ML20003B977
| ML20003B977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1981 |
| From: | Crouse R TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003B975 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102260316 | |
| Download: ML20003B977 (20) | |
Text
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.o KREDO EDISON Docket No. 50-346 AcmuoPCmmu vc. %w License No. NPF-3 se+<
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Serial No. 1-180 January 5, 1981 A. B. Davis, Chief Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Dear Mr. Davis:
This letter is in response to IE Inspection Report 80-31, dated December 10, 1980, concerning the November 6, 1980 emergency exercise for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
The exercise was a full scale test of the new Davis-Besse. Emergency Plan and a fully integrated exercise with State and local government radiological emergency plans.
From the exercise critique by Toledo Edison and comments of the NRC during the inspection exit interview, we have identified several deficiencies requir-ing improvement.
The Toledo Edison review and critiqv.e is attached (Attachment A).
Reconcen-dations in each section will be consolidated into groups of major corrective actions. Documentation of actions to resolve these items will be available.
Specific deficiencies identified in Paragraph 4 of IE Inspection Report 80-31 are presented here with corrective actions and completion schedules as noted:
1.a Training for radiation monitoring teams covering survey techniques..
Discussion:
Some members of the radiation monitoring teams require additional train-ing on procedures for radiation monitoring ec,uipment use in the field, although all personnel were familiar with the equipment and its operation.
Corrective Action:
Instructions which are housed with these instruments havt been revised
'to incorporate more detailed instructions for field use.
Radiation
. monitoring te.ms will be provided additional trair.tng on. the use of field' survey instruments.
L THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY ED! SON PtAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO. OHIO 43652 81022603.10 JAN 0 81981
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 1-180 January 5, 1981 Page two Completion Date:
Additional training on use of instruments will be completed by the 1981 semi-annual Health Physics Drill.
1.b.
Training for telephone communicators covering technical topics.
Discussion:
During the emergency exercise it was readily apparent that telephone communicators needed more familiarity with the technical verbage of emergency communications. Although familiar with the general Station and nuclear power verbage, the specific vocabulary identifying coci.
things as units of measure in radiological communications was lacking.
Corrective Action:
As part of a planned Task Analysis for the emergency center managers (see #4), Toledo Edison will identify specifics for various phone communicator training programs.
Completion Date:
Dependent upon the completion of the Task Analysis, it is expected th".t this. training would be completed during the third quarter of 1981.
2.
Revision of the radioiodine analysis procedures.
Discussion:
Based on in person discussion during the inspection exit interview, tha chemistry and health physics staff were made aware of specific procedures which were identified as being in need of revision.
Corrective Action:
Radioiodine analysis' procedures were revised to account for various iso-topes of iodine and this has been discussed with W. L. Axelson of the Emergency Planning Program Office in Region III.
Completion Date:
This has been completed.
3.
More realistic' incident to test the licensee operator's response in techn.tcal-areas.
Discussion:
-The scenario'used by Toledo' Edison during the 1980 emergency exercise was' designed specifically to assist the Ottawa County and State of Ohio officials.with their response activitie.. With a fully integrated exercise,:it was' desired that the mrdn focus would be the external
. participation.
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 l
Serial No. 1-180 January 5, 1981 Page three Corrective Action:
A more realistic accident scenario will be developed for use during the 4
next Davis-Besse emergency exercise.
Completion Date:
Davis-Besse emergency exercise - no later than fourth quarter, 1981.
4.
Better defined task assignaents for Technical Support Center and Emer-gency Control Center managers.
Discussion:
The first full scale test of the new Technical Support Center (TSC) concept identified some uncertainty as to TSC responsibilities during emergency operations.
Corrective Action:
In order to accurately determine the tasks for these Center managers, Toledo Edison will-conduct a study of the roles and responsibilities of key personnel. This study will be based, in part, on the current and will be utilized in the final concepts for the Emergency Pi 7 Emergency Operations Facility under construction at the site.
Fc11owing this study, Emergency Control Center and Technical Support Ceuter managers will participate in training sessions designed to familiar-ize them with the assignments.
Completion Date:
Third quarter,-1981.
Yours very truly, ff
^-
RPC/JH/jz cc: NRC DB-1 Resident Inspecter Dan Carner, Project Manager Division of Licensing
'U.S.N.R.C
' Washington, D.C.
20555 a
Attachment A I.
CONTROL ROOM A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Activities were well under control with better than satisfactory participation by all. The Control Room personnel did an above average job of evaluat ng releases and emergency action levels and were able to provide TSC with methods to stop the release.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Control Room was still doing dose assessment after TSC and ECC were activated.
Function should be in the ECC when activated.
3.
Personnel:
Need better assignment of functions - one man doing initial calculations, one on dose assessment (prior to ECC), one on stopping release.
4.
Communications:
Handled fairly well.
Information passed to and from Control Room without any major problems but could use more knowledgeable people as communicators.
Initial conflict in guard notification and later problem with reaching security via phone or gai-tronics. The phone was busy and no one answered the gai-tronics.
Shift supervisor finally had to physically walk to "CAS" to get someone's attention.
5.
Records:
t Need one location for recordkeeping - notes were scattered about and in real event could be lost.
B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical - too many people around Control Room desk.
2.
Resource Material - good use'of all available material.
RO's need work on TI-59 programmable calculator.
3.
Communications - worked well.
4.
Access Control - too'many people not involved with drill were in the-Control Room.
5.
Records - no central area for data for communicators.
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Attachment A C.
Recommendations 1.
Shif t supervisor should assign specific duties to operators.
2.
Centralize recordkeeping - better use of status boards.
3.
TSC or EDO should take over dose assessment function to allow CR to handle plant recovery as soon as one of these locations is activated.
II.
Perfo rmance 1.
Overall:
Seemed to be a lack of understanding of the actuil function of the TSC and individual tasks as related to that function.
The TSC was never able to identify its role either before or after ECC activation.
It maintained a majcr dose assessment activity well after ECC was activated.
Lost sight of who was to make recommendations te whom.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Radiological evaluation was confused - some off-the-wall answers never had sources identified.
Group was late in starting technical evaluation because of work on dose assessment.
3.
Personnel:
Need better identification of roles.
4.
Access Control - good.
5.
Recordkeeping - utilization of status boards poor at beginning. Need documentation of calculational verification or recommendations.
B.
Recommendations 1.
Do a task analysis study and training of key personnel on same.
2.
Provide training on use of loop system.
3.
Better style and use of status boards.
4.
Provide verification and documentation of data.
Attachment A III. OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Perscas responded well to station alarms and were well assigned at the OSC. Major problems were: inadequate communications due to lack of loop phone at the OSC, and the accountability problem, where people were still unaccounted for almost until noon.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Center's manager was well suited to dispatching proper assistance to areas calling for personnel support.
3.
Personnel:
Response teams formed quickly and efficiently.
4.
Communications:
Phone talkers were above average and communicated well with Center manager.
5.
kecords:
No established log for OSC, notes kept by communicator.
Facilities and Equipment
~
B.
1.
. Physical - turbine deck is noisy and hot during plant operation. Recommendation that perhaps maintenance and I&C could muster in their own work areas, be accounted for there_and a report made to OSC.
2.
Resource material - P&ID's weren't available.
l 3.
Communications - although difficult due to lack of adequate phones, were handled well by fire poi-tables.
l l
4.
Personnel - equipment (Security Computer) provides only minimal assistance in detenmining onsite personnel ac-countability.
5.
Access control good.
C.
Recommendations j
1.
Ir sl] at least one loop telephone for communications to g,
y Attachment A 2.
Provide upgraded accountability system in conjunction with Station security.
IV.
EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Appeared to be general confusion in the ECC partially due to size of facility and layout and partially d"e to insufficient numbers and inadequate training c. phone talkers. Data clarification and verification was very confused.
Lack of delegation of duties by Emergency Duty Officer (except for phone talkers) created too much work for EDO. Even when ECC was manned, problems arose on separation of duties between ECC/TSC/CR in area of dose assessment.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Major problem was in communications of raw data early in scenario sequence. After confusion with an erroneous number within the first hour - calculations seemed to go better.
No knowledge by EDO that TSC had sent out on-site radiation monitor'ing teams early with Micro-R meter. Need more than one person doing calculations and better procedure for TI-59 to speed and verify calculations.
3.
Personnel Functions:
Need better deployment of personnel. The EDO performed too many functions which should have been performed by others in the ECC such as filling in status board, doing some calculations, and dispatching the RMT's.
4.
Communications:
Need better training for communicators in passing informa-tion from one location to another.
5.
Records:
Status board updating needs to be re-emphasized to maintain continuity in the ECC. The essential information sheet needs a complete revision, too complicated to follow and full of extraneous infonmation.
l ~
Attachment A B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical - the obvious problem of size, layout and crowding will be solved with the completion of the EPF.
To alleviate severe noise problems, the NRC has recommended purchase of several small heaters for the ECC to maintain an acceptable heat level during winter.
2.
Resource Material - everything was available as needed:
Plans and procedures 3.
Communications Equipment:
The telephone loop system is a major improvement over the previous system - and no serious problems have been identified.
The radio system for communicating with RMT's is still non-functioning. Because of the design of the onsite radio system, it is impossible for mobile units in Company cars to talk with the ECC without taking D-B Security off the air. The two portables assigned to RMT's function fine but only within about a three mile radius. This is identified as a major problem area which should be addressed immediately.
4.
Emergency Equipment:
The RMT equipment worked well this year with the only identified problem being the amount of time it takes RMT's to prepare it for the field use.
Although cars were specifically identified for RMT's for this exercise, there is the potential for no cars to be available for offsite RMT's.
i 5.
Personnel Quantity:
As identified previously, there is a need for additional personnel to assist the EDO with basic functions such as status board upkeep, dispatching and coordination of RMT's information.
6.
Area' Access Control:
Security guard needs to remain at ECC during entire manning period to avoid entrance by unauthorized persons.
7.
- Recordkeeping:
Satisfactory O,
Attachm:nt \\
C.
Recommendations 1.
Provide sufficient personnel to ensure EDO is not forced into duties which detract from his required management functions.
2.
Identify both a short and long-term solution to the radio communications problem.
3.
Identify an RMT coordinator to fully direct the activities of the RMT's.
V.
RADIATION MONITORING TEAMS A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Generally, the RMT's response was above average. All were able to check out equipment adequately although the time to do this needs to be reduced. Equipment all functioned well.
RMT's were hampered by cramped quarters in the ECC and lack of an RMT coordinator.
Failure to follow EI 1300.08 did create some problems for EDO.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Satisfactory, although teams need to be trained better in use of equipmect - not using air samplers on ground and when to turn on equipment.
3.
Personnel:
Failure to follow Procedure EI 1300.08 - when onsite RMT's were dispatched from the TSC instead of reporting l
first to ECC. EDO was not aware onsite teams had been l
dispatched.
l 4.
Records:
Well kept - needs better map location or additional map l
from one large sector map in ECC.
B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Dhysical:
r Major problem was crowded condition for RMT's at the ECC.
l New EPF will alleviate this problem.
2.
Resource Materials:
~
Available as needed f
-Attachment A 3.
Communications Equipment:
This is the major problem area for RMT's.
As previously identified, the Company radio system cannot accommodate the mobile transmission from car to ECC without removing Davis-Besse Security from transmission capability.
4.
Emergency Equipment:
We have some of the best equipment there is and plenty of it.
5.
Personnel Quantity:
Sufficient.
6.
Recordkeeping:
Above average - recommend a log for RMT activities.
C.
Recommendations 1.
Upgrade radio system by removing Davis-Besse Security from existing Maintenance and Operations radio frequency.
This will allow RMT's to communicate with ECC/TSC. This will be a major breakdown during a real emergency as the system now exists.
2.
Provide additional map for RMT's to log readings for EDO instead of using large sector map.
3.
Revise RMT procedure and increase training for RMT's on use of equipment.
(This has been completed)
VI.
OTTAWA COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
The ability of the EOC personnel to function this year was a vast improvement over last year. The major identi-fiable problem was the failure to pass information on to other county groups. This was probably due to the lack I
of a readily recognizable authority in charge of the EOC.
There was some confusion with data transmission which could be alleviated by using the Teleprinter 43 for data i
transmission backed up by voice communication instead of the reverse procedure.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Much improved over last year. Only problems occurred when incorrect data was relayed from the ECC.
Attachment A 3.
Personnel:
Definite improvement in familiarity with the county plan and individual department procedures.
4.
Communications:
Need trainir4g on communication of data. Teleprinter 43 was not used to its fullest capability and consequently there was come confusion during data transmission.
5.
Records:
Although each agency kept an individual log, a centralized log and centrally updateu information sheets were not available.
B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical:
Adequate but could use some rearrangement.
2.
Resource Material:
Adequate 3.
Communications Equipment:
lo problems with actual equipment but need to determine omergency power status for telephones, Need direct telephone line to Ohio Department of Transportation.
4.
' Emergency Equipment:
Emergency generator power for EOC may not be adequate.
5.
Personnel Quantity:
For exercise purposes adequate but in real time a shift change would be difficult to accomplish.
6.
Area Access Control:
Excellent - this was the most obvious improvement over last year.
C.
Recommendations 1.
Designate a person to take charge of EOC to ensure vital information is. passed on to all departmenta.
2.
Determine emergency power sources for EOC.
G w e e
Attachment A VII. PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER A.
Perfo rmance 1.
Overall:
The Public Information area was a vast improvement over last year with the main problem again being the lack of adequate, qualified manpower.
The Company PIC Coordinator (Media Relations Supervisor) is still required to do too many activities.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Area needs work. Public Information still lacks a qualified media trained technical spokesman to adequately address the issues.
3.
Personnel Functions:
There are too many activities assigned to the Media Relations Supervisor.
It is impractical to assume he can handle gathering information, writing press releases, hand?.ing news conferences and maintain coordinated activity with state and county.
State of Ohio needs additional training for its public information officer in handling confrontation situations.
4.
Communications:
Very untimely. Significant events at" the plant were not
. reported to media immediately but rather, were held for next briefing session. Corporate offices took too long to approve news releases.
5.,
Records:
(
All incidents were documented but press releases were taking a long time to get approved. Ottawa County was not using printed press information as was TECo and State of Ohio.
B.
Facilities and Equipment l
1.
Physical Facilities:
l The P.I. Office for TEco at Courthouse is less than adequate, too small, no facilities. Most of this problem will be remedied with new EPF when P.I. function shifts to there and the Courthouse Public Information is a
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subsidiary of EPF.
l Attachm nt A 2.
Resource Material:
Adequate.
Graphics may be too small for a full size auditorium.
3.
Communications Equipment:
Adequate. The addition of several Port Clinton lines helped alleviate some telephone problems but P.R. phone in ECC needs looked at because of voice quality and tone.
4.
Emergency Equipment:
NA 5.
Personnel Quality:
Although there were a lot of public information personnel, most were not media trained professionals and, therefore, unable to readily assist where most needed. A trained media person is necessary to remain at the briefing center at the Junior High full-time.
Should have Corporate level spokesperson at the press briefing area also.
6.
Area Access Control:
Press arrived at briefing site l\\ hours before Toledo Edison arrived to activate the area.
Someone closer should be designated to do this.
C.
Recommendations l.
Provide additional media trained personnel for media briefing. area.
2.
Provide additional technical assistance.
3.
Upgrade the paper flow to Plaza for Co rporate approval.
VIII. EDISON PLAZA - 16th, 7th, 8th A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Plaza activities functioned well with few problems consid-ering the distance from immediate activities. Most items identified are simple revisions in equipment such as additional telephones.
s.-.
Attachment A 2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
There was some initial confusion on the 16th floor with the early declaration of a site emergency because of failure to communicate the reason for this declaration.
When it was determined that an improper number had been used, this was cleared.
The huclear Engineering group functioned very well, identifying all necessary items for plant recovery.
3.
Personnel Functions:
Well defined and executed in all locations.
4.
Communications:
Some initial confusion in establishing phone loops due to unfamiliarity with system by users.
Problem on 7th floor with a phone talker with a very heavy foreign accent. This created great difficulty for the TSC in undarstanding the communicating of technical information.
5.
Records:
Kept as required.
B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical:
Planning Center on 16th floor for Corporate facilities are excellent.
l Identified minor items: addition of clock and telephones 7th floor Nuclear Engineering area is a little small for the number of people working on the problem but this i
could be solve' for a long-term recovery situation by minor rearrangement of furniture.
2.
Resource Material:
The Planning Center on 16th floor needed an Emergency Planning Zone map. No items were identified as unavailable in the 'fuclear Engineering area.
3.
Communications Equipment:
Some areas were identified as needing additional loop telephones. Additional training is recommended for personnel on use of emergency loop telephones.
1
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Attachment A 4.
Emergency Equipment:
NA 5.
Personnel Quantity:
Adequate in all areas.
6.
Access Control:
Effective 7.
Recordkeeping:
Excellent in both areas.
C.
Recommendations 1.
Provide clock and additional telephone in 16th floor Planning Center.
(This has been completed) 2.
Provide additional training of all personnel on use of loop phones.
IX.
CONSTRUCTION OFFICE BUILDING A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Personnel performed as required, however, a gap in the communications procedure exists in notifying the COB of accidents and actions to be taken.
t
.2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
Was difficult based on the l'ack of adequate information being provided.
3.
Personnel Functions:
Was a minor problem with accountability of persons who weren't in their office area.
4.
Communications:
4 Poor to terrible. The Site Construction Manager was 4.
completely unaware of any activity after the initial notification.
5.
Records:
E 12-
Attachmnnt A B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical Facilities:
Good for assembly of all COB personnel.
2.
Resource Material:
Site Construction Manager should have copy of Plan.
3.
Communications Equipment:
Functioned as designed. SCM should have a Centrex line which is not part of the loop system.
All his Centrex ifnes currently are taken for loop in emergencies.
4.
Emergency Equipment:
NA 5.
Personnel Quantity:
Above average - may want to identify some of the COB personnel for use onsite if needed.
6.
Area Access Control:
Excellent C.
Recommendations 1.
Needs to be a clear cut procedure developed for communi-cating with the COB.
2.
Supervisors need a method of accounting for personnel who may be at Unit 1 or offsite entirely.
X.
SECURITY A.
Performance 1.
Overall:
Security personnel were cognizant of their responsibilities and procedures. Some over-reaction early caused minor problems at site entrance.
2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
NA.
Attachment A 3.
Personnel Functions:
Was a minor over-reaction to the initial alarm of an unusual event, which caused a blocking of roads and some access problems.
4.
Communications:
Adequate - Solution to problem with who continues notifi-cation to COB after initial notification needs to be determined.
Failure of station to notify security when drill ended for site caused minor problem too.
5.
Records:
Initial problem with failure to keep record of persons leaving the Protected Area. This was remedied by Nuclear Security Manager.
B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical facilitiesi Adequate 2.
Resource Material:
Good 3.
Communications Equipment:
The problem with RMT communication to the ECC creates communications deficiencies with the Security radio.
(See IV.B.3. & V.C.l.)
4.
Emergency Equipment:
Satisfactory - security could use additional portable radios.
I l
S.
Personnel Quantity:
l No problems l
i 6.
Area Access Control:
l l
Major problem area was at the ECC. When Station returned I
to normal activity, the guard at ECC left. An unauthorized l
person was able to gain access to ECC. Otherwise, control was satisfactory, i
l b
o Ar
Attachment A 7.
Recordkeeping:
Major identified problem was with accountability readout from computer. This was due to type of readout and unfamiliarity of Operations Support Center personnel with the readout format.
C.
Recommendations 1.
Personnel onsite but outside protected area need more training on emergency procedures to assist security in controlling site access.
Need better accountability through Security computer.
2.
3.
Need guard at ECC the entire time it is manned.
XI.
MEDICAL A.
Performance 1.
Cverall:
Response by all persons involved in medical exercise was satisfactory. Problems were encountered with communication to Magruder Hospital due to having security contact them from site. Failure to provide immediate direction to ambulance to onsite location slowed response time.
Major concern with medical drill was using an area which has the potential for contamination of personnel in I
exercise.
l 2.
Assessment and Evaluation:
l Adequate 3.
Personnel Functions:
There seemed to be a lack of management direction at the scene although all persons performed the necessary func-l tions.
L 4.
Communications:
l
.Sa ti's fa cto ry.
Could have been better to assist in ambulance response.
5.
Records:
l While awaiting the ambulance, time was wasted which could have been used for writing injury report'instead of waiting for information from C&HP man at hospital to provide this detail., -
'E Attachment A B.
Facilities and Equipment 1.
Physical Facilities:
NA 2.
Resource Material:
NA 3.
Communications Equipment:
The nearest gai-tronics was outside the room where injured was located, causing difficulty in communicating to necessary persons.
4.
Emergency Equipment:
Problems with use of one type of stretcher and contents of First Aid bag but these did not severely hamper response.
5.
Personnel Quantity:
More than adequate.
6.
Access Control:
NA C.
Recommendations 1.
Retura hospital contact directly to Edison operator to avoid the confusion which occurred when hospital was not directly contacted by Security.
2.
Separate medical drill from other emergency exercises.
Too much activity for combined exercise.
NRC COMMENTS Scenario:
If you make the scenario more realistic you'll get a better response from plant personnel. We like to see the Three Mile Island type scenario.
Communications:
You need better training of phone talkers on how to
~
pass information.
When critical decisions need to be made, managers should talk to each other and bypass the phone talkers.
Monitoring Remember to do habitability survey of TSC and ECC Activities:
and when you're, using charcoal and silver zeolite, count both.
Attachment A There needs to be at least a discussion among managers of Potassium Iodide protection for ALL emergency workers.
You need to tighten up your RMT coordination - they need better field direction on use of equipment.
Assign a C&HP person at the ECC to help the EDO.
Accountability:
By April 1, 1981, must be able to account for all onsite personnel within \\ hour, not 1\\ hours as in this exercise.
Public A major improvement over last year.
Several items Information:
can improve it such as providing tar-technical spokesmen for media to address all areas of potential accident and having these people speak in laymen's te rms.
Provide updates of major plant conditions to media immediately - don't wait for scheduled briefings.
Consider use of higher level Corporate officer for major briefings.
TC 54/1-17 r
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