ML20003B798
| ML20003B798 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-SQN-CEB-803, SQRD-50-328-81, NUDOCS 8102250584 | |
| Download: ML20003B798 (2) | |
Text
P M TENN ESSEE V ALLE'/ AUTHCRIT
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cx4TTAscoc4 re meast: n.:c i 400 Chestnut Street Tower II February 20, 1981 J.
SQRD-50-328/81-01 Mr. J P. O'Reilly, Director Office o nspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuc1 Regulatory Commissica Regica II -
ite 3100 101 Marietta et Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DISCREPANCY IN AS-BUILT VERSUS AS-ANALYZED PIPING ANCliOR LOCATION - SQRD-50-328/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. W. Wright at December 3,1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SQN GB 8037. An interim m port was submitted on January 5, 1981.
Enclosed is our final mport.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please 3et in touch with D. L. Lambert at FIS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 1
L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure) v/
Enclosure cc Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosmaission Washington, DC 20555
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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 DISCREPANCY IN AS-BUILT VERSUS AS-ANALYZED PIPING ANCHOR LOCATION SQRD-50-328/81-01 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency During a review of a support modification request, it was discovered that design drawings of an anchor in the component cooling water system did not agree with the as-analyzed anchor location. The as-analgzed location of the anchor is at elevation 705'-6" on a run of pipe 45 with the vertical. The as-built location is at elevation 707'-6" on a horizontal run of pipe.
Safety Implications As a result of this discrepancy, it was not known whether the anchor and associated run of piping were qualified to the appropriate design loads. Failure of this support could have rendered the component cooling water system inoperable. The component cooling water system supplies coolant to various heat loads in systems and components necessary for the safe operation of the plant. Failure of this safety-related system could have adversely affected the safety of the plant.
Corrective Action TVA has performed a reanalysis of the subject piping and has determined that no hardware changes will be required because the anchor and associated run of piping is still qualified to the appropriate design loads. Verification of support locations on a generic basis is being handled in respons,e to IE Bulletin 79-14.
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