ML20003E491
| ML20003E491 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/26/1981 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19247E087 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-81-153, NUDOCS 8104030681 | |
| Download: ML20003E491 (60) | |
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NUCIZAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN C4$)
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10 Room 1130, j
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12 Thursday, March 26, 1981.
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E 14 The Commissioners met at 1:05 p.m.
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15 notice, Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
ma 16 Commissioners Present:
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y John Ahearne, Commissioner.
18 Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner.
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U 19 Present for the NRC Staff:
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Dircks V.
Stello 21 S.
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Hanrahan 22 S.
Bassett L.
Barry 23
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Present for *:h e Office of Gene ral Counsel:
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Present for the Office of the Secretary:
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Chilk.
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2 cwAIRMAN AHEARNE:
May we come to order.
3 The com=ission meets this morning for i briefing on s.
4 the Nuclear Data Link.
We have a handout, and I guess the nest
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5 thing to do is to let the Staff go ahead and pre sent the
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6 propositions they have in hand to the Cc==ission.
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7 Bill, do you want to go ahead, or Vic?
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8 MR. DIRCKS:
Well, I'll just mention something.
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9 CHAIRMAN AEEARNE:
All right.
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10 MR. DIRCKS:
The Nuclear Data Link is beginning to be E_
E 11 one of those in s ti tu tio n s, I guess, that will go on forever, just R
y 12 trying to get out of the proposal stace.
We have been discussing
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13 it, I guess, in meetings since February 7th, 1980, May 15th, 3m l
14 1980, July lith, 1980, plus we've had conversations with OMB, n
2 15 congress and so on.
wn 16 The proposal that is being made today is really i
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~but I'm s u r. e we are still grappling with the b as ic decision of X
20 whither the Nuclear Data Link.
Il Based on the guidance that we have gotten from the 22 commission in all these meetings, I think this is the proposal 23 that we are left with.
I'm sure we will go into the details 24 more, but I have to stress that it's the package we have based 25l on the guidance we got from the Commission thus far.
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COMMISSIONER A H E' A RN E :
What he's just told us is that 7,
2 if we don't like the package, we gave him lousy advice.
3 (Laughter.)
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I detected a certain element of
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6 MR. DIRCKS:
Vic, did you want to pursue any more R
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MR, STELLO:
Well, yeah, I would like the first slide d
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up as background, fulfilling my promise to never discuss this i
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14 I think we are at a point where we really need to l
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17 way to accomplish getting started on an NDL.
I 18 I remind you that what we are looking at is a system 5
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Nothing has changed.
That's 21 still the basic concept which we were after.
The emphasis on 22 what we are doing is to really understand and be informed.
I 23 think the exercises that we have continue to remind me f
24 emphatically of.a need.
The need is r e al a nd it is genuine.
I 25 If these are our roles, this is what we are to fulfill, it's my ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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belief that to do it, and do it properly, we've got to have an
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with that, Brian will summarize the contents of the
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It's a way in which to reach a decision.
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5 MR. GRIMES:
Next slide, please.
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7 red like to first briefly review the data needs 2l 8
during an emergency, and emphasize that the principal users of d
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the data during any accident are the licensee and the state.
2 10 However, there are other offsite users of in f o rma tio n,
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12 The next slide illustrates the same point.
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(Slide.)
m I4 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:
I was go ing to ask on your a
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MR. GRIMES:
No.
I think the next slide that's now d
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P" 19 MR. STELLO:
I think the orde r of priority in terms g
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Their needs are first.
The 21 state, in terms of the need to eventually decide on protective 22 action, and their involvement is clearly there, they have a 2
I would put the NRC in direct role, and if I were to put 24 'I terms of our responsibilities, and then ve ndo rs and NSAC.
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order of priorities?
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2 MR. STELLO:
Yeah, I would accept those as what I 3
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4 CHAIRMAN H7NDRIE:
It's less an orde r of priority
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You can't recommend p rotective 3n g
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plant.
Somewhere between knowing wh ~ s goihg on and saying d
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we recommend you move people offsite, you're very likely to 2
h 10 have suggestions to people at the plant to see if there are Ej 11 measures that could be taken maybe so you don't have tL recommend k
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3 13 So I don't think-you can make a priority and say, 5
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They come together and it's a hierarchy of actions u3 y
16 which have a single collective priority.
How aboat that?
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18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think Vic understands what
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I was getting at.
I think it's that " advise" on plant 21 strategy that I think is underlying a lot of the concerns about 22 how much we might intrude on the management decisions being s -
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made by the people on the scene, and I think that underlies a I
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lot of it.
I think that's the point that Vic w ill try to make at 25 every chance he can get, that he does not intend to second-guess i
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1 the responsible officials at the scene of the accident.
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don't want to impose our dacisions on them, because they are 3
about the only ones who can know what's going on.
4 Is that right, Vic?
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5 MR. STELLO:
Yeah, I think the word that troubles Xe j
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management, it's the takeover.
The sense I have is that an 3-l 8
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10 COMMIS SIONER GILINSKY :
Well, I think there's a E
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So it seems to me z
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17 MR. STELLO:
If you remember the first line, it's a wz 18 dashed lins.
It's identified.
It's considered to be unlikely E
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agency, since it has that responsibility, if it really did feel 21 that it was in a position where it had to direct, in the very 22 uausuel, unlikely situation, that's preserved as a po s s ible role.
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It's not visualized as an eventuality that would be 24 derived from looking at information derived from a data link.
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you got onsite, if it were to happen.
2 We seem to have a great deal of difficulty and spend a 3
lot of time talking about what I think is a very unusual circum-4 stanc;.
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much often.
I would suspect that it would be a two-way street.
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over the phone in terms of advice.
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13 MR. GRIMES: I think part of the development and m
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But we should develcp 21 through these exercises, particularly some kind of un de rs tanding 22,
that they are finally responsible, and they have to tell us 1
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.they are rejecting our advice or taking an alternate course of 24 action, unless we feel very, very strongly about it.
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certainly are up there, they are on the scene, they have the
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authority and responsibility to do that.
2 MR. STELLO:
I think understanding, too, that 3
advice, simply asking questions that might start with did you m
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And at some point you get the issue of needing to even 5
6 have information to know what's going on, which is just under-R R
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I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't want to suggest dy 9
that I don't think we ought to be talking to them, or we've 2
h 10 got the competence or these sorts of th in g s.
Obviously we will Z
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15 I guess I've expressed this before.
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Well, I think that goes back to the d
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It would be e as y to say that we have e
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And if you're in it a little bit, you're in it, and 22 I don't know how you can extricate yourself.
m CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
At the present time, we have now l
24 at least one incident I run a number of drills and incident 25-can remember, and we're there at the end o f one, or at best, two l
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telephone lines, and the level of information inflow to the m
2 Response Center with the telephone system is bound to create a sense of modesty and humility on the part of the op Center people.
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console, you.know, with the lights going on like a monstrous n
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22 really know, you can't talk to me that way."
23 So I think that's the kind of influence on our attitude
-24 that I think Vic was speaking to.
It's a concern.
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I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But it's not all bad.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But not necessarily all bad.
2 clearly we have to do better than the t e le ph o n e.
I haven't talked 3
to anybody who doesn't believe that we need something better 4
than the information transfer system composed of two human
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ought to end up at the current cost and sophistication of the Xl 8
equipment, but -- well.
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9 MR. STELLO:
I must point out that there is one flaw 2
h 10 in thsc reasoning, if it's a flaw, that disturbs me, and that is El 11 tomething tbat suggests that we seem to function in such a way B
6 12 that the smarter we are, the worse we behave.
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No, I think the comment is just E
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15 MR. STELLO:
I agree, but clearly the need for us aa j
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18 much more authoritatively, and to the extent we do anything, it's E"
19 a great deal more wisdom than you are going to ever get pushed k
20 over those voice communication systems.
I 21 COMMIS SIONER AHEARNE:
Why don't you say, Vic, to 22 speak to what is going on more intelligently?
23 MR. GRIMES:
The problem is you don't want to confuse 24 l the roi7s.
I think the agency has said that the licensee has 25[
the re spo ns ib ilit y.
If he thinks we're going to look over his i
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shoulder and see if signals are going to be called in from the 2
sidelines, it's going to be confusing t o h im and confusing to 3
us to see whether we should be sending in those signals.
4 The danger of confusion arose that underlies a lot of this e
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think such perils as maybe lie R
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Present company has discussed Xl 8
this matter at such length that I think we are all quite dd 9
sensitive to it, and if there is a pitfall here down tne line i
h 10 for the NDL, why, it's several years of f when a new crop of i
g 11 people who have not had the benefit of our searching analyses 3
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13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vic will still be there, a
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2 15 C HAIRMA N HENDRIE:
Yes, Vic, you'll keep g
16 MR. GRIMES:
The discussions may still be going on.
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E 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Ask for a briefing every six h
19 months.
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- onward, 21 MR. GRIMES:
The purpose of the functional diagram
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22 is just to illustrate what we've b e.e n talking about in a 23l graphical manner on the location of the data users.
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I 25l The next slide indicates what was covered fairly I
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. thoroughly in NUREG 730, that there are several different 2
ways of collecting and communicating in f o rm at io n, and I won't 3
go through them in detail, except to say that they all have l
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tying up people and introducing the disadvantages of delays in h
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transmittal and analysis of information, especially trend informa-R R
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whoever else is using the data, d
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We have not done this 3
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4" 19 additions There is some discussion of whether a standard R
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22 I There are also people who believe that to assure L
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I s-25 have seen various cost esti=ates for that.
My understanding now i
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is that it could be done witnout -- under $10,000 pe r site for m
2 that terminal, although there have been estimates that have 3
gone up to 80,000 earlier in the process.
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6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see.
If the 310,000 R
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MR. GRIMES:
Yes.
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That is, in orde r to have a terminal i
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17 MR. GRIMES:
That's correct.
You'd have to have a wz 18 standard protocol specified.
Lut you would not h ave to specify E"
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Not hardware of the licensees would be the same, H
20 only the output be the same.
21 CHAIRMAN HE ND RIE :
But the preferred system at the 22 moment I don't know if " preferred" is the right word -- b u t 23 l the sfstem we seem to be talking mostly about, is one in which 24 the reactor data acquisition system is not necessarily a
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That is to say, it does not necessarily produce a i
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standard output to go to our t e rmin al, but rather we have a 2
rather more expensive terminal on s i te, and we are able -- and 3
we make the conversion between the data acauisition system and 4
our standard protocol cor transmission in our te rminal onsite.
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MR. GRIMES:
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estimate 3 were based on that thinking.
In 0696, we did say R
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there would be a standard protocol that would be specified.
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I see.
We have gone to the standard dd 9
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I think you are talking about 3
11 this distinction between a stand alone and a standard.
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12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Have I got the things mixed up?
5 13 Probably.
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14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I thought the standard that, a
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II MR. GRIMES:
There was a concept with the whole unit w
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C 19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE :
I see.
I see.
Okay.
20 MR. GRIMES:
But there have been various cost estimates 21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So I think what the Staff is 22 recommending is what would have been called the stand-alone s
23 system, but the interface between the licensee's stand-alone and 24 the data transmission being a unit to put into the standard --
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Onward.
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(Slide.)
2 MR. GRIMES:
The next slide gets to the subject of 3
the meeting, which is a discussion of the alte rn ative concepts, if i
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one were to go forward with the NDL.
Plan A is the concept e
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6 for specific hardware and system design.
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done the studies of the program to date, to manage a good deal dd 9
of the implementation of the program.
N 10 Plan C, which as a bottom line we are recom=ending, E
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17 COMMISSIONER GILINS KY :
Which we would do under Plan u
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E 19 MR. GRIMES:
Which we would entirely do un de r Plan A,
R 20 yes.
I 21 i (Slide.1 22 The next slide says the same thing, and there is a more detailed breakdown of this in the paper, but as a rough cut, 1G l 24 you can see that in Plan C the technical integrato r would be j
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contractor work and helping with the licensee interface 1
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3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could I ask you a question on 4
that, Brian?
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In your paper, when I read in the back in Enclosure 29 g
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which is the RFP, you say:
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contracting, including RFP preparation and propo.
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Which is accurate?
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As I read this, they would 20 then do the contracting?
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Would you foresee their doing 23 !
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So the less competitive bidding 3
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Could you just go over once 21 again that last point that you made on the c han ge :h f t this type 22 of systems integrator?
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I just reserve objection to 21 that.
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Thank vou, Sam.
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You say NRC costs and industry 2
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How large a staff?
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Which person would man the --
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That's why we keep certain people away from the control room.
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Let me ask you, what 24 would it-cost to hook up two plants?
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We're going to cover that.
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Do you mean during --
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system, and two CRTs transmitting at the present time about l
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50 parameters which they had hooked up to their simulator 2
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with that particular point.
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On this chart, the monies 3
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two plants in that.
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In fact, i.s it practical to do 24 the prototype on.the basis of hand-wavi.ng?
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Well, is this chart something 21 we ought to be addressing, or is it obsolete?
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I MR. STELLO:
I should at least note that the Staff 2
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resources are needed to do this.
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That seems to be the Xl 8
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So that he could get the f
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Now, let's see.
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For ' 82?
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No hands.
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That's the premise.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You know, the whole thing won't 2
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enormous cost; whereas if we go to Chattanooga std cit it 2
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Congress, confuses me, because it really seems to underlie 2
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What is that?
Just put the 2
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That's right.
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Right.
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don't have any problem with that approach.
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design contract, with a total system contract?
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assistance.
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f specifications.
What you need is somebody incapable of doing 2
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Yes, I understand.
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Other comments?
24 COMMISSIONER GILIUSKY:
One question:
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is their reaction to it?
2 MR. GRIMES:
We got some feedback on the comments 3
on 0696, and I would say there is not a great constituency
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I guess if no one has 23 other comments to add or questions to ask, I'll adjourn the f
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Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the meeting was
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MUCLEAR REGULATORY COM4ISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before One NRC Commission in the matter of:
Date of Proceeding:
March 26, 1981 Docket !! umber:
Place of Proceeding:
washington, D.C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Ccamission.
ANN RILEY Official Reporter (Typed) 7-t
- i. s.
t.
l Official Reporter ( Sign atur e :'
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