ML19354D838
| ML19354D838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1990 |
| From: | William Cahill TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| TXX-90002, NUDOCS 9001220247 | |
| Download: ML19354D838 (26) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:*;$7 i o-r Log # TXX 90002 L P9 File # 10014 916 r C Ref. # 10CFR50.36 1UELECTRIC January 15, 1990 ' 500$$5s U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) DOCKET NO. 50 445 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REF: Letter dated September 12, 1989, from Mr. C. I. Grimes to Mr. W. J. Cahill, Jr.- Gentlemen: The referenced letter provided TV Electric the draft operating license No. NPF-28 for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Unit 1. Enclosed with the draft license were several attachments, including Appendix A to the draft-license Technical Specifications. to this letter furnishes marked pages from the dreift Technical Specifications indicating recent changes at CPSES Unit 1. These changes have resulted from design modifications, revised calculations and vendor recommendations and are consistent with the FSAR through Amendment 78. The date for submittal of this letter was intentionally chosen by TV Electric in order to assure that the Technical Specifications match the final plant design. Attachment I to this letter provides the justifications associated with the attached changes. Should you require additional information or desire further discussions on the attached changes, do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely. William J. Cahill, Jr. JDS/vid Attachments c-Mr. R. D. Hartin, Region JV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) ggrggsg7:388 eggs 40$ A b a g !L l
'At,tachment 1 to TXX 90002 CPSES TS REVISION' DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page l'of 5 1 l .TS. Page (as amanded) Greue Descristian 3/4 1-11. 12 2 See Page No(s):3/4 5 10. B3/4 1 3, 83/4 5 2 ) Correct instrument accuracy and unusable volume in RWST. Expand range of boron concentration in RWST. Revision i The Westinghouse uncertainty analysis, recently issued I for Comanche Peak Unit 1, provides a level instrument j indication error of +/- 45 for the RWST. In addition, the RWST baron concentration range has been expanded from 2000 2100 ppm to 2000 2200 ppa to ] provide a reasonable band for maintaining the RWST within the LCO. The increase in the upper limit of the baron concentration band to 2200 ppe has been reviewed against the CPSES design basis accidents and no impact will result from this change. This increased allowance in boron concentration will provide sufficient margin in the setpoint so as not to unnecessarily challenge Technical Specification limits nor unnecessarily force entry into a plant transient to hot standby. The unusable volume of the RWST was determined to be 45,494 gallons during the Post Construction Hardware Validation Program. This change was reflected in the Bases for 3/4.1.2, "Boration Systems" and 3/4.5.4, " Refueling Water Storage Tank." Actual total required j volume for the RWST remains unchanged. This change has been evaluated under the TU Electric 50.59 program per.TXX 89718 dated September 28, 1989. TS Change Request Number: TS 89 104 Related SER Section: 16 SER/SSER Impact: No 3/4 1 19, 20 2 See Page No(s): Figure 3.1 1 Include Westinghouse control rod wear mitigation techniques. Revision: This change clarifies the intent of the Technical Specifications and implements a modified control rod repositioning strategy recommended by Westinghouse for the All Rods Out range of steps withdrawn. This strategy should reduce preferential fretting wear on control rod cladding and thus extend the life of the control rods. This change has been evaluated under the TV Electric 50.59 program per TXX 89718 dated September 28. 1989. TS Change Request Number: TS 90 004 Related SER Section: 16 SER/SSER Impact: No
] to TXXo90002 CPSES TS REVISION
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~ DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page 2 o i i .rs reee ] (as maanded) troun Osacriation ) i l 3/4 3 29 3 See Page No(s): Table 3.3-3 l Change the 6.9kV Bus Undervoltage trip setpoint from 2100V to 2037V and Allowable Value from 1995 to 1935. Revision: i The setpoint is revised to reflect the reference CPSES calculation. The Dropout Voltage was calculated to be 33.95V. The trip setpoint is calculated as the Dropout Voltage times the Bus Pickup Tap Ratio, ort (33.95V) * (7200V) / (120V) - 2037V In addition, change the allowable value lower limit from 1995 to 1935 V. This change is based on a 5% tolerance. Both of the above changes reflect the Tech Spec change j from " pickup" value to the " dropout" value. No change has been made to the actual setting of the device. TS Change Request Number: TS 89-110 jl Related SER Section: 8.2.4 i l l SER/SSER Impact: No l \\ 3/4 3 39 2 See Page No(s): Table 3.3 4 I Revision of alare/ trip setpoint for control room air l intake radiation monitor, i Revision: The design basis accidents considered in the develop-ment of the setpoint for control room air intake rad-istion monitors include Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Small Line Break (SL) outside containment. Locked Rotor (LR), and Fuel Handling (FH). L The previous revision of the calculation-for this set-point provided an alare setpoint based on the concen-tration equivalent of 30 ren to the thyroid of a Control Room Operator due to a SGTit or MSLB event. A l safety injection signal is initiated for these two j events, which will automatically place the control room ventilation into emergency recirculation: therefore, the SL, LA, and FH events should be considered for establishing the alarm setpoint. Of the three events. I the FH accident is the limiting event with respect to l control room operator dose. The FH accident is assumed as the basis for the control room intake air radiation high alarm setpoint and an assumed concentration equiv-l alent to 10 ren thyroid was calculated for the maximum l~ setpoint. The operator doses remain within 10CFR50, ] Appendix A (GDC-19) values. 1 This change has been evaluated under the TV Electric 1 50.59 program per TXX 89718 dated September 28, 1989. ] TS Change Request Number: TS-89 108 Related SER Section: 16 1 l
V p CPSES TS REVIS!0M \\ At,tachment 1 to TXX 90002 DETAILED DESCRIPTION P89' 3 L TS Pepe J (as amanded) Staug Descrietten SER/SSER Impact: No 3/4 6 1 2 Reise the upper limit of the nitrogen cover pressure for the Safety Injection Accumulators from 636 to 644. I Revision: { The previous pressure band of 623 636 psig (13 psi) has been revised to 623 644 psig (21 psi) within which to maintain the accumulator pressure. The narrow band width of 13 psi could require more operator attention 3 toward maintaining the accumulator volume / pressure than is necessary. The revised upper limit has been reviewed and determined to have no adverse affect on the results of the FSAR accident analyses. This change has been evaluated under the TU Electric 50.59 program per TXX 89718 dated September 18, 1989. TS Change Request Number: TS 89 107 Related SER Section: 16 SER/SSER Impact: No 1 3/4 5 1 2 Revision: 1 The upper limit for boron concentration in the Safety l Injection ($1) accumulators is increased from 2100 to ( 2200 ppa to correspond to the maximum boron concentra-tion in the RWST. This increase will avoid unnecessary operator action for dilution since the 51 accumuiators l are filled with water from the RWST. This change has l-been evaluated under the TU Electric 10 CFR 50.59 process as described in TXX 89718, dated 9/28/89. TS Change Request Number TS 90 001 Related SER Section: 6.3.2 SER/SSER Impact: No 3/4 6-12 4 See Page No(s):8 3/4 6 A Clarification: Clarify gallons by adding 5 height of liquid. Control Board instrument reads in % height of liquid for the Spray Additive Tank. l TS Change Request Number TS 89 103 Related SER Section: 9.3 SER/SSER Impact: No l l 3/4 7 4 3 Revise Turbine Driven Aux. Feedwater pump surveillance l Test Pressure,to 1450 psid. Revision: A revised calculation establishes the surveillance test parameters for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater t w w
CPSES TS REVISION AttachmeQt 1 to TXX 90002 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page 4 I TS Page las amanded) Atma Descriptism pump 1450 psid 8 860 gpe. TS Change Request Number: TS-89 106 Related SER Section: 10.4 SER/55ER Impact: No 3/4 7 14 2 Remove surveillance for testing Automatic valves Revision: These valves are blanked / removed from the Service Water Recirculation lines. Since power to these valves is being permanently disconnected, the subject surveillance requirement is no longer needed. These were the only automatic valves in the Service Water loops activated on a Safety Injection signal. This change has been evaluated under the TU Electric $0.59 program per TXX 89718 dated September 28, 1989. TS Change Request Number TS 90 003 Related SER Sec. tion: 16 SER/$5ER lapact: No 3/4 8 1, 10 2 Reduce the minimum required volume for the EDG fuel storage system. Revision: Change the minimum required volume in the diesel generator fuel storage system to 86,000 gal. This volu. me is sufficient for continuous operation of the Diesel Ggnerator at rated load for 7 days plus the volume of unusable oil at the bottom of the storage tank. This change has been evaluated under the TV Electric 10Cr'R50.59 program per TXX 89718 dated September 28, 1989. TS Change Request Number: TS 90 002 Related SER Section: 9.5.4 SER/SSER 1mpact: No 3/a 8 5 2 Revise the maximum voltage limitation for the full load rejection surveillance requirement for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Revision: The maximum acceptable output voltage during and following a full load rejection test is being changed from 110 percent of EDG rated voltage to 120 percent of FDG rated voltage. Recent preoperational testing demonstrated that transient voltages in excess of 110 percent of rated can be expected. Discussions with the EDG manufacturer, along with reviews of vendor design documents, equipment specifications. Technical Specif-ications of other plants, IEEE standards, and regulat-i to TXX 90002 CPSES TS REVISION DETA! LED DESCRIPTION Page 5 TS Page s (as maanded) troup bascriation i ory guides concluded that the voltages recorded may j be expected. The higher transient voltages will not have an impact on the ability of the EDG's to perform their safety function. The diesel generator vender i has evaluated this infrequent voltage escalation (the surveillance test is performed once every 18 nenths) and has established this will not cause irdury or i degradation to the Class 1E system. This change het been evaluated under the TU Electric 50.59 program per TXX 89718 dated September 28, 1989, i TS Change Request Number TS 89 109 Related SER Sectiont 8.3.1 SER/SSER Impact: No l I' 1 l. 1 s I --r-. w 1-
v l AttacWeent 2 TXX.90002 j [. ]. Page 1 cf 20 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE: a. A botic acid storage tank with: 1) A minimum indicated borated water level of 10% when using the boric acid transfer pump, 2) A minimum indicatec borated water level of 20% when using the gravity feed connection, 3) A minimum boron concentration'of-7000 ppm and 4) A minimum solution temperature of 65'F. b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with: T5 ,14#/o 1) Aminimumindicatedberatedwaterlevelof,26C Pl~l 04 2) A minimum boren concentration of 2000 ppm and 3) A minimum solution temperature of 40'F. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. MA: With no berated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required berated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 7 days by: 1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2) Verifying the indicated borated water volume, and 3) Verit) sng the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water, b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it l is the source of beratec water and the outside air temperature is l 1ess inan 40'F. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11
I^ h hhj.'l !~ TXX 90002 Pa'pe 2 of 20 t RiACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS p BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE 1 as required by Specificatic.n 3.1.2.2: 4. A boric acid storage tank with: 1) A minimum indicated borated water level of 50%, l 2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and i 3) A minimum solution temperature of 65'F. b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with: 9N* T5 l 1) Aminimumindicatedboratedwaterlevelof,96( i 2) A boron concentration between 2000 ppm and 4100' ppm, W09 5tp.00 \\ 3) A minimum solution temperature of 40'F, and 4) A maximum solution temperature of 120'F. APPLICABILI2: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With the boric acid storage tank inoperable and being used as one 4. of the above required borated water sources, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTOOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% Ak/k at 200'F; restore the boric acid storage tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours. b. With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status l within 1 hour or be in at least EDT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l l l COMAN;HE FEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12
hMQ TXX 90002 l Pa'ge 3 of 20 WRdk3 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMJ + RCD DROP TIME i i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.4 The individual (shutdown and control) rod drop time from 90-004 withdrawn position shall be less than or equal to 2.4 seconds from beginning of decay of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry with: T,yg greater than or equal to 551*F, and a. b. All reactor coolant pumps operating. APPLICABILITY: MODE $ 1 and 2. ACTION: i With the drop time of any rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2. i SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.4 The red drop time of rods shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality: a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head, b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the Control Rod Drive System which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and c. At least once per 18 months. l l l l-l l COMANCHE FEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-19 l i
, g p., Attach 3ent 2 TXX 90002 br(s.Na) 3 5 Pa'ge 4 of 20 REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEN SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT' i LIMITIhG=C0NDITION'FOROPERATION ~ o T3 3.1.3.5. Allishutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn." " 70' M APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* **. s ACTION: With a maximum of one shutdown rod not-fully withdrawn, except for surveillance fterting pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within I hour either: a.' Fully withdraw the rod, or Declare the rod to be. inoperable and apply Specification b.' -3.1.3.1. 3RVEILLANCEREOUIRiMENTS 4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawni
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Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control - Bank A, B, C,;or 0 during an-approach to reactor criticality,- and b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter. uk' J n "See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.
- With K,ff greater than or ecual to 1.
wk* r.It wtA.h w a sA 1/ k +Le eewJ. % wAere s G id..aa c..l., a,e.4 n rS _ pst tw wirkta rke tann t a -( b 2,2 8 -J $ 3 3 3, COMAN:HE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-20
~ DiiAff ~Pa,tachment'2 TXX-90002 At ge 5 of 20 {ee An~M (twTse cl C.ot VG-o 240 i (30.1.228) (84.4.228) TS ( 90-00H - 200 'h BANK 5 -[ I ISO ) ( 00.146) g O . BANK C B l 120 / c EO /SANK D cc (0.49) 40 / (31.0) O d 20 40 60 80 100 / PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER FIGURE 3.1-1 ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-22 ~
1 Att'achment 2'TXX-90002 Page'6_of.20= -FIGURE 3.1-1 ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS-VERSUS THERMAL POWER 240 e 231 (3 (84.4,228). ,_,__.11,228) 228 i T200 - - - - ~ ~~-~~ By BANK B (0,164)' b 160 ~ ~J -~~ B M (100,146) BANKC w $,120 ~ ~~ ~ 5 p E g 80 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 1 l BANK D 8 (0,49). - c 40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ C- ~ ~. E . (31,0) i i O 20 40 60 80 100-PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER
- Fully withdrawn shall be the condition where control rods are at a position within the interval of !!:228 and $231 steps withdrawn.
e COMANCHE PEAX - UNIT 1 3/4 1-22
re ' I-gg IAlllE 3.3-3 (Continued). T;T }. o* ENGINIFRED SAFEIY TEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS- ^5 i,i E$m i o TOTAL. SENSOR y i ERROR i !?) IIlilC i l 0llAl liffl i ALLOWANCE (TA) Z (5) TRIP SEIPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE-W o it. Ioss of Power,(6.9 kV & 480 V N o e c; Safeguards System Undervoltage) (Continued)~ l L 59 o b. 6.9 kV Alternate OfIsite < -69B-V Source Undervoltage N.A. N.A. N.A. 3-5004 V i4900V g c. 6.9 kV Bus Undervoltage N.A. N.A. N.A. >MV V 99-110 : ~ 2037. {3450V d. 6.9 kV Degraded Voltage N.A. N.A. N.A. 1 6054 V 1 5933 V e. 480 V Degraded Voltage N.A. N.A. N.A. 1 439 V 1 435 V D f. 480 V tow Grid y <p Undervoltage N.A. N.A. N.A. 1447 V 1 443 V ."Jy. .n 9. Control Room Emergency Recirculation -3 a. Manual Initiation N.A. N. A. N.A. N.A. N.A. l AutomI ic Jctt rt-{.orjicund^M.-AW NrA. NrA. M,? M,Ai gl fctutionRlays / ;* l, f. Safety injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values. 10. Engineered Safety features Actuation System Interlocks a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-ll N.A. N.A. N.A. < 1960 psig i 1975.2 psig h. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. N. A. N.A. 'N.A. N.A. 11. Solid State Safeguards Sequencer N.A. N.A. .N.A. N.A. N.A. i i (S555) l l .m. m ea - r- . en .s .a,. k.a m. u
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TABLE-3.3-4 . = :: ,{ Q, RADIAT10N ' MONITORING INSTRtMENIATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS -$ k - '3n .A u . MINIMIM x. 'S CilANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP ? ~7 7 IIINCil0NAl.I! NIT 10 IRIP/ ALARM OPERABLE MOULS ~5EIPOINT- . ACTION ' E. 8 E 1. RCS Ieakage Detection ~ j a. Particulate Radioactivity N.A. I 1, 2, 3, 4 N.A. Xf3-l h. Gaseous Radioactivity N.A. 1 -1,2,3,4 M.A. 28-zy.- 2. Containment Ventilation Isolation Gasentis Radioactivity 1 -1 1,-2, 3, .2(r Z 7 p"';. 4* 6** wg 3. Control Room ~ "TJ ; t'. i 3 . /. 4 x ID TS . Q ".,. Y Air Intake-Radiation Level 1/ intake 2/ intake All 6 G. 2 x 10 " - #2 8 O '308 pCi/mi 4 -A. .m -,1-- - - - - - - - - - = - -. = = = -. - - - - - - - - ' - - - - ' - - - - + - ' - ' - - - - - - " - " " ~ - - ' " ' ' ' ' - ' " " ' ' - - ' ' ' '
~AttechaCnt 2 TXX 90002 $f.Q 7 ~Page 9 of 20 y gj;j j EMERGENCY' CORE C00 LING' SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS COLD LEG INJECTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each' cold' leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with: a. The discharge isolation valve open with power removed, b. An indicated borated. water level of between 39% and 61% 2Z00 g.9 0- o ol c. A boren concentration of between 1900 and-HOO ppm, and d. An indicated cover pressure of between 623 and-6Mrpsig. .rs-89-107 4't4 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*. ACTION: a. With one cold leg injection accumulator' inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or the boron concentration outside the required values, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours. b. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the. isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and reduce pressurizer. pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours. With the boron concentration of one cold leg injection accumulator outside the required limit, restore the boron concentration to within the required limits within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure-to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 12 hours by: 1) Verifying the indicated borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure in the tanks, and " Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 7
J;i: y-7 kii g -Attachment 2 TXXo90002 Pa'ge 10 of 20 Fo EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS !3/4.5'4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with: 3-3 9Jife a. A minimum indicated borated water level of-96%7-gS-/ o 'f b. A boron concentration of between 2000 and 4400' ppm of boron, noo c A minimum-solution temperature of 40'F, and d. A maximum solution temperature of 120 F. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours-. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 7 days by: 1) Verifying the indicated borated water volume in the tank, and 2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water. b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40 f or greater than 120*F. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-10
p .q ' TXX-90002-M3 glU Pa'ge 11 of.20 /l ] CONTAINMENT' SYSTEMS i SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with: inh & leve 9l
- TS A spray additive tank cent:ini.S, a vetumle of between Md a.
79 103 5314 ellens of between 28 and 30% by weight NaOH solution, and 9E/o b. Four spray adcitive eductors each. capable of adding NaOH solution -l from the chemical additive tank to a Containment Spray System pump n flow. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE 'l status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, restore the Spray ~ Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following-30 hours. i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. - At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; Atleastonceper6mjnthsbyj g f5 b. 1) Verifying the ccnt:incd solution vehme in the tank, and N-10 3 2) Verifying the concentration of the Na0H solution by chemical analysis. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each c. automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Spray Actuation test signal; and d. At least once per 5 years by verifying: 1) The flow path through the Spray Additive supply line, and 2) RWST test water flow rates of between 50 GPM and 100 GPM through the eductor test loop of each train of the Spray Additive System. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-12
b ) Rf5,M'f - Attachment-2 TXX 90002 Pa'ge 12 of 20-i .... a p L ' PLANT SYSTEMS jd6 O~ 'O h -SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) m ~* ,,,s ' ^ " - 2)- Verifying that the steam turbine-dr ven pum d ve op a 9 pressure of greater than or equal to i J d at a. low of !? greater than or equal to 860 gpm when h secondary steam - /.; supply pressure is greater than 532 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3; 3) Verifying that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position-is in its correct position; and
- w. *A1 MM"
""*"""4 4) Verifying that eachg ;t:= ti: valve in the flow path is in the fully open position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is in standby for auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER. b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by: 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates ~ to its correct position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater - Actuation test signal,.and ' 2) ' Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically-upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not. applicable to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into g3. % e a, rs t. e e \\ i l L COMAciE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-4
[At,tachehnt2-TXX90002 -Page~13 of 20 PLANT SYSTEMS- -1 3/4.7.4' STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM i i; i LIMITING' CONDITION FOR-OPERATION sr*,.>-
- 3. 7.' 4 At least two independentaservice water loops shall be OPERABLE.-
. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. 1 ~1 -ACTION: Isur,w-With only one service water loop OPERABLE,. restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in-COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ~ src..e 4.7.4 Each, service water loop.shall.be demonstrated OPERABLE: -a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual,. l power-operated, or automatic ~) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or.othervise secured in position.is in its correct position; and AtleastonceperIBmonthsduringshutdown,byverifyingtha[f ~ T$
- b. --fach-automat 4c-vehe-servicing 55fety9 elated--equipment-actuates-gg tH trcorrec t-pos444 on-en-a-Saf ety-I n j ec t-i o n-t e s t-s i g na h-a nd-
[fafetyInjectiontestsignal. [h/achstationservicewaterpumpstartsautomaticallyona lt l. (~ l COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-14
I D P:. 5 'At,tachmont 2 TXX-90002 f ' '] Page<14 of-20 l 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission a. network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution System, and b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with: 1) A separate day fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 1440 gallons of fuel, M 2) A separate-Fuel Storage System.containing a minimum volume of -100,000 gallons of fuel, and 9 0 0 0 2. 8 000 3)- A sdparate fuel transfer pump. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: a. With one offsite circuit of tne above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1/a within 1 hour and at least once per.8 hours thereafter. If either diesel generator has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours, demonstrate its OPERABILITY by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 a.4) for each such diesel generator, separately, within 24 hours. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT-STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, b. With either diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the above required A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 a within 1, hour and at least once per 8 hours / thereafter. If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demon-strate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 a.4) within 24 hours f unless the diesel is already operating and loaded.# Restore the incoerable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- uring performance of surveillance activities as a requirement for ACTION Dstatements, the air roll test shall not be performed.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 E-1
Atjachm3nt2TN-90002 1, Pagel15=of;20-I ELECTRICAL POWER-SYSTEMS-l' SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)
- a)-
An API Gravity of within 0.3 degrees at 60'F, or a speci-fic gravity of within 0.0016 at 60/60*F, when compared.to the supplier's certificate, or an absolute specific gra-vity at 60/60*F of-greater than or equal to 0.8348 but less than or equal to 0.8984, or an API gravity of greater than or equal to 26 degrees but less than or equal to 38 degrees; b) A kinematic viscosity at 40'F of greater than or equal to 1.9 centistokes, but less than or equal to 4.1 centistokes (alternatively, Saybolt viscosity, SUS at 100 F of greater-than or. equal to 32.6, but less than or equal to 40.1), if gravity was not determir.ed by comparison with the sup-plier's certification; c) A flash point equal to or greater than 125*F; d) A clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM-D4176-1982; 2) By verifying within 30 days of obtaining the sample that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM-0975-1981 are met when tested in accordance with ASTM-0975-1981 except that the ' analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM-01552-1979 or ASTM-D2622-1982. e. 'At least once every 31 days by obtaining a sample of fuel oil in accoraance with ASTM-02276-1978, and verifying that total particu-late contamination is less than-10 mg/ liter when checked in accor-dance with ASTM-D2276-1978, Method A; f. At least once per 18. months *, during shutdown, by: .1) Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service; 2) Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 783 kW while maintaining voltage at 6900 2 690 volts'and frequency at 60 2 6.75 Hz; g i 3) Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 7000 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not excoed ME - 4 volts during and following the load rejection; S Mro t ,o 4) Simulating a loss-of-offsite power by itself, and: a) Verifying deenergization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses, and "For any start of a diesel, the diesel must be operated with a load in accordance witn the manufacturer's r'ecommencations. All planned diesel engine starts for the ourpose of this surveillance may be preceded by a prelude period in accordance with vencor recommendations. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 8-5 l 1 l
-Pa,tachment:2 TXXo90002 ~At ge:16 of 20; ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l A.C.-SOURCES- . SHUT 00WN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -3.8.1.2 As-a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: a. One circuit be' tween the offsite transmission network _and the Onsite Class:1E Distribution System, and bc.One diesel generator with: 1) Day' fuel.. tank containing a minimum volume of 1440 gallons of
- fuel, 86,0%
75 2) A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 100,000= gg gallons of fuel, and 3) A fuel. transfer pump. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. $ TION: With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical-power sources OPERABLE,-immediately suspend all-operations involving CORE ~ ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated-fuel, or crane operation with loads over the fuel-storage pool, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through'a greater than or equal-to:2.98 square inch vent. In addition', when in MODE 5 with the-reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required sources:to OPERABLE status as soon as possible. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications ~ 4.8.1.1.1, 4. 8.1.1. 2 (except-f or Specification 4. 8.1.1. 2a. 5)), and 4. 8.1.1. 3. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 8 '.0 l 1
o TXX 90002 'Qh Pa'ge 17 of 20 ynMt L REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity' condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable. The limitation for a maximum of two charging pumps to be OPERABLE and the requirement to verify one charging pump to be inoperable below 350'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. The limitation for minimum solution temperature of the borated water sources are sufficient to prevent boric acid crystallization with the highest allowable boron concentration. The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140 F. This condition requires either 1.100 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,113 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water from the RWST. . As listed below, the required indicated levels for the boric acid storage tanks and the RWST include allowances for required / analytical volume, unusable volume, measurement uncertainties (which include instrument error and tank tolerances, as applicable), system configuration requirements, and other required _ volume. Tank MODES Ind. Unusable Required Measurement System Other Level Volume Volume Uncertainty Config. (gal) (gal) -(gal) (gal) 7g Wo e 49o RWST 5,6 45P 7,113 .5%"of span 57,857 N/A frb/04 1,2,3,4 ,967 -47,472-70,702 5%~ of span N/A 055,55 " 95 % 'i5an 357,/As35 Boric " 5,6 10% 3,221 1,100 6% of span N/A N Acid 1,2,3,4 50% 3.221 15,700 6% of span N/A N/A o age y 5,c ciyg 2* % 3t' 8"' 3" "/# The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reac'.ivity control while in MODE 6. " Additional volume required to meet Specification 3.5.4. 1 COMANCHE PEAK - UN!T 1 B 3/4 1-3
q A -A technent 2 TXX 90002
- Page 18 cf 20
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' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)- to be inoper'able below 350 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. The requirement to remove power from certain valve operators is in accord-ance with Branch Technical Position ICSB-18 for valves that fail to meet single failure considerations. Power is removed via key-lock switches on the control board. The Surveillance Requirements provided.to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. - Surveillance Requirements, for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance i of proper-flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each j injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding _ runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2)' provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of tctal ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed e in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK -The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injec-tion by the-ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, (2) for small break LOCA and steam line breaks, the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing.of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with a~11 control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly, and (3) for large break LOCAs, the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all shutdown and control rods fully withdrawn, and (4) sufficient time is available for the operator to take manual action and complete switchover of ECCS and containment spray suction to the containment sump without emptying the RWST or losing suction. Y Therequiredindicatedlevelincludesagpercentmeasurementuncertainty, D an unusable volume of-%42 gallons and a required water volume of +2frif59-9g q gallons. 4.Gy9y M937 The limits on indicated water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a long-term pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution cf iodine and minimizes the'effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2
..q7 3 f !At,tachment 2 TX'X 90002 J 'MNNINENTSYSTEMS K k BASES b-o S.,\\ 4 aJ c MT CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued) Vs T. d Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for contain-tY -ment ventilation. valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage l f @g : failures could-develop. The 0.60 L leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b. shall not be exceeded when the leak $ge rates determined by the leakage integrity -tests-of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all j,j valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests. L N 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS T 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM di The 0PERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment 7S depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a i t LOCA or steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower contain-I
- $ - 1 ment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions' used in the safety
. analyses. N l: h S'* The Containment Spray System which is composed of redundant trains, pro-y _}y% bvidespost-ateidentcoolingofthecontainmentatmosphere. However, the Con-iinment Spray System also provides a mechanism for re:x;ving iodine from the 9 g $ontainmentatmosphereandthereforethetimerequirementsforrestoringan ],4 o inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent J,g (}with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment, n ~- :s k 3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM 1 The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH }gis added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH 3 p 'd /olume and concentration ensure a long term pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band .y *h minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and I d .Y : O caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components'. The contained } }.f solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assump-tions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety 75 nalyses. rmM g pg .t g d3/4.6.3 AINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I s W
- d O The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the con-
[ 0 g painment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event s y of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressuri-O) zation of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Md4 Design Criteria 54 through 57 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. Containment iso-Y D lation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the en-vironment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3
g ...,,,l. t './:, j E TXX-90002 $? ~ ' Pige 20 of.20 PLANT SYSTEMS c D BASES L 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be. cooled down to less than 350'F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss-of-offsite power. Each electric motor-driven auxiliary feedwater_ pump is capable of deliver-ing a total feedwater flow of 430 gpm to two steam generators at a pressure of 1221 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. The steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is' capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 860 gpm to four steam generators at a pressure of 1221 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temp-erature to less than 350 F when the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation. The Auxiliary Feedwater System is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 430 gpm at a pressure of 1221 psig to the entrance of at least two steam generators while allowing for: (1) any possible spillage through the ~ design worst case break of the main feedwater line; (2) the design worst case single failure; and (3) recirculation flow. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat-and U reduce Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350 F at which point the Resiaual Heat Removal System may be placed in operation. n-lo6 N.tlUEl N En'h 5 E!! N
- R'w pa. % $ "d V N USi W U O v d l r
-The auxiliary feedwater flo th is a passive f low path based on the f act 1 that valve actuation is not required in order to supply flow to the steam generators. The automatic valves tested in the flow path are the Feedwater Split Flow Bypass which are required to be shut upon initiation of the 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System to meet the requirements of the accident analysis. Both steam supplies for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedsater pump must l be OPERABLE in order to meet the design bases for the complete range of accident j analyses. The allowed outage time for one inoperable steam source in consistent a with the lower probability of the worst case steam or feedwater line break f accident. l 3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water { volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT i STANDBY conditions for 18 hours with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of offsite power or 4 hours at HOT STANDBY followed by a cooldown s to 350 F at a rate of 50 F/HR for 5 hours. The contained water volume limit I includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line loca-tion or other physical characteristics. The required indicated level includes-3.5percertmeasurementuncertainty,anunusablevolumeof.,1Qgallonsanda requiredw olume or, C'..::Q11gs. You NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1 requir'es a backup source to the CST which is the CPSES Station Service Water System, which can be manually aligned, if required @u D in lieu of CST minimum water volume. CCMAN:HE PEAK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 t '}}