ML20003G466
| ML20003G466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Counsil W CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-04-02, TASK-4-2, TASK-RR LSO5-81-04-039, LSO5-81-4-39, NUDOCS 8104290513 | |
| Download: ML20003G466 (5) | |
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Dear Mr. Counsil:
RE: SEP TOPIC IV-2;, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Enclosed is a copy of the draf t staff evaluation of tne lead PWR plant for SEP Toric IV-2.
This assessment cogares the lead PWR plant (R.
E. Ginna) with the criteria currrently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. These criteria were reflected in the questions on this topic that were sent to you earlier this year.
You are requested to evaluate the design of your plant using the questions as an Outline and to prepare a safety analysis report. The report should be similar to the format in our eval' ation of Ginna, however, it should specifically address the answers to questions asked previously by the i
staff.
In future correspondence regarding this topic, please refer to the topic number in your cover letter.
Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Draft SEP Topic IV-2 for Ginna cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
- See previous yellow for add'tional concurrences, SEPB:0L SEPB:DL SEPB:Dlf% i OfiB75TDUPM ;
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Docket No. 50-213 Mr. W. G. Coans11, Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Operations Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Conpany Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101
Dear Mr. Counsil:
RE: SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS - R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PL/NT Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation of SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Coat rol Systems for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This assessment compares the facility, as described in Docket No. 50-244, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. These criteria were reflected in the questionson this topic that were sent to you earlier this year.
You are requested to evaluate the design of your plant using the questions as an cutline and to prepare a safety analysis report.
The report should be similar to the format in our evaluation of Ginna, however, it should specifically address the answers to questions asked previously by the staff, C'
1 In future correspondence regarding this topic, please refer to the I
topic number in your cover letter.
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Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating P.eactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Draft SEP Topic IV-2 for Ginna i
cc w/ enclosure:
l See next page "n+
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' Docket *No. 50-213 LS05-81-04-039 Mr. W. G. Counsil, Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Operations Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101
Dear Mr. Counsil:
RE: SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Enclosed is a copy of the' draft staff evaluation of the lead PWR plant for SEP Topic IV-2. This assessment compares the lead PWR plant (R.
E. Ginna) with the criteria currrently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. These criteria were reflected in the questions on this topic that were sent to you earlier this year.
You are requested to evaluate the design of your plant using the questions as an outline and to prepare a safety analysis report. The report should be similar to the format in our evaluation of Ginna, however, it should specifically address the answers to questions asked previously by the staff.
In future correspondence regarding this topic, please refer to the topic number in your cover letter-Sincerely, Y
41:! 1 Dennis M. Crutchfield, C ef Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing l
Encleaure:
l Draft SEP Topic IV-2 for Ginna cc w/ enclosure:
See next page l
o Mr. W. G. Counsil cc Day, Berry & Howard U. S. Environmental Prctecttui Counselors at Law Agency One Constitution Plaza Region 1 Office Hartford, Connecticut 06103 ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Superintendent Boston. Massachusetts 02203 Haddam Neck Plant RFD #1 Resident Inspector Post Office Box 127E Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Steion East Hempton, Connecticut 06424 c/o U. S. NRC East Haddam Post Office Mr. Janes R. Himmelwright East Haddam, Connecticut DME3 Northeast Utilities Service Conpany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101
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Russell Library 119 Broad Street Middletown, Connecticut 06457 30ard of Selectmen Towr. Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 Connecticut Energy Agency ATTN: Assistant Director Research and Policy Development Department of Planning and Energy Policy 20 Grand Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Director.. Criteria and Standards Division Office of Radiation Prograns l
(ANR-460)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D. C.
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SEP TOPIC IV-2, RFACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS INCLUDING FUNCTIONAL DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE FAILURES R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
' DOCKET NO. 50-244 1.
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this evaluation is to insure that the design basis for the Ginna reactivity control systems is consistent with analyses performed to verify that the protection system meets General Design Criterion 25.
General Design Criterion 25 requires that the reactor protection system be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for any single calfunction of the reactivity contr.o1 systems, such as accidental withdrawal of control rods. Reactivity control systems need not be single failure proof. However, the protection system must be capable of assuring that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a single failure in the reactivity control systems. The re-view criterion, covered in this evaluation, is addressed in Section II.
Review areas that are not covered, but are related and essential to the completion of this topic,are covered by other SEP topics addressed in Section III. The scope of the SEP topics is defined in the " Report on the Systematic Evaluation of Operatir,g Facilities" dated November 25, 1977.
I This report is limited to the identification and evaluation of inadvertent control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control systems.
II. REVIEW CRITERION The re view criterion for this topic is based upon Section 7.7, Part II of the NRC Standard Review Plan.
In the specific case of the reactivity con-
.. trol systems a single failure shall not cause plant conditions more severe than thoseibr which the reactor pro.tection system is designed.
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS The following listed review areas are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of this topic. These review 4reas are covered by other SEP topics as indicated below.
1.
Analyses of the consequences of control rod withdrawals and the ma1 positioning of control rods which may occur as a result o'f single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control systems are covered by SEP Topic XV-8, " Control Rod Misoperation (System Malfunction or Operator Error)"
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2.
Analyses of reactivity insertions occurring as a result of inadvertent boron dilutions are covered in SEP Topic XV-10
" Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in tne Reactor Coolant."
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The purpose of this evaluation is to identify inadvertent control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control systems for the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
V.
EVALUATION l
Information was provided in Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation letter dated January 19, 1981, describing de:ign features which limit
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1 control rod withdrawals and ma1 positioning of control rods caused by failures within the reactivity control systems at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear l
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.... Power Plent. Bas,ed upon the information provided by the licensee we conclude that the following may occur as a result of single failures:
- 1) Two control rod banks may be simultanecesly withdrawn.
- 2) Two banks may overlap at other than the design value.
This conclusion is based upon the availability of alarm and interlock circuits associated with the rod control system such that certain consequential effects of single failur2s within the rod control system are precluded by the operability of these interlocks and alarms. The basis for the assumption that these alarms and interlocks will be opera-ble is that a failure in the alarm and interlock circuits will be identified and corrected during routine maintenance or as a result of system fault investigation. The effects of single failures occurring after an undetected failure has occurred in the alarm and interlock system are not included in the evaluation. This is consistent with the basis used for plints currently under operating license reviw.
l VI. CONCLUSION Each of the following two reactivity control system malfunctions have been addressed as part of SEP Topic XV-B to verify that specified acceptable l
fuel design limits are not exceeded:
- 1) Simultaneous withdrawal of two control rod banks.
- 2) Overlap of two banks at other than the design value.
Fuel design limits are not exceeded for either of the above two mal-functions and thus, General Design Criterion 25 is met insofar as 1
electrical failures within reactivity control systems are concerned.
.