ML20002B574
| ML20002B574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012120216 | |
| Download: ML20002B574 (1) | |
Text
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/pn u:vy'o, UNITED STATES
,g ' j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
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1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVMtD
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SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA J -
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....it Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist Ict P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Attention: Mr. John J. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager Genttemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21 requires your action with regard to your power reacter facility (ies) holding an operating license or a constructicn permit. Should you have questions concerning this bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, i r /?
tarY!(//
RPf R.;H:iEnges en g f Director i
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Enclosures:
1.
Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/ enclosures:
R. J. Rodriguez, SFUD l
L. G. Schwieger, SMUD l
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1 8012120 2 g
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SSINS flo.: 6820 Accession No.:
8008220246 IEB 80-21 UilITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C051ISSION m
c, 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT U
3 UASHINGTON, D.C.
20555
.9 c -2J November 6, 1980 IE BULLETIfl NO. 80-21:
VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY ftALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPANY, INC.
Descriotion of Circumstances:
On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Comoany notified IE Region I that cracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system at their Suscuehanna Steam Electric Station. The potential for connon-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant, safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a fa' lure mode whereby all RER functions could be simultaneously lost. Specifically, the cracks were located in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to-yoke vertical section interface.
An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performed by the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They concluded that the cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yoke material not having the croper mechanical properties. Purchased as ASTM A-216, Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yield strengths o' elow the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.
The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcolm Foundry Ccmpany, Inc., of Newark, New Jersey. The fcundry is no longer in business.
Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of the other valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves at
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Susouehanna. To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been tested.
Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve ynkes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly belcw the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-l mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.
Specification A-370 These additional valve yokes are on a wide range of valve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed with Malcoln over a ceriod of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, it l
appears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to one short time period. Anchor Darling intends to replacc the defective valve yokes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear power plants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm have been provided.
l Since ffalcolm Foundry Comoany, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staff cannot determine directly if Italcolm has provided valve parts to other valve manufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.
Actions To Be Taken by Addressees:
For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the following actions are required:
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IEB 80-21 Movember 6, 1980 Page 2 of 2 1.
Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systens at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Comoany, Inc.
If no valves are identified as having potentially faulty material, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining ouestions.
2.
Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall immediately visuall.v insoect for cracks all normally accessible valve carts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactor operation).
3.
Licensees or oermit holders having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer (s) of these valves and eitner:
'a.
Verify that all valve carts cast by Malcolm have mecnanical procerties in accorcance witn the ASTM material specification; if such is no: the case, tnen comoly with either b. or c. below also.
b.
Reolace tne defective materiais ano/or valves.
c.
Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and the basis for such actions.
For clants with an operating license, Ine results of your initial determination (item 1), visual inspection resui ts (itam 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, ycur planned action (ir.am 3), and the schedule for accomolishing this action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the approcriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reector Construction Inspection, Washington, CC 20555.
l For clants with a construction permit, the resul.ts of your initial determination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer (s), your planned action (item l
- 3) and the schedule for acccmolishing this action shall be reported within j
sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC l
Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Peactor Construction Insoection, Washington, DC 20555.
I Comoliance with this bulletin by the licensees.does not relieve the affected valve nanufacturers frcm the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate IE Pegional Office.
Approved by GAO, B100225 (R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980. Aoproval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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IE3 80-21 November 6, 1980 RECE!!TLY ISSUED IE SULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To Supplement 3 Environmental Qualification 10/24/80 All power reactor to 79-10B of Class 1E Eauionent facilities with an OL Supplement 2 Environmental Qualification 9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-01B of Class 1E Equipment facilities with an OL 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/30 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees scurce Connectors 79-26 Boren loss from BWR 8/29/80 All BWR ocwer Revision 1 Control Blades facilities with an OL 80-20 Failures of Westinanouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Tyce W-2 Spring Return cower facility in tc Heutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of "ercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power
':stted Matrix Relays in facilities having
'esctor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP cf Coeratina Nuclear Power
?lants Designed by Combus-tien Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate
. 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flcu Thru Centrifugal facilities holding Ols Charging Pumps Following and to those FWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Sucolement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Pods 7/18/60 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BUR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR