ML20002D255
| ML20002D255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1981 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-24, LAC-7306, NUDOCS 8101200178 | |
| Download: ML20002D255 (4) | |
Text
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DA/RYLAND h
[k COOPERAT/VE eo eOxsi7 2615 EAST AV SOUTH
- LA CROSSE wtSCONSIN 54601 (608) 788-4000 January 6,'1981 In reply, please refer to LAC-7306 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Mr. James G. Keppler ii[
Regional Director
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U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 4 Directorate of Regulatory Operations
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Region III
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799 Roosevelt Road LD:
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 1/
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SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE o
J LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
GC PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 IE BULLETIN NO. 80 WATER LEAKAGF INSIDE CONTAINMENT
Reference:
(1)
NRC Letter, Keppler to Linder, dated November 21, 1980.
(2)
DPC Letter, Madgett to Skovholt, LAC-1442, dated January 29, 1973.
(3)
DPC Letter, Madgett to O' Leary, LAC-2102, dated January 17, 1974.
(4)
DPC Letter, Madgett to Ziemann, LAC-2686, dated August 15, 1974.
Dear Mr. Keppler:
Your letter (Reference 1) required short term actions which would preclude IP-2 type events at LACBWR.
We have reviewed the subject bulletin from the standpoint of applic-ability to our nuclear power facility and have determined that there are no open cooling water systems routinely in operation inside containment which, in our opinion, match the footnote definition presented on page 2 of the bulletin.
There are four systems which utilize river water as a means of cooling during emergency conditions.
These are:
(1)
Shutdown Condenser - Normally supplied by demineralized water and backed up by High Pressure Service Water (river water) System; is static during normal operations with river water under pressure in piping inside containment to the automatic make-up valve. je 0 B 8E 8101200 \\]lk
Mr. James G.
Keppler LAC-7306 Regional Director January 6, 1981 (2)
High Pressure Service Water Back-Up to the Emergency Core Spray System - System is static during normal operation with river water under pressure in piping inside containment up to automatic inlet valve.
(3)
High Prestsure Service Water Supply to 1 " Fire fiose Stations Inside Containment (4) - System is static during normal operation with river water under pressure in piping inside containment up to manual isolation volve at each hose station. Lbder IDCA conditions an autcnatic isolation valve plus a check valve in series will prevent breach of contafnment integrity if a fire hose were in use simultaneously with a LOCA.
(4)
Alternate Core Spray System Automatic Isolation Valves Located Outside of Containment - System is static during normal operation and river water under pressure exists up to the automatic isolation valves, but not in containment.
Other than minor packing leaks on system valves, no significant leaks inside containment have ever occurred.
It should be noted that the above systems do not outflow frca contaiment to the river.
Isolation valves for the above systems, which must close during a LOCA to maintain con-tainment integrity, are tested in accordance with Appendix J to 10CFR50.
Cooling of components inside containment is accomplished by the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.
These components are:
(1)
Air Cbnditioners (2 units)
(2)
Forced Circulation Pump Auxiliaries - (2 pumps)
(3)
Primary Purification Cooler (4)
Decay Heat Cooler (5)
Fuel Storage Well Cooler (6)
Shield Cooling Cooler (7)
Sample Coolers (5) (Small)
The Component Cooling Water System heat exchangers which contains the interface between CCW and river water are located in the Turbine Building.
There has never been a leak observed between river water and CCW.
A minor leak of CCW was observed in a Forced Circulation Pump coupling oil cooler heat exchanger near the beginning of the cur-rent refueling outage.
The CCW system is not isolated from containment during a LOCA.
The system is equipped with a radiation monitor to detect any in-leakage contamination.
Leakage from the CCW system would be alarmed in the Control Room as a result of a low level of the CCW surge tank, which is located in the Turbine Building. _
Mr. James G. Keppler LAC-7306 Regional Director January 6, 1981 A system of moisture detectors is located inside containment and functions as discussed in References 2, 3 and 4.
The moisture de-tectors are capable of alarming in the Control Room on accumulation of visible liquid approximately one-inch deep on floor surfaces at four (4) locations inside containment and six (6) locations outside containment.
Inside containment these are:
1)
Basement (near sump) 2)
Grade Floor 3)
Intermediate Floor (by Core Spray Pumps) 4)
701' Level.
The immediate action in the event of an alarm is prompt investigation by an operator.
A sump exists in the containment basement.
Two 20 gpm pumps alter-nate service and provide transfer to two 6000 gallon retention tanks located inside containment.
These tanks are equipped with high level alarm devices which sound a common alarm in the Control Room.
The sump also has a high level alarm which annunciates in the Control Room.
The Containment Building is normally accessible 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.
Operator entrance into containment is routinely performed twice per shift, usually at four-hour intervals.
When the reactor is above 212 F.,
known and unknown leakage of water inside containment is calculated and the result is usually less than 1 gpm.
Technical Specifications restrict the allowable leakage in containment regard-less of source.
Procedures have been implemented which deal with steps to be taken in the event of HPSW System rupture, OHST rupture, CCW System rupture, and ACS System rupture.
For example, symptoms are identifed and corrective actions specified.
No changes are required in our opinion by Item 2 of the subject bulletin.
We have estimated that at least 25 man-hours were required to respond l
to this bulletin.
This time involved the attention of the Operations Supervisor, Assistant to Operations Supervisor, Quality Assurance Supervisor, Assistant Superintendent, Superintendent, Assistant General Manager, General Manager and secretarial staff.
e Mr. James G.
Keppler LAC-7306 Regional Director January 6, 1981 Authorization for submittal of this report beyond the deadline date was granted by Mr. Ken Ridgway of your office to Mr. R. E.
Shimshak on January 5, 1981.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please let us know.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE Frank Linder, General Manager FL:RES:af cc:
Director, U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D.
C.
20555 NRC Resident Inspectors STATE OF WISCONSIN )
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COUNTY OF LA CROSSE) 2 Personally came before me this W day of January, 1981, the above named Frank Linder, to me known to be the person who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged the same.
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Lo1 /k 6%
Notary Public La Crosse County Wisconsin. #,
My Commission Expires 2/26/84.
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