ML20002B159
| ML20002B159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1979 |
| From: | Womack E BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8012100067 | |
| Download: ML20002B159 (22) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGut.ATORY CCMMISSION i
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In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mr. E. Allen Womack i
Manager Plant Design 4
5i, 6i, 71 Si Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site 10i TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant Middletown, Pennsylvania ui j
May 9, 1979 12' (0 ate of Interview) i 131 June 28, 1979 l
oe 14)
(Data Transcript Typec) 188 151 (Tape Numcer(s))
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NRC PERSONNEL:
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Mr. James S. Creswell 23; Mr. Owen C. Shackleton 2b!
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80121o0o67 f
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lj SHACKLETON:
This is an interview of Mr. E. Allen, Womack. Mr. Womack 2
is presently the Manager Plant Design, Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear 3!
Power Generation Division in Lynchburgh, Virginia. This time of this 4
interview is 9:50 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, May 9, 1979. The place 5
of the interview is in an office of Babcock and Wilcox Facility for 6
their Nuclear Power Generation Division in Lynchburgh, Virginia.
7 Present to conduct this interview from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 8
Commission is Mr. James S. Creswell. Mr. Creswell is a Reactor Inspector j
g presently assigned to Region III. My'name is Owen C Shackleton.
I'm 10 an investigator presently assigned to Region V.
Just prior to beginning g
this interview on tape, I presented to Mr. Womack a two page document 12 fr a the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which outlines the scope g
and purpose of this investigation.
It identifies the authority by 14l which the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is conducting this investi-h
- gation and advises Mr. Womack of his rights to refuse to be interviewed y
and to refuse to submit any form of a statement.
It also identifies to Mr. Womack that he has the right to have present someone of his choice.
Mr. Womack has present for this interview Mr. Byron D Nelson.
Mr. Nelson is the Assistant Council for Babcock and Wilcox for their g
Nuclear Power Generation Division in Lynchburgh, Virginia.
On this two page document on the second page are listed three questions all of which Mr. Womack answered in the affirmative.
At this time to make it 22 a matter of record, I'm going to repeat these questions and ask Mr.
Womack to please respond orally.
Mr. Womack did you understand the text of the two page document that I am discussing?
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lj WOMACK: Yes.
2 3
SHACKLETON: And do we of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have 4{
your permission to tape this interview?
5 6
WOMACK: Yes.
7 SHACKLETON: Would you like a copy of the tape?
8 91 i
10j WOMACK: Yes.
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SHACKLETON:
g Alright sir, we will provide that to you or sent it to g
you by mail to your facility here where you are employed.
And now Mr.
Womack for the benefit of the many people who will be listening to y
your testimony as you attempt to help us here to reconstruct what g
transpired from the beginning of the incident on March 28, 1979 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station operated by Metropolitan Edison, would you please give us your background regarding your 181 education and work experience in the Nuclear field?
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WOMACK: Alright Mr. Shackleton, I was educated in physics at the 21!
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the highest degree I hold is a 22!
Occtor of Philosophy which I received in 1969.
My experience in the nuclear field began with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1968 24 from 1968 until 1975 I was employed in a division of Reactor Develop-l
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1 ment and Technology and in various capacities.
In 1975 I joined the 21 Babcock and Wilcox Company. From 1975 until 1978 I was employed in 3
association with the International Program Support of the B&W company.
4 In August of 1978 I became a Manager of Plant Design coming from the 1
5 Posii.ie6 sf Pr:g ::::.%dger for Amuillheim Kerlig Plant in West Germany.
6j Since August of 1978 I have been Manager of Plant Design.
7' SHACKLETON: Thank you very much sir and now I'll turn the interview 8,
g over to Mr. Creswell.
10 11.
CRESWELL: Mr. Womack who do you report to in the Nuclear Power Genera-12-tion Division Organization?
13 1
WOMACK:
I report tc Or. Donald Roy who's Manager of Engineering.
1s CRESWELL: Okay. As Manager of Plant Design what are your responsi-16 17l bilities in the Nuclear Power Generation Division?
18l WOMACK:
yg The Plant Design section of the Engineering Department incompasses 20i gr ups which have responsibility for Reactor System and NSS Analyses.
We have a unit which does emergency cooling system analyses and a unit which does safety analyses a unit which does what we call control g
analyses and a unit which does analyses of the machanical response of the reactor systems in addition two other units are part of the section this units have respectively the integration responsibility for the 25!
plant design for the B&W domestic NSS and for international projects.
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1 CRESWELL:
I see. Mr. Womack as part of your responsibilities would l
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you make decisions related to safety related problems that are identified 3
at your facilities in regard as to whether they should...changas 4
should be implemented in other plants?-
5' 6
WOMACK: Yes or the members of my staff would.
7 8 -
CRESWELL: Would the ultimate decision be yours?
9 10 WOMACK: Not in every case but I would frequently contribute to the n.
ultimate decision.
12 CRESWELL: Okay.
I'd like if we could to go back to the time of March 3
14 28, 1979, and if you could relate to us when you first found out about the event that had occurred at Three Mile Island Unit 2?
3 16 WOMACK:
I was first notified that an incident had occurred at TMI 2 17 shortly before 8:00 a.m. when I arrived in the office on the 28th of yg 79f March.
l 20 CRESWELL: Who did you hear about the event from?
22 WOMACK:
Dr. Roy came to my office and gave me the information.
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l 5-1 CRESWELL: Did Dr. Roy indicate where he had obtained the information?
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3 WOMACK: My recollection is that he mentioned that Bill Spangler had 4
passed it to him.
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6' CRESWELL:
Did Dr. Roy elaborate on the status of the plant as he 7
understood it at that time?
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g WOMACK: Yes, he gave me certain information, I believe that he charac-10 terized that he thought this had been a loss of feedwater event and n
that the only thihg right at that moment that I recall that appeared to be particularly unusual with respect to this event was an indicated g
high radiation reading in the upper portion of the containment reactor building.
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15i CRESWELL: What did that indicate to you?
16l 17 WOMACK: Well either one of two things either that there had been some 18t I
release of radioactivity within the building or that a particular 191 instrument might be reading incorrectly.
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CRESWELL: So at that time as far as radiation levels were concerned 22{
t your information was based on one instrument?
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WOMACK:
Based on indirect knowledge one instrument is...of what I 2'
understood to be one instrument, yes.
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4, CRESWELL: Okay. Upon receiving this information what discisions did 5
you...did you make?
61 7
WOMACK: Well I was asked by Dr. Roy to establish responsibility, to 8
followup this incident, to make those analyses which might be necessary 9
to help the licensee, help Met Ed recover in the longer term since...from 10 the event and reestablish reliable' safe operation at TMI 2 as promptly Ig as possible.
121 1
CRESWELL: Was there any discussion of...between you and Dr. Roy of 33 g
providing recommendations to the plant in a short...in the short term?
15i WOMACK:
It certainly wasn't an immediate...it certainly wasn't my immediate thought at that point in time and for most of the morning following we were primarily in a data gathering mode and our immediate i
thcught was to gather those kinds of data which we knew we would need 19f to assist Met Ed in a recovery operation, in particular data which l
might be related to the exposure of the components to thermal, out of 21!
l the ordinary thermo conditions.
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l 23 CRESWELL:
But the subject of providing recommendation to the plant at l
that point in time wasn't discussed?
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WOMACX: My recollection was that we certainly were not in the immediate 2-mode of trying to provide recommendations to Met Ed.
The onsite 3-operators were handling the event to our knowledge, and indeed were.
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CRESWELL: Okay, it's my understanding at this point that Dr. Roy gave 6
you responsibility for the data collection, analysis.....
7 8
WOMACK:
Right, he ask me...he ask me to take...he ask me actually to 9
delegate that responsibility and when he did call in other people and 10 made the various assignments.
11 12 CRESWELL:
How did you go about implementing that responsibility?
13 WOMACK: Well one of the things we did was recognize that we Gould 14 g
need additional detailed information to followup the engineering 16 evaluation of the event and we asked immediately we selected three 77 people whom I believe you've interview to make a trip to the site near Harrisburg and those three people were Mr. Robert Winks and Mr. Joe yg gl Kelly and Mr. R. C. Twilley. We did make transportation arrangements 9 **
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CRESWELL:
Did you communicate ey of the information that you were giving to anyone higher in the organization say than Dr. Roy in...in the Management structure?
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WOMACK:
I did not directly at that point in time we then wished as 2;
the morning developed we all wanted know more about what was happening i
3 at TMI and our source of information is usually as it was in this case 4
through our Nuclear Service Department later in the morning we asked...we 5
joined Mr. Spangler of Nuclear Service in a general meeting and which 6
involved a number of us and I believe did involve well among others 7
Mr. Davis, the Senior Manager of the Division at that...on that day 8
and we received a report of information from Mr. Sprangler.
9' 10 CRESWELL:
So your source of information concerning site conditions n
basically came from Mr. Spangler?
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WOMACK: Mr. Spangler, yes.
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CRESWELL: And that was...was that true throughout the day of March 16{
28, 1979?
17l WOMACK: Generally yes, Mr. Spangler communicated throughout the day g
with... the in...with Pennsylvania.
I did have one additional conver-sation following our morning meeting, Mr. Jim Floyd who is a member of 201 i
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the oper t.ing staff at Met Ed was here for simulatae requalification and I talked briefly with him he indicated to me that he had been in I
touch with someone at the site and passed on additional information 23' 24l:
that there had been delay in the auxiliary feedwater initiation or thought that there had been delay and this is second hand information l
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9 1) of course and we used that information in an attempt to get started on l
21 simulating the transient that might have occurred at TMI 2.
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4 CRESWELL: Okay, what sort of information...what was the nature of 5
discussion with Mr. Floyd beyond say the delay of the emergency feedwaters 6
is that a fair characterization of what he would relate t'o you?
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WOMACX: That's my recollection that...I don't recall, you know, gj extensively what else we might've discussed I think we probably discussed...you 10 know... how might've that happened and that kind of thing.
ul CRESWELL:
Did you discuss with Mr. Floyd what activities...what the 12 13 nature of the activities that B&W would be engaged in at that point?
14 3l WOMACK:
I think ; hat I mentioned to Mr. Floyd that we would be trying 16l to simulate the event, probably did, but what he had passed on t.. us 77l would be helpful and I believe in fact that later on in the morning i
he...as he was at the simulator he was a part of our efforts to do g
some simulation.
20l CRESWELL:
During the day of March 28, 1979, did you personnally I
contact any officers of Metropolitan Edison Company or their parent 22!
I company and GPU?
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WOMACK: No.
To the best of my recollection I did not.
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3 CRESWELL: Okay, are you aware of any such conversations that did take 4
place?
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WOMACK:
I believe that conversations... conversation did take place 7
during the course of the day between Mr. Denton and Mr. Arnold.
8 CRESWELL: Okay. Do you know anything of the nature of that conversa-g tion?
10l 11l WOMACK: The only thing that I know directly...well it's all indirect f
of course... the indirect knowledge that I have of that conversation was that in the midole of the afternoon Mr. Denton did pass on a recommendation to Pr. Arnold that if high pressure injection flow was 16:
not...had not been established or was not being maintained at at least 400 gallons a minute that we'd die.
17l 18t CRESWELL: Was someone responsible to you for yourself the one that i
191 determined the quanity of flow that was necessary?
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WOMACK: Yes.
223 23 CRESWELL: Who would that've been?
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WOMACK: That was my manager of ECCS and he simply recommended the...that 24 we make sure that high pressure injection flow vas being maintained
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3l and he gave me a quantitative recommendation which I asked him to 4
check before we passed on and he did check that and we passed it on.
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61 CRESWELL: Your manager of ECS...ECCS is who?
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8 WOMACK:
Burt Ounn.
9 10 CRESWELL:
Burt Dunn. Are you aware of how Mr. Dunn arrived at that g
particular flow value?
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WOMACK: Yes, I believe he arrived at by looking at the...at the 141 expected decay level at that time.
15; CRESWELL:
Okay. Were any other recommendations made to officials of 16i g
Metropolitan Edison Company or its parent company that you're aware of?
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WOMACK: Well late during the day we discussed and recommended the 20!
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initiation of operation of one of the reactor coolant pumps in order I
to establish...to reestablish force flow. That was...I don't remember 22j the exact time but it was very light in the day, 6 or 5:30 or 6.
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CRESWELL: Going back earlier in the morning we may have already l
2l discussed this it's my understanding there's a meeting conducted 3
around 10:00 in the morning in one of the training rooms.
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WOMACK: Yes.
6' 7
CRESWELL: Did you attend that meeting?
8 9'
WOMACK: Yes that was the meeting with the...in which Mr. Spangler 10 gave us the information again.
.11 CRESWELL: Okay and it's also my understanding that during'the course f that meeting the decision was made to send the three individuals we 13 discussed earlier to the...to the site.
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Y 16 already made a decision to send the...those three individuals earlier and arrange transportation earlier. We just confirmed the...that 18f l
these people should preceed and I think the final decision was made at 191 that point as to who the third individual would be, Mr. Twilley.
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l 21j CRESWELL:
How was the decision made to send these three individuals?
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i By that I mean these individuals appear to have certain areas of 231 expertise.
Could you describe to me why these three individuals were selected?
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WOMACK: Well I can describe to you in particular how the two individuals l
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who are part of the plant design section were selected.
Mr. Winks is 3
especially knowledgeable of plant performance... excuse me...and he is 4l a control analyist and especially qualified in collection of data and 5,
the analysis of...and the analyses of plant transients and it was 1
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recognized that he would need assistance and I made the decision to I
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send with him Mr. Kelly who has a broad knowledge' of plant systems 8
generally in having participated in startup programs of other plants.
9 10 CRESWELL: Um Um.
Did you personnally give these gentlemen instructions n
before they left?
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WOMACK:
13 Yes, I ask them to go as quickly as they could, gather information 14 and telecopy it back to us so that we could begin...begin evaluations.
15 CRESWELL:
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Could you recollect when you first received telecopied data of any nature from the site and what the nature of the material was?
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WOMACK:
It was the next day, it was the 29th I believe these gentlemen didn't really get to the site until the 29th and we began to receive telecopy plots of temperature pressure in the reactor coolant system.
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CRESWELL: Would you characterize the information that you had the 231 first day as..as being minimal of nature or was it sufficient enough to become....begin some sort of analyses that would either be hand 25 l
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typed calculations, computer typed calculations. You already mentioned I
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that there was some work done on the simulator.
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4 WOMACK: Yeah, I think I would certainly say that we went ahead and 5
did some work based on the feeling that we had had a delayed feedwater 61 event and we used the simulator because it was immediateiy and readily 7
available to us rather than other design codes which would have taken gt a bit longer to set up.
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CRESWELL:
10; Then perhaps it required more input data...
i 11 WOMACK: Oh absolutaly, yes.
g 13 CRESWELL: Were there any model changes made on the simulator that 14!
day?
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WOMACK:
I can't really say for sure, I doubt it, in the sense of model changes as we would understand model changes the way the set of I
equations which the simulator solves certainly changes appropriate to 191 assumption had to be made to delay feedwater for example which would
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not be the normal mode of response.
22t CRESWELL: Were you at anytime in the simulator room observing?
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WOMACK:
I don't believe that on the 28th I was.
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3l CRESWELL:
Did you receive any information from anyone as to how the 4{
simulator was performing in mock modeling this particular event?
5 Si WOMACX:
Yes it was relayed back to me that...that the simulator 7
had...was running and they were running various cases and they were 8
seeing various things and more or less as we expected.
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i 10 CRESWELL:
0o.. 00 you think that the simulation was successful or 11 unsuccessful?
12.
WOMACX: Well, that's... success in terms of being able to say that, 13 14 y u knew, we ran...we ran simulation of certain...of what we knew at 3
that particular point in time the simulation ran and produced results yg) of more or less in accord with our....with our expectations that was successful.
I would say at that point in time we did not have sufficient 17 7g information to sucessfully simulate what had actually had happened and g
was happening at TMI 2 and that did not come until later when we fouled up with the information that we had to get on the 29th from Mr.
Winks and Mr. Kelly.
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o 22 CRESWELL: Okay, that is from retrospect?...
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WOMACK:
Yes, from retrospect.
I 2l 3-CRESWELL:
...that you would evaluate that? At that point in time was 4l any data or any information that was obtained from the simulator runs l
Si used as a based for making recommendations?
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WOMACK:
I don't believe so, no, my recollection is that it was not.
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CRESWELL: You had mention that there had been a certain recommendation j
10 made te Mr. Arnold regarding high pressure infection flow. Upon what g
information was that...that recommendation made other than I believe i
gl you stated that decay heat in the core...
13 WOMACK:
Right.
14 15 CRESWELL:
...was the question at that time.
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17l WOMACK: Well I think'that they also had indirect information of high l
readings in the reactor hot leg thermecouples and we were concerned 19!
l that adequate cooling be maintained.
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CRESWELL: Was it assumed to your knowledge that the 4... 400 gpm high pressure infection flow would all be directed through the core area?
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17 1l WOMACK: No, I'm sure that it was assumed that there could be some 2;
deversion of this flow and some factor or conservatism and was added 3:
that is our standard practice.
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CRESWELL: What would be the path of deversion regarding the...the 6
layout of the reactor coolant system?
7 8
WOMACK: Well when we performed ECCS analysis we typically take the gj assumption that a break might have occurred in one of the paths for 10 high pressure injection flow. There's one in each cold leg and so we y
assumed that some of the high pressure injection flow might have i
been...might be deverted out the break and we have instructions regarding balancing those flows to assure tnat that deversion of flow out the 73 g
break is not...does not deprive the core of necessary cooling.
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CRESWELL: You assume then for the purpose of the 400 gpm figure that y.
there was a break?
18l WOMACK:
No, I'm just...I'm just telling you generically how we do ECCS analysis and with respect to the assumption o'f 400 gpm figure I 201 don't know much conservatism specifically was added, I'm just telling i
you generally that we do add conservatism in the chanca that there is some deversion.
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18 lj CRESWELL:
I quess what I'm trying to get to though is was there any l
2l discussion of flow pass which could bypass the core area?
3 4
WOMACK:
No.
Not with me and I don't believe it was...or if it was Si really being considered at that point in time.
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'RESWELL: At this point in time did you and your personnel believe 8
that the hot leg temperatures were within some band of accuracy telling g
you that there was a bubble in that area of the reactor coolant system?
1 01 l
WOMACK: Well yes during the early to mid afternoon we became aware at g
12 that time it was...at least the indirect information we were getting 73 was indicating that.
I 14!
CRESWELL: Did you or individuals responsible to you make recommenda-tions that a reactor coolant pump be started?
17!j WOMACK: Yes we did.
191 20j!
CRESWELL:
Did you or any of response..'. people responsible to you 21j provide to either your people at the site, that's B&W people at the site or to the licensee a correlation between reactor coolant pump currents and possible conditions in the reactor coolant system?
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WOMACX: Yes I believe late in the day when we were communicating 2
particularly communicating these recommendations we did...I wouldn't 31 so much call it a correlation but we did pass along the information as 4
to what current which you might expect to see if the pump were not 5
pumping...if the pump were unicaded there were significant voids in 61 the pump bowl.
7' 8
CRESWELL: Were there any other things to be considered as a function 9
of pump current other than just the condition of voids in the area of 10' the impeller or void or voiding in the area of the impeller?
11 WOMACK: At that point in time my recollection is that there were not.
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13 CRESWELL: Okay. Owen, at this point I'd like to turn it over to you 14 15l see if you have questions.
I 16i SHACXLETON: Thank ycu, no, at this inasmuch as Mr. Womack did not go to Three Mile Island, I don' t have any...any questions.
Mr. Womack g
would you have any further comments that you would like to make at this time?
20j 21!
l WOMACK:
No, I don't think so, thank you very much.
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SHACXLETON: We thank you very much in behalf of the Commission for 24l yoJr time and we'll end this interview at this time.
The time is now 10:20 a.m. Eastern Oaylight Time, May 9, 1979.
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EDUCATION MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTh: OF TECHNOLCGY Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 E.S.,
Physles, 1963 -
M.S.,
Physics, 1965 Ph.D.,
Physics, 1969 MILITARY Licutenant, U.S.
Navy Ecserve, 1968-1970, assigned to AEC WORK 1968-1973, Reactor Engineer, Division of EXPERIENCE Reactor Development and Technology; U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission 1973, Chief, Control and Electrical Systems Branch, USAEC; Technical review and management of protection, control, j
and electrical system design for liquid metal fast breeder reactor projects 1973-1975,- Assistant Director, Division of Reactor Research and Development,.
USAEC Project Manager responsible for government cupported development of gas ccclcd re actor projects 1975-1976, Senior Technical Consultant, Babcoch & Wilcox Company; Nuclear Export Operations 1976-1978, Pfogram Manager, International Program Management Department; Manegement of engineering support for Muelheim Kaerlich project August 1978-present, Manager of Plant Design Section, Engineering Department, Babcock & Wilcox Conpany; System Analycis and integration of nuclear steam supply systems.
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Atomic Energy Commiccion i
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Babcoch & Wilec;. Company; Nuclear E:. port Operations 1976-1978, Program Manager, International Program Management Dopartment; Management of engineering support for Muelheim Kaerlich project 4
August 1978-present, Manager of Plant Design Section, Engineering Dcpartment, Babcoch & Wilcox Company: Syste=.'nalycis and integraticn of nuclear steam s u.c p l y systems.
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