ML19354D799

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Requests Review of Facilities to Determine Whether Failure of Any Equipment Not Meeting Criteria of Class I Seismic Const Particularly Circulating Water Sys,Could Cause Flooding Sufficient to Affect Performance of ESF
ML19354D799
Person / Time
Site: Robinson 
Issue date: 08/08/1972
From: Skovholt D
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Jackie Jones
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 9001220139
Download: ML19354D799 (2)


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UNITED STATES

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION W

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August 8, 1972 Docket No. 50-261 Carolina-Power & Light Company ATTN:

Mr. J. A. Jones Senior Vice President Engineering & Operating n

336 Fayet.teville Street

} }9 j [ t Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Gentlemen:

FLOODING OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENT A failure of an expansion bellove in the circulating water line which serves the main condenser recently occurred at Quad-Cities Unit 1.

The resultant flooding caused degradation of some of the engineered safety features. Interim corrective action has been taken and more permanent corrective measures are planned at Quad-Cities 1 and 2 to prevent recur-A copy of the abnormal occurrence report filed by Commonwealth rence.

Edison for this event is enclosed.

l You are requested to review your facilities to determine (1) whether I

failure of any equipment which does not meet the criteria of Class I seismic construction, particularly the circulating water system, could '

cause flooding sufficient to adversely affect the performance of engi-'

neered safety systems, and (2) whether failure of any equipment could cause flooding such that conunon mode failure of redundant safety related equipment would result. The integrity of barriers to protect critical equipment from flood waters should be assumed only when the bactier meets the' seismic requirements for Class I structures. If your eeview determines that-engineered safety features could be so affected, provide your plans and schedule for corrective action together with the justification for continued operation of your facility pending completion of -the corrective i

action.

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Carolina Power & Light Company. !

August 8, 1972 t

The results of your review are requested within sixty days.

This infor-mation should be provided with one signed original and thirty-nine additional copies.

i Sincerely, s

wn:1- -

h nald J. Skovho g

Assistant Director for Operating Reactors Directorate of Licensing

Enclosure:

CE ltr dtd 6/17/72 cc:

George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge & Madden 910 17th Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

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11-Mr. Edward J. Bloch, Acting Direc*or Directorate of Licensing U. S.

Atomic Enorcy Commission Washington, D.

C.

20545

'Re feren ce :

License DRP Quad Cities Nuclear Power i

Station Unit 1 - Appendix A Se ction 6.6. A.3 and 6.6.B.3

Dear l'r. Bloch:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of an abnormal occurrence on Unit 1 at Quad Cities Nuc1 car l

Power Station June 9,1972, at 5: 05 p.m.

Tnis occurrenc(

was rc, ported by telegram on June 10, 1972.

DESCRIPTIO'I' OF I!! CIDE.'lT i

I Due to prcblems experienced with the main condenner flow reversing valves drif ting out. of positien, a mcdification was approved to provide for mechanical blockinc, of these valves.

On June 9,1972 the condenscr, circulating water flou was to be reversed in order to move all 8 valves to the opoesite position to complete the modification.

Af ter the pins had been removed from some of the valves it became necessary to start the hydraulic unit in order to move the valven uhich had drifted against several of the pins preventing their removal.

The hydraulic system had recently boon filled with clean oil, however, and thus required venting of the headers to remove entrapped air.

As this air was being vented by loosening a hydraulic fitting, one of the 10 foot butterfly valves on the northeast water box slammed closed.

Three circul'at'ing water pumps were in operation at the time with flow in the North direction.

  • The shock from this rapid closure caused a rupture of l

the rubber expansion, joint located about 16 feet above the valve at the bottom water box connection.

River unter from the circulating Nater syntem began floodine !

the condensate pump room in the Turbine Building baner.eq (El. 547').

The, basement eventually filled to a depth i

of 15 feet, 6 inchos (El. 562'6")

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j ITUTEDI ATE CORP.ECTIVE ACTIO!{

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The men workinr, in the condensate pump room i

evacuated the area cnd reported the situation to the

. control room.

The operator immediately shutdown all j

i circulating water pumps which automaticall:1 closes the pump discharge valven.

The supply breakers ' on all major electrical enuipment in the area were racked e

out of service within about 6 minuten of the start of flooding.

The Unit 1 circulating water discharr,e head works gatos were also closed and the ice molting v. ate l

was opened to prevent backflow to the condensor and lower the discharge pool level.

Representative samples were taken of the water 7

'in the basement prior to and during the pump out end the activity was.found to be typical of river back-ground.

Temporarci pumps and hoses were set up within a few hburs.

One pump was lined up to tkim the oil film from the surface and discharge to the oil separator.

7he remainina pumps discharFed directly to the canal just beJow the weir and upntroam of the composite canal sampicr.

Samples were also taken at least houriv throughout the discharr,e period.

The station standard laborator/ procedures were used to count these samples.

The results are shown in Table 1.

These samples con firmed that the activity level remained at the river background level and well below the maximum allowable Technical Specification limit for concentration in the l

dis char.7,o canal.

- l DAMAGE ASSESS"EMT AND F.EP AI9 ST ATUS The following equipment was damaged as a result of the occurrcnce:

- ' 4 RHRS Service Water Pumpg,

2 Diesel-Generator Cooling Water Pumps (#1 and 1/2) 4 Condensate - Condensate Dooster Pumos 3 Condensate Trannfer Pumps Soismic Detector 4'Eauinment and "loor Drain Sumo Pumos Hypocijlorito Svatem Analyzer and Samplc Purr Circulatinr. water valve hydraulic power unit.

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4he 1/2 diesel, one condensate transfer pump, and scinnic detector were returned to service prior to.the Unit 2 startup on June 12, 1972.

Instrunentation,

subjected to the. flooding connints primarily of condennata svnton pressure raures and transmittern.

75cco'inntrumenta are beine, cicaned and re-calibrated.

All electrical meters, with the exccotion of one RHR service water pump ucro removed for drying and snould be re-inntalled by June 16; 1972.

The motors are being r

mcggered in the shop and anain followinc, installation of power cables.

Operatior al tes ting and control checks will be completed prior to startup.

Flow rate, tests will alno be conducted on the RllRS service, water pumps.

The estimated date fot< completion of repairs and testinc,

is June 17, 1972.

One P.HR service water pumo motor requires re-Uinding.

Wiring for the moter is being flown in from Schenectady, !!ew York to the General F,lectric Company i

Servicq Shop in Chicarc, where the coile will be wound.

Instal 10 tion in the motor will then be performed at the Ocneral Electric shop in the Quad-Citics.

All work

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is proceding on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day basic and it is' cati-mated that this service water pump will be tested and returned to service on June 19, 1972.

'EVALUATIO'1 0F OCCUPPSICE AMD CORPECTTVE ACTIOll At the time of the occurrence the Unit I reactor was in the hot shutdown mode at 50 psig and 281'F.

The reactor was in the eichth day of a planned maintenance outare.

The Pesidual Heat Removal System (RilR3) "as not required for decay heat and was not in service.

The Unit 2 reactor was in the startup modo at

,22 MWt holding 250 psig with a scarch for condenser l

' air leakaFe in progress.

Immediately following the l

occpfrence all control rods were inserted.

i-Safety related systems rendered inoperable by tho l

flooding consisted of the !!on. I and 1/2 diesel cenerator, l

and the Unit 1 containment cooling mode of the RllR Systen The occurrence wan discunsed with Pessrs.

D. 1?oney cu and D. Boyd of Perion III Compliance at the s tation on June 10, 1072.

The samnle records were reviewed alone with the immediato and planned corrective action.

It was concluded that no uncontrolled release of radio-activity was.ade to the environrent as a result of the occurrence.

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Mr. Edw:rd.J,. Bloch

  • June 17,14 72

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L Corrective action being taken to prevent a f

repetition of the occurrence includes a new main-tenance procedure for ventinc the circulating water

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valve hydraulic system.

This procedure requires that all butterfly valvos will have their lock pinn in place prior to venting.

Another new procedure-has boon written to prescribe operator action required during flooding of the condensate pump room.

The response to the occurrence by operators on shift with-out any procedure was deemed excellent by station management.

The interim corrective measures to bo per' formed prior to Unit 1 startup are as follows:

1.

The door to the condenser hotwell arca will be scaled and made water tight.

2.

Two 4' x 4' ventilation opening that connect the area under the condenser with the condensato pumo room will be scaled off with steel plate.

3 A lo'vol alarm will be installed under the condenser that will annunciato in the control room.

The two drain sumps located in the condensate pump room already contain hir,h high alarms which in-dicate abnormal water level in this room.

These two alarms annunciate.in the control room.

These interim corrective measures are also being installed on Unit 2 since it was shutdown for a scheduled outage. on June 15, 1972.

This work will be completed prior to the Unit '2

,startup on June 17, 1972.

,The final corrective measures to be, performed during our next scheduled outage, on each unit are as l

follows:

V 1.

Hoplace the existing scaled door with a water ticht bulkhead door.

2.

Extend the ventilation ooenines to a Icycl that would preclude flooding.

3 Install 'two alarms at different levels to indicate flooding under the condensor.

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'Mr~. Edward J. Bloch June 17, 1972 I

4.

Install a very bich level trip for the circulating water pumps, under the condenser.

5.

Inventicate and install if feasible a steel guard bcIlo.'s around cach of the four existinn rubber expansion joint bellows.

6.

One additional alarm will be inntakled in the condensato pump room as a back up to the e

existing sump pumo alarms.

This alarm' vill also annunciato in the control room.

Items 1 and 2 above will meet Class I seismic criteria.

Items 3 and 4 will meet the IEEE-279 critoria.'

7ho Station Review Board reviewed this occurrence 1

and approved Startup of each unit based on the interim and final measures doncribed above.

Due to the unusual nature of this occ'urrence, the Station Review Board requested the iluclear Review Board (llRB) to review the occurrence and the corrective measures.

The HRS reviewed.

this occurrence on June 16 ti 17, 1972 and concurred with the SRB action.

A final report on this occurrence will be submitted Within 30 days.

Very tr'uly y'ours, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Quad Cities Nuclear Power Statio

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F. A. Palmer Superintendent FAP/zm l

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TABLE I

Samplo Beta Activity Alpha Activity '

Channo

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'Date Tirm Dei /ml uei/mi Mater '

1;.6/9 1750 5.0 x 10-8

2. 5 x 10-9 0 ft.

2.

6/9 1750 413 x 10-10 1.3 x 10-9 0

3.

6/9 1750 2.2 x 10-8 2 5 x 10-9 0

4.

6/9 1750 1.8 x 10-8 2.5 x 10-9 0

5.

6/9 1750 3 0 x 10-8 5.0 x 10-9 0

6.

6/9 1750 4.0 x 10-8 1.3 x 10-9 0

7.

6/10 C0JO 1.1 x 10-8 2.5 x 10-9 1

8.

6/10 0115 2 3 x 10-8 (1,3 x 10-9 15 9.

6/10 0215 3.3 x 10-8 2.5 x 10-9 25 10, 6/10 0315 3.8 x 10-8 3 7 x 10-9 3.5

11. 6/10 0415 2 5 x 10-8 3.7 x 10-9

'4. 5

12. 6/10 0540 4.0 x 10-8 6.3 x 10-9 5.5
13. 6/10 061.0 2.1 x 10-8 3.7 x 10-9 34, 6/10 0720 6.3 x 10-8 1.3 x 10-9 7.5 95
15. 6 10 081.0 1.8 x 10-8.

< 1.3 x 10-9 11.5' 16, 6 10 0930 1.1 x 10-8

<1 3 x 10-9 13 75

17. 6 10 1030 4.2 x 10 (1 3 x 10-9 14.75 Composite over entire 4.8 x 10-8 1.9 x 10 diocharco period 4.4 x 10-8 1 9 x 10-9

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110TE:. All ga..ca scans showed no oignificant photo peaks.

g4_Holm RIVER CMU'OSITE SAMPI.T.S, ffG230 Date Beta ues/nl.

Sthau_ci/

Inlet 6/9-6/10 8.1 x 10-9 2 5 x 10-9 Outiot l

6/9-6/10 1.3 x 10-8 1.25 x 10-5 Inlet' 6/10-6/11 3.4 x 10-8 3.1 x 10 9 Outlet 6/1M/11 2.8 x 10-8 1.9 x 10-9 1

RADIATION SIMVEY (I,o PookFntry$

P_ ate.: 6/10 ILw.: 1140 Location: Turb. Bids. 547' RESULTS: <1 mr/hr e surface (100epMft2smeara:

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