ML20003G448
| ML20003G448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kay J YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-04-02, TASK-4-2, TASK-RR LSO5-81-04-040, LSO5-81-4-40, NUDOCS 8104290467 | |
| Download: ML20003G448 (5) | |
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April 24, Iggy Docket No. 50-29 LSOS-81-04-040 g\\"
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Mr. James A. Kay 8
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Dear Mr. Kay:
RE: SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Enclosed is a copy of the draft staff evaluation of the lead PWR plant for SEP Topic IV-2.
This assessment cogares the lead PWR plant (R.
E. Ginna) with the criteria currrently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. These criteria were reflected in the questions on this topic that were sent to you earlier this year.
You are requested to evaluate the design of your plant using the questions as an outline and to prepare a safety analysis report. The report should be similar to the format in our evaluation of Ginna, however, it should specifically address the answers to questions asked previously by the staff.
In future correspondence regarding this topic, please refer to the topic number in your cover letter.
Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 l
Division of Licensing l
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Enclosure:
Draft SEP Topic IV-2 for Ginna 1
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See next page i
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Docket No. 50-29 i
Mr. James A. Kay Senior Engineer - Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Cogany 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
Dear Mr. Kay:
RE: SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS - R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation of SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Control Systems for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This assessment cogares the facility, as described in Docket No. 50-244, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new j
facilities. These criteria were reflected in the questiors on this topic that were sent to you earlier this year.
You are requested to evaluate the design of your plant using the i
questions as an outline and to prepare a safety analysis report.
The report should be similar to the format in our evaluation of Ginna, however, it should specifically address the answers to questions asked previously by the staff.
In future correspondence regarding this topic, please refer to the i
topic number in your cover letter.
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, Sincerely.
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Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Draft SEP Topic IV-2 for Ginna cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
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April 24,1981
' Docket' No. 50-29 LS05-81-04.040 Mr. James A. Kay Senior Engineer - Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
Dear Mr. Kay:
RE: SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS lant Enclosed is a copy of th6 draft staff evaluation of the lead PWR p(R.
This assessment compares the lead PWR plant for SEP Topic IV-2.
E. Ginna) with the criteria currrently used by the regulatory staff for These criteria were reflected in the questions licensing new facilities.
on this topic that were sent to you carlier this year.
You are requested to evaluate the design of your plant using the questions The report should as an cutline and to prepare a sefety analysis report.
be similar to the format in our evaluation of Ginna, however, it should specifically address the answers to questions asked previously by the staff.
In future correspondence regarding this topic, please refer to the topic number in your cover letter.
Sincerely, bih Den 5i5 M'. Crutchfie d.
ief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Draft SEP Topic IV-2 for Ginna cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
1 Mr. Janes A. Kay 1
Mr. Janes E. Tribble, President Yankee Atomic Electric Conpany 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 0153)
Greenfield Connunity Cellege 1 College Drive Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301 Chairman Board of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting.. Council
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14th Floor One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Director, Criteria and Standards Division Office of Radiation Progracs (ANR-460)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D. C.
20460 U. S. Environmental Protection.
Agency Region I Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC Post Office Box 28 Monroe Bridge, Massachusetts 01350
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s SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SEP TOPIC _IV-2 RfACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 2
INCLUDING EUNCT10!iAL DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE FAILURES R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 I.
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this evaluation is to insure that the design basis for the Ginna reactivity control systems is consistent with analyses performed to verify that the protection system meets General Design Criterion 25.
General Design Criterion 25 requires that the reactor protection system be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel design lim [ts are not exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems, such as accidental withdrawal of control rods. Reactivity control systems r.eed not be single failure proof. However, the protection system must be capa'ble of assuring that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a single failure in the reactivity control systems. The re-view criterion, covered in this evaluation, is addressed in Section II.
Review arcas that are not covered, but are related and essential to the completion of this topic are covered by other SEP topics addressed in Section III. The scope of the SEP topics is, defined in the " Report on the Systematic Evaluation of Operating Facilities" dated November 25, 1977.
This report is limited to the identification and evaluation of inadvertent control rod withdrawals and ma1 positioning of control rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control systems.
II. REVIEW CP.ITERION The re view criterion for this topic is based upon Section 7.7, Part II of the NRC Standard Review Plan.
In the specific case of the reactivity con-
. trol systems a single failure shall not cause plant conditions more severe than thosefor which the reactor protection system is designed.
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS The following listed re'ticw areas are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of this topic. These review areas are covered by other SEP topics as indicated belr>w.
1.
Analyses of the consequences of control rod withdrawals and the malpositioning of contml rods which may occur as a result of single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control systems are cosered by SEP Topic XV-8, " Control Rod Misoperation (System Malfunction or Operator '.rror)"
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2.
Analyses of reactivity insertions occurring as a result of inadvertent boron dilutions are covered in SEP Topic XV-10
" Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant."
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES i
The purpose of this evaluation is to identify inadvertent control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods which may occur at a result of single failures in the electrical circuits of the reactivity control systems for the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
V.
EVALUATION l
Information was provided in Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation letter dated January 19, 1981, describing design features which limit
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I control rod withdrawals and malpositioning of control rods caused by failures within the reactivity control systems at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear 1
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Power Plant. Bas,ed upon the information provided by the licensee we conclude that the following may occur as a result of single
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failures:
- 1) Two control rod banks may be simultaneously withdrawn.
- 2) Two banks may overlap at other than the design value.
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This conclusion is based upon the availability of alarm and interlock circuits associated with the rod centrol system such that certain consequential effects of single failures within the rod control system are precluded by the operability of these interlocks and alarms. The basis for the assumption that these alams and interlocks will be opera-ble is that a failure in the alarm and interlock circuits will be ider.tified and corrected during routine maintenance or as a result 1
of system fault investigation. The effects of single failures occurring after an undetected failure has occurred in the alarm and interlock system are not included in the evaluation. This is consistent with the basis used for plants currently under operating ilcense review.
V!.
CONCLUSION Each of the following two reactivity control system malfunctions have been addressed as part of SEP Topic XV-8 to verify that specified 3cceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded:
- 1) Simultaneous withdrawal of two control rod banks.
- 2) Overlap of_two banks at other than the design value.
Fuel design limits are not exceeded for either of the above two mal-functions and thus, General Design Criterion 25 is met. insofar as electrical failures within reactivity control systems are concerned.
.