ML20004B075

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Notifies That Info Provided in Re Reactor Vessel Brittle Fracture Concerns in B&W Plants Is Applicable to Facility.Util Will Perform Further Fracture Analyses & Participate in Owners Group Activities Re Thermal Shock
ML20004B075
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 05/22/1981
From: Mattimoe J
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-2.K.2.13, TASK-TM TAC-45202, NUDOCS 8105270190
Download: ML20004B075 (2)


Text

k e smur SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211 N.

j May 22,1981

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n DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION p

ATTENTION DARRELL G EISENHUT DIRECTOR i os DIVISION OF LICENSING U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20555 DOCKET 50-312 RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT NO 1 THERf1AL SH0CK TO REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL The Sacramento Municipal Utility District has received your letter of April 20, 1981 requesting information on the effects of thermal shock to reactor pressure vessels. As Chairman of the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Regulatory Response Group, I responded on May 12, 1981 and provided you with a letter report on reactor vessel brittle fracture concerns in Babcock & Wilcox operating plants and a summary of the Electric Power Research Inrtitute programs pertaining to brittle frac-ture. This response provided the information requested in your letter and during meetings with NRC staff on March 31, 1981 and April 29, 1981.

We have determined that the information provided in my letter of May 12, 1981 is applicable to Rancho Seco Unit No.1 and support the conclusions presented therein. One of the conclusions was that the analysis presented in BAW-1648, " Thermal Mechanical Report - Effect of HPI on Vessel Integrity for Small Break LCCA Eveat with Extended Loss of Feedwater", represents a bounding cooldown event. We commit to perform further plant specific analyses to demonstrate that considerable time exists before there are any concerns over brittle fracture during such an event at Rancho Seco Unit No. 1.

These analyses will consider the actual borated water storage tank temperature of 800 and limiting weld locations. Also, we have previ-cuiy committed to install an upgraded auxiliary feedwater control system which will provide safety grade control of auxiliary feedwater, including ODl s

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aN E L E c;? t C SYSTEV iER7tNi MCRE THAN 600 000 IN THE HEART OF C All F O R N I A

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DARRELL G EISENHUT May 22, 1981 a means to prevent primary system overcooling. These controls will be installed during the first extended outage following equipment delivery in 1982. This system was described in our letter of November 17, 1980.

We further commit to participate in generic Owners Group activities which develop in the area of reactor vessel thermal shock. We feel confident that these actions will provide adequate justification for operation of Rancho Seco Unit No.1 for its design lifetime.

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I John. Mattimoe Asisstant General Manager and Chief Engineer i

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