ML20003C889

Reviews EPRI Evaluation Re Potential Conservatisms & Ranges of Uncertainity in WASH-1400 Analysis of Iodine Release for Tmlb Sequence.More Research Required.Prof Qualifications & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20003C889
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/05/1980
From:	Denning R Battelle Memorial Institute, COLUMBUS LABORATORIES
To:	Bernero R NRC
Shared Package
ML20003C884	List: ML20003C883 ML20003C889
References
NUDOCS 8103180637
Download: ML20003C889 (13)

Text

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• . ' i Columbus Laboratories 563 Eng Avence t

Columbus. Ohio 41:m *

. Tetephone (6 4) 424-W24 l Teles 24 5454 August 5, 1980 ,

Mr. Robert Bernero Probabilistic Analysis Staff -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocinission ~

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr,

Bernero:

At your request, we have reviewed an evaluation that was made by EPRI of the. potential conservatisms and ranges of uncertainty in the WASH- Our c'om- s 1400 analysis of the iodine release for the TMLB'6 sequence.

ments follow. ,

The representation of attenuation factors for the WASH-1400 Scenario and Models (Case A) is somewhat over-simplified and does not quite represent what was actually done. Although only 88% of the iodine inventory was

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assumed to be released during core melting in the vessel, the other 12%

was released during the gap'and vapo'rization periods. The attenuation factor should therefore be unity. Similarly, the fraction.of the con- .

tainment inventory released rapidly at the time of rupture was 0.85.

However, more iodine was released from containment.during the following In

. hours as the result of gas production from attack of the concrete.

fact', RCB plateout and RCS rupture mode attenuation factors cannot be l

separated. In WASH-1400, 0.7 of the core inventory The of iodine was esti-total attenua-mated to be eventually released to the environment.

i In our reanalysis of TMLB'6 using PARCH tion factor was therefore 1.4 and CORRAL, the total release obtained was 0.31 for a total attenuation of 3.2. The reduction in .the predicted release of iodine relative to WASH-1400 is due to the improved treat:nent of containment themal-hydraulics afforded by PARCH, leading to increased plateout in the l

containment.

• Case B, which is intended to be more realistic about attenuation factors, -

raises some interesting questions .that will require Some more of the effort most to resolve significant l

than is possible in this limited review.

issues relate to the details of the themal-hydraulic behavior in the pri-i-

mary system during core melting, though clearly there are substantial'un- He-f certainties regarding the chemistry and transport behaviorSome of iodine.

of the other will provide you with our current views on these issues.' in the un -

apsects of fission products attenuation have been address . and TRAP .

(

i tainty analyses that have been performed for PARCH / CORRAL 1

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0 U l 2 August 5, 1930 j

' 1:r. F.abert Barnero j

/  !!e see no reason to be as optimistic about the core melt releasa fraction as indicated by EPRI in Case B. TheSASCHAreleaseexperiments[3Ishow

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Although the f( 10 % release for iodine at the temperatures of interest.in these experiml p actor situations, we see no reason to assume enhanced retention; though 7 the chemical form of the iodine could obviously have an influence on its

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release. It has been speculated that some peripheral low power bundles may not actually melt in an accident of this type because of reduced self absorption of nuclear radiation and because of high thermal radiation to surrounding structures. Even if these were the case, it would only repre-sent a small fraction of the core inventory of iodine. We would estimate the range of the core melt release attenuation factor as 1-1.2.

We have investigated primary systen plateout for the TMLB's sequence ir)qn 1 uncertainty analysis associated with the developaent of the TRAP code.H Under the assumption that iodine is released as a vapor, the attenuation factor is predicted to be in the range of 1-1.02 with a best estimate of 1.007. If postulatedge iodine is actually released in the CsI, as Malinau dicted to be 1.1. These values

• are obviously well below the EPRI range of 1-100. .,

As implied earlier, water ' trapping of the released iodine is the most dif-ficult mode of attenuation to assess because of many uncertainties regarding the details of thermal-hydraulic conditions during meltdown as well as un-R certainties regarding iodine chemistry and transport. The first question is whether or not there will be water in the pressurizer during the time of iodine release from the fuel. Following dryout of the steam generators, Heat removal the flow through the primary system loops would stagnate.

- from the primary system would then be accomplished by steam generated in

- the core region passing to the upper plenum, to the pressurizer surge line in one of the hot legs,- through the pressurizer and out the relief'and/or safety valves to the pressurizer quench tank. As the steam passes through l

' the water in the pressurizer, both would be saturated. Except for some amount of carryover, the water in the pressurizer would not be released out the safety valve or boiled away. Prior to core uncovery, this water l

I would not be able to flow down against the countercurrent flow of steam from the core. At 2 hr following shutdown, the steam flow rate would be 5

o approximately 2.3 x 10 .lb/hr and the steam velocity in the surge line would be 7.8 ft/sec.

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! countercurrent flow ir. pipes, the critical velocity above which no flood-ing (countercurrent flow of water) can occur is 1.8 ft/sec under these conditions. Thus, until significant core uncovery occurs, water would LOFT experiments also confirm beexpectedtogiaininthepressurizer.As core uncovery takes place, however, two im this behavior.

happen: The flow rate of steam decreases and the exit temperature of gases from the core becomes superhaated relative to the water in the pressurizer.

With no countercurrent flow of steam, the. pressurizer could empty into the primary system in approximately one minute. Thus, we would expect the water

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g August 5,1930 3

Mr. Robert Bernero in the pressurizer to flow back into the reactor vessel as the core ,

, being heatup.

uncovered and heated up.It would also,i however, this waterlead wouldto reevolu f

the water i; 'he pressurizer earlier in the accident s nceConsequently, ,

be subseq0e i evaporated.

water in tne pressurizer does not have a significant potential for retain ing iodine'in an accident of this type.

The tank.

other region in which water could trap fodin f presserizer is saturated at the pressure corresponding to the the relief and/or safety valves. .

back pressure, the steam remains saturated and actually gains tion (assuming a containment Thus, the saturated pressure water in ofrelief the 2 barstank the may quality not be would b imately 0.925).

heated and boiled away by the hydrogen released from the primary sy After core uncovery, the steam released from the If all of system primary superheated, but the flow rate would beit would significan Since k

take about 40 minutes to boil-away the g00 ft only a fraction of the decay heat would be transf of the pressure vessel.

If the water in the quench tank were subcooled, Since condensation the water of th would be very effective in scrubbing fodine from the flow.

is expected to be saturated, however, toe amount ofbubbles. iodine sc on the ability of the iodine toAssuming diffuse aout of the bubble.s water-steam before the partition coefficient escape the surface of the water. i f of 200, a subchergency of 5 feet, and71aUnder bubble s using mass transfer calculations for stagnant spherical i ld be bubble.

these assumptions, approximately 50 percent of the released iod ne w retained in the water. Variations in the above assumptions do not appe to markedly affect the above results.

from the fuel would flow out of the pressurizer and through the q Some of the iodine would still be in the primary system at the .

failure and would flow into the reactor cavity Based following on the abovevessel esti- hea without passing through water in the quench tank. ARCH results bound on mates of iodine diffusion out of the bubbles and observa regarding gases retained in the vessel, we would estimate the upper

10. ..

the po'tential for water trapping to be an attenuation factor of '

The amount of plateout in thel containm9n} has been studied At a i analyses of the MARCH and CORRAL codest / for this accident sequ 90%

2.3 to 20.

probability level, the range of attenuation factors but does notfa rate following containment failure as well as several otherAlthough it is p include attenuation in the leak path.

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/ 4 August 5, 1950 j gr. R:bert Bernero

/ containment failure mode could involve tortuous leak paths through the concrete which would result in significant attenuation; such a failure

• rode would not be consistent with pressure levels that challenge.the .

gross structural integrity of the containment, as have been considered in HASH-1400 and related studies.

Given the other accident assumptions, we see little basis for taking credit for significant attenuation in the leak path. .

Table 1 sea.arizes our estimates for potential iodine attenuation factors.

As you can see, our total range is much smaller than the EPRI evaluation and our best estimate is actually below the EPRI lower value.

We will not comment in detail on Case C since a wide variety of assumptions can be made about partial core melt accidents. The consequences will be obviously influenced by' the degree of core melting and, perhaps make im-Further, if con-portantly, by the effectiveness of containment sprays.

tainment integrity is maintained, the consequences to the public health would be minor regardless of other assumptions.

We believe that the exercise performed by EPRI has been useful in showing the magnitude of uncert.ainty associated with =any of the phenomena in the The THLS's accident, one of *the . dominant sequences for the WASH-1400 PWR.

evaluation provides good evidence that more research is required to enable accurate predictions to be made of the consequences of core meltdown acci-dents. It cannot be concluded, however, that the consequences of the THLS'd f.i..

'"' accident segeunces are being grossly overestimated under our current assumptions.

Sincerely,

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Richard S. Denning (

Research Leader Nuclear and Flow Systems Section RSD:erc .

xc: H. Cunningham, NRC O

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t Mr. P.obert Scencro 5 Aupst 5,1950 l

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/ TABLE 1. ESTIMATED ATTENUATION FACTORS FOR TML3'6 Low High B.E.

Core Melt 1 1.2 1 1.1 1

PCS plateout 1

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Water trapping 1 10 2 RCB plateout 2.3 20 3.2

- 2.3 260 6.4

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August 5,1930 Mr. R:bert Sernero 6

. (1) P. Baybutt, et al., "Results of Uncertainty Studies for the MARCH / -

CORRAL Code Package", to be published September, 1980. .

(2) P. Baybutt, et al., "An Assessment of LWR Primary System Radio-Nuclide Retention in Meltdown Accidents Using the TRAP Computer Code", CONF-800403/V-II, pp 1322-1327-(April,1980). .

(3) H. Albrecht, Y. Matschoss, and H. Wild, " Experimental Investigation of LWR Core Material Release at Temperatures Ranging from 1500 -

2800 C", unpublished.

(4) R. A. Lorenz, J. L. Collins, and A. P. Malinauskas, " Fission Product Source Terms for the Light Water Reactor loss-of-Coolant Accident",

Nuclear Technolocy, Mid-December,1979.

(5) G. B. Wallis, One-Dimensional Two-Phase Flow, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York,1979.

(6) L.. P. Leach, "Results ana Evaluation of the Nuclear Tests", GRS-16 April, 1980. .

(7) Crank, J., The Mathematics of Diffusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967.

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h Appendix II Resume of Dr. Jan Beyea m ,n m 9

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Rscums for Jan Boysa February 1981 EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968 (Nuclear Physics)

B. A., Amherst College, 1962 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

1980 to date, Senior Energy Scientist, National Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022.

1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University.

1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College.

1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Columbia University Physics Department.

CONSULTING WORK:

Consultant on nuclear energy to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Office of the Attorney General, Common-wealth of Massachusetts, the state of lower Saxony in West Germany and the Swedish Energy Commission, and various citizens' groups in tha United States. _._

PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ENERGY POLICY:

" Details of the The Audubon Energy Plan," Peterson, Beyea, Paulson and Cutler, National Audubon Society, March 1981.

" Indoor Air Pollution," Commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 37, Page 63, February 1981.

" Locating and Eliminating Obscure but Major Energy Losses in Resi-dential Housing", Harrje, Dutt and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 85, Part II (1979). (Winner of ASHRAE outstanding paper award.)

" Attic Heat Loss and Conservation Policy", Dutt, Beyea, Sinden.

ASME Technology and Society Division paper 78-TS-5, Houston, Texas, 1978.

" Comments on the proposed FTC trade regulation rule on labeling and advertising of thermal insulation", Jan Beyea and Gautam Dutt, testimony before the Federal Trade Commission, January 1978.

" Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Energy Balance of Twin Rivers Townhouses", Beyea, Dutt, Woteki, Energy and Buildings, Volume I (1977), Page 261. Also Chapter 3 of Saving Energy in the Home, Ballinger, 197S.

"The Two-Resistance Model for Attic Heat Flow: Implications for Conservation Policy", Woteki, Dutt, Beyea, Energy--the International Journal, 3, 657 (1978).

PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ENERGY POLICY (CONT'D.):

" Energy Conservation in an Old 3-Story Apartment Complex," Beyea, Harrje, Sinden, Energy Use Management , Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1977, Volume 1, Page 373.

" Load Shifting Techniques Using Home Appliances," Jan Beyea, Robert Weatherwax, Energy Use Management, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1978, Volume III/IV, Page 121.

PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY Articles:

""mergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36, Page 40, December 1980. (An earlier version of this article appeared in German as Chapter 3 in Im Ernstfall hilflos?,

E. R. Koch, Fritz Vahrenholt, editors, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne, 1980.)

" Dispute at Indian Point," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, -

36, Page 63, May 1980.

Published Debates:

The Crisis of Nuclear Energy, Subject No. 367 on William Buckley's Firing Line, P.B.S. Television. Transcript printed by Southern Educational Communications Association, 928 Woodrow Street, P. O.

l Box 5966, Columbia, South Carolina, 1979.

Nuclear Reactors: How Safe Are They?, panel discussion sponsored l

l by the Academy Forum of The National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Con-stitution Avenue, Washington, D. C. 20418, May 5, 1980, to be published.

Reports:

"Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island," Report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, December 1980.

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PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY (CONT'D.)

" Decontamination of Krypton 85 from Three !!ile Island Nuclear

' Plant", (with Kendall, et.al.), Report of the Union of Concerned Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.

"Some Comments on Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (with Gordon Thompson),

National Audubon Society, Environmental Policy Department Report No. 3, April, 1980.

" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Containment",

(with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.

"The Effects of Releases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivity from Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at-the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility", report to the Government of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review",

February, 1979.

" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Risk  ;

Spectrum", presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1, 1978. l A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Acci-dents at Barseback, report to the Swedish Energy Commission, Stockholm, DS I 1978:5, January,1978. ,

! ' Testimony:

" Advice.and Recommendations Concerning Changes in Reactor Design l.

and. Safety Analysis which Should Be Required in Light of the Accident o at Three Mile Island," Statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' concerning the proposed rulemaking hearing on degraded cores, Dec. 29, i 1980.  ;

" Testimony on Behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York

j. Regarding A.N.G.R.Y. Contention.No. V(d)," submitted Sept. 30, 1980.

(This' testimony concerned filtered venting retrofits at TMI Unit No. 1 as-a condition of restart.) ___

" Alternatives to the Indian Point Nuclear Reactors", Statement E

-before.the Environmental Protection Committee.of the New York City

' Council, December: 14,_1979. Also before the Committee, "The Impact i

on New York City of Reactor Accidents at' Indian-Point", June 11, 1979.

Also " Consequences of.a Catastrophic Reactor' Accident", statement to l the New York City Board of Health, August.12, 1976.(with Frank i

L ._ _.a. von Hippel).

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PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY (CONT'D)

" Emergency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident",

Testimony before the California Energy Resources and Development Commission, Emergency Response and Evacuation Plans Hearings, November 4, 1978, Page 171.

"Short-term Effects of Catastrophic Accidents on Communities Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Installation", testimony before the1976.

California Energy Resources and Development Commission, December 3, /

" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Jamesport". Written testimony before the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), May, 1977.

piscellaneous:

" Comments on WASH-1400", Statement to the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Oversight Hearings on Reactor Safety, June 11, 1976, Serial No. 94-61, Page 210.

" Upper Limit Calculations of Deaths from Nuclear Reactors",

Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 21, III (1976).

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a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fMTg_ ppF?.ESPONDENCB BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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In the Matter of )

METROPOLITAN EDISON ) Docket No. 50-289 g q)

COMPANY, et~~

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE p I hereby certify that copies of the " Direct Testimony of Dr. Jan Beyea on Behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York Regarding A.N.G.R.Y. Contention No.IIIB(D)" have been mailed postage pre-paid this 27th day Of February, 1901,to the following parties:

Secretary of the Commission Mr. Steven C. Sholly U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Union of Concerned Scientists

, Washington, D.C. 20555 ' Suite 601 Attn: Chief, Docketlng & Service '1725 I Street, N. W.

Section ' Washington, D. C. 20006 James A. Tourtellotte, Esq. Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.

Office of the Exec. Legal Director Fox,' Farr & Cunningham U.S. Nuclcar Regulatory Commission 2320 North Second Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA 17110 Robert !!. Adler, Esq. _

r.'ada Berryhill Assistant Attorney General Coall. n for " clear Power 505 Executive House Postpo < t P.O. Box 2357 2610 endon -

Harrisburg, PA 17120 W4 ington, Delaware . 8 Da .. Pt. P . Walter W. Cohen, Consumer Adv.

32 South 'ar Street Department of Justice York ennsylvani l'*1l Strawberry Square, 14th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17127

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4 Cert, of Service -

Docket No. 50-289 Ro ** L. Knupp, E qufre Chauncey Kepford Assista. Solici* Judith H. Johnsrud County of D in Environmental Coalition on P.O. Box- Nuclear Power 407 N . Front eet 433 Orlando Avenue Har 1sburg, PA 171 - State College, PA 16801 John A. Levin, Esquire t Q. Pollard Assistant Counsel Chesap Energy ' lance Pennsylvania Public Utility 609 Montpell reet Commission Baltim - , arylan 8 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Ms. Louise Bradferd Marvin I. Lewis TMI Alert .. .

6504 Bradford Terrace 315 Peffer Street Philadelphia, PA 19149 Harrisburg, PA 17102 ,

Ms. Marjorie Aamodt Ivan W. Smith, Chairman RD #5 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Coatesville, PA 19320 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Dr. Linda N. Little 881 W. Outer Drive 5000 Hermitage Drive Oak Ridg1, Tennessee 37830 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612

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GeorgeF.Trowbridge,Esqukre MsT Jm.n fa Shaw, Pittman, Potts & R.D. 3 ox s.' ~

rs, Pennsylvania '4 Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washingto'n, D.C. 20036 .

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