ML20004E510

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PNS-I-81-011:on 810606,manual Valve in High Head Safety Injection Pump Common Suction Line Found Shut During Routine Operator Tour Due to Removal of Chain & Padlock.Plant Vital Areas Isolated & Addl Security Precautions Implemented
ML20004E510
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 06/08/1981
From: Beckman D, Greenman, Greenman E, Keimig, Keimig R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
References
PNS-I-81-011, PNS-I-81-11, NUDOCS 8106120277
Download: ML20004E510 (1)


Text

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PRELIMINARY bOTIFICATION DCS No. 50334-810606 N

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Date:

June 8, 1981 0 p\\CBF Q

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[/ PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF SAFEGUARDS EVENT--PNS-I-81-11 This inary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE Y

. hibf>f security or oublic interest significance.

The information presented is kTT11tially received witnout verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff as of this date.

Facility:

Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valiey Power Station, Unit i Shippingport, Pennsylvania (DN 50-334)

Subject:

MANUAL SUCTION VALVE FOR HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (HHSI) PUMP FOUND MISPOSITIONED A manual valve, in the High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Pumps" cormion suct1on line, was found shut during a routine operator tour at about 1:00 a.m., on June 6, 1981. The valve was immediately reopened.

This valve, which is checkcd by operators eacn shift, had been verified open at about 4:30 p.m., June 5.

With the valve shut, emergency core cooling water from the refueling water storage tank would not have been available to the three HHSI pumps for high pre:ssure injection of water into the core under emergency conditions.

The chain and padlock wnicn secured tnis valve in the open position have not been found.

Additionally, about 9:00 a.m., June 5,1981, similar locks and chains were found removed from three auxiliary feedwater pumps' manual suction isolation valves but the valves were all in their normally open position.

These locks and chains also have not been found.

Licensee investigation of this event was inconclusive and has now been combined with the investigation of the June 6 occurrence.

The licensee has isolated the plant vital areas and implemented additional security precautions.

The licensee has periodically reverified correct valve alignments for engineered safety feature (ESF) systems since June 6 and safety related equipment is being checked every 2-4 hours.

The two man rule is in effect.

The Senior Resident Inspector has independently verified proper positioning of ESF valves and breakers.

i The FBI Office, Pittsburgh, PA initiated an investigation about 3:30 p.m., June 6, following licensee notification at about 1:30 p.m., June 6.

The SRI followed the licensee investigation through the weekend.

A Region I Investigator arrived on site on June 7, 1981.

There has been considerable media interest.

The licensee issued a press release on June 6.

NRC Region I does not plan a press release at this time but is responding to media inquiries. The IAT has been informed.

The Cor.monwealth of Pennsylvania has been notified.

This PN is issued for information only.

The HQ:00 was notified by the licensee via ENS at 1:40 a.m., on June 6, 1981.

Region I received notification of this event from the SRI at about 8:00 a.m.,

June 6, 198i.

This information is current as of 9:C0 a.m., June 8,1981.

Contact:

SECKMAN 8-722-5757 GREENMAN 488-1227 KEIMIG 488-1224 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION i

Region I Form 83-la

,#t (Rev. January 19S1) 8106120 N

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