ML20003G002
| ML20003G002 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1981 |
| From: | Collins S, Gallo R, Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003F999 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-81-02, 50-271-81-2, IEB-80-21, IEB-80-23, IEB-80-24, NUDOCS 8104280024 | |
| Download: ML20003G002 (29) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1981002
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
' TERA
Region I
50-271/800214 80-03-01
50-271/801121 IEB 80-24-
Report No.
81-02
50-271/801114 IEB 80-23
50-271/801106_ IEB_80-21_ .
Docket No.
50-271
-50-271/8.10126J1RL81-0.2-02
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50-271/801130 LER 80-40
License No.
DPR - 28
Pri6Mty
category ~-C
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50 27F/B00905 CER 80-28
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50-27r/800630 CER o'T-21
Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company
50-271/800707 LER 80-21
50-271/800107 LER 80-03
1671 Worcester Road
50-271/800617 LER 80-20
50-271/800424 LER 80-17
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
50-271/800307 LER 80-10
50-271/801205 T/I2515/4G
Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee
50-271/801218 T/I2515/47
Inspection at:
Vernon, Vermont
Inspection conduct d-,
January 2 - January 30, 1981
Inspectors:
M
b
$~
/
7 J. Raymon
SenifResidentInspector
date signed
MO
3&dal
S/ J. Collins, Resident Inspector
date signed
date signed
Approved by:
A
3 h g, h (
R. M. Gallo, Chief Reactor Projects
date signed
Section 1A, Projects Branch #1
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Insoection Surimary:
Inspection On January 2 - January 30, 1981 (Report No. 50-271/81-02)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection on regular and backshifts by Resident
Inspectors of:
action taken on previous inspection findings; IE Bulletin followup;
review of shift logs and operating records; plant tours; surveillance testing;
operational safety verification; maintenance activities; followup of everts; in-office
review of licensee event reports; review of periodic and special reports, observation
of physical security; and inspector actions based on T/I 2515/47 Inspection Require-
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m:nts to Review Licensee Actions in Response to IE Bulletin No. 80-24, T/I 2515/46,
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Survey to Determine Existence of Adequate Emergency Procedures for Coping with ATWS
Events at Operating Power Reactors, and IE HQ Request for Licensee Status of TMI-2
Action Plan Item implementation. The inspection involved 98 hours0.00113 days <br />0.0272 hours <br />1.62037e-4 weeks <br />3.7289e-5 months <br /> onsite by two
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resident inspectors.
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Results: Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance were identified.
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Region I Form 12
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(Rev. April 77)
8104280024
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were among
those contacted:
Mr. R. Branch, Assistant Operations Supervisor
Mr. P. Donnelly, Instrument and Control Supervisor
Mr. L. Goldthwaite, Instrument and Control Foreman
Mr. S. Jefferson, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
Mr. R. Kenny, Technical Assistant
Mr. M. Lyster, Operations Supervisor
- Mr. W. Murphy, Plant Superintendent
- Mr. J. Pelletier, Assistant Plant Superintendent
Mr. W. Penniman, Security Supervisor
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Mr. D. Reid, Engineering Support Supervisor
Mr. S. Vekasy, Technical Assistant
Mr. G. Weyman, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor
Mr. W. Whittmer, Maintenance Supervisor
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the
inspection, including members of the Operations, Health Physics,
Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Security
Contractor and General Office staff.
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'(* denotes those present at management meetings held periodically during
theinspection)
2.
Action Taken on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-271/80-03-01): Licensee delivered package of
LSA radioactive waste to a carrier for transportation with a radiation
dose rate from its surface exceeding 200 millirem per hour.
In response
to the subject item of noncompliance, the licensee stated in letter
VY-5675, dated May 27, 1980, that the Vermont Yankee Administrative
Procedure AP 0504 covering shipment of radioactive waste had been re-
vised to require surveys of all areas of shipment.
In addition, the
licensee reported the procedure was revised to clarify the instructions
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necessary to maintain exclusive use shipment controls. The licensee
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stated that full compliance was achieved by February 15, 1980.
The inspector reviewed Chem and H.P. Department Instruction (DI) 80-1,
dated February 15, 1980.
Subject DI incorporated changes to AP 0504,
Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Materials, in that additional surveys
underneath the Exclusive use Shipment were required and a Note was added
to VYAPF 0504.02, (VYNPS Radioactive Shipment Record, Exclusive Use
Radioactive Material Shipment, Truck Survey), requiring that the carrier
not permit loading, unloading, or rearranging of the cargo or changing of
the tractor or fifth wheel movement without prior permission from the
licensee.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
This item
is considered closed.
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3.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletins listed below, the inspector verified the following:
that the written response was within the time period stated in the
bulletin, that the written response included the information required
to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective
action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and
the licensee's reviews, that licensee management forwarded copies of
the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives,
that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate,
and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the
written response. The following bulletins were reviewed:
(a)
IEB 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Contain-
ment, dated November 21, 1980
The inspector reviewed licensee response FVY 81-1, dated December 31,
1980, and verified that subject IEB requirements have been addressed.
Further followup in this area was conducted in conjunction with per-
formance of T/I 2515/47, see section 13.b. of this report.
No inadequacies were identified.
(b)
IEB 80-23, Failure of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor
Engineering Corporation, dated Novenber 14, 1980
The inspector reviewed licensee response WVY 80-169 dated
December 11, 1980.
The inspector verified that subject IEB require-
ments have been completed in that the licensee reported that Vermont
Yankee does not utilize Valcor Engineering Corporation solenoid
valves having part numbers V709000-21-1 or V90900-21-3 in any safety
related systems or for any safety related function.
No inadequacies were identified.
(c)
IEB 80-21, Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcom Foundary Company, Inc.,
dated November 6, 1980
The inspector reviewed licensee response WVY 80-168, dated
December 5, 1980. The inspector verified that subject IEB require-
ments have been completed in that the licensee reported that Vermont
Yankee does not use or plan to use valve parts cast by Malcom
Foundary Company, Inc. in any safety related system.
No inadequacies were identified.
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4.
Shift Logs and Operating Records
a.
The inspector utilized the following plant procedures to determine
the licensee established administrative requiraments in this area
in preparation for review of various logs and records.
AP 0001, Plant Procedures, Revision 6, dated September 25, 1979.
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AP 0150, Responsibility and Authority of Operations Department
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Personnel, Revision 14, dated December 19, 1980.
AP 0153, Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Revision 8,
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dated December 31, 1979.
AP 0140, VY Local Control Switching Rules, Revision 4, dated
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December 19, 1980.
AP 0020, Lifted Lead / Installed Jumper Request Procedure,
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Revision 4, dated October 16, 1980.
AP 0021, Maintenance Requests, Revision 9, dated September 25, 1980.
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AP 0154, Control Room Night Order Book, Revision 5, dated
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January 7, 1980.
AP 0030,- Plant Operations Review Committee, Revision 6,
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dated January 7, 1980.
The above procedures, Technical Specifications, ANSI N18.7-1972
" Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" and
10 CFR 50.59 were used by the inspector to determine the acceptability
of the logs and records reviewed.
b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room logs and surveillance sheets are properly
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completed and that selected Technical Specification limits
were met.
Control Room log entries involving abnormal conditions
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provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status,
lockout status, correction, and restoration.
Log Book reviews are being conducted by the staff.
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Operating and Special orders do not conflict with Technical
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Specifications requirements.
Jumper (Bypass) log does not contain bypassing discrepancies
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with Technical Specification requirements and that jumpers
are properly approved prior to installation.
c.
The following plant logs and operating records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Control Room Log: January 2-January 30, 1981.
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Night Order Book Entries: January 2-January 30, 1981.
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Control Room Operator Round Sheet:
Periodic reviews during
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inspection period.
Manager of Operations Directives:
80-01, Policy on Material
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Purchase Requests for Calibration Services (Revision 1),
dated February 29, 1980.
80-02, Change in RPS Delay Time,
dated March 12, 1980.
Plant Information Reports: 79-01, Repeated Wiping of #5 and #6
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Main Turbine Bearings, dated May 9, 1979.
80-01, Hydrogen
Recombination before A0G recombiners, dated June 25, 1980.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Plant Tour
The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant including
the Control Room Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building, Diesel
Rooms Intake Structure, Security Gate Houses 1, 2 and Alarm Stations,
and Control Point Areas.
a.
Monitoring Control Room Panels
Routinely during the inspection period, the inspectors conducted
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reviews of the centrol room panels. The following items were reviewed
to determine the licensee's adherence to Licensee Technical Specifica-
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tion - Limiting Conditions for Operation and to verify the licensee's
adherence to approved procedures.
Switch and valve positions required to satisfy LCO's, where
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applicable.
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Alarms or absense of alarms. Acknowledged alarms were
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reviewed with on shift licensed personnel as to cause and
corrective actions being taken where applicable.
Review of " pulled alarm cards" with on shift perso mel.
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Meter indications and recorder values.
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Status lights and power available lights.
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Front panel bypasses.
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Computer printouts.
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Comparison of redundant readings.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Radiological Controls
Radiation controls established by the licensee, including:
posting of radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of
step-off pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed
for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and AP 0503,
Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas, OP 4530, Dose Rate
Radiation Surveys and OP 4531, Radioactive Contamination Surveys.
Confinnatory surveys were conducted in the following areas to
verify licensee posted results:
HPCI Room, Floor Elevation 213'.
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The inspector noted a High Radiation Area setup in the Northeast
corner of the HPCI room.
Posting indicated the area was utilized
for storage during the refueling outages at the time of the
inspection the area was empty. The observation was noted to
Control Point Health Physics personnel who indicated that the
area would be surveyed and removed.
The following Radiation Work Pennits were reviewed by the inspector
to verify conformance with licensee procedure AP 0502, Radiation
Work Permits:
81 No. 00093, A0'S Rounds, dated January ~23, 1981
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81 No. 00092, General Entry to Cask Room, dated January 23, 1981
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81 No. 00091, Compact Trash, dated January 23, 1981
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81 No. 00072, A0 Access to NRHX Room, dated January 19, 1981
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81 No. 00073. A0 Access to RCU Demin. Piping, dated
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January 19, 1981
81 No. 00071 A0 Access to RCU A and B. Pump Rooms, dated
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January 19, 1981
81 No. 00140, Repair RCU Pump, dated January 28, 1981
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81 No. 00103, Remove Blade Guides from SFP, dated January 28, 1981
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81 No. 00106, Insp. FP Heat Exch. Room for RCU Pipe, dated
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January 28, 1981
81 No. 00105, Decon. Pump Parts (RCU), dated January 28, 1981
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Except as noted below, the inspector had no further questions in
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this area.
During the inspector review of the above RWP's, it was noted that
Radiation Work Permits Nos. 00072, 00073, and 00071 contained the
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names of two Auxiliary Operators who had signed in on the subject
RWP's but had not recorded the time or dosimeter readings in and out
of the work area. Since the subject RWP's required signing both in
and out, this did not appear consistent with AP 0502 requirements.
The inspector noted his finding to Health Physics control point
personnel who indicated they would contact the Auxiliary Operators
to determine if they had in fact performed work in accordance with
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the subject RWP's.
Following discussions with Health Physics
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personnel, it was detennined that the individuals had inadvertently
signed in on the subject RWP's when reviewing the weekly posted RWP's
which authorize routine A.0. actions and require initial signing
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only. The licensee determined that the individuals had not entered
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the work areas authorized by RWP's Nos. 00072, 00073 and 00071,
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their names were deleted from the subject RWP's and they have been
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reinstructed in the requirements of AP 0502.
c.
Plant Housekeeping and Fire Prevention
Plant housekeeping conditions, including general clearliness and
storage of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in all
areas toured for confonnance with AP 0042, Plant Fire Prevention,
and AP 6024, Plant Housekeeping.
No inadequacies were identified.
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d.
Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations
Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the
existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibratien.
No inadequacies were identified.
e.
Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints
During routine tours of the plant, pipe hangers and restraints
installed on various piping systems were observed for proper
installation, tension, and condition.
No inadequacies were identified.
f.
Control Room Manning / Shift Turnover
Control Room Manning was reviewed for conformance with the require-
ments of 10 CFR 50.54 (k), Technical Specifications, AP 0152, Shift
Turnover, AP 0150, Responsibility and Authority of Operations Depart-
ment Personnel and AP 0036, Shift Staffing.
The inspector verified,
during the inspection, that appropriate licensed operators were on
shift. Manning requirements were met at all times.
Several shift
turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All
were noted to be thorough and orderly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance test to verify that
testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures,
that results were in conformance with Technical Specifications and
procedure requirements, that the results were reviewed by personnel
other than the individual directing the test, that any deficiencies
management _ personnel, and ~that activ_roperly reviewed and resolved _b
identified during the testing were p ies were in comp _liance with
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AP 4000, Surveillance Testihg Control.
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OP 4386, Liquid Process Radiation Monitor System Calibration, Revision 7,
dated April 16, 1980.
The inspector reviewed instrument No.17-350,
Radwaste Water Effluent, calibration data as recorded on VYOPF 4386.01
for the following dates: April 7-8, 1980, July 8, 1980, October 7, 1980
and January 6, 1981. The inspector noted that the calibration attempt
of January 6 resulted in replacement of the effluent monitor detector
and crystal, and recalibration of the instrument. The inspector verified
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by review of OP 2610 (Liquid Waste Disposal, Revision 7, dated
November 13,1980), discharge permits for the period of
October 7, 1980 to January 7, 1981, that the licensee had not per-
formed an ef*1uent discharge to the Connecticut River utilizing
instrument No.17-350. The inspector also notr* that OP 2610 re-
quires sampling of the effluent prior to discharge and resetting of
the effluent monitor setpoint utilizing the most recent calibration
data and known background activity.
The inspector determined that
licensee compliance with T.S. Section 4.B.A which states in part,
Radioactive effluents shall be continuously monitored and alarmed,
was adequate. The inspector further detemined that the last
licensee discharge to the Connecticut River utilizing Radwaste
Effluent Water was on September 11, 1979, utilizing discharge
permit No.79-686.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
The inspector had no
further questions in this area.
7.
Operational Safety Verification
A detailed review of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI)
was conducted during the period of January 26-27, 1981, to verify that
the system was properly aligned and fully operational in the standby
modo.
Review of the above system include the following.
verification that each accessible valve in the flow path was in the
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correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote
position indication.
Plant procedure OP 2120, Revision 12, dated
November 24, 1980, and drawing G-191169, Revision 19, was used to
verify proper HPCI system lineup.
verification that accessible power supplies and breakers were pro-
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perly aligned for components that are required to actuate upon
receipt of a safety injection signal.
visual inspection of major components in the selected system for
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leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, general condi-
tion and other factors that might prevent fulfillment of their
functional requirements.
verification by observation that the instrumentation essential for
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system actuation and performance was operational and/or within
calibration requirements.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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8.
Maintenance Activities
The inspector reviewed portions of the following maintenance activity
to verify compliance with LC0 requirements where applicable, that re-
dundant components were operable, administrative approvals and tagouts
were proper, approved procedures were utilized, activities were con-
trolled by qualified personnel, equipment certification, proper equip-
ment return to service, and compliance with AP 0021, Maintenance Requests,
and AP 0200, Maintenance Program.
The following activities were reviewed
by the inspector:
MR 83-249, Replacement of MSIV 80A guide pins and installation of
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new spring plate, dated February 27, 1980.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Inspector Followup of Events
The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection
period to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance
with the Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements. The
following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's
review of operational events:
observations of plant parameters and systems important to safety
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to confirm operation within approved operational limits;
description of event, including cause, systems involved, safety
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significance, facility status and status of engineered safety
features equipment;
details relating to personnel injury, release of radioactive
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material and exposure to radioactive material;
verification of correct operation of automatic equipment;
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verification of proper manual actions by plant personnel;
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verification of adherer:e to approved plant procedures;
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verification of conformance to Technical Specification LC0
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requirements; and,
compliance with AP 0010, Occurrence Reports, when applicable.
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Operational events reviewed during this inspection are discussed below.
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a.
Power Reduction for Turbine Generator Unit' Maintenance
During the week of January 12, 1981, the licensee noted higher than
normal vibration readings on 19 bearing of the plant's turbir.e
generator unit.
Investigation by the licensee concluded that the
vibration was originating from the flexible coupling which connects
the shaft from the Main Turbine Generator to the direct-driven
Alternator-Exciter.
The #9 bearing ir.dicated vibration ranged
from 11 to 13 mils as compared to previous readings in the 5 to 9
mil range, the turbine generator vibration setpoint for #9
bearing is 15 mils.
On January 17, 1981, the licensee reduced power and removed the
turbine generator from the grid to support disassembly of the sus '
pect flexible coupling. The inspectors observed disassembly of
the coupling and discussed its repair with cognizant plant
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personnel.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
b.
Drywell Entry
On January 17, 1981, reactor power was reduced to approximately
15% to facilitate licensee investigation and repair of indicated
turbir.e generator. bearing vibration originating in the generator
exciter flexible coupling. During the repair period, the licensee
performed a routine primary containment entry to inspect the dry-
well area. The purpose of the drywell entry was an attempt to
locate sources of unidentified drywell leakage.
system unidentified leakage for the period of January 7 to
January 15, 1981, ranged from .33 to .16 GPM; the limit for
unidentified leakage is 5 GPM per T.S. Section 3.6.C.
Inspection
of the drywell by licensee personnel revealed three possible
sources of unidentified leakage:
(1) RWCU Valve 99 packing leakage (steady drip)
(2)
'B' Recirc. Motor air cooler condensation from unlagged line
(3) RPR system lower spray ring leakage
Corrective action by the licensee was taken in that CU-99 packing
was tightened and motor air cooler condensation and lower spray
ring leakage was identified.
The inspectors monitored the initial drywell entry for compliance
with licensee procedure VYAP 0507, Primary Containment Entry,
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Revision 3, dated September 25, 1980. Vermont Yankee Radiation
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Work Pemit (RWP) No. 00064, Drywell Inspection, dated
January 17, 1981, was reviewed fer compliance with licensee
procedure VYAP 0502, Radiation Work Permits, Revision 9, dated
June 30, 1980.
Upon completion of the drywell entry, VYAPF 0507.01, Containment
Entry Checklist was reviewed for completeness and RWP No. 00064
was reviewed for proper termination. The inspector noted that
VYAP 0507 requires that when the reactor is operating, a team of
two personnel will be stationed at the drywell entrance to provide
assistance as required. Discussion with licensee personnel indi-
cated that this requirement was necessary only when personnel
entering the containment utilized self-contained breathing
apparatus. The licensee indicated he would look into the basis of
the two-man assistance team requirement and clarify AP 0507,
Section 8 ff deemed necessary (IFI 50-271/81-02-01).
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
No items
of noncompliance were identified.
c.
RADWASTE Transoortation, Shipment No. 81-07
On January 28, 1981, the licensee infomed the inspectors that an
apparent discrepancy had been found in a shipment of dry compacted
LSA waste to Beatty, Nevada disposal site. Review by the
inspectors revealed the following:
VY LSA Shipment 81-07 consisted of 153 55-gallon drums. of
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dry compacted waste contracted to Hittman/ Tristate for
transportation to the Beatty, Nevada disposal site.
The shipment left the site at 10:00 A.M. on January 21, 1981,
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and arrived at Beatty, Nevada on January 26, 1981.
Waste disposal site inspectors discovered a pencil size hole
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approximately one inch from the top of one 55-gallon drum.
The hole was initially covered with a piece of tape.
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The hole was discovered on January 26, 1981, by Nevada state
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inspectors and reported to the licensee on January 27, 1981.
The disposal site suspended VY disposal Permit Number 264 as
a result of the occurrence.
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The subject drum contained a plastic liner which was not
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punctured.
Surveys of the barrel and shipment vehicle re-
vealed no spread of contamination as a result of the container
breach.
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The licensee held a conference on January 28, 1981, with the
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State of Nevada and VY Permit No. 264 was reinstated by the
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State of Nevada based on commitments made by the licensee.-
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Pending further clarification of the commitments made to the State
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of Nevada, and pending completion of USNRC Regionlinvestigation
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into this occurrence, this iten will remain unresolved
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(URI 50-271/81-02-02).
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d.
Leak' Test of Explosion Detector Sources
On January 21, 1981, the inspectors received notification from the
Region of a possible contamination' source in certain models of
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Explosion Detectors manufactured by Ion Track Instruments. Inc..
The inspectors verified that Vermont Yankee utilizes two (2) of-
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the Ion Track Instruments, Model 75. Entry Scan Explosion Detectors.
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The inspectors requested that the licensee perform a leak check
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test of the sources containea in these' devices. The instruments
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contain the active isotope " Electro" (Nickel-63) which is deposited
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on an inert nickel foil and is classified as an unsealed source,
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which is exempt from NRC. licensing.
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On January 23, 1981, the licensee reported that a swipe survey of_
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the source contained in each explosion detector resulted in no
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detectable contamination. These results were forwarded to USNRC
Region I personnel as requested.
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The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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10.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports
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The licensee event reports (LERs) listed below were reviewed in the NRC
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Resident / Regional Office. The reports were reviewed to detemine whether:
the infomation provided was clear in the description of the event and
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identification of safety significance; the event cause was identified and
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corrective actions taken (or planned) were appropriate; the report satis-
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fied requirements with respect to information provided and timeliness of
r
submittal per NUREG 0161 and T. S. Section 6.7 criteria. Those reports
annotated with an asterisk (*) concern events that required inspector
'
followup action and inspector review / evaluation of the event is documented
i
elsewhere, in this or other inspection reports.
,
+
a.
Continuous Environmental Air Sample Not Taken:
)
.
. LER 80-40. Event Date November 30, 1980
l-
. LER 80-28, Event Date, September 8, 1980
,t
,
l
3-
'
,m-,r.,.,-,,.,s,.,-.my-.,,mn,
,y,,ymmm-m.ye w r,w m ow -- %
,ew,
.
-,,,-w,-w
,_,m,
..,.mc.
,m-w,_
,
--.cm~ w
.
.
.
14
LER 80-21, Event Dates June 30, 1980 and July 7, 1980
.
LER 80-03, Event Date January 7, 1980.
The inspectors noted
.
that TS Table 3.9.1 requires that containuous air sampling
be performed. As a result of LER 80-04 the licensee is com-
mitted to install surge suppressors on the supply to the
monitoring stations.
LER 80-28 previously reported that "If
feasible, lightening surge suppressors will be installed in
all nine Environmental Sample Stations."' LER 80-21 reports
that due to apparent pump bearing failure modifications of the
puaip and ventilation are being evaluated.
LER 80-03 reports
that due to instances of disconnected tubing, stainless steel
hose clamps were installed to prevent future recurrence.
The licensee is currently evaluating Air Sample Station per-
formance.
The inspectors will follow system evaluation and
implementation of corrective actions.
(IFI 50-271/81-02-03).
b.
PCIS Valve Failure to Close Due to Accumulation of Dirt on Plunger:
LER 80-20, Event Date June 17,1980 (See Inspector Report 271/80-17)
.
LER 80-17, Event Date April 24, 1980
'
.
LER 80-20 reports that' a preventive maintenance program is being
evaluated to preclude potential future events.
The inspectors
will follow program evaluation and implementation of corrective
actions.
(IFI50-271/81-02-04)
c.
Change in RPS Delay Time.
LER 80-10, Event Date March 7, 1980
.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pur-
suant to Technical Specification 6.7 and Environmental Technical Specifi-
cation 5.4 were reviewed by the inspector to verify that applicable re-
porting requirements had been met.
VYV-5937, Monthly Statistical Report, Month of December 1980, dated
--
January 14, 1981
VYV-5906, Monthly Statistical Report, Month of November 1980, dated
--
December 9,1980
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
,.
--
-
-. _ - .
- _ . .
- - _ _ _
__ -_ -
--. -
_ __
.
.
.
-
15
12. Observations of Physical Security
The inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified during regular
and offshift hours that selected aspects of plant physical security were
in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical security plan
and approved procedures.
a.
Physical Protection Security Organization
observations indicated that a full time member of the security
--
organization with authority to direct physical security actions
was present as required.
manning of all shifts on various days was observed to be as
--
required.
-
b.
Access Control
Observations of the following items were made:
identification, authorization and badging.
--
access control searches, including, when applicable, the use
--
of compensatory measures during periods when equipment was
escorting.
--
'
Physical Barriers
c.
selected barriers in the protected area ard vital area were
--
observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed.
Observation of vehicle searches were made.
inspector tours of gate house 1 and 2, the Central and Secondary
--
.
Alarm Stations were conducted at random periods.
,
No items of noncompl.iance were identified.
13.
Inspector Actions Based on Performance of Temporary Instruction (T/I)
'
Requirements
a.
Inspector Actions Based on Performance of T/I 2515/46, Survey to
Determine Existence of Adequate Dnergency Procedures for Coping
with ATWS Events at Operating Reactors, dated December 5, 1980
The objective of T/I 2515/46 is to verify that licensees have
emergency operating procedures adequate to respond to ATWS events.
.__
__.
- _ _
_.
_ ___._
.
_ . , _ . _ . _
.
.
l
'
16
l
suriey_was initiated by IE Bull [ tin 80-17, d'ated.Julyj,
~
1980,following. the Brown's F.erry failure to completely scram
event.
This T/I formalizes the actions needed to com-
plete the survey. The results of T/I 2515/46 inspection are
i
summarized below and have been transmitted to IE Headquarters
by memorandum to Mr. W. R. Mills, HQ, I.E., dated January 19, 1981.
References:
(a)
IE Bulletin 80-17, Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to
Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR, dated July 3, 1980
(b) Vemont Yankee Letter to B. H. Grier, WVY-100, dated
July 13, 1980
,
(c) T/I 2515/46, Survey to Determine Existence of Adequate
'
/
Emergency Procedures for Coping with ATWAS Events at
,
Operating Power Reactors, dnted December 5, 1980
(d) T/I 2515/39, Inspection Requirements to Review BWR
Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletin
No. 80-17, dated July 3, 1980
(e) Vemont Yankee Inspection Report 50-271/80-10, dated
October 16, 1980
(f) VY OP 2111, Revision 10, Control Rod Ceive System, dated
November 13, 1980
(g) VY OP 2114, Revision 9, Operation of the Standby Liquid
Control System, dated November 24, 1980
(h) VY OP 31J0, Revision 9, Reactor Scram Emergency Procedure,
dated July 11, 1980
(i) VY OP 3109 Revision 1, Anticipated Transient Without Scram
Emergency Procedure, dated November 26, 1980
(j) VY AF 0150, Revision 14, Responsibilities and Authorities
of Operations Department Personnel, dated December 19, 1980
VermontYankeeisaBWR,thereforereference(c)sectionIV
Acceptance Criteria 1. and 3. apply as noted below:
. Acceptance Criterion 1. :
For BWR's, IE Bulletin 80-17, Action No. 4 of " Actions to be
taken by Licensees" and Guidance contained in T/I 2515/39.
-
_
_
- _ - _
..
.-.
.
-
.
-
. -
.
.
.
.
17
" NOTE:
To be effective, if recirculation pumps do not auto-
matically trip. .the procedure must require the op'erator
to do this quickly folicwing an ATWS condition,
Bulletin 80-U, reference (a) Section 4. requires a review of
emergency operating procedures to assure that for a scram,
'
'
operator actions include:
(thefollowin
correspond to reference (a) Section 4.) g paragraph numbers
"4.a. Place the reactor mode switch in a position other than RUN."
'
The inspectors determined that this requirement is contained
--
in reference (h), " subsequent action", to be performed after
verification that steam flow has decreased below .64M#/hr in
each steam line.
"4.b. Detemine whether either of the two conditions below exist:
(1) Five(5)ormoreadjacentrodsnotinsertedbelowthe
06 position.
(2) Thirty (30) or more rods not inserted below the 06
position."
4
The inspectors concluded that the determination of rods not
--
inserted is cor.tained in reference (h), "immediate actions".
Vermont Yankee's detemination is conservative, in that
section 1.b. of reference (h) requires action "if any scram
condition exist for greater than 10 seconds with failure of
two or more control rods to fully insert in response to a
full scram. . ."
"4.c. If either condition 4.b. (1) or 4.b. (2) exists:
(1) Trip the recirculation pumps.
(2)
Insert rods manually.
If rods cannot be inserted manually,
alternately reset the RPS and scram the reactor until all
rods are fully inserted.
(3) Vent the scram air header.
(4) Manually open or bypass the scram instrument volume drain
and vent valves, if possible."
<
,
.
.
.- , - - - - . , ~
--
-,_-
-.-y_,
,.,-r-
, . - - - - - _ _ ,
- . . - - - . - - . - - - - , - . . - .
.m.-
, ,--.
.
.
18
The inspectors determined that reference (h) requires the
--
following operator actions based on rods not inserted:
(1)
If the conditions of 4.b. above exist, the operator is
required to " Trip the recirc pumps by placing their con-
trol switches to pull-to-lock on CRP 9-4 (reference (h)
Step 1.b. (1)).
(2) Reference (h) Step 1.b. (1) requires:
" manually rescram
,
the reactor by depressing both manual scram pushbuttons
'
on CRP 9-5".
Step 1.b. (2) requires additional actions
.
if indication exists that the scram signals have failed
to open the sc.am valves, these actions include:
Step
1.b. (2) (a) and (b), manually opening circuit breakers
or manually securing RPS MG sets provide alternate methods
of scramming the plant.
(3) Reference (h) Step 1.b. (3) requires tne following actions,
"until all control rods are fully inserted, monitor nuclear
instrumentation for decreasing neutron flux and indication
of local areas of high neutron flux while performing the
following:
,
a)
Clear the cause of the scram, bypass the SDV and
'
verify open or manually open the Vent and Drain
valves, place mode switch in shutdown, reset both
i
RPS channels.
l
'
b)
Individually scram those control rods not fully in-
serted from CRP 9-16 starting with those in local
areas of indicated high neutron flux.
Reset each
control rod after it fully inserts and continue to
scre.:a rods until all contrcl rods are fully inserted."
c)
If 3.b. is unsuccessful in scramming control rods,
manually scram the reactor, reset and repeat if in-
sert rod motion is observed until all control rods
are fully inserted,
d)
If 3.c. is unsuccessful in scraming control rods, by-
pass the RWM and attempt to marW ily insert control
rods with the reactor manual control system, starting
with those in local areas of indicated high neutron
l
flux.
"4 d. . If, at any time, either condition 4.b. (1) or 4.b. (2) exists
and either RPV water level cannot be maintained or suppression
pool water temperature cannot be maintained below the
suppression pool water temperature scram limit, initiate the SLCS."
i
.
F'**r
w
w.-
--
y
y
,
--g
ig-
p,-,y.-
-e,
vwr
-yt
y
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--
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-
-,-,-y
p--- - - ..--
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m---g.-
,,-w
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.
.
19
The inspectors determined that reference (g) states that the
--
control room operator will initiate the SLCS, with shift super-
visor approval, should any of the following conditions exist:
O) A gross failure of control rods such that they cannot be
scrammed or manually inserted into the core.
(2) Nomal rod exercise indicates a rod is stuck such that
shutdown margin requirements cannot be met.
(3) The reactor engineer detemines that shutdown margin re-
quirements of the T.S. cannot be met.
(4)
R.V. water level cannot be maintained and the CRD system
is unable to maintain the reactor subcritical as indicated
by the neutron monitors.
The shift supervisor is nromally stationed in the control room and
thus readily available to acknowledge initiation of SLCS operation
without undue administrative delay. Further, per reference (j)
the control room comand function is transferred to the senior
control room operator during shift supervisor temporary absences.
Reference (h) Step 1.b. (4) requires that " initiate injection of
SLC solution into the reactor vessel at any time reactor water
level cannot be maintained or torus water temperature cannot be
maintained below the. torus scram limit (1100F) if simultaneously
the control rod dri,ve system is unable to maintain the reactor
suberitical at existing conditions as indicated by neutron monitors."
Reference (i) notes the concerns associated with an ATWS event,
and details symptoms and actions to be taken. Vermont Yankee
has installed a recire pump trip (RPT) circuit to quickly add
negative reactivity to the core to mitigate the consequences
of an ATWS event.
If RV water level ramins at the low-low set-
point, (-44.5) for > 10 seconds or RV pressure increases to
1150 psip, both recTrc. field breakers will automatically open.
This can also be accomplished manually, using pushbuttons on
CRP 9-4.
Acceptance Criterion 3.:
.
The operator should have complete authority to activate the Standby
Liquid Control System (BWR) or commence emergency boration (PWR),
and he should be responsible for doing this when the situation
requires it.
If the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) is key
operated, the key must be readily available to the opera or.
Criteria for the use of SLCS and emergency boration relative to
inability to insert negative reactivity by other means should be
included in emergency procedures.
4
wn-
, - -~,
- ,
e--
,,.me
-e
---n.
,--
, - - ~ - , - . , - - - ~ , - . - , + -
,
w ---- - ,
,-e-,,
- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ -
_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__
_ _ _ _ _ .
_ ____ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
.
20
.
..le inspectors determined that at Vermont Yankee the SLCS-is
--
key operated, reference (g) step B.2 requires the key to the
SLC switch be kept in the switch itself.
Reference (h) requires initiation of SLCS any time RV level
cannot be maintained or torus water temperature cannot be
maintained below the torus scram limit (110 F) if simultaneously
the CRD system is unable to maintain the reactor subcritical
at existing cLnditions as indicated by neutron monitors.
Reference (i) requires initiation of SLC system into the RV
if the control rods cannot be scranmed.
Based on the above information, the licensee has addressed IE
Bulletin 80-17 concerns in his procedures for coping with ATWS.
Within the scope of T/I 2515/46 the inspector identified no
exceptions from the acceptance criteria,
b.
Inspector Actions Based on Performance of T/I 2515/47, TI For IE
Dulletin 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside
Containment
The objective of T/I 2515/47 is to verify that actions required by
IE Bulletin 80-24, dated November 21, 1980, have been satisfactorily
completed, that suitably detailed descriptions of open cooling systems
within containment are provided as required, and that acceptable
4
documentation is provided by the licensee.
The results of T/I 2515/47
inspection are summarized below and have been transmitted to IE Head-
quarters by memorandum to Mr. R. Woods, HQ, I.E. , dated January.7,
1981.
References:
l
(a) Preliminary T/I 2515/47, dated December 18, 1900, TI for IE
Bulletin 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage
!
Inside Containment.
(b)
IE Bulletin 80-24, dated November 21, 1980, Prevention of
Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17,
1980, Indian Point 2 Event).
.
. . _ - . .
,
. . , . _ .
_,
_ - . . _ . . . , .
. . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ , ,
.
- - - -
. .
_-
-
-
.
.
.
.
i
l
21
(c)
Letter, L. H. Heider to B. H. Grier, dated December 31, 1980,
Response to IE Bulletin 80-24
,
The following tables are provided in response to IE Bulletin 80-24
" Actions to be taken by Licensees." The numbered items correspond
,
i
to the nunbered action in the subject bulletin:
TABLE I LEAKAGE HISTORY, OPEN SYSTEMS
i
IE BULLETIN 80-24. ITEMS 1. (a.-f.)
OPEN
N S
LEAK
WET
REPAIR
SYSTEM
P, F, LOCATION SPOTS DRIPS STREAMS DELUGES METHOD
NONE
1
KEY:
N = Normally used
P = Post - LOCA
S = System uses salt or brackish water
F = System uses fresh water
TABLE II LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS
IE BULLETIN 80-24. ITEMS 2. (a.), (b.)
i
MEANS OF
INDICATION (I)OR
TYPE OF
FLOW MEAS.
LOCATION OF POTENTIAL
DETECTING
ALARM (A) IN
FLOW
READOUT IN
.
!
WATER ACCUMULATION
WATER
CONTROL ROOM
MEAS. INST.
CONTROL RM.
i
500 GAL. EQUIP. DRAIN
FLOAT
I, (HIGH LEVEL)
TOTALIZER
YES, CHART
SUMP, EQUIPPED WITH
SWITCH
I, A (HIGH-HIGH
IN SUMP
FLOW RECORDER
TWO 50 GPM PUMPS
LEVEL)
DISCH. LINE
AND TOTALIZER
,
(ALTERNATING)
READOUT
'
TEMP.
SENSOR
I, A
l
SUMP LEVEL
l
SWITCHES.
TIMES SUMP
A (< PRESET FILL
FILL RATE
RATE)
'
AND
I FILL TIME)
!
PUMP RUN TIME A > PRESET RUN TIME)
I PUMP OUT TIME)
l
PUMP RUN
'
INDICATION
I
500 GAL. DRYWELL
FLOOR DRAIN SUMP
EQUIPPED WITH TWO
50 GPM PUMPS
(ALTERNATING)
SAME AS AB0VE WITH EXCEPTION OF TEMP. IhDICATION
.
-
. . - -
. .
, - -
-
- . . . -
- - - - . - . - -
'
1
.
.
.
22
' Item 2.(c) Review of the licensee's surveillance procedure, OP 4152 Revision 8
July 11, 1980, Drywell Equipment and Floor Drains Surveillance revealed
.-
no unacceptable conditions.
I' tem '2. (d) Within the scope of the inspectors review, no unacceptable areas were
noted. Reference (c) does not address periodic contaimnent entry.
The inspector discussed periodic entry into containment with the licensee.
Vennont Yankee noted that the requirements to consider periodic entry into
the containment to inspect for leakage is contained in IEB 80-24, section
2.d. which applies to plants with OPEN cooling systems: VY does not have
these systems.
TABLE III, LEAKAGE HISTORY, CLOSED SYSTEMS
IE BULLETIN 80-24, ITEM 3
CLOSED
SYSTEM
DATE
SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCE
CLOSED
4/ 2/74
DRYWELL COOLING UNIT RRU-1, SMALL COOLING COIL
C00 LING
LEAK, SUBSEQUENTLY REPAIRED.
WATER
11/12/74
SMALL COOLING COIL LEAK, 1 GPM, REPLACED
3/24/78
SMALL C0OLER LEAK, RECIRC. PUMP'M0 TOR "B" LOWER
BEARING COOLER.
DETECTED BY MOTOR COOLER LEAK
DETECTION SYSTEM.
LEAK REPAIRED.
8/12/79
RRU-1 DEVELOPED 2 TU8E LEAKS IN THE COOLER.
BOTH ENDS OF THE TUBES WERE CAPPED.
The inspector had no further questions concerning the licensee's
response to IE Bulletin 80-24. No items of noncompliance were
identified.
c.
Status of TMI-2 Action Plan Items with Implementation of January 1,1981
Per IE:HQ request transmitted in a January 2,1981, letter from
J. Sniezek to Regional Directors, the inspectors provided a tabulation,
based on licensee /NRC correspondence, of the actions taken and completion
status of TMI-2 Action Plan Items - January 1,1981
implementation at
Vermont Yankoe. As requested, the information was forwarded to IE:HQ,
E. Blackwood, DROI by memorandum dated January 9,1981. Post-implementa-
tion review of selected li~censee commitments will be conducted. Accord-
ingly, where that review results in the identification of additional or
modified commitments by the licensee, a reinspection will be conducted.
A summary of the inspector findings is provided below:
.
e
-
.,
-
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.ir,
4-
e-s-,
- - -
-y
,e--.
,
w - , - - - -
--,-w.-,
- - + - -
.
.
,
J
23
The following references are utilized:
,
(a) NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,
published November 1980.
'
(b) Vermont Yankee letter WVY-170, dated December 15, 1980, Post-TMI
Requirements-Implementation Date Commitments.
(c) Vermont Yankee letter WVY 79-130, dated November 20, 1979,
Followup Actions Resulting from the NRC Staff Review Regarding
the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident.
(d) Vermont Yankee letter WVY 80-135, dated September 29, 1980,
STA Implementation Schedule
The item numbers below pertain to reference (a), enclosure 1
clarification items.
.
Item
--
+ 1.A.1.1. ,
Shortened Title
Action
+... training program implemented
Status
+ Committed Completion Date - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes (See Note 1)
+ Scheduled Completion Date - June 1,1981
+ Reason Not Completed - (See Note 1)
Item
--
+ 1, A,l .1,
Shortened Title
Action
+... degreed engineers on shift
.
. . . . . . - . . .
.
-- , , - - - -
,.,
-
.-
. , _ . . - ,
, _ , .
, , , . , . . - .
..
.
-- .- ..
.
-
.
.
24
Status
+ Connitted Completion Date - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes (See Note 2)
+ Scheduled Completion Date - June 1, 1981
+ Reason Not Completed - (See Note 1)
't
Itsn
--
+ I.A.1.3.
Sho6tened Title
+ Shift Manning
Action
.
4
+ .. . overtime limits . implemented
status
,
+ Committed Completion.Date - January 1, 1981
+ Completed - Yes (See Note 5)
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
Itsn
--
+ I.572.1. (4)
.
Shortened Title
.
+ R0 & SR0 Training Program
Action
+... implementation
Status
j
l
+ Committed Completion Date - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes (See reference (b))
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
r
l
Item
j
--
+ I.C.5.
f
I
-. . - . , . . - - .
. - . , , - _ . . . _ , _ _ - - _
. - , , - . _ _ _ . , _ _ , , , . - , _ _ . . , - - - - . _ , - - - . .
. - - _ _ _ . , - . - - . . . . . , . .
.
.
.
25
.
Shortened Title
+ Feedback of Operation Experience
Action
+... Procedure implemented
Status
+ Committed Completion Dat.e - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
Item
--
+ I.CT6.
Shortened Title
+ Verify Performance of Operating Activities
Action
+... revise performance procedures and implement
Status
+ Committed Completion - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes (See Note 3)
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA .
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
Item
'
.
--
+II.E.4.2.(5)
Shortened Title
+ Containment Isolation Dependability
Action
+... Containment pressure setpoint adjusted
,
5
. . _ . - _ .
_ - _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ . . . . - _ . . .
._
_ . - . . . _ . . . _ . . -
. . _
_ _ . . . . . _ _ , _ _
..-..
___
. _ , _ _ . _ . .
. -.
.
--
.
.
.
26
Status
+ Committed Completion Date - Januar
+ Completed - Yes (See reference (b)y 1, 1981
)
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
Item
--
+ II.E.4.2. (6)
Shortened Title
+ Containment Isolation Dependability
Action
+... containment purge valves closed and surveillance implemented
Status
,
+ Committed Completion Date - Janucry 1, 1981
+ Completed - Yes (See reference (b))
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
'
Item
--
+ II.K.3.9.
S.'iortened Title
+ Proportional Integral Derivative Controller Modification
Action
+... Mod Accomplished on Westingl.ouse Plants
Status
+ Committed Completion Date - NA (See Note 6)
+ Completed - NA
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
Item,
--
_
+ II . K.3.22a.
l
l
1
.-
..
_.
. . - .
.
..
. _- .
.
. - .
- --
.
27
i
Shortened Title
RCIC Suction Switchover from CST to suppression pool
Action
+... procedure implemented for manual method of switchover
Status
,
+ Connitted Completion Date - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes (See reference (b))
+ Scheduled Canpletion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Canpleted - NA
Iten
--
+ III.D.3.3.
Shortened Title
+ Inplant Radiation Monitoring
Action
+... improved inplant iodine instrumentation under accident conditions
,
Status
'
+ Committed Completion Date - January 1,1981
+ Completed - Yes (See reference (b) and Note 4)
+ Scheduled Completion Date - NA
+ Reason Not Completed - NA
NOTES:
(1) By reference (c), VY committed to provide STAS on shift by
January 1,1980, initiate STA training in 1980, and have fully
trained STAS in place by January 1, 1981. As of January 1, 1980,
an interim group of STAS were on shift.
The group was formed
from existing plant and engineering staff members and consisted
of 13 degreed individuals with plant experience and specific STA
training provided by GE and VY training staffs. Concurrent with
implementation of the interim STA group, a program was initiated
to hire and extensively train a new group of degreed engineers to
ultimately fill the STA role as a full time permanent job function.
The training program for the permanent STA group was designed to
meet INP0 standards published in May 1L80.
Completion of training
1
.
._
_
.
.
.
.
. , _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ ,,
.
.
.
28
i
and start of shift assignment for the permanent group was
scheduled to occur by January 1, 1981.
However, by
reference (d), VY reported that final implementation for
the permanent STA group could not be completed until June 1,1981.
Delays in the implementation date were attributed to:
(1) difficulties in finding degreed en
nuclear and industry experience, and (gineers with previous 2) schediiTii
the full STA trai.ning program.
The last of seven individuals
fonning the permanent STA group was hired in November 1980-and
the STA training program was begun in October 1980. Reference
(d) specifies the permanent STA group will assume shift duties
at the completion of the training program by June 1,1981.
(2) Operating shifts are now staffed with the interim group of
STAS, all of whom are degreed.
However, as reported above
the permanent, fully trained group of STAS will not assume
shift duties until June 1,~1981.
(3) By reference (b), VY stated that management control systems
already in effect meet the intent of the five clarification
items identified in Item I.C.6. of reference (a).
The
addition of independent verification to the management control
system had been previously considered by VY and rejected as
being less desirable and less effective than existing controls.
VY thus refused to commit to independent verification, but
will do so whenever existing controls are found to not provide
(
assurance of system operability.
(4) By reference (b), VY stated that adequate portable sample and
l
analysis capabilities for iodine exist without the use of iodine
l
collection media such as silver zeolite.
(5) Administrative procedure AP 0036, Shift Staffing, issued on
January 8,1981, instituted limits on overtime hours in
accordance with the reference (a) requirements, with the
exception of the following:
(1) the limit on the number of
hours that an individual could work in any seven consecutive
days was set at 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />, instead of 72; (2) an it.dividual
is limited to working no more than 18 consecutive days
(instead of 14) without having 2 consecutive days off.
(6) The purpose of this controller modification is to prevent
inadvertent opening of the power-operated relief valve (PORV).
l
This modification applies only to Westinghouse plants and is
therefore not applicable to Vermont Yankee.
l
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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14. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are items about which more information is required to
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ascettain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or
deviations.
Unresolved items are discussed in Detail 9.c of this
inspection report.
15. Management Meetings
During the period of the inspection, licensee management was periodically
notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspectors. A summary
was also provided at the conicusion of the inspection and prior to report
issuance.
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