ML20002B578
| ML20002B578 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012120232 | |
| Download: ML20002B578 (1) | |
Text
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2 Eto o,
UNITED STATES
! ' ), (;f,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
REGION V o,
- g 1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD e*
SulTE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA sd
%,+,,,e WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596
--*a Ncvember 6, 1980
20 Cl ::; i.
3 11 Docket No. 50-344
, f:E'liCES
~ :.. i Portland General ' Electric Comcany 121 S. W. Salmon Street Pertland, Oregon 97204 Attenticn: Mr. Bart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21 requires your action with regard to your power reactor facility (ies) holding an operating license or a construction permit. Should you have questions concerning this bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
- ,ff UN fp(iken)@f Rf H.
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/ Director
Enclosures:
1.
Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/ enclosures:
J. W. Durham, Esq., PGE C. P. Yundt, PGE 80121'2o M p
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i SSIflS tio. : 6820 Accession No.:
8008220246 IEB 80-21 UIIITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM'iISSION g
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AfiD E!!FORCEMEllT
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UASHIt!GTON, D.C.
20555 November 6, 1980 IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21:
VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPAtlY, INC.
Descriation of Circumstances:
On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Comoany notified IE Region I that cracks had been discovered in the. yokes of a number of valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system at their Susouehanna Steam Electric Station. The potential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant, safety'related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby all RHR functions could be simultaneously lost. Specifically, the cracks were located in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to-yoke vertical section interface.
An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performed by the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They concluded that the cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yoke material not having the proper mechanical properties.
Purchased as ASTM A-216, Grade L B material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yield strengths below the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.
The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., of I!ewark, New Jer:;ey. The foundry is no longer in business.
Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of the other valve yokes cast by :alcolm and used on-Ancher Darling valves at Susquehanna. To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been tested.
Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly below the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.
Specification A-370 These additional valve yokes are on a wide range of valve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed with Malcolm over a period of at least. ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, it appears that the problen is not isolated to one heat of material or to one short time period. Anchnr Darling intends to replace the defective valve yokes at Susouehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear power plants under construction where valves with' valve yokes cast by Malcolm have been provided.
I Since Malcolm Foundry Comoany, Inc., is no longer in business. the NRC staff cannot determine directly if Malcolm has provided valve parts to other valve manufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.
Actions To Be Taken by Addressees:
For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits' the following actions are required:
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!!ovember 6,1980 Page 2 of 2 1.
Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Comcany, Inc.
If no valves are identified as having potentially faulty material, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
2.
Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall irnediately visually inspect for cracks all nomally accessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reacter operation).
3.
Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer (s) of these valves and either:
"a.
'!erify that all valve carts cast by Malcolm have mechanical procerties in accordance witn the ASTM material specification; if such is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below also.
b.
Replace the defective materials ana/or valves.
c.
Identify any otner corrective actions that may be exercised and the basis for such actions.
For olants with an operating license, the results of your initial determination (item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, Scur clanned action (item 3), and th9 schedule for accenplishing t1is action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletin tcT the Director of the approoriate i;RC Regional Office with a copy sent to the MRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspecticn, Washington, CC 20555.
1 i
For olants with a construction permit, the results of your initial determination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer (s), your planned action (item
- 3) and the schedule for accomolishing this action shall be reported within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the f;RC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, l
Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve the affected valve nanufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate IE Pegional Office.
l Accroved by GAO, 8130225 (20072); clearance expires flovember 30, 1980. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980
.RECE!:TLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subiect Cate Issued Issued To Supplement 3 Environmental Qualification 10/2a/30 all power reactor to 79-10B of Class 1E Equicment facilities with an OL Supplement 2 Environmental Qualification ' 9/30/80 All power reactor j
to 79-01B of Class 1E Equipment facilities with an OL 00-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/30 All radiograohy "odel 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees source Connectors 79-26 Boron Loss from BWR 0/29/80 All BWR oower Revision 1 Control Blades facilities with an OL 80-20 Failures of Westingnouse 7/31/80 To eacn nuclear Type W-2 Spring Peturn cower facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having 4
an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power
'Jettec Matrix delays in facilities having Ceactor Protective Systens either an OL or a CP cf Coeratina Muclear Fower P1 ants Designed by Combus-i, tion engineering 80-13 "aintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Ficw Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Folicwing and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/00 All BWR power reactor to 30-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding CLs t
Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BUR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Pods 7/13/80 All BWR poser reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a CUR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs l
l at a EWR
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