets for the two assemblies identified in Item F of the Notice of Deviation, failed to show the identity of the welders working on the assemblies.
The inspector was informed that weld reports which would have provided an additional method for identifying personnel used to perform welding, are made up from the Production Route Sheets and not until after completion of assembly.
See Notice of Deviation, Item F.
(6) See Notice of Deviation, Item G.
(7) The Production Route Sheets for the Shop Engine No. 2931 Tank Lube Oil Sump Inlet Compartment indicated a welding date of July 29, 1980, for the weld of Item A to Item B with a magnetic particle examination acceptance on the same da*a.
Nn record was made on the Procuction Route
16 Sheet to indicate a visual inspection acceptance had been made.
Paragraph 5.4.4 in Section 5 of Quality 4
Control Procedure I.P.-500 states with respect to weld inspection, however, "The welder will request the inspector to inspect the weld upon completion of the operation or as required.
The insoector will indicate acceptance of the weld in the space provided on the Production Route Sheet." It was not ascertained during the inspection whether the magnetic particle examina-tion acceptance signified final QC acceptance of the weld. See Notice of Deviation, Item H.
(S) Review of the Production Route Sheets for the Shop Engine No. 2931 Tank Lube Oil Sump Inlet Compartment showed no inspection acceptance stamps for Operation Nos.10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, and 130.
These operations included:
burning material to size and required shapes; layout of openings for burning and subsequent burning operations; layout for drilling etc.
Inspection Reports denoting a rejected status were also not available for these operations to confirm an inspection had been mads.
See Notice of Deviation, Item I.
b.
Unresolved Items None c.
Other Findings-Comments (1) The TD drawing practice does not provide a system for unique identification of welds in assemblies, i.e, a specific number or letter symbol is not assigned to a given weld.
Base materials are assigned a letter symbol for each item, but duplicate symbols are assigned for items of the same configuration and size.
This practice could lead to weld repair and examination traceability and control problems, e.g. if two welds existed in an assembly with the same base material items utilized for each weld.
(2) The map used to show type and size of electrodes in the holding oven did not contain the lot identity of the electrodes.
No deviation from ASME Code traceability requirements was identified during the inspection, however, in that only one lot number was in the storage area and in use for each size and type of electrode.
17 C.
Followup on Reported Deficiencies in Diesel Generator Piping System Component Supports
===1.
Background===
Region IV of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement was notified on September 26, 1980, concerning irregularities in TD emergency diesel generator piping system component supports furnished to the Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 facility.
The reported problems included both welds not meeting visual inspection requirements and the component supports not being certified to have been manufactured in accordanc.: with Subsection NF of the ASME Code.
2.
Insoection cajectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported deficiencies and determine any generic implications.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of Gibbs & Hill Specification No. 2323-MS-34, Revision 1, with respect to fabrication requirements and designated Codes and standards for the Comanche Peak diesel generator component supports.
b.
Review of TD internal correspondence on the reported problems.
c.
Discussions with QA management.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no deviations from commitment or unresolved items were identified.
b.
Review by the inspector of the customer purchase specification failed to reveal any specific reference to or requirement for l
fabrication of the diesel generator component supports in accordance with Subsection NF of the ASME Code.
c.
Insufficient information was available to determine the nature of the weld visual inspection problems.
This subject will be further examined during a future inspection.
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