ML20002C325
| ML20002C325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1980 |
| From: | Crossman W, Renee Taylor NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002C324 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-80-23, 50-446-80-23, NUDOCS 8101100063 | |
| Download: ML20002C325 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1980023
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
O
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-445/S0-23; 50-446/80-23
Docket No. 50-445; 50-446
Category A2
Licensee:
Texas Utilities Generating Company
2001 Bryan Tower
Dallas, Texas 75201
Facility Name:
Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2
Inspection at:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Glen Rose, Texas
Inscection Conducted:
October 1980
Inspector:p
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M . G.' Taylor, Resicent Reactor Inspector
Date
Projects Section
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Aoproved:
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W. A. Crossman, Cnief, Projects Section
Bate
Insoection Summary:
Insoection During October 1980 (9ecort No. 50-445/80-23: 50-446/80-23)
Areas Insoected:
Routine, announced inspection by tne Resident Reactor Inspector
(RRI) including general site tours; piping, electrical and instrument instal-
lation activities; protection of installed equipment; and pipe supports and
restraints.
The inspection involved seventy-five inspector-hours by the RRI.
Resuits:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in fice of
tne areas.
One item of noncompliance (infraction - failure to follow porcedures
for making full penetration welds
paragrapn 6) was identified in one area.
8202 20006,3,
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Princioal Licensee Emoloyees
- D. N. Chapman, TUGCO, Quality Assurance Manager
"R. G. Tolson, TUGCO, Site Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. R. Ainsworth, TUGCO, Quality Engineering Supervisor
Otner Persons
J. V. Hawkins, Brown & Root, Project Quality Assurance Manager
The RRI also interviewed other licensee and Brown & Root employees during
the inspection period including both craft labor and QA/QC personnel.
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- Denotes those persons with whom the RRI held on-site management meetings
during the inspection period.
2.
Action on Previous Insoection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-445/79-18; 50-446/79-18):
Preinstallation
Handling of Hot Shutdown Panel.
The RRI reviewed a letter from the
panel fabricator dated July 10, 1980, which was accompanied by the data
runs of a computer analysis of the panel structure and the lifting
eyebolts.
The vendor, Reliance Electric Company, states that the
analysis indicated that the stresses imposed on the panel during the
lift were approximately an order of magnitude less than the material
yield strength and that in their opinion there has been no compromise
to either the safety or performance of the panel under design con-
diticas.
The licensee's Architect / Engineer concurred with the
analysis of the vendor by letter dated August 15, 1980.
The RRI had no further questions regarding this matter.
(Closed) Infraction (50-445/80-20; 50-446/80-20):
Unsuitable Weld
Surface Condition as Required by Magnetic Particle Test Procedures.
The licensee notified RIV by letter dated October 20, 1980, that all
of the components involved in tha noncompliance item had been reinspected
and that components requiring rework to acnieve compliance had been
completed or were being processed.
The licensee also stated that he
would assure that in process and release inspections would be accomplished
in the vendor's shops to assure ccmpliance on future production efforts.
The RRI observed a portion of the reinspection and rework effort in regard
to the components and was satisfied that it was being accomplished in a
sound manner.
The RRI also interviewed the Brown & Root employee who
was the basis for an allegation made to RIV 'in regard to these components
and found that he had been assigned to close monitoring of the vendor's
on-site activities involving the reinspection and rework effort.
The
interviewee indicated that he was satisfied with the effort.
The RRI had
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no further questions regarding the components themselves.
The licensee's
commitment in regard to future inspections in the vendor's facilities
will be evaluated during future routine inspections.
This item of noncompliance is therefore considered closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-445/80-08; 50-446/80-08):
Qualification
of Rockbestos Electrical Cable.
The RRI was provided with documentary
evidence that flame tests had been accomplished on both the cable
and the individual wires of multicanductor cable.
The test data
furnished indicated that the cable met the requirements of IEEE-383-74.
The RRI had no further questions on this matter.
3.
Site Tours
The RRI toured the safety-related plant areas several times weekly during
the inspection period to observe the general progress of construction and
the practices involved.
Three of the tours were accomplished during
portions of the second shift where the main activity continues to be the
installation of electrical cables and the application of protective coatings.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Protection of Major Installed Ecuipment
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The RRI observed that the Reactor Vessel Internals (core support structure)
continued to be partially installed within the Unit 1 Reactor Vessel.
The
vessel head and the lifting rig structure were fully covered with heavy
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plastic as a dust cover.
The Unit 2 Reactor Vessel was found to be well
protected during the period with a full floor cover over the refueling
pool cavity and with a prefabricated cover on the vessel itself.
The Unit
2 Reactor Vessel Internals remained in their storage enclosure during the
period.
The RRI observed that randomly selected electric prime movers for pumps
had their space heaters energized as did the motors associated with motor
operated valves.
Relative to the status condition of the Reactor Vessel Internals, the RRI
reviewed documentation relative to an incident which occurred on September
12, 1980, and was reported to RIV as a potential Significant Construction
Deficiency on September 13, 1980.
The incident involv7d what appeared to
be the inadvertent application of weld metal to one of three Roto-lock
inserts during the process of welding in an anti-rctotion locking tab.
The incident was initally documented by the licensee on Nonconformance
Report 80-00072 which has now been finalized by requiring that the insert
be removed and returned to Westinghouse for examination for possible internal
cracking as a result of the welding or for replacement.
The licensee
informed RIV by a letter dated October 10, 1980, that their final review
of the incident indicated the matter was not reportable under the criteria
of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The RRI has reviewed the engineering analysis upon
which this decision was based and had no further questions.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Safety-Related Pioing Installation and Welding
The RRI made several observations of the handling practice, relative to
piping components during the inspection period both in the on-site fabrica-
tion shop and within the main plant buildings.
The practices observed were
consistent with the construction practices outlined in Construction Pro-
cedure 35-1195-CPM 6.9, Project Specification MS-100, and good industry
practice.
The RRI observed the following welds being made during the inspection
period:
Weld No.
Isometric
Filler Ht.
Welder (s)
Procedure
Process
W-1
CS-2-AB-013
464176
ABN
88025
FW-2
SI-2-SB-005
464074
BBI-AHS
99028
The RRI verified that the weld filler metals being utilized in the above
welds were certified by the suppliers via Certified Material Test Reports
as meeting the applicable requirements of ASME Section II.
The welders and
weld procedures noted above were verified to have been properly qualified
in accordance with ASME Section IX.
The RRI also examined the radiographs of the following welds for compliance
with the requirements of ASME Section III for weld quality and Section V for
the quality of the radiographs themselves.
Weld No.
Isometric
Line No.
W-16
RC-2-RB-072
6-RC-2-100-2501R1
FW-6-2
RC-1-RB-020
6-RC-1-161-2501R1
FW-16
SI-1-RB-022
3-SI-1-202-2501R1
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FW-5
CS-1-RB-028
2-CS-1112-2501R1
W-7 & W-4
RC-2-RB-072
6-RC-2-098-2501R1
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W-9
SI-2-RB-018
6-SI-2-102-2501R1
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W-15A
CS-1-RB-001
2-CS-1-107-2501R1
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W-3 & W-2
RC-2-RB-073
6-RC-2-147-2501R1
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W-7-1
SI-1-Y0-03
12-SI-1-031-151R2
FW-2
CT-1-RB-017
8-CT-1-076-301R2
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Pioino System Succorts and Restraints
a.
Pioe Whio Restraints
During the inspection of this gentral class of components as discussed
in Inspection Report 50-445/80-20; 50 1?6/80-20, the RRI became aware
of yet another substantial group of large weldments that nad been
fabricated by Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) in their Salt Lake City,
Utah, facility.
This group of weldments has been designated as pipe
whip restraints rather than pipe mount restraints involved in the above
referenced report but are fabricated of essentially the same materials
and are similar in appearance.
It was found that the components had
been procured by Brown & Root for the licensee under sub-contract
35-1195-0578 which in turn references a series of design drawings
beginning with 2323-SI-0581.
Drawing 2323-SI-0578 :ontains the general
and specific technical requirements for the componants while the balance
of the cawings contain design details for each component.
The RRI located several of the components in an on-site storage area
and examined them as well as possible for weld quality, considering
that each had been painted.
Of necessity, the inspection had to be
limited to one of general appearance.
Most of the welds on the
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components presented a good appearance since they were of good confi-
guration and were reasonably smooth, which would be typical of good
welding practice.
Most of the welds were noted to be on both sides
of the "T" member connections and appeared to be full penetration
double welded joints.
The RRI found several connections, however,
that had been welded only from one side and showed no weld metal on
the other side.
The RRI was also able to slip the point of a pocket
knife blade under the edge of the unwelded side in a few locations.
Reference to the design drawings and the welding notes indicated
that these connections were to have been full penetration, which they
were not.
Review of the fabricator's shop drawings, as approved by
the engineer, revealed a joint design that would not provide full
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This item of noncompliance was identified to the licensee by an offi-
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cial notification on October 16, 1980.
b.
Sway Struts
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On September 19, 1980, the licensee informed the RRI that a potential
Significant Construction Deficiency had been identified in regard to
devices generally known as sway struts.
A sway strut is usually a
length of small pipe with threaded pieces welded on the ends.
Threaded
eye bolts are then installed to form a turnbuckle with the assembly
being used to support or restrain the motion of a pipe system at a
particular location in primarily one direction.
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The ASME Code requires that the eye bolts have full thread engagement
in the end pieces and tnat there be a means to provide assurance that
full thread engagement is achieved after installation.
It had been
found during the installation of three struts manufactured by NPS
Ir%stries, that the eye bolts could be completely removed from the
assembly even though tne end threads were to have been upset as a
measure to assure full engagement.
The licensee subsequently notified RIV by a letter dated October 15,
1980, that, after evaluation, it had been concluded that the deficiency
was not formally reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The evaluation
contenas that since each strut is designed to a custom length for a
specific location. there is no reasonable probability that the eye
bolts would not have the necessary full thread engagement and, there-
fore, would not present any safety hazard.
After review of the
evaluation, the RRI had no further questions on this matter since the
contention was found to be factual.
In order to satisfy a specific Code requirement, the licensee and/or
the vendor are in the process of identifying those struts which do
not have the upset thread feature and are making minor modifications
to allow for thread upsetting and thereby achieve full compliance with
the ASME code.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Electrical Installation Activities
The RRI made a number of observations of electrical cable pulling operations
during the period.
The RRI was able to observe each of three cable pulling
crews one or more times during the period in order to ascertain whether they
were working within the parameters of the site installation procedures and
good practices.
The RRI also observed the activities of the QA/QC personnel
assigned to monitor the pulling crews.
The RRI found that both the craft
labor and QA/QC forces were working consistently to the requirements of
their respective procedures, EEI-7 and QE-QP-11.3-26.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Instrument Installation Activities
The RRI observed two different pipefitter instrument crews installing
im W se tubing during the reporting period.
The workmanship which involves
cutting, deburring and bending small diameter stainless steel tubing was
being done in accordance with standard practices.
The tubing runs were
properly sloped and properly fastened to the support devices.
The RRI
observed that the Swage-lock fittings were being tightened in accordance
with the manufacturer's recommended procedures.
The R?I did not verify
whether the tubing runs and instruments were located as required by design
drawings.
This function will be accomplished during future inspections.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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9.
Manacement Meetincs
The RRI met with one or more of the persons identified in paragrapn 1 on
October 3, 9, 14, 16, 29 and 31, 1980, to discuss inscection finaings and
the licensee's actions and positions.
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