ML20003F429
| ML20003F429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003F422 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104210237 | |
| Download: ML20003F429 (4) | |
Text
.
- g r49A UNITED STATES
["
s,7 k
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 l
~
O SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION AMENDMENT NO. 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-3 YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (YANKEE-ROWE)
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-29 I.
INTRODUCTION By letter dated September 16, 1980, Yankee Atomic Electric Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License No. OPR-3 for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee-Rowe). The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the TMI 2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in direct response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2, 1980.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION By our letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established asia result of our review of.the TMI-2 accident. Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1,1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to the licensee dated April 18, 1980.,
In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requested that licensees amend their TS to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2,1980.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable. The licensee's application is in direct response to our request.
Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.
III. EVALUATION 2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements The pressurizer water level indicators, pressurizer relief and block valves, and pressurizer heaters are important in a post-accident situation. Adequate emergency power supplies add assurance of post-accident functioning of these components. The licensee has provided the requisite emergency power supplies.
The licensee has proposed adequate TSs which provide for a 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration and actions in the event of component 810.421023 7
. ir op erabil ity. We have reviewed these proposed TSs and find that the e ergency power supplies are reasonably ensured for post-accident func-t'or.ing of the subject components and are thus acceptable.
2.1.3.a Direct Indication of Flow Tre licensee has provided direct indication of flow downstream of the PCRV and safety valves in the control room.
These indications are a diacnostic aid for the plant operator and provide no automatic action.
Tre licensee has provided TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-
, nts channel calibration requirement; thus, the TSs are acceptable and trey meet our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Inadequate Core Cooling ite licensee has installed an instrument system to detect the effects of ice reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling. These instruments, scaccoling meters, receive end process data from existing plant instrumen-ta-fon. We previously reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated April 18, 1980. The licensee submitted TSs with a 31-day channel
- Feck and an 18-month channel calibration requirement and actions to be taken in the event of component inoperability. We conclude the TSs are acceatable as they meet our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
I 2.1. 4 Diverse Containment Isolation Tre licensee has modified the containment isolation system so that diverse oa-ameters will be sensed to ensure automatic isolation of non-essential s.sstems under postulated accident conditions. These parameters are High citainment Pressure and Initiation of Safety Injection. We have reviewed t'is system in our Lessons Learned Category "A" Safety Evaluation dated
.,-i' 18, 1980.
The modification is such that it does not result in the
- r. cmatic loss of containment isolation after.,the containment isolation signal is reset. Reopening of containment isolation would require deliberate 3;arator action.
The existing TSs already list each affected con.tainment isolation valve and provide for the appropriate surveillance and actions ir t.e event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that.the
~53.are acceptable.
i 2.'.'.a Auto Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems
- a result of the SEP safe shutdown review and the post-TMI review, the
:e see has decided to install an entirely new auxiliary feedwater system.
W5 will review the TSs for this new system after they have been submitted-at a later date.
- s 2.1.7.b Auxiliary (Emergency) Feedwater Flow Indication The licensee has installed auxiliary (emergency) feedwater flow indication that meet our testability and vital power requirements. We reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated April 18, 1980. The licensee has proposed a TS with 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration requirements. We find this TS acceptable as it meets the criteria of our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
2.2.1.b Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA. The leiensee's application would add one STA to each shift to perform the function of accident assess-ment. The individual performing this function will have at least a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.
Part of the STA duties are related to operating experience review function. Based on our review, we find the licensee's submittal to satisfy our requirements and is acceptable.
EVALUATION TO SUPPORT LICENSE CONDITIONS 2.1.4 Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a System Integrity Measure (nents Program. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of significant amounts of radio-activity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor containment. By letter dated September 16, 1980, the licensee agreed to adopt such a license con-dition; accordingly we have included this condition in the license. -
2.1.8.c Iodine Monitoring Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to iodine monitoring. Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring l
personnel access under accident conditions. By letter dated September 16, 1980, I
the licensee agreed to adopt such a license condition; accordingly, we have l
included this condition in the license.
IV.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION l
We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this i
determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an l
i l
l l
a: tion which is insignificant from the standpoint of. environmental 1 ?act and, pursuant to 10 CFR !$1.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact s:sterent, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need rot be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
V.
CT.CL USION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
('.) because that amendment does not involve a significant increase in t>e probability or consequences of accidents previously considered ard dces not involve a significant' decrease in a safety margin, the arendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public w'll not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) s'.:h activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical tc the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dz:e : April 2,1981 m
O 9
k 4
4
,4 e
O