ML20003C889
| ML20003C889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1980 |
| From: | Denning R Battelle Memorial Institute, COLUMBUS LABORATORIES |
| To: | Bernero R NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003C884 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103180637 | |
| Download: ML20003C889 (13) | |
Text
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v Columbus Laboratories 563 Eng Avence t
Columbus. Ohio 41:m Tetephone (6 4) 424-W24 Teles 24 5454 August 5, 1980 Mr. Robert Bernero Probabilistic Analysis Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocinission ~
Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr,
Bernero:
At your request, we have reviewed an evaluation that was made by EPRI of the. potential conservatisms and ranges of uncertainty in the WASH-Our c'om-1400 analysis of the iodine release for the TMLB'6 sequence.
s ments follow.
The representation of attenuation factors for the WASH-1400 Scenario and Models (Case A) is somewhat over-simplified and does not quite represent Although only 88% of the iodine inventory was what was actually done.
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assumed to be released during core melting in the vessel, the other 12%
The attenuation was released during the gap'and vapo'rization periods.
Similarly, the fraction.of the con-factor should therefore be unity.
tainment inventory released rapidly at the time of rupture was 0.85.
However, more iodine was released from containment.during the following In hours as the result of gas production from attack of the concrete.
fact', RCB plateout and RCS rupture mode attenuation factors cannot be separated.
In WASH-1400, 0.7 of the core inventory of iodine was esti-The total attenua-l mated to be eventually released to the environment.
tion factor was therefore 1.4 In our reanalysis of TMLB'6 using PARCH i
and CORRAL, the total release obtained was 0.31 for a total attenuation The reduction in.the predicted release of iodine relative to of 3.2.
WASH-1400 is due to the improved treat:nent of containment themal-hydraulics afforded by PARCH, leading to increased plateout in the l
containment.
Case B, which is intended to be more realistic about attenuation factors, raises some interesting questions.that will require more effort to resolve Some of the most significant l
than is possible in this limited review.
issues relate to the details of the themal-hydraulic behavior in the pri-mary system during core melting, though clearly there are substantial'un-He-certainties regarding the chemistry and transport behavior of iodine.
i-Some of the other will provide you with our current views on these issues.'
f in the un apsects of fission products attenuation have been address
. and TRAP tainty analyses that have been performed for PARCH / CORRAL
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August 5, 1930 j
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fraction
!!e see no reason to be as optimistic about the core melt releasa TheSASCHAreleaseexperiments[3Ishow as indicated by EPRI in Case B.
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Although the f( 10 % release for iodine at the temperatures of interest.in these experiml
-[c[s9/Vratios p actor situations, we see no reason to assume enhanced retention; though the chemical form of the iodine could obviously have an influence on its 7
o release.
It has been speculated that some peripheral low power bundles may not actually melt in an accident of this type because of reduced self absorption of nuclear radiation and because of high thermal radiation to surrounding structures.
Even if these were the case, it would only repre-sent a small fraction of the core inventory of iodine.
We would estimate the range of the core melt release attenuation factor as 1-1.2.
We have investigated primary systen plateout for the TMLB's sequence ir)qn uncertainty analysis associated with the developaent of the TRAP code.H 1
Under the assumption that iodine is released as a vapor, the attenuation factor is predicted to be in the range of 1-1.02 with a best estimate of postulatedge iodine is actually released in the CsI, as Malinau 1.007.
If dicted to be 1.1.
These values are obviously well below the EPRI range of 1-100.
As implied earlier, water ' trapping of the released iodine is the most dif-ficult mode of attenuation to assess because of many uncertainties regarding the details of thermal-hydraulic conditions during meltdown as well as un-R certainties regarding iodine chemistry and transport. The first question is whether or not there will be water in the pressurizer during the time of iodine release from the fuel.
Following dryout of the steam generators, Heat removal the flow through the primary system loops would stagnate.
from the primary system would then be accomplished by steam generated in the core region passing to the upper plenum, to the pressurizer surge line in one of the hot legs,- through the pressurizer and out the relief'and/or safety valves to the pressurizer quench tank. As the steam passes through l
the water in the pressurizer, both would be saturated.
Except for some amount of carryover, the water in the pressurizer would not be released out the safety valve or boiled away.
Prior to core uncovery, this water would not be able to flow down against the countercurrent flow of steam l
I At 2 hr following shutdown, the steam flow rate would be from the core.
approximately 2.3 x 10.lb/hr and the steam velocity in the surge line 5
o would be 7.8 ft/sec.
l countercurrent flow ir. pipes, the critical velocity above which no flood-ing (countercurrent flow of water) can occur is 1.8 ft/sec under these conditions.
Thus, until significant core uncovery occurs, water would LOFT experiments also confirm beexpectedtogiaininthepressurizer.As core uncovery takes place, however, two im this behavior.
The flow rate of steam decreases and the exit temperature of gases happen:
from the core becomes superhaated relative to the water in the pressurizer.
With no countercurrent flow of steam, the. pressurizer could empty into the primary system in approximately one minute.
Thus, we would expect the water
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g August 5,1930 3
Mr. Robert Bernero in the pressurizer to flow back into the reactor vessel as the core being uncovered and heated up.It would also, however, lead to reevolu heatup.
i this water would the water i; 'he pressurizer earlier in the accident s nceConsequently, f
pressurizer does not have a significant potential for retain evaporated.
be subseq0e i water in tne ing iodine'in an accident of this type.
The other region in which water could trap fodi f
presserizer is saturated at the pressure corresponding to the tank.
back pressure, the steam remains saturated and actually gains the relief and/or safety valves.
tion (assuming a containment pressure of 2 bars the quality would b Thus, the saturated water in the relief tank may not be heated and boiled away by the hydrogen released from the primary s imately 0.925).
After core uncovery, the steam released from the primary system If all of superheated, but the flow rate would be significan Since it would take about 40 minutes to boil-away the g00 ft k
only a fraction of the decay heat would be transf of the pressure vessel.
If the water in the quench tank were subcooled, condensation of th Since the water would be very effective in scrubbing fodine from the flow.
is expected to be saturated, however, toe amount of iodine sc bubbles.
on the ability of the iodine to diffuse out of the bubble.s before the Assuming a water-steam partition coefficient i
f escape the surface of the water.
of 200, a subchergency of 5 feet, and a bubble s 71 Under using mass transfer calculations for stagnant spherical bubble.
i ld be these assumptions, approximately 50 percent of the released iod ne w Variations in the above assumptions do not appe retained in the water.
to markedly affect the above results.
from the fuel would flow out of the pressurizer and through the q Some of the iodine would still be in the primary system at the failure and would flow into the reactor cavity following vessel hea Based on the above esti-without passing through water in the quench tank.
ARCH results mates of iodine diffusion out of the bubbles and observa bound on regarding gases retained in the vessel, we would estimate the upper 10.
the po'tential for water trapping to be an attenuation factor of The amount of plateout in the containm9n} has been studied i At a analyses of the MARCH and CORRAL codest / for this accident sequ l
90% probability level, the range of attenuation fa factors but does not rate following containment failure as well as several otherAlthough it is p 2.3 to 20.
include attenuation in the leak path.
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4 August 5, 1950 j gr. R:bert Bernero
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containment failure mode could involve tortuous leak paths through the concrete which would result in significant attenuation; such a failure rode would not be consistent with pressure levels that challenge.the gross structural integrity of the containment, as have been considered in HASH-1400 and related studies.
Given the other accident assumptions, we see little basis for taking credit for significant attenuation in the leak path.
Table 1 sea.arizes our estimates for potential iodine attenuation factors.
As you can see, our total range is much smaller than the EPRI evaluation and our best estimate is actually below the EPRI lower value.
We will not comment in detail on Case C since a wide variety of assumptions can be made about partial core melt accidents. The consequences will be obviously influenced by' the degree of core melting and, perhaps make im-portantly, by the effectiveness of containment sprays.
Further, if con-tainment integrity is maintained, the consequences to the public health would be minor regardless of other assumptions.
We believe that the exercise performed by EPRI has been useful in showing the magnitude of uncert.ainty associated with =any of the phenomena in the The THLS's accident, one of *the. dominant sequences for the WASH-1400 PWR.
evaluation provides good evidence that more research is required to enable accurate predictions to be made of the consequences of core meltdown acci-It cannot be concluded, however, that the consequences of the THLS'd f.i..
dents.
accident segeunces are being grossly overestimated under our current assumptions.
Sincerely,
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Richard S. Denning Research Leader Nuclear and Flow Systems Section RSD:erc xc:
H. Cunningham, NRC O
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Mr. P.obert Scencro 5
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TABLE 1.
ESTIMATED ATTENUATION FACTORS FOR TML3'6
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Low High B.E.
Core Melt 1
1.2 1
PCS plateout 1
1.1 1
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Water trapping 1
10 2
RCB plateout 2.3 20 3.2 2.3 260 6.4
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Mr. R:bert Sernero 6
August 5,1930 (1)
P. Baybutt, et al., "Results of Uncertainty Studies for the MARCH /
CORRAL Code Package", to be published September, 1980.
(2)
P. Baybutt, et al., "An Assessment of LWR Primary System Radio-Nuclide Retention in Meltdown Accidents Using the TRAP Computer Code", CONF-800403/V-II, pp 1322-1327-(April,1980).
(3)
H. Albrecht, Y. Matschoss, and H. Wild, " Experimental Investigation of LWR Core Material Release at Temperatures Ranging from 1500 -
2800 C", unpublished.
(4)
R. A. Lorenz, J. L. Collins, and A. P. Malinauskas, " Fission Product Source Terms for the Light Water Reactor loss-of-Coolant Accident",
Nuclear Technolocy, Mid-December,1979.
(5)
G. B. Wallis, One-Dimensional Two-Phase Flow, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York,1979.
(6)
L.. P. Leach, "Results ana Evaluation of the Nuclear Tests", GRS-16 April, 1980.
(7)
- Crank, J., The Mathematics of Diffusion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967.
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h Appendix II Resume of Dr. Jan Beyea m,n m 9
I
Rscums for Jan Boysa February 1981 EDUCATION:
Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968 (Nuclear Physics)
B.
A.,
Amherst College, 1962 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
1980 to date, Senior Energy Scientist, National Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022.
1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University.
1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College.
1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Columbia University Physics Department.
CONSULTING WORK:
Consultant on nuclear energy to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Office of the Attorney General, Common-wealth of Massachusetts, the state of lower Saxony in West Germany and the Swedish Energy Commission, and various citizens' groups in tha United States.
PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ENERGY POLICY:
" Details of the The Audubon Energy Plan," Peterson, Beyea, Paulson and Cutler, National Audubon Society, March 1981.
" Indoor Air Pollution," Commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 37, Page 63, February 1981.
" Locating and Eliminating Obscure but Major Energy Losses in Resi-dential Housing", Harrje, Dutt and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 85, Part II (1979).
(Winner of ASHRAE outstanding paper award.)
" Attic Heat Loss and Conservation Policy", Dutt, Beyea, Sinden.
ASME Technology and Society Division paper 78-TS-5, Houston, Texas, 1978.
" Comments on the proposed FTC trade regulation rule on labeling and advertising of thermal insulation", Jan Beyea and Gautam Dutt, testimony before the Federal Trade Commission, January 1978.
" Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Energy Balance of Twin Rivers Townhouses", Beyea, Dutt, Woteki, Energy and Buildings, Volume I (1977), Page 261.
Also Chapter 3 of Saving Energy in the Home, Ballinger, 197S.
"The Two-Resistance Model for Attic Heat Flow:
Implications for Conservation Policy", Woteki, Dutt, Beyea, Energy--the International Journal, 3, 657 (1978).
PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY CONSERVATION AND ENERGY POLICY (CONT'D.):
" Energy Conservation in an Old 3-Story Apartment Complex," Beyea, Harrje, Sinden, Energy Use Management, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1977, Volume 1, Page 373.
" Load Shifting Techniques Using Home Appliances," Jan Beyea, Robert Weatherwax, Energy Use Management, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1978, Volume III/IV, Page 121.
PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY Articles:
""mergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36, Page 40, December 1980.
(An earlier version of this article appeared in German as Chapter 3 in Im Ernstfall hilflos?,
E.
R. Koch, Fritz Vahrenholt, editors, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne, 1980.)
" Dispute at Indian Point," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36, Page 63, May 1980.
Published Debates:
The Crisis of Nuclear Energy, Subject No. 367 on William Buckley's Firing Line, P.B.S. Television.
Transcript printed by Southern Educational Communications Association, 928 Woodrow Street, P. O.
l Box 5966, Columbia, South Carolina, 1979.
l l
Nuclear Reactors:
How Safe Are They?, panel discussion sponsored by the Academy Forum of The National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Con-stitution Avenue, Washington, D. C. 20418, May 5, 1980, to be published.
Reports:
"Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island," Report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, December 1980.
l l
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~ PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY (CONT'D.)
" Decontamination of Krypton 85 from Three !!ile Island Nuclear (with Kendall, et.al.), Report of the Union of Concerned
' Plant",
1980.
Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, "Some Comments on Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (with Gordon Thompson),
National Audubon Society, Environmental Policy Department Report No. 3, April, 1980.
" Nuclear Reactor Accidents:
The Value of Improved Containment",
(with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Effects of Releases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivity from Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at-the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility", report to the Government of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review",
February, 1979.
" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Risk Spectrum", presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research l
1978.
in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1, A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Acci-report to the Swedish Energy Commission, Stockholm, dents at Barseback, DS I 1978:5, January,1978.
' Testimony:
" Advice.and Recommendations Concerning Changes in Reactor Design and. Safety Analysis which Should Be Required in Light of the Accident l.
at Three Mile Island," Statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission o
concerning the proposed rulemaking hearing on degraded cores, Dec. 29, i
1980.
" Testimony on Behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York Regarding A.N.G.R.Y. Contention.No. V(d)," submitted Sept. 30, 1980.
j.
(This' testimony concerned filtered venting retrofits at TMI Unit No. 1 as-a condition of restart.)
" Alternatives to the Indian Point Nuclear Reactors", Statement
-before.the Environmental Protection Committee.of the New York City E
i
' Council, December: 14,_1979.
Also before the Committee, "The Impact on New York City of Reactor Accidents at' Indian-Point", June 11, 1979.
l Also " Consequences of.a Catastrophic Reactor' Accident", statement to the New York City Board of Health, August.12, 1976.(with Frank i
L._
_.a. von Hippel).
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. PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY (CONT'D)
" Emergency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident",
Testimony before the California Energy Resources and Development Commission, Emergency Response and Evacuation Plans Hearings, November 4, 1978, Page 171.
"Short-term Effects of Catastrophic Accidents on Communities Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Installation", testimony before the California Energy Resources and Development Commission, December 3, 1976.
/
" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Jamesport".
Written testimony before the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), May, 1977.
piscellaneous:
" Comments on WASH-1400", Statement to the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Oversight Hearings on Reactor Safety, June 11, 1976, Serial No. 94-61, Page 210.
" Upper Limit Calculations of Deaths from Nuclear Reactors",
Bull. Am. Phys. Soc. 21, III (1976).
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a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fMTg_ ppF?.ESPONDENCB BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON
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Docket No. 50-289 g
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COMPANY, et al.,
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M occ:"ITO (Three Mile Island
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE p
I hereby certify that copies of the " Direct Testimony of Dr. Jan Beyea on Behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York Regarding A.N.G.R.Y. Contention No.IIIB(D)" have been mailed postage pre-paid this 27th day Of February, 1901,to the following parties:
Secretary of the Commission Mr. Steven C.
Sholly U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Union of Concerned Scientists Washington, D.C.
20555
' Suite 601 Attn:
Chief, Docketlng & Service
'1725 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20006 Section James A.
Tourtellotte, Esq.
Jordan D.
Cunningham, Esq.
Office of the Exec. Legal Director Fox,' Farr & Cunningham U.S. Nuclcar Regulatory Commission 2320 North Second Street Washington, D.C.
20555 Harrisburg, PA 17110 r.'ada Berryhill Robert !!. Adler, Esq.
Coall.
n for " clear Power Assistant Attorney General 505 Executive House Postpo <
t P.O. Box 2357 2610 endon Harrisburg, PA 17120 W4 ington, Delaware 8
Da..
Pt. P Walter W.
Cohen, Consumer Adv.
32 South
'ar Street Department of Justice York ennsylvani l'*1l Strawberry Square, 14th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17127
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. 4 Cert, of Service Docket No. 50-289 Ro
- L. Knupp, E qufre Chauncey Kepford Assista.
Solici*
Judith H. Johnsrud County of D in Environmental Coalition on P.O.
Box-Nuclear Power 407 N Front eet 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16801 Har 1sburg, PA 171 John A. Levin, Esquire t Q. Pollard Assistant Counsel Chesap Energy '
lance Pennsylvania Public Utility 609 Montpell reet
8 Commission Baltim -
arylan Harrisburg, PA 17120 Ms. Louise Bradferd Marvin I. Lewis 6504 Bradford Terrace TMI Alert Philadelphia, PA 19149 315 Peffer Street Harrisburg, PA 17102 Ms. Marjorie Aamodt Ivan W.
Smith, Chairman RD #5 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Coatesville, PA 19320 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Dr. Linda N.
Little 881 W. Outer Drive 5000 Hermitage Drive Oak Ridg1, Tennessee 37830 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 GeorgeF.Trowbridge,Esqukre MsT Jm.n fa
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Trowbridge rs, Pennsylvania
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