ML20004E273
| ML20004E273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-81-436-000 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, PT21-81-436, PT21-81-436-000, SQRD-50-328-81, NUDOCS 8106110454 | |
| Download: ML20004E273 (3) | |
Text
f TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A. TENNESSEE 374o t 400 Chestnut Street Tower II f['
May 26, 1981 SQRD-50-328/81-33 s
NN Mr. James Pg O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear gulatory Consnission Region II - Su e 3100 101 Marietta St et Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - REACTOR COOLANT PLHP NO. 3, SEAL NO.1 BYPASS, PIPING ANALYSIS ERROR - SQRD-50-328/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on May 6, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SQN CEB 8111. Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR 21 applicable to this deficiency.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l
L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure f
cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)V Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 An Equal Opcortamty Empicye-t10611045N S
Nt,I-:
E CL'OSURE n
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 a
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP NO. 3, SEAL NO. 1 BYPASS PIPING ANALYSIS ERROR SQRD-50-328/81-33 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Condition The 3/4-inch No.1 seal bypass piping for reactor coolan+ pump (RCP)
No. 3 had piping movements during hot functional testing.hich caused certain snubbers to move in a direction opposite to that raticipated by design. The piping analysis for the affected piping is 0600154-08-17 and is a reanalysis of an EDS Nuclear problem performed by Gilbert Commonwealth. The current analysis was found to have incorrect input movements of the RCP No. 3, which were determined by Gilbert Commonwealth.
Safety Implications Pipe movement in a direction opposite to that for which the snubbers are oriented would cause the snubbers to lock, which would greatly increase the stresses in the pipe. An inordinate increase in pipe stresses could cause the pipe to break, resulting in a LOCA.
Corrective Action TVA has performed a piping analysis which indicates that changing out one snubber and resetting one spring hanger will resolve this problem.
These changes will be accomplished before fuel leading.
TVA has instructed the contractor to ensure that existing check procedures, which are designed to catch deficiencies of this nature, are more closely adhered to.
In addition, TVA has developed an independent checklist to be completed by TVA which reviews the l
contractor's analyses. This checklist will be attached to the analysis reports, documenting TVA's review.
I I
-.. - _ v,-- _ v- - - -
[ c ~PART 21 IIENTIFICATION NO.'
f/
P3 5-o o #
CEPAW IWE. NM DATE OF LETTER _{[24[N
_ to3(gr to, so 2
DATE DISTRIBiffED ORIGI!ML EPORT V StP?LB9fiARY DISTRIBlJTION:
l PEACTOR (R)
FUEL CiCLE &
SAFECMDS (S)
IEFILES FMTERIALS C'D IE FILES ES - M '
IE FILES AD/SG l
AD/FFFEI AD/RDI l
)
EGI0iG I,II,III,IV,V REGIONSI,II,III,IV,V PEGIONSI,II,III,IV,V VB03R BR R-IV VSO3R BR. R-IV VSO3R BR. PcIV LO B / PPA FIG 5715 M'ES/FC'S SS-395 IE/D3L AEOD FIG 76T LC8 / FFA i,ij5 5715 g.SS / SG SS-881 s
Gcen0 Jus mrre7zn N?//Iiy_
AE33 2iG _/t2 LO3 / FFA lTG 57E Qi1]DlDu mne 7zr1 NRR/DSI ASLBP E/W 453
- EOD FIG 7602 CtfLd SAo/So tiG-7210A ASLBP 'p WTS '72.n '
.N' E/d 450 -
NP?/D3'_
CSUPIL FILES 016 CENTRAL FIES 016 ASLB?
E/d 450 CSERE FIB C GEO CBERE FILES (GEO CSiiRALFILES 016 PDR CENTRAL FILES SS-395 CEhTRAL FILES (GPJD LPDR PDR PDR TE LPDR
. 4 acin g%
=
sR h
jutt 0 4 98F 1
% u.s.y=,;g^' " ;@
ACTIO'h
\\%
%jn%*?
O PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF WE'AhJ -'
ICATES LEAD RESPONSIBILITY poa FOLLOh'J? AS SFOhN BELOW:
IE IE IGESE Dilria ]
EES PEV, 8/1/8: