ML20002B580
| ML20002B580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Humboldt Bay |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Crane P PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012120247 | |
| Download: ML20002B580 (1) | |
Text
.
/
'o UNITED STATES
"' q? ',,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION m,
s REGION V o,
[
1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD W
%d e
SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA
',, 7, ; y
- ,,,e WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNfA 9459*
t'ovember 6,1980 ;V.i... n 1.,
p Docket tio. 50-133
- v:cEs Pacific Gas and Electric Cemeany 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Attenticn: Mr. Philip A. Crane, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel GentTemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21 requires your action with regard to your pcwer reactor facility (ies) holding an operating license or a construction permit. Should you have questions concerning this bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, 2
f.
'b f@lbY
- 1. $. Engelken p '
Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Eulletin No. 80-21 2.
Recently Issued IE Sulletins cc w/ enclosures:
J. D. Shiffer, PG&E W. Raymend, PG&E E. Ueeks, PG&E, Humboldt Bay l
l l
l i80]2;so f W
SSIllS tio. : 6820 Accession No.:
8008220246 IEB 80-21 UllITED STATES fiUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0fl CFFICE OF INSPECTION AfiD E!!FORCEMENT
,U D N U fD f
c7 UASHIt!GTON, D.C.
20555
@@ Ag g Hovemcer 6, 1980 IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21: VALVE YOS'ES SUPPLIED BY ftALCCLM FOUNDRY COMPAilY, IflC.
Descriotion of Circumstances:
On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Ccmeany notified IE Region I that cracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system at their Suscuehanna Steam Electric Station. The potential fer comon-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant, safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode wnereby all RHR functions could be simultaneously icst. %ecifically, the cracks were located in the racii at the yoke mounting flange-to-yoxe vertical section interface.
An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performed by the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They cuncluded that the cracking was not cue to casting defects, but rather was due to the yoke material not having the proper mecnanical properties.
Purchased as ASTM A-216, Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yield strengths 'oelcw the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.
The cracked valve yokes were all cast cy italcolm Foundry Company, Inc., of tiewark, New Jersey. The fcundry is no longer in business.
Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of the other valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves at Suscuehanna. To date, approxirately half of the valve yokes have been tested.
Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values sicnificantly balcw the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relatienship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.
Specification A-370 These additional valve yokes are on a wide range of valve sizes and are frca a number of different purchase orders placed with
alcolm over a ceriod of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, it apoears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to one short time period. Anchnr Darling intends to replace the defective valve yokes at Suscuehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear power plants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm have been provided.
Since Falcolm Foundry Comoany, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staff cannot determine directly i' fialcolm has provided valve parts to other valve manufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.
Actions To Be Taken by Addressees:
For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits-the following actions are required:
IEB 80-21 flovember 6, 1980 Page 2 of 2 1.
Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related syste :s at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Comoany, Inc.
If no valves are identified as having potentially faulty material, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining cuestions.
2.
Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty raterial shall imediately visually inscect for cracks all normally accessible valve carts (i.e., those wnich can be inspected during reactor operation).
3.
Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty naterial shall identify the manufacturer (s) of these valves and either:
'a.
Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanical procerties in accorcance witn the ASTM material specification; if such is not the case, then comoly witn either b. or c. below
- also, b.
Replace tne defective materials and/or valves.
c.
Identify any otner corrective actions tnat may be exercised ano the basis for such actions.
For clants witn an ocerating license, che results of your initial determination (item 1), visual iaspection results (itam 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, jcur planned action (itam 3), and the schedule for acccmplishing this action shall be reported within thirty days of the cate of this bulletin to the Director of the approcriate :2C Regional Office with a copy sent to the
?!RC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, CC 20555.
For clants with a construction permit, the results of your initial determination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer (s), your planned action (item
- 3) and the schedule for acccmolishing this action shall be reportad within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate fiRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the iRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Insoection, Uashington, DC 20555.
Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve th affected valve manufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
If you desire additional inferration regarding this matter, please contact the aporopriate IE Pegional Office.
Approved by GAO, 3100225 (R0072); clearance expires rtovember 30, 1980. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subiect Date Issued Issued To m
Supplement 3 Environmental Qualification 10/24/80 All power reactor to 79-10B of Class IE Eauioment facilities with an OL Supplement 2 Environmental Qualification 9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-01B of Class 1E Equipment facilities with an OL 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees source Connectors 79-26 Boron Loss from BWR 8/29/80 All BWR power Revision 1 Control Blades facilities with an OL 80-20 Failuces of Westingnouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to f!eutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/30 All nuclear power Wetted Patrix Relays in facilities having reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Coerating Muclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Min'imum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BUR Supplement 1 Failure of Centrol Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR