ML20002A180
| ML20002A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/17/1980 |
| From: | Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-80-409, NUDOCS 8011050102 | |
| Download: ML20002A180 (25) | |
Text
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SECY-80-409 tw 8w{
PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO AMEND PART 50 O
N CONCERNING ATWS (ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITil00T SCRAM) l
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e IS FREQUENCY SIGNIFICANT?
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ATWS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES PRESSURE FAIL RCS (LOCA AT 111G11 POWER)
FAIL SilVTDOWN COOLING SYSTEMS i
POWER EXCEED SilVTDOWN COOLING CAPACITY FAIL SUPPRESSION TYPE CONTAINMENTS 4
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ATWS FREQUENCY llIGil RATE OF CHALLENGE OF SCRAM 1 TO 10 TRANSIENTS / RY 10-3 LOCA'S
/ RY SCRAM RELIABLE FOR MULTIPLE FAILURES SCRAM VULNERABLE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE EXAMPLES FOREIGN BWR SCRAM BREAKERS BROWNS FERRY SCRAM
T U
=
T NUMBER OF TRANSIENTS PER RY
=
U UNAVAILABILITY OF SCRAM
=
(PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMAND)
ESTIMATES OF ATWS FREQUENCY STAFF:
F
@ 10-3 TO 10-4 /RY INDUSTRY:
F w 10-5 TO 10-7 /RY BENCilMARKS (BASES FOR EXCLUDING EVENTS)
F (EXTERNAL llAZARDS)
< 10-6 TO 10-7 /RY F (VESSEL FAILURE) 4 10-6 TO 10-7 /RY
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UNCERTAINTY IN ATWS FREQUENCY e
SCRAM IS VERY RELIABLE e
LONG TIME BETWEEN FAILURES e
NEED VERY LONG OPERATING EXPERIENCE TO VERIFY (60,000 RY) 4 1
PROBABILITY OF SEVERE CONSEQUENCES IF ATWS OCCURS I
e CORE MELT CONTAINMENT FAILURE MITIGATING SYSTEMS (Sil0RT TERM)
PWR BWR SAFETY a RELIEF VALVES SAFETY VALVES AUXILIARY FEEDWATER HIGH PRESSURE MAKEUP TURBINE TRIP FEEPWATER TRIP ELECTRIC POWER ELECTRIC POWER REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP NEUTRON POIS0N INJECTION INITIAL CONDITIONS POWER LEVEL MODERATOR TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS
PROBABILITY OF UNFAVORABLE ATWS VARIABLES R
PROBABILITY OF HAVING WORSE VALUE
=
MOST VARIABLES 5 ' 10-1 R
0.5
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CRITICAL VARIABLES R
2 10-1 TO 10-2 10%
TO 1%
ACCIDENT METEOROLOGY R
C 5%
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PER :lO]OXL Ty en c A L PWR Hooensron knea,one Coerrocsen hasait ury Anc /C A Fvuc room Of TIME lN EQUlL D 6 R IUM CYCL E (n es,1 Futc P ow e n) 0-
, MTC arws MTc-ee4xpeeccu se scuc,r,viv y (to'l*f)
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l = id'l'F ~ 80 -300 P S E s
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'R 'G 90 50 0
Peaceur or Ovenar una Tune MTc is Mone Neonavg i
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3 30
/50 300 OAYS OF E G U l L l6 R l U IA C~rce c (conrwuous) Oeep.sr son
l Ty esca t BWR Floosaaron Vosa Correscisar Tbeaan. 7y (NEAR FULL POW C R) 70..
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-- cro ATw2 MVc-Pe* %ssua e Cene uruv sr y MVC i v fo $ ~ 'A PS I (wiru RPT) osp.)
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T'e n c e ur or Oee nsr unc, % e MVCas he NEGA TIVE
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REDUCTION OF RISK REDUCE FREQUENCY OF TRANSIENTS IMPROVE RELIABILITY OF SCRAM MITIGATE CONSEQUENCES i
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REDUCE FREQUENCY OF TRANSIENTS ELIMINATE 90% TO 99% OF TRANSIENTS COSTLY SOME EXTERNAL DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE
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IMPROVE SCRAM RELIABILITY (PREVENTION)
SEPARATE SCRAM SYSTEM MECllANICAL CONTROL RODS & DRIVES JUDGED LESS LIKELY NOT PROPOSED ELECTRICAL SENSORS, LOGIC, ACTUATORS JUDGED MORE LIKELY PROPOSED FOR SOME DESIGNS
MITIGATE CONSEQUENCES 1
SEPARATE MITIGATING SYSTEMS RELIEVE PRESSURE REDUCE POWER COOL CORE i
ALTERNATIVES 1
STATUS 000 2A PREVENT ELECTRICAL CAILURE 2B PREVENT ELECTRICAL FAILURES MITIGATE MOST ATWS 2C MITIGATE ALL ATWS 2D PREVENT ELECTRICAL FAILURES MITIGATE ALL ATWS
I CONTENT OF ATWS REQUIREMENT L
e MITIGATION EARLIEST PRACTICAL:
JANUARY 198ft INCREASE AFTER JANUARY 198t1 e
PREVENTION EARLY INSTALLATION:
JULY 1982
ATWS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA e
RADIATION PART 100 NO REASON TO CilANGE e
PRESSURE LEVEL C SERVICE LIMIT YIELD STRENGTH NO LARGE DEFORMATIONS & STRESS NO COMPLEX CALCULATION DEFORMATION COMP 0NEllT OPERABILITY e
LONG-TERM SiluTDOWN & COOLING WITil00T CONTROL RODS
ATWS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA e
FUEL INTEGRITY C00LABLE CORE e
CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE SAME AS LOCA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION e
OSCILLATIONS NON-DAMAGING C00LABLE CORE
b ATWS EVALUATION MODEL (MITIGATION) e REACTOR & RADIATION DOSE DETAILS IN REGULATORY GUIDE OBJECTIVE REALISTIC PREDICTION OF ATWS CONSERVATIVE PREDICTION OF CONSEQUENCES PRE-84 POST-84 EM-I EM-II 90-95% MTC 99% MTC SINGLE FAILURE e
6 e-
DESIGN CRITERIA (PREVENTION)
AMSAC ATWS MITIGATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITS (INDEPENDENT & DIVERSE FROM RPS)
SPS SUPPLEMENTARY PROTECTION SYSTEM (DIVERSE FROM RPS)
SDV SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (GE) 4 i
-v
D DESIGN CRITERIA VENDOR PLANT CATEGORY CURRENT NEW PRE-1/84 POST-1/84 E
EM-I EM-I AMSAC AMSAC SPS SF C-E EM-I EM-II AMSAC AMSAC SPS SPS SF B&W EM-I EM-II AMSAC AMSAC SPS SPS SF GE EM-I EM-I SDV SDV SPS SPS SF OLD PLANTS (PRE-9/69) = C0flSIDER CASE BY-CASE O
e y
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IMPLEMENTATION SCllEDULE YEAR 80 81 82 83 10/1 3/1 7/1 12/1 7/1 l
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I EVALUATION MODEL 0
INITIAL CllANGES DESIGN 0
INSTALL A
DESIGN FINAL CllANGES CllRRENT PlJiNTS 0
OLD PLANTS 0
INSTALL FINAL ELECTRICAL CllANGES A
INSTALL FINAL CilANGES BWR CURRENT A
OLD A
PWR A
ATWS SCllEDULE 9 / 11 PAPER TO COMMISSION 9/19 COMMISSION 10/15 MEETINGS 10/1 PUBLISH NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND DRAFT REG. GUIDE 12/1 END COMMENT PERIOD l
1/1/81 PUBLISil EFFECTIVE RULE AND GUIDE
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Septecter 17, 1980 C 0 R R E C T I 0 N N 0 T I C E TO ALL HOLDERS OF SECY-80-409 - PROPOSED RULEf% KING TO Af1END 10 CFR PART 50 CONCERNING AflTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) EVENTS (POLICY SESSION ITEft)
PER THE REQUEST OF THE DIRECTOR, STANDARDS DEVELOPf1ENT REPLACEMENT PAGES ARE BEING PROVIDED FOR EliCLOSURES B AND H OF THE SUBJECT PAPER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATTACHED MEMORAt:DUM.
ATTACHMEN T:
AS STATED THE SECRETARIAT U
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UNI?ED STATES 8
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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' 5, ' e (. J ' S WASHINGTON. D. C. 203 t
7 1 lb I I
SfsJ$/ /
1, p
.. J MEMORANDUM FOR:
Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission FROM:
Robert B. Minogue, Director, Office of Standards Development
SUBJECT:
REPLACEMENT PAGES FOR SECY 80-409 Please replace page 4 of Enclosure B and pages 7, 8, and 9 of Enclosure H of SECY 80-409 with the enclosed pages B-3, H-7, H-8, and H-9.
The changes are being made to clarify these tables by including the actual impacts and values of Alternative 2d for plants under construction with fuel load date after l
January 1,1984 instead of die incremental changes from Alternative 2b.
/*
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'b 71L K ;
! t Rob rt B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development
Enclosures:
As stated cc:
W. Dircks, ED0 w ho ocoI013[
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1 TABLE 1.
SUMMARY
DIRECT REDUCED RISK VALUE* AND DIRECT COST IMPACT OF ATWS REQUIREMENTS 1980 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS PER PLANT LIFETIME
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Plants Under Construction (Construction Permit Issued)-
Future Plants Fuel Load Date Fuel Load Date (Construction Permit i
Operating Plants Before 1/1/34 After 1/1/84 Not Issued)
Alternative 2b Alternative 2b Alternative 2d Alternative 2d Pesigner Impacts Values Impacts Values Impacts Values Impacts Values Babcock &
2.2 -
2.3 -
4.4 -
4.0 -
Wilcox 2.8 8.7 2.0 8.6 2.9 17.3 2.5 14.9 i
Combustion 2.2 -
2.3 -
4.4 -
Engineering 2.6 7
- 1. 8 8.6 2.9 17.3 i
Westinghouse 4.3 -
4.6 -
4.6 -
3,,
- 1. 7 17.4
- 1. 2 17.3 1.8***
17.3 gg j om J
- General 24.0 -
24.2 -
25.6 -
(0 Electric 3.5 60.0 3.2 58.8 10.8 61.9 gg U
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- Indirect values are not included in this table.
They were included in NUREG-0460, Vol. 2, Ap g
y g (g
)
and in submittal to ACRS.
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$3 I e
- No cost was included for cleanup and downtime resulting from inadvertent actuation of poison 8.3 E
g injection system (estimated $200,000 to $8,000,000 per plant lifetime).
t
- These values are likely to be conservative, especially those for Westinghouse plants and j
.O U for theose GE plants where the SLCS piping is not in p' ace yet.
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