ML19354D536
| ML19354D536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1989 |
| From: | Reis H FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#489-9415 OLA-4, NUDOCS 8911160118 | |
| Download: ML19354D536 (49) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REouLAroRr CoNNISSIoM BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AMD LICEMBIMG BOARD 89 NOV -7 P4 :12 crn.
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In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA-4 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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50-251 OLA-4
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(Turkey Point Plant
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(P/T Limits)
Units 3 & 4)
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LICENSEE'S REPLY TO INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO LICENSEE'S NOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOEITION OF INTERVEMoRE' COMTENTIONE I.
Introduction On September 11, 1989, Florida Power and Light Company
("FPL" or " Licensee") filed " Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition of Intervenors' Contentions" (" Licensee's Motion").
In support of the motion, Licensee filed " Licensee's Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard With Respect To Intervenors' Contentions" (" Licensee's Statement") and the " Affidavit of Stephen A. Collard on Contentions 2 and 3" (" Collard Affidavit"). 1/
On October 19, 1989, the ITRC Staff filed " Response of NRC Staff In Support of Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition"
(" Staff's Response").
The Staff's Response agreed that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the Licensee is 1/
Although Licensee's Motion, Licensee's Statement, and the Collard Affidavit address Contentions 2 and 3, Licensee's Motion with respect to Contention 3 was rendered moot by the withdrawal of Contention 3 by the Intervenors.
See letter I
dated September 8, 1989, from Joette Lorion to the Licensing Board members.
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. entitled to a favorable decision on Contention 2 as a matter of law.
In support of its response, the Staff submitted " Affidavit In Support of NRC Staff's Response To Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition" ("Elliot Affidavit").
On October 19, 1989, The Center for Nuclear Responsibility and Joette Lorion (collectively referred to herein as l
Intervenors) filed "Intervenors' Response To Licensee's Motion l
For Summary Disposition Of Intervenors' Contentions"
("Intervenors' Response").
Intervenors' Response included "Intervenors' Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is A Genuine Issue to Be Heard With Respect To Intervenors' Contention 2 ("Intervenors' Statement"), the " Affidavit of Joette Lorion on Contention No. 2" ("Lorion Affidavit"), and numerous documents, i
l excerpts from documents, and a letter from Dr. George C. Sih i
L dated October 18, 1989.
Also, on October 14, 1989, the Nuclear Energy Accountability Project (NEAP) submitted a document, signed by its Executive Director, Thomas J. Saporito, Jr., and entitled " Relevant Information for Consideration."
To the extent it considered it appropriate, the Licensee responded to NEAP's document in a letter to the Licen, sing Board dated November 2, 1989.
Accordingly, the NEAP document will not be addressed in this pleading; and, as stated in the letter, Licensee will also respond separately to a subsequently received untimely " Petition for Leave to Intervene" submitted on behalf of NEAP and Mr.
Saporito.
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- 4) However, pursuant to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's i
October 3, 1989, Order, the Licensee hereby files this reply to Intervenors' Response.
As discussed below, Intervenors' Response is deficient as a matter of law.
Additionally, Intervenors' Response fails to identify a genuine issue of material fact. 2/
Therefore, since Licensee's Motion and the Staff's Response ara sufficient to dispose of Contention 2, Licensee is entitled to summary disposition of this contention. 2/
i II.
Intervenorc' Response Does Not Satisfy The Requir-- nts of 10 CFR E 2.749thi A.
Applicable Legal Standards Under 10 CFR S 2.749(b), when a motion for summary disposition is filed and is supported by affidavits, "a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer."
Instead, the opposing party's " answer by 2/
Licensee's Reply focuses upon the statements in Intervenors' Response that relate to materiel issues or arguably material issues.
Licensee's Reply does not discuss statements by the Intervenors that are in the nature of background information or are otherwise not germane to Contention 2.
Therefore, the fact that this Reply does not discuss certain statements in Intervenors' Response should not be construed as indicating that Licensee agrees that such statements are factually correct.
2/
For the convenience of the Licensing Board, the Licensee has attached to its reply a table identifying issues from Intervenors' Response (Attachment A).
This table identifies each issue from Intervenors' Response and shows how Licensee's Reply disposes of this issue. As this table shows, each of the Intervenors' issues is either outside the F
i scope of this proceeding, an impermissible attack on the Commission's regulations, or fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
, ~ - - - - -,,,
i
, affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section must set s
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact."
Id.
Sag also Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-629, 13'NRC 75, 77-78 (1981); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 453 (1980); Duke Power Co..(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-83-56, 18 NRC 421, 430 (1983).
In particular, "[t]he opposing party's facts must be material, substantial, not fanciful, or merely suspicious."
Florida Power and Light Co.
(Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4),
LBP-86-27, 24 NRC 255, 257 (1986) (quoting Gulf States Utilities Cn. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC 246, 248 (1975) (footnotes omitted)).
A party may also "not oppose a motion for summary disposition 'on the vague supposition that something may turn up' at hearings." Id.
In short, when a motion for summary disposition is supported by an affidavit or other forms of evidence, "the opposing party must proffer countering evidential material or an affidavit explaining why it is impractical to do so."
Public Servics Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-32A, 17 NRC 1170, 1174 n.4, 1175 (1983).
Statements by the counsel or representative of a party are not admissible as evidence unless it is demonstrated that the j
individual in question is competent to testify as to the statements.
Therefore, such statements are not sufficient to i
. defeat a motion for summary disposition.that is supported by affidavits, Public Service co. of New Hampshire, (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-32A, 17 NRC 1170, 1175 (1983).
In particular, unsworn statements in the response of an opposing party are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact when a motion for summary disposition contains sworn affidavits.
Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-27A, 22 NRC 207, 229,.231 (1985).
In addition, because the regulations require an opposing party to file affidavits or other forms of evidence, it is not enough for the opposing party to rely on quotations from or citations to published research because such quotations are not
" evidence" absent an affidavit from the author.
Carolina Power &
Light co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP 7, 19 NRC 432, 435-36 (1984) (citing Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure S 2722, (1983)), reconsid. den. on l
other grounds, LBP-84-15, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984).
Furthermore, copies of the published work of researchers are not admissible as substantive evidence at hearing unless the researchers themselves are produced as supporting w tnesses.
Shearon Harris, supra, 19 NRC at 436.
In short, documents that are intended as a substitute for an affidavit are subject to "the same evidentiary 1
requirements as an affidavit."
Cleveland Electric Illuminating CQ2 (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 755 (1977).
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If a party submits an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary disposition, 10 CFR S 2.749(b) requires that the affidavit " set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Eaa also Cleveland Electric illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 754-56-(1977).
In this regard, an affidavit which only attests that all statements of fact set forth therein are true and correct to the best of the knowledge, information, and belief of the affiant falls short of a showing that the affiant is competent to testify to the facts in the affidavit.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit No. 1), LBP-77-45, 6 NRC 159, 162-63 (1977).
In judging whether information is admissible and whether a person is competent to testify, the Commission has adopted the expert witness standards set forth in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-701, 16 NRC 1517, 1524 (1982); Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 475 (1982).
Rule 702 states:
If scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The party sponsoring a witness, and therefore an affiant, l
" hart the burden of demonstrating his expertise" under this i
standard.
Sgg Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon
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Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398, 1405 (1977).
Furthermore, a person not otherwise competent does not become so because he has studied "the problems of nu'elear power" for a number of years, Enach Bottom, supra, 16 NRC at 1523-24; because he has spent years reading AEC and NRC documents, McGuire, supra, 15 NRC at 475; because he has an ability to understand and evaluate technical matters, id.; or because he is "a well-informed layman, with a broad general knowledge of the field," Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-36, 8 NRC 567, 573-74 (1978).
Instead, a person is competent to testify only if, through experience or education, he has acquired "special" knowledge or skill " germane to the matters which his proposed testimony" l'
addresses sufficient to qualify him as an expert.
Ema Peach Bottom, supra, 16 NRC at 1524; McGuire, supra, 15 NRC at 475.
B.
Intervenors' Response Does Not Satisfy These Standards Intervenors' Response does not contain anything that is admissible into evidence.
Intervenors' Response is comprised of I
the following:
- 1) the Response itself and Intervenors' l
Statement; 2) the Lorion Affidavit; 3) numerous documents and excerpts from documents attached as exhibits.
As discussed below, none of these is admissible as evidence or sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
First, Intervenors' Response and Intervenors' Statement merely contain allegations and assertions of a party.
They do not set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence
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under 10 CFR S 2.749 (b).
Therefore, in accordance with seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 1175 and Harris, anpra, 22 NRC at 231, these documents are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Second,-the'Lorion Affidavit is not admissible as evidence in'this proceeding because'it fails to meet.the requirements of an affidavit pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.749(b).
As stated above, this section provides that "[a)ffidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."
The Lorion Affidavit fails on both The affidavit is only two pages long and does not set counts.
forth any admissible facts.
The affidavit only contains a number of statements by Intervenor Lorion, none of which factually discusses the issues in this proceeding.
The Lorion Affidavit does state that it " incorporate [s]... by reference" Intervenors' Response.
However, the affidavit wholly fails to establish that Ms. Lorion is competent to testify to the matters asserted in Intervenors' Response.
It merely states that she is a' "research consultant" and makes claims to a " broad knowledge of pressure vessel embrittlement issues and safety problems at Turkey Point." 1/
However, these statements do not establish that she has any special knowledge or skill, and therefore these statements do not qualify her as an expert.
Peach Bottom, supra 16 NRC at 1523-24, McGuire, supra, 15 NRC at 475.
Nor does the affidavit 1/
Lorion Affidavit at 1 3.
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.. include a resume or statement of her educational or work experience which would enable the Board to determine whether she qualifies as an expert.
Thereforo, the Lorion Affidavit should not be accepted as evidence, and it is not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 1/
5/
We are aware that in Florida Power and Light company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 303-305 (1985), the Licensing Board denied licensee's motion to strike affidavits which Licensee argued failed to demonstrate the competence of the affiants.
One i
ground for.the ruling was the view that in NRC licensing proceedings before Licensing Boards with technical members, opponents of such motions, as differentiated from proponents, may support their opposition with affidavits supplied by affiants of " questionable competence."
We submit that the Licensing Board's ruling in LBP-85-29 is l
erroneous.
It is inconsistent with a basic practice in NRC licensing proceedings: contentions, even those resting on dubious factual assertions, are admitted comparatively
. liberally on the assumption that summary disposition of admitted contentions will in fact be available to proponents of motions for such relief.
Sam, a2st, Mississippi Power &
Light company (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 426 (1973); Houston Lighting and Power company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 549-551 (1980).
In any event, in ruling on Licensee's motion to strike, the Board also explained that i
l l
the challenged filings consist, in most telling part, of claims quoted and paraphrased from technically l
competent Staff discussions, and we found the Intervenors' emphasis on those discussions helpful as a u
starting point for our coming to a fuller understanding of the technical questions raised by the parties' filings.
22 NRC at 305.
In this case, Intervenor Lorion's affidavit does not consist "in most telling part, of claims quoted and paraphrased from technically competent Staff discussions."
Furthermore, Intervenors' affidavit does not assist the Board in examining any potential safety issues in this proceeding.
P 4.5
, Finally, the documents and excerpts from documents attached to Intervenors' Response do not qualify as evidence in this proceeding.
None of these documents and excerpts is supported by an affidavit from the author of the document attesting to the truthfulness of the statements contal'ned in the documents. 1/
Therefore, in accordance with Harris, supra, 19 NRC at 435-36 and Perry, supra, 6 NRC at 755, these documents are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
In particular, the Intervenors rely heavily upon the October 18, 1989 letter from Dr. Sih.
San Intervenors' Response, pp. 27-29.
Tnis letter is not accompanied by an affidavit from Dr. Sih or by any other evidentiary material attesting to the truthfulness of the information in the letter.
Because Dr. Sih's letter does not rise to the level of admissible evidence, it does not establish a genuine issue of material fact.
As shown above, Intervenors' Response does not satisfy the
- requirements of 10 CFR S 2.749(b), because it does not contain anything that is tantamount to evidence.
Therefore, it is not sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
n/
Ms. Lorion's statement in her affidavit that she " prepared the exhibits attached to Intervenors' Response To Licensee's Motion For Summary Disposition and (testifies) that each extract of a document, to the best of [her) knowledge, was taken from the document that is listed as the exhibit," does not meet this requirement.
Such a statement does not attest to the truth of the statements in these documents.
t !
III. Intervenors' Response Addresses A Number Of Issues That Are Outside The Scope Of This Proceedina In admitting Contention 2, the Licensing Board excluded any issues pertaining to Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) and the acceptance of the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program in 1985' 2/' Additionally, the Board limited the scope of the contention to the issue of whether " Licensee's conduct of the integrated surveillance test program at Turkey Point fails to meet the requirements of the program itself" and whether the
" difference of less than five percent in the operating time between the two units is.
. significant." R/
Intervenors' Response, however, ignores the Board's Order limiting Contention 2 and attempts to litigate a number of issues that are outside the scope of this proceeding.
- First, Intervenors' Response contains numerous statements addressing FTS or referencing documents pertaining to PTS. 2/
For example, Intervenors' Response contains the following assertions and references:
Intervenors reference and quote from articles and documents by Demetrios Basdekas regarding PTS. 10/
2/
Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989) pp. 17, 19.
H/
Id. pp. 17, 18.
l 2/
Intervenors' make statements addressing PTS on pages 4-5, 6-7, 9-10, and 13-14 of their Response.
10/
Intervenors' Response, pp. 4, 14.
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Intervenors discuss the ability of the reactor vessel to withstand " abnormal transients", " shocks", and similar accident conditions-11/ that may be pertinent I
to PTS but not to normal operating conditions 1
applicable to the Pressure / Temperature (P/T) limits for Turkey Point.
Intervenors reference an NRC 10 CFR S 50.54 letter dated August 23, 1981, requesting information related to PTS. 12/
t Intervenors discuss whether FPL has exceeded the 300*F screening criterion in 10 CFR S 50.61 governing protection against PTS. 13/
Intervenors discuss and quote from an NRC contractor's report on PTS. 11/
Intervonors do not explain how any of these discussions regarding PTS are relevant to the adequacy of the P/T limits for Turkey Point.
Therefore, these discussions regarding PTS are outside 1
11/
Id., pp. 5, 6, 14.
12/
Id., pp. 6-7, 10, 24.
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Id., pp. 9-10.
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11/
Id., pp. 13-14
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'O v the scope of this proceeding as established by the Licensing 1
Board and are not entitled to any consideration by the Board.
Second, much of Intervenors' Response (pages 15-27) consists of an attack upon the acceptability of the Turkey Point Integrated Surveillance Program approved by the NRC in 1985,15/
Among other things, this section asserts that:
The NRC " improperly and perhaps illegally" granted the license amendments in 1985 authorizing the Integrated Surveillance Program given the difference in the RTng of the surveillance capsules from Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. 1E/
r The NRC realized at the time it issued the amendments for the Integrated Surveillance Program in 1985 that l
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 would be operating with i
mixed fuel cores that were not identical, but the 1
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Safety Evaluation for the amendments "does not document mixed fuel core design changes." 11/
FPL's 1985 application for amendments authorizing the Integrated Surveillance Program did not contain a 15/
Sgg Florida Power & Light Co. Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Unit Nos. 3 and 4, Amendments Nos. 112 and l
106 (Apr. 22, 1985).
11/
Intervenors' Response, pp. 16-18 11/
Id., pp. 18-20 1
9 4
< discrete document entitled " contingency plan" and therefore did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix H. 1H/
Statements such as this indicate that Intervenors are attempting to litigate the acceptability of the 1985 license amendments authorizing the Turkey Point Integrated Surveillance Program.
These attacks are contrary to the Board's Order because the Board excluded any issues which attack "the integrated test program itself or as specifically applied to the Turkey Point units by the 1985 license amen ments." 12/
d Finally, much of Intervenors' Response is based upon events which occurred at. Turkey Point prior to the NRC's acceptance of the Integrated Surveillance Program in 1985. 2A/
For example, Intervenors' Response discusses the following topics:
1 Differences in the RTug of surveillance capsules j
l removed from Turkey Point during the mid-1970s. 21/
1 l
E Use of cores with mixed fuel prior to 1985. 22/
l 18/
Id., pp. 21-22 l
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12/
Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989) p.
17.
l 2A/
Intervenors' Response pp. 6-11, 17-18, 19-21, and 24-25.
21/
Id., pp. 8-10, 17-18 l
22/
Id., pp. 18-20 1
1
v i Differences in capacity factors for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 prior to 1985. 21/
Two overpressurization events at Unit 4 in 1981. 21/
All of this information pertains to events occurring prior to 1
1985.
Therefore, at most, it relates to the acceptability of the Turkey Point Integrated Surveillance Program and not to whether the Licensee has properly implemented the program from 1985 to l
the present.
Since the Licensing Board has limited the scope of l
Contention 2 to the issue of whether the " conduct of the 1
l.
. integrated surveillance test program at Turkey. Point fails to meet'the requirements of the program itself," 25/ events l
L occurring prior to approval of the Integrated Surveillance Program in 1985 are outside of the scope of contention 2 because they cannot pertain to the " conduct" or implementation of the progr'am.
Since much of the Intervenors' Response pertains to matters that are outside of the scope of this proceeding, these portions of Intervenors' Response are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
22/
Id., pp. 20-21 2A/
Id., p. 25 l
25/
Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989), p. 17.
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> IV.
Intervenors' Response Constitutes an Impermissible Challenge to the C---Immion's Ren_ulations L
Attacks upon the validity of Commission regulations are not cognizable under 10 CFR S 2.758 (1989),
age carolina Power and Light c o.'
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 544, (1986); Kansas Gas and Electric co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-784, 20 NRC 845, 846 (1984);.
commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30 12 NRC 683, 692-93 (1980).
As the Licensing Board itself has stated, "[i]t is clear that Commission regulations and case law do not permit an attack upon the Commission's rules." 26/
'Several of the issues discussed in Intervenors' Response constitute attacks upon the validity of the Commission's regulations.
Therefore, these issues should not be considered by the Licensing Board and are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
1 First, Intervenors' Response states that only plant specific r
survoillance data from Turkey Point Unit 4 should have been used in calculating the Pressure / Temperature limits for Unit 4. 22/ In support of this assertion, Intervenors reference and attach three exhibits.
They ares excerpts from a Pacific Northwest Laboratory Report NUREG/CR-2837 entitled PNL Technical Review of l
Pressurized Thermal Shock Issuga, (July 1982); a memorandum from 21/
Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989) pp. 16-17.
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22/
Intervenors' Response pp. 13-15.
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, Q NRC Safety Engineer, Demetrios Basdekas to Commissioners Gilinsky and Ahearne discussing PTS, dated December 3, 1982; and an October 10, 1985 letter from Dr.. George Sih, Director of Fracture Mechanics at Lehigh University to Intervenors' former attorney Martin H. Hodder. 28/
The fiest two exhibits are general in nature and do not specifically address Turkey Point. 21/
The third exhibit discusses Turkey Point, but the discussion is equally applicable to all reactors.
Thus, it is apparent from the references cited in Intervenors' Response that Intervenors
{.
are claiming in_ general that only unit specific surveillance data should be used to calculate the P/T limits for nuclear power L
reactors, including Turkey Point.
This claim constitutes a l
challenge to the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix H.II.C. which explicitly authorize the use of integrated surveillance programs, i.e.,
the use of surveillance capsules from one reactor to predict the fracture toughness of another i
reactor.
Therefore, this claim should not be considered by the Board in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact i
exists.
Second, relying upon an October 18, 1989, letter from Dr.
Sih, Intervenors claim that FPL did not account for the " change in strain rate" in calculating the RTun and P/T limits for Turkey 2R/
Intervenors' Response pp. 13-14.
21/
Furthermore, Intervenors' citation to NUREG/CR-2837 and the Basdekas Memorandum is inappropriate, because both of these documents discuss PTS issues, which as discussed above are outside the scope of this proceeding.
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" Point. 3A/
As discussed above, this letter is inadmissible as evidence.
In addition, although Dr. Sih's letter is far from clear, it does assert that " measuring fracture toughness from the Charpy V-notch tests is not conclusive because fracture toughness e
is strain rate dependent" and cannot be adequately described unless changes in strain rate are taken into account through an
" elastic-plastic stress analyses." 31/
These assertions constitute a challenge to the Commission's regulations for the following reasons:
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G.II.E defines the adjusted reference temperature in terms of the change in RTer as l
determined from Charpy V-notch test data.
Similarly, I
Appendix G.III.A and G.IV.A state that fracture l
toughness must meet the requirements of the ASME Code, 1
and Section III NB-2331 of the ASME Code (Attachment B) l-l states that the reference temperature shall be 1
calculated based upon the results of Charpy V-notch tests.
Since Dr. Sih states that the use of Charpy V-notch test results is insufficient to measure fracture 1
toughness, he is attacking the validity of these provisions in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 which require the use of Charpy V-notch tests results to l
calculate RTn -
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Intervenors' Response, pp. 27-28.
31/
Id., Intervenors' Attachment A, pp.
1-2.
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] l As discussed above, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G.III.A and g
G.IV.A state that fracture toughness and P/T limits
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shall be calculated in accordance with the ASME Code.
Appendix G of the ASME Code provides a procedure for calculating allowable loadings used in deriving P/T limits.
Article G-1000 of the ASME Code (Attachment C) states that the procedure is " based on the principles i
of linear elastic fracture mechanics."
To the extent that Dr. Sih argues that non-linear elastic-plastic stress analysis should be performed, his letter constitutes an attack upon the validity of Appendix G
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of the ASME Code (and therefore upon Appendix G of 10
[
E CFR Part 50).
Additionally, Paragraph G-2110(a) of the ASME' Code-(Attachment D) states that allowable loadings on reactor vessels are to be calculated based upon a curve of stress intensity factors that are based upon a
" lower bound of static, dynamic, and crack arrest critical Ki values."
Dr. Sih's letter also constitutes an attack upon the validity of this provision of the ASME Code (and therefore Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50) to the extent that it argues that changes in strain rate are not adequately accounted for, either by this provision or other provisions in the ASME Code.
These assertions in Dr. Sih's letter constitute an impermissible attack upon the Commission's regulations.
Therefore, even if Dr.
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'i Sih's letter was admissible, it does not establish a genuine i
issue of material fact and should be disregarded by the Board.
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V.
Intervenors' Response Does Not Identify anw Genulme Issues of Material Fact j
Assaming arguendo that the above legal deficiencies with i
.Tntervenors' Rospense did not exist, and assuming arguendo that all of the statemente in Intervenors' Rusponse were true, the Board should still grant Licensee's motion for summary disposition because Intervenors' Response does not identify a genuine issue of material fact, f
The Licensee has reviewed Intervenors' Response and has i
attempted to identify the primary isrues being raised by the Intervenors.
Each of these issues is discussed below.
As this l
discussion demonstrates, none of the issues raised by the f
Intervenors indicates the existence of a genuine issue of l
r material fact.
j A.
Qif9erence in RTet_fDr Unit 3 Capsule T and Unit 4 l
CAE%rla_T l
In a number of places, Intervenots' Response s*,ates that the RTmg for the Unit 4 Capsule T is different than the RTer for the Unit 3 Capsule T. 12/
This statement does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Licensee and NRC Staff agree that the Unit 4 Capsule T has a different RTag than the Unit 3 l
r 12/
Intervenors' Response pp. 8-11, 14-15, 17, and 18.
lIl 4
> Capsule T. 33/
Thus, there is no underlying factual dispute that j
requires resolution in a hearing or otherwise.
Both the I
Licensee and the Staff have shown that the difference in RToy for
{
Capsule T from Unit 4 and Capsule T from Unit 3 does not indicate l
that any significant difference exists in reactor vessel embrittlement for Units 3 and 4, and that the difference in RTar for the capsules is due to factors such as data scatter. 31/
Since the Intervenors have not presented anything to contradict this fact, there is no genoine issue of material fact requiring a hearing. 35/
B.
Fuel Loading Patterna Intervenors' Response states that the fuel loading patterns in the cores for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 have not been identical. 31/
This statement does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Licensee and the NRC Staff agree that the fuel loading patterns have not been identical. 32/
Thus, there is no underlying factual dispute that requires resolution in a hearing or otherwise.
Despite the differences in the fuel 1
loading patterns, the Licensee and the Staff have shown that the f
I 31/
Collard Affidavit at 1 43; Elliot Affidavit at 11 18-20.
11/
Id.
15/
Additionally, as is explained in Section III, supra, this issue is outside the scope of this proceeding because it pertains to the acceptability of the Integrated Surveillance Program and not its implementation.
31/
Intervenors ' Response pp. 18-20.
31/
- San, e.g.,
Elliot Affidavit at 1 22.
r l
) total fluences for Units 3 and 4 are comparable. 31/
In determining the effects of neutron irradiation in a reactor vessel, it is the total amount of fluence that is of importance.
Fuel loading patterns, outages, EFPY, capacity factors, and 1
operation at low power are of significance to fracture toughness only to the extent they affect total fluence. 31/
Therefore, sinco the total fluences for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are j
comparable, historical information concerning differences in fuel loading pctterns are immaterial to fracturo toughness and Intervenors' assertions do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
C.
Differences in capacity Factors Intervenors' Response states that the capacity factors for i
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 have not been identical. AD/
This
~
statement does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Licensee and the NRC Staff agree that there have been differences in capacity factors. 11/
Thus, there is no underlying factual dispute that requires resolution in a hearing or otherwise.
As discussed above with respect to fuel loading patterns in the core, the difference in total fluence between the two reactors is 18/
Collard Affidavit at 11 59-65, Elliot Affidavit at 1 26.
31/
Collard Affidavit at 1 61.
AD/
Intervenors' Response pp. 21.
11/
Collard Affidavit at Table 5 and 11 64 and 68; Elliot Affidavit at 11 21-22 and 26.
s
I l
l j
i
. of importance in determining fracture toughness.
12/
Any differences in capacity factors are accounted for in calculating the total fluence of surveillance capsules in the reactor i
vessels. 11/
Therefore, as the Licensee and the Staff have shown, since the total fluences for Units 3 and 4 are comparable, Intervenors' statements about differences in capacity factors are immaterial and do not raiso a genuine issuo of material fact. 11/
D.
Eaggrate Document for a contingency Plan Intervenors' Response states that FPL does not have a i
separate document entitled " contingency plan" and that therefore FPL does not meet the roquirements of Appendix H.
The Licensee agrees that it does not have a separate document entitled
" contingency plan."
Thus, there is no underlying factual dispute that requires resolution in a hearing or otherwise.
However, the Licensee does have a contingency plan for the Turkey Point Integrated Surveillance Program.
Licensee's contingency plan provides that, if one unit were to experience an extended outage or period of low power operation, the other unit which continued to operate would utilize its own curveillance capsules. 15/
This contingency plan is documented as one part of FPL's 1985 application to the NRC for approval of FPL's Integrated r
Surveillance Program.
Furthermore, in the NRC's safety 12/
Collard Affidavit at 1 61.
12/
Elliot Affidavit at 1 26.
11/
Collard Affidavit at 11 59-65; Elliot Affidavit at 1 26.
i 15/
Collard Affidavit at 1 49; Elliot Affidavit at 11 23-24.
l l
l
i
(
i 1 evaluation approving the Integrated Surveillance Program for Turkey Point the NRC accepted Licensee's contingency plan by stating:
"(s)ince each plant has its own capsules and both plants are capable of independently predicting and monitoring radiation damage as a function of power output, the program will not be significantly jeopardized by operation at reduced power levels or by an extended outage of either plant." AS/
In fact, Intervenors' Rosponse notes that FPL's application and the Staff's safety evaluation discuss the substance of Turkey Point's i
contingency plan. 11/
Therefore, the fact that the Licensee does i
not have a separate document entitled " contingency plan" is immaterial because Licensee's application for the Integrated Surveillance Program does have a contingency plan that was accepted as part of the NRC's approval of the Integrated Surveillance Program.
Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to this issue.
l E.
Adeouacy of surveillance Data to Make Predictions un to l
20 fFPY~
~
\\
i Intervenors' Response takes issue with Licensee's statement that existing surveillance capsule data are sufficient for predictions or calculations up to 20 Sffective Full Power Years (EFPY). 18/
However, nothing in Intervenors' Response identifies l
in/
San Florida Power & Light Co. Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-i 251, Turkey Point Unit Nos. 3 and 4, Amendments Nos. 112 and i
106 (Apr. 22, 1985).
11/
Intervenors' Response p. 22.
AH/
Intervenors ' Response p. 23.
4 any specific concerns or any factual basis for disputing this statement.
The only basis for Intervenors' assertion is Intervenora' statement that "it would be prudent, say in the case i
of Unit 4 which has not been tested since 1976, to test capsule V to assure that the P/T limits are conservative." 11/
Obviously',
this statement does not constitute a factual statement and is merely an argument by Intervenors.
Therefore, this argument does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
F.
Differences in Flux Lot Numbgrg Intervenors' Response states that the difference in flux lot numbers for the Unit 4 welds and Unit 4 weld specimens is only of l
minor importance and does not account for the difference in
}
Capsule T data for Units 3 and 4. 50/
The NRC Staff agrees that t
differences in flux lot numbers are net of importance, 11/ and the Licenses has never asserted that the difference in flux lot numbers was a primary factor in determining the fracture j
toughness of the Turkey Point reactor vessels.
For example, the Licensee has asserted that the primary factors in determining
\\
fracture toughness are temperature, fluence, and chemistry. 52/
L l
Thus, there is no underlying factual dispute that requires resolution in a hearing or otherwise.
The Licensee has only I
cited to the difference in flux lot numbers, together with a 11/
Id.
0 50/
Intervenors' Response pp. 23-25 51/
Elliot Affidavit at 1 16.
52/
Collard Affidavit at 1 7.
y
r
. number of other factors such as data scatter, as a possible explanation for the difference in the RTw,. for the Unit 4 CapsuJe i
T and for the Unit 3 Capsule T. 52/
Therefore, Intervenors '
i statements do not raise a genuine issue of material fact on this point, and instead appear to raise only matters of semantics that are not material.
G.
Calculation of P/T Limits Using Only One Surveillance caesule Data Point Intervenors' Response argues that the P/T limits for Unit 4 i
should be calculated using the single surveillance Capsule T data point for Unit 4 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, I
" Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage To Reactor Vessel Materials" (Apr. 1977) (hereinafter " Reg. Guide f
f 1.99, Revision 1"). 51/
The Intervenors have proffered no basis for disputing the current version of Reg. Guide 1.99, i.e.,
NRC l
Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, " Radiation Embrittlement Of
. Reactor Vessel Materials" (May 1988) (hereinafter " Reg. Guide 1.99, Revision 2"), which contains appropriate methods for I
t calculating neutron irradiation damage to reactor vessel beltline r
materials. 15/
Reg. Guide 1.99, Revision 2 does not allow for the use of surveillance data in calculating RTer if only one data
~
l point exists. in/
Instead it requires the use of the chemistry L
52/
Collard Affidavit at 1 43.
51/
Intervenors' Response pp. 25-26.
I l
l 55/
SAR Elliot Affidavit at 1 7; Collard Affidavit at 1 22.
l 51/
Collard Affidavit at 1 73; Elliot Affidavit at 1 14.
b m
i o
1 I
content of the reactor vessel welds to calculate RTer when less than two credible surveillance data points exist.
Since there is l
no dispute concerning these facts, Intervenors' argument that the Licensee should also use Reg. Guide 1, Revision 1, does not raise f
a genuine issue of material fact.
In any case, it is apparent that the Intervenors have also misread Reg. Guide 1.99, Revision 1.
Similar to Revision 2, this j
version does not permit the use of a single data point in calculating RTen.
Instead, Reg. Guide 1.99, Revision 1 provides l
that the RTag may be based upon chemistry content or an
" extrapolation" or " interpolation" of surveillance data. 51/
By definition, extrapolation or interpolation requires the use of two or more surveillance capsule data points (since there is no limit to the number of lines or curves that can pass through a single point, nothing can be inferred (i.e. interpolated or extrapolated) from that single point).
Therefore, Reg. Guide 1.99, Revision 1 does not support Intervenors' position that the single surveillance capsule data point for Unit 4 may be.used to calculate the RTyg for Unit 4.
l H.
Licensee's Hypothetical calculation of P/T Limits for Unit 4 I
For the purposes of settlement, the Licensee calculated a i
hypothetical RTer for Unit 4 without regard to the surveillance data for Unit 3 that would be used under the Integrated Surveillance Program.
Consistent with Reg. Guide 1.99 Revision 2, this calculation was based on the chemistry content of the il/
Sea Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 1 Section C.2.a (Attachment E).
Surveillance data were not utilized because only one surveillance data point exists for Unit 4.
Intervenors' Response states that this hypothetical calculation should be rejected because it was calculated on a " desk top computer," has not been verified by the NRC Staff, and was based on only one data point.
Intervenors' assertions do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for several reasons.
First, the hypothetical calculation was offered for consideration to the Licensing Board only as added support for Licensee's primary case; acceptance of the hypothetical calculation by the Board is not necessary for a ruling in favor of the Licensee.
Second, the allegation that the calculation was performed on a " desk top computer" does not identify any deficiency in the calculation.
Third, contrary to Intervenors' assertion, the NRC Staf f has determined that the results of this calculation "are within the proper range." 5H/
Finally, contrary to Intervenors' assertions, FPL did not use a single surveillance data point in this hypothetical calculation.
As is plainly discussed in the Collard Affidavit, 11/ the chemistry content of Unit 4 welds was used to calculate the chemistry f actor used in determining the hypothetical RTun as y
required by Revision 2 to Reg. Guide 1.99.
i 51/
Elliot Affidavit at 1 27.
Moreover, only recently the Appeal Board has rejected the claim that an applicant's
" calculations are somehow suspect and cannot form the basis for the Board's findings because the Staff did not independently verify them."
Florida Power & Light company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-921, Slip Op.
- p. 16 (September 20, 1989).
51/
Collard Affidavit at 1 73.
J
?
i I
- I.
Dr. Eih's Letter of October 19. 1999 Citing to a letter from Dr. George Sih dated October 18, 1989, the Intervenors' Response states that material degradation due to neutron irradiation is a " time-history and rate dependent process," that damage accumulation is a " highly nonlinear process" and that predictions based on the " linear sum" are not always conservative, and that the " loading history" of the Turkey l
9 Point units are different in that, for example, Unit 3 experienced a " slow down period." 6D/
These assertions do not i
establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Dr. Sih's letter is marked by its ambiguity and lack of clarity.
However, as best as Licensee can discern, Dr. Sih t
appears to be stating that the total amounts of irradiation of the reactor vessels for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 during any given period are different because the power levels (ita, rates of irradiation) and duration of operation during the period (i.e.,
" time history" or " loading history") are different.
Based upon this conclusion, Dr. Sih then appears to state that l
irradiation damage is "non-linear" and that the amount of damage l
for Units 3 and 4 may be different at a given point in time.
l None of these statements is inconsistent with statements l
made by either the Licensee or the NRC Staff.
The Licensee and the NRC Staff agree that total irradiation or fluence is AD/
Intervenors' Response at pp. 27-29.
Intervenors' Response and Dr. Sib's letter also make arguments related to changes in strain rate.
As discussed in Section IV, supra, such i
I arguments constitute a challenge to the Commission's I
regulations.
l l
i l
i,
dependent upon the rates of irradiation and the duration of t
irradiation.
The Licensee and the NRC Staff also agree that irradiation damage is "non-linear" as a function of time because amounts of irradiation or fluence differ over time. 11/
In short, the difference between Dr. Sih and the Licensee and NRC l
Staff on this matter appears to be a matter of semantics.
The Licensee and NRC Staff have stated that total fluence is of importance, while Dr. Sih has stated that rates of irradiation and duration of irradiation are of importance.
Since both are i
functionally equivalent (i.e., rates of irradiation multiplied by duration of irradiation equals total fluence), there is no genuine issue of material fact.
j J.
Differences in EPPY Intervenors' Response asserts that the Licensee and NRC Staff are incorrect in stating that Turkey Point Unit 3 has more EFPY than Unit 4, because according to information in response to Intervenors' Interrogatory No. B.1, Turkey Point Unit 4 has nearly 10,000 more Effective Full Power Hours (EFPH) than Unit 3. 12/
Intervenors have simply misread Licensee's Interrogatory Response.
Licensee's Response to Intervenors' Interrogatory B.1.c provided Intervenors with a table containing the annual t
[
11/
- Ega, e.g., Collard Affidavit at 51 58, 61, and 64; l
Ellioil/12t Affidavit at if 12, 21-22, and 26.
I 62/
Intervenors' Response pp. 29-30.
r
\\
) EFPH for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 over the four year period f
from 1985-1988.
Licensee's response to Interrogatory B.1.c.
I states:
L Annual EFPH Unit 3 Unit 4 1985 5032.5 7706.5 1986 6652.9 2601.8 t
1987 1344.6 3950.2 1988 5176.3 4828.9 18,206.3 19,087.4 Total lifetime EFPY for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 as of August 23, 1989, are 10.203 and 9.732, respectively.
As the response clearly indicates, Unit 4 did have a greater EFPH that Unit 3 over the four year period from 1985-1988.
- However, that difference was approximately 900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />.
Therefore, Intervenors' assertion based on Licensee's Interrogatory Response that Unit 4 has nearly 10,000 more EFPH than Unit 3 is grossly inaccurate, and Intervenors have misread Licensee's Interrogatory e
Response.
Furthermore, the response also clearly states that the
"[t)otal EFPY for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 as of August 23, i
i 1989, are 10.203 and 9.732, respectively." 13/
Therefore, i
il/
SaA Licensee's Response to Intervenors' First Set Of Discovery Requests To Licensee (August 28, 1989) pp. 9-12.
This is a difference of only about 4,100 EFPH or less than 5%.
The difference in EFPH for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 was calculated by subtracting the EFPYs for Units 3 and 4 and multiplying the difference by the number of hours in a year.
.046 10.203 EFPY Unit 3
.471
=
-9.732 EFPY Unit 4 10.203
.471 (continued...)
i
i f
i
! }
Intervenors' assertion about EFPH and EFPY do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
I i
K.
Estimates of Pluence Intervenors' Response states that "the Licensee may be underestimating the calculated fluence for Turkey Point Unit 4." 11/
Intervenors base this assortion on calculations performed by the i
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) contained in a safety Evaluation Bv The Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Regarding
[
Projected Values Of Material Properties For Practure Toughness Requirements For Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events Florida Power And Light Company Turkey Point Plant. Units r
3 and 4 attached to a letter from the NRC to FPL dated March 11, i
1987. 15/
BNL's calculations are inapplicable with respect to I
this proceeding.
The Safety Evaluation containing BNL's calculations pertains to issues related to PTS; there is nothing t-to indicate that the BNL comments would apply similarly to the l
calculation of neutron fluence used in determining P/T limits.
Nor has the Staff, for whom the BNL Report was prepared, l
expressed any reservations abut these calculations.11/
1 1
Therefore, Intervenors' statements regarding the fluence for Unit 12/(... continued)/ hrs. per year =
.471 x 8,760 4,125.96 hrs.
l This is equal to a difference of 4.6%
I 11/
Intervenors' Response p. 30.
f AS/
Intervenors' Response Exhibit 24.
AA/
Elliot Affidavit at 11 8, 26.
1 l
.-~
F l
4
. 4 do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the fluences used to calculate the P/T limits.
L.
Fluence for Capsule V of Unit 4 Intervenors' Response contains a calculation purporting to determine what the current fluence for Unit 4 Capsule V might be.
Based upon a calculated fluence of 1.599 x 10", 62/ the
?
Intervenors concluda that this fluence exceeda the f 3uence used j
to calculate the P/T limits (i.e,1.26 x 10").
This assettion does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
First, Licensee notes that the Intervenors have made a mathematical error in their calculation of fluence for capsule V of Unit 4; their results should have been 1.266 x 10" and not 1.599 x 10". ER/
This error again demonstrates why an expert affidavit is needed from Intervenors.
In any case, it is apparent that Intervenors are making an incorrect comparison.
Intervenors' numbers represent fluence at the inside surface of the wall of the i
reactor vessel, while FPL's use of 1.26 x 10" was for 1/4 of the way through the reactor vessel wall itself. 11/
Therefore, even if Intervenors' calculation did not contain a mathematical error, the calculation still would be meaningless because it pertains to a parameter that was not used to calculate the P/T limits.
61/
Intervenors ' Response pp. 30-31.
]
4 ER/
The source of Intervenors ' error appears to lie in transcription.
Intervenors should have used the number.037 x 10" rather than.37 x 10".
AR/
Ena Collard Affidavit at is 28 n.3, 56-57.
I
[
t 4 ;
VI.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Intervenors' Response is legally deficient and does not raise a g3nuine issue of material fact.
Since the Licensee's Motion and the NRC Staff's Response are i
sufficient to dispose of the issues raised by Contention 2, the Licensee is entitled to summary disposition.
Respectfully submitted, bW Harold F. Reis Steven P. Fra.1tz Kenneth C. Manne Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 955-6600 f
Co-Counsel John T. Butler Steel Hector & Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 577-2800 November 6, 1989 t
I
~.. -
Attachment A Le&LI Addre ned in IV.ervenors' hesconse on Page Disposed of Issue Outside the Issue Constitutes an Issue Faits or In Intervenors in Lice,see's scope of this
!apermissible Attack on To Identify a Genuine issue stetesent et i nept y on Paoe Proceedino Consission's neout erions issue of materiet Fact I, Intervenors* Response contains numerous state-4-5, 6-7, ments, and references a number of star m ts 9-10, 11-13 X
pertaining to PTS.
13-16 A. Mtervonors discuss the ability of the 5, 6, 16 11-13 y
reactor vesset to uithstand *abnormat transients,*
- shocks.* and s*.dtar accident conditions that any be pertinent to pts.
S. Intervenors discuss uhether FPL has exceeded 9-10 11-13 X
the 300*F screening criterion in 10 CFR S 50.41 governing protection against PTS.
II. Interws' mesponse attacks the acreptability 15-27, 13-14 X
X of the Turkey Point Integrated Surveittence 11 4-5 Program approved by the seAC in 1985.
A. Intervenors assert that the teAC improperty 16 18, 13-14 X
X and perhaps iltagetty granted the License 14 amendment in 1985 authorizing the Integrated sur weit 1ance Program.
S. Interveners assert that the Isac realized that 18-40, 13-14 X
X at the time it issued the amendees ts for the 14 Integrated Surveittance Progras Units 3 and 4 esautJ be operating witt eized fuel cores that uste not identicat.
C. Interveners assert that the Turkey Point 21-22, 13-14, X
X 2ntegrated survettlance Progree does not meet 10 23-24 the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix H because it does not contain a discrete h e t entitted ' contingency ptan.'
e
-e 4
.e w+-
e+
Attachment A LA8ME s.ddressed in Is.ters enors' Response (b Page Disposed of Issue Cutside the Issue Constitutes an Issue Fails Or Im *.ntervenors in Licensee *s Scope of this lepermissible Attack on To Identify a Genuine Issue stat _ev nt h (
, eepl y on___PE Proceedino Coesission's Recutations issue of noteriet Fact III. Interweaors* Response is based soon events d.ich 6-11, 17-18, 14-15 x
X occurred at Turkey Point prior to the seRC's 19-21, 24-5 acceptance of the Integrated Survetitance Program in 1985.
Intervenws discuss dif ferences in the RT 8-10, 17 18 14-15.
In Porta X
IV.
ofsurveillancecapsulesremovedfromTurbh 20,21 Point.
v.
Intervenors discuss the use of cores with mixed 13-70, 14-15, in Porta X
fuet.
1 16 21-22 VI.
Interwners discuss dif ferences in cap. city 20-21, 14-15, In Part
- X factors for units 3 and 4.
t 15 22-23 UII. Interwern s discuss tuo overpressurization 25 14-15 X
csonts at Unit 4 in 1981, v!!!.Intervenors assert that only plant specific data
?UG, 16-20 X
from Unit 4 should have been used in calculating 17,19, the P/T Limits for Unit 4.
1 18 IX.
interwenors assert that FPL diJ not account for the 27.*3, 16-20 X
change in strain rate in ca culating RT 11 10-11 s
g7 E.
Interveners assert that existing surveillance data 22, 24-25 X
is insufficient to make predictions up to 20 EFPY.
1 17
- 1hese issues are outside the scope of this pNceedi.g to the estent they address events e ach occurred prior to the 8sRC's acceptance of the Turkey Point Integrated Surveillance Progree in 1995.
e e
meO
i Attactament A LD ks$ressed in Intc,rwenors*
pespcstse On Page Disposed of Issue Outside the Issue Corstitutes an Issue Feits or In toterwenors im Licensec*s Scope of this Impermissible Attack on lo Identify a Genuine issue Statement at y_
neo.y on Pecs,
Proceedino Commission's Reautations
_ Issue of Material Fact s
XI.
Intervenors essert that the differences in flux tot 23-25, 25-26 X
nushers for the unit 4 iselds and capsules is of minor 18 importance.
XII. Intervenors essert that the P/T tiaits for unit 4 25-26, 26-27 X
should be based en a sinnte surweittence capsute.
17 E!!I. Interveners dispute L'ansee's hypotheticet 25-26 21-28 X
calculotten of the P, I tialts for Unit 4.
MIV. Interveners essert.het esterial degradstion 27-29, 29-30 X
due to neutron irr' dietion is a time-history 11 12-14 and rete dependent process.
NW.
Interwenors essert that the Licensee and IInc 29-30, 30-32 X
Staff are incorrict in stating that Turkey 11 Point unit 3 has w e EFPY that unit 4.
Mv1. Interveners essert that the Licensee may be 30, underestimating the calcuteted fluence for is 2-3
- 3. 33 X
Turkey rotat Unit 4.
Mv!I.Interwenors* mesponse contains e calculation 30-51, 33 X
purportieg to determine iAet the current i6 fluence for Unit 4 Capsule V sight be.
e
[
[1 F
. - ~ -
s' u.:-
Attachmsnt B t9a6 Edmen N5M - MI ASME Coda Section III 11B 2331*~
1 4
N53322 Test Speshmens aan orlasted la any direedom. Tbs orientados used shau k reged la es Card $ed M Tot Repat A47 Ns.3833,1 Lasados of Test Spesinema 1a.pnet tot specime= ter gesenhed and tempend muerial shal be removed from se noens6 as in ch prodnet fors spoGed in NS 2230 for seneDe test specimena. For N5 3880 TER REQUIREMENTS AND material in other heat treated conditions, impact tot ACMFTANCI MANDARDS' specimens shall be removed from the bations oper" N53331 Mawid for Vaans ited for tensile not specimens la the material spe>
Presure retalalas man
- al for vossala, other than n
18 cation. For all material, the number of teste shall be in accordanse with NN.2340. For bolting, the C, bolting, shall be tested e rl1 we 0
impact tot 6pecimes shd be takes with the longitudi.
(e) Establish a refertu.mperature ATypr; this
]
mal ask of the specimen loosted at least one.hdf thd be done es follows.
radius or 1 in, below the eur6m plus the machining (1) Determine a temporarm Tsar that is et or dowance per side, whichever is less. The fracture above the d. ductility transition temperature by drop l
planc of the specimens shall be at least ou diameter or weight testa.
thickans from the heat treeted end. When the stude, (J) At a temperstore not greater than Tsar +
I I
nuts, or bohs are not of suScient length, the takt.
407. each specimes of the C,let (N5 2321.2) shall length of the specimen shall be at the midlongth of the oakMt at least 35 mils laters! upansion and not les stuts, nuts, or bolts. The stud:., nuts, or Wts selected than M A.lb absorbed energy. Ratesting in accordano to provide twe coupon materia', shall he identical wth with N5 2HO is permitted. When thans esquirements l
rapset to the quarxhed ontour and else erept kr are met, Tsar is the reference temperstm ATuor.
l ler.gth whbh A.ah! 3 qual or wooed the length d te (J)la the event that the requiretaants of (2) repreenad studa.nutt, or bolfg.
above ete art met, cogder,t addithaal C, tests in l
groups of thtee spentadas (N5 3111.2) to detenine Ns.2 22.2 orlestedee of tapest Test Spechaea the tcperarm Te,at wwh de m raet. In thh cau l:
Is) Specimens for C, impact tests shd be criented the refereses tempe:sture ATysf = Te - dor, 4
Thus, the reference temperature ATyrris, tbs hist.:t j
as fo11ews.
L (1)!Lpedmans for fhtsings, other than Wtg of Tsar and (Tc, - 40'F),
j esJ bats twed for pressure retainlag parts of media.
(d) Wen a C, test boa act besa performed at pumps, sad valves,2d be oriented la a efection Typr 4 607, or when tha C, test at Trpr + dO7 i.
normel to the priadpel diroodos na whM the material does not esHist a maalaus of so A.tb and 38 alls l
l I
was worked. Specimens are neither requirut ear lateral upanelen, a tasaperarm represertlog a raial.
prohibited from the thickness direction, mum of $0 A.lb and 38 m'in la6eral espaasfor. may be (J) Spoolmens hom material for pipe, tube, au!
obtained from a fd C, impact curve developed from attings, except for thans made from plate sad emedap.
the adnimum data polate of d the C, tats performed.
shd be oriented la the sales dhooden. Speahnas (W Apply the procedures of (a) above to (I), (2),
from pipe material used fbr 6,oennes la veenals ahd be and 0)below oriented la a diroce6cm aeriaal te the priadpal
()) thwbeen material; direction in wblah the material was worired, other (2) the hans material, the heat afected sons, and j
than the thicknees dironden.
weld metal from the weld proceduto trdAA leets (J) Speclases arosa bottlag material and bare la assordance with NS.4H0 shallbe orien asial direction.
(J) the weW metalof N52431.
(f) S br all plott weartet, laeludhg
(,) move havlag a wLdth or dianwar of f la, and less that used for and 6tday, shaB be orlanted whleh prohdhh obtaining dsop weight test speeknes i
in a dirwtion normal to the artnolpal roning dirwda, ihm beinied na esseredam wkh Ns.2Hz.
, otherthanthickansdirootion.
(d) Sesas acades or appartenanaes la veneels, (J) St for east matadal shd have tleir r,sartness of prodnet form, have leenSolent material axes oriented the same es the saat of the idadhe for obtaitlag isapest teest eher heat treatment (eseept specimens (NS 2226).
(6) la cases (1) thrttugh ($) above, the notab of
'ta ans as a sa' tame a h e ** =aar a = and=is hr t
the c, specimen ihan be normat h es surfwe ot te matartal, es tem does are ensignmed es to uses es a,haain for snatorial.
anabgehhg laserv6se opermass es der une is secture pvvendes (b) Specimens for drop weight teste saay 1. ave their e,eimashe 043211(4 ene Appeans 01 13 f
~. -.
._ __._..~ ___
NB4&81 2 3641 SECTION !!! DIYtllM i - $U365CTION N3 pseg gege, em as a
pu alt 0VAVta
<., -.a-with seminal wall thiekaans G la, gad less for piping i
henWW iWet laterei TMenes.* m.
t o we % new (pipe and tubes) and matedal $r pumps, valves, and esas@ %M6d'%ti Wp4'Mfebde..* *.>wenleet wott h asIMla.464 lim 6bau k m a W h tim
" "- We win -ra'
- 0) and 0)below.
om % u 1%. naci.
as (1) Tot three C, speobosas at a temperature o w 1% to %, tact.
oo lower than or equal to the lowest eeMee temperaturo.*
All three spechnens shall meet the requhements of bom j
to ree me, va'm. ens fne,,i, vw w neww eine won Table N5 2H2(a).l.
J
- '*" d * "N (2) Apply & procedures a((l) eheve to.
1 i
(a) the bene material;
)
(b) the bees material, the heat sfa:ted seas, u s u N6. m M and weld metal from the weld procedure qualL6aation l
REQUIRED C, VALVCS F04 80LTING iddTERIAL leauin accordance with NS dDC, and fr) the weld metal of NS.2431.
)
g (4) Pressure retalains maserial, othee than tolting, l
own.ty, nn, tape,sion, ede et.se S'Ith nominal wall thiekases over 2414. for piping (P Ps and tuba) and material for pumpe, valves, and L
I 1wi we wet,mv 4 metoo w Attiass with my pipe scanaticos of nonlaal well l
4 I
ow 1 u 4, irv.t.
as we re+nenaw thickneu greater than 24 la. shall meet the twalso-0-4 as as meets of nim 331, The lowest serviot tempersturis i
thall not be kvar than ATag + 10FF unless a lowet
(
l temperature is hattled by followlag methods shauar l
post **14 heat treatnest) la this case, it is not ascenhuy to perforte b?th the drop weight and transverse C, tapet tests a requirst by NB 2331(a).
N52*I4 Balties Material lasiend, this tastw41 may k woud by only using Por Mt!as material, lasindias stude, suu, and
- c. ski C, speelseas. Tu three C, W eo re.
We, let h C, @me at a wapwature w l
moved shall be tested at a temperstvre icwor than et Q than tb W tung or the lowest i
equal to th; lowest tarvios temperature but no higher um tampesture, whiebevw is ins. AD thrw than the required ATupr' + 6&F for the veneet aban sun the.,_,
d Table S maurial to which the noenla or appartenanos is attached. Each specimes shall sakildt at least 35 mus lateral capaaston and not less than 30 fWb absorbed NB4843 NUMatt OF DetPACT 1WIS energy.
(e) Consideration shall be given to the essoes of REQUIRED trrutiados (NB.3 sesserInt seashmem proper.
tim to the core at tbs reemor veneet.
Ns3841 Fieses The Design $
aball tanhule additional One tem shah h made tem eneh plane es heat requiteents, as to ensure adequem bee.
trend. h pine are farnished la the unbes.
ture toughnen for esprias lidschne of the veneet treted condiden and geallied by bent treaud test T%e toughness properties may be vertied la servia, opmineen,,a tut shall w made ser euk plate an.
)
paiodteauy t,y a maurist earvinteen prosrum using roued. harm esquad nfers to the plate round l
tk awthods of ASTM B llM2 and the maserial l
conditions monitored by the laservios laapeedes w
,myse
- i...ia
,,,.we c e requiranents atseesaa xi. -
sold rushes w su e ar, aim,enedy, ine einesians (f) Consideration shall be given to the test tempers.
7 ture requira. sets of hydressade testias of the veend
% M "j "",',".e,."es,.,.e 9 l,",,",,*,3
= or m
-,e cmnu.
16
-n-
-,,---,n~
,,,m--n-en.,n_
n.w m m.,---
_w-nav.,_-~~~
~
. ~ - - - - - - - - - - - -
V E
NW Attachm:nt C
~~
ASME C;do Articlo G-1000 o
L ARTICLE G 1000 INTRODUCTION l
This Appendit presents a pro:cdure for obtaining the allowable loadings for ferritic pressure retaining snaterials in components.11 tis procedure is based on the principles of linear clastic fracture mechanics, At l
each location being investicated a maximum postu-lat:d flaw is assumed. At the same location the mode /
stress intensity factor' Kg is produced by each of the specified loadings as calculated and the summation of the K values is compared to a reference value K a i
f which is the highest critical value of Kr that can be cre.t:cd for the meterial and tr nperature invo'.ved.
l Ifferer6t procedutts are ie:cmruaded fut dire:er.t
- ompneats and operat:ag con &tions.
- n.e ss.vu hatuity /nw as used in frecu.t ercchanics bn to sciation t+ 4Ad must t/* he coofused eith th< trica sateury no a:t i
in Articlo d tl4s $s: pow F rthermo:t. sv.aus tr'ted tr. in this Apyndia st< ukulard normV ter6sh strwn wt stems
('
icieny,ics in a t.o'e *ree s.ees anodst et the surfac4 cesrv tLe txs&A of the ea w ddar*s.
%l
f 3-mm
(-
_ Att2hinent D ASME Coda Paragrcph G-2110(c) 4)
t J
i o
i ARTICLE G 2000 I
h VESSELS r
l
[
C+2100 GENEltAL REQUIREMENTS material prior o its use in manufacturc. This informa-I " '"
- ' E" E*# # * " "'
f G 2110 REFERENCE CRITICAL S~litESS l
INTENSITY FACTOR
~
(a) Figure G 22101 is a curve showing the relation.
G 2120 MAXIMUM POSTULATED ship that can be conservatively expected between the DEITCT critical, or reference, stress intensity factor Ku, Lsvin., and a temperature which is related to the The postulated defect used in this recommended reference rul ductility temperature RT r rdetermined procedure is a sharp, surface defect nonnal to the A
direction of maxianum stress. For section thicknesses j
in NU 2331. ' nits curve is based on the lower bound of of 4 in. to 12 in., it has a depth of one founh of the static, dynamic, and crack arrest critical Kg values section thickness and a length of 1% times the section necured as ti function of tempers.ture ca specimens thictra. For sections gtuter than 12 in, thick, the
(
of FA 533 Grade D Class I, and SA 5081. SA 508 2',
postu!ated defen for the 12 in, sectica a used. For I
and SA408 3 steel. No available dr.te pdnts for static sections :ess than 4 it, thick, the i in. r.,eep defect is h
dyrarnie, or arrest tests fall belsw the curve. An eg,,,,g y,,y
,g.D postulatM cfe ts of 1
analytical appronmation to the curve,ts; thickness were usd in developing the cuties of Fig.
G-22
- 1. Smauer pe{ect s rny W usd n an K,, a 26.78 + l 233exp(0.0145(T - RTm + 160))
j individual cas.c basts if a smaller site of r,aximum 9
Unless higher Kra values can be justined for the postutsted defect can b: ensured. Due to the safety particular material and circumstanz b-ir.g consid-facw recommendst here, the pcvention of ncndue.
h
- c. red, Fig. G=2210-1 may be 'udd for territic steeb tHe framre is ensured for sotau! th, racat imponant which meet the tequirements of ND 2331 and which situati ns even if the defects were to be about twice as have a specified rninimum yield strength at room large in linear dimensions as this postutt ted matimum d'I'CI' temperature of 50.0 tsi or less.
(b) For materials which have specifed minimum yield strengths at room temperature greater than 50.0 ksi but not exceeding 90.0 Lsi. Fig. G 2210-1 may be G 2200 LEVEL A AND !! SERVICE used provided fracture mechanics data (similar to the LIMITS Kro data referenced in WRCD 175) are obtained on at least three heats of the material on a sufficient nurnber C*2210 Sl{ ELLS AND l{EADS REMOTE of specimens to cover the temperature range of FROM DISCONTINUITIES interest, including the weld metal and heat.affected G 22tl Recommendations tene, and provided that the data are equal to or above the cuive of Fig. G 22101.11iese data shall be The assumptions or this Subaniele are ree-included in the Desi n Speciftcation. Where these ommended for shell and head regions during Level A C
materials of hi her yield strengths [specified minimum and D Service Limits.
t yield strength greater than 50.0 Lsi but not cacceding
'waco its (w ld.ns Rewarcei councit ounenn im evRc 90.0 ksi are to be used in conditions where radiation e
Recommendations on Tovstians Requiremenu ror rerruic rnay affect flie material properties, the effect of Materials" provido pnndurn in Paragrapli 5(cG ror consider.
radiation on the Ku curve shall be determined for the ins maaimum twulaica ocrecu smauer ibn ii.ow onenird 562 V
z" Attcchm:nt U s_.,,
y RCg. Guido 1.99, Revision 1 C;vlolon 1 t
f*#,,eeo.,%.
U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMIS$10N April 1977
%o.,g.
) OFFICE OF STANDARDS DE MEOULATORY oulDE 1 te EFFECTS OF'RESIOU AL CLCMENTS ON PRE 0lCT00 RADIATIONIQAM AGE TO REACTOR VESSEL. M ATERIAL.S A. INTRODUCTION
- 1. Paragraph ll.11 of Appendit G defines the beltline in terms of a predicted adjustment of General Design Criterion 31," Fracture Prevention reference temperature at end of seriice hfe in excess of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," of Appen-of 50*F; paragraphs lil.C and IV.li specify the ad.
dit A. "Gcacral Design Criteria for Nuclear Powcr ditional test requirements for bc.ittine materials that Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50," Licensing of Produc-supplernent the requirements for reactor vessel tion and Utilization Facilities" requires,in part,that materials Eenerally, the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that, when stressed
- 2. Paragrsph II.C.3 of Appendit 11 establishes the utider operating maintenance, testing, and required number of surveillanec capsules on the basis postulated accident conditions, (I) the boundary of the predicted adjusted refctence temperature at the behaves in a nontrittle manner and (2) the end of serviet lifc,In additio't, withdrawal of the first capsule (when four or rnore are required)is to oxur probability of rarWy propsgatinj ftacture is when the predicted adjustment of reference stalnitr.tzed. Appendit G, " Fracture Toulthness Re.
quirements," and Appendis 11,. "Rcactor Vcssel teroperature is approximanly KrF or t.t one.fuurth Malcrial SunclMn<c Program Hecuirements,"
of the service life, whkl.eect is carlict, which were adds'io IOCFR Part 50 effccttic August 3 Paragraph IV.C of Appendi'. O tc. quires thr.
16, IM.4, to bif.lemoet, in part, Criterion 31, nece,.
sifste tht prediv' ion cf the arnount of radiation vessels be designed to permit a therrnal anacabr,g damen to the reecWr <essel of water cooled pc wer trutment if the predicted velut of adjusted reference reactors throrrhaul i;r service life, temperature exceeds 2MF durie.g their service life.
This guide thscribes general predires acceptable L Pmgraph 11.8 ei Appendit H incorporates l
to the NRC %afi es an interist nasis' fvr pr*dicting ASTM El$5 73 t'y refere.xe. farsgraph 4.! of l
the effects of the residual ehmec9 copper ud ASTM CICS,73 requires tbst 6e material 4 ;o be phosphor,.s or, neutror, radiedon dem y e to the low placed in 5 stveillan.s be those that may lic-it opera.
l tion of thr. ttactor during its lifetime, i.e., e,ose en alley steels currently used for light.waier. cooled reae.
pected to have'the highest adjusted reference sor vesst t, The Advisory Committee ott cleactor temperature or the lowest Charpy upper shelf er.ergy i
hfeguards has been consulted concerning this guide at end of life. Both measures of radiation damege and has concurred in the regulatory position, must be considered.
- 5. paragraph V.B of Appendit G describe, the B, Ol$CUSSION The principal examples of NRC requirements that basis for setting the upper limit for pressurc as a func-necessitate prediction of radiation damage are:
tion of ternperature during heatup and cooldown for a gwen service penod in terms of the predicted value l
of the adjusted reference temperature at the end of
- kenarch and construction esperience Ah low eesidual-element toenposMont or these steelt es scrumvistiftf rapidly and is to.
the service period.
r pomed to pro, ids a rarm bus for ocupuW proc <durcs in the nest The two measures of radiation darnage used in this guide are obtained frorn the results of the Charpy V.
"tha indic u evt.ii mi.t ch.nga trem pre.i v. Inve.
ostvnc e(cvarony oviof s gg g,;,g7my(";.,Pf;ay,,*l,5,,;; gyy,
.*,.w,c.......,.....,.,o...
Of'9.' 8884 U.,eer og.,( geg,, g
,p g,,
gg, gy {
ne... gen's "6 a.a.ra
- o......,,,...,, 9 gg,q,, gg..n..,,.....,,,o,,,,..e,i.e, t,,, p.,u g m
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. e.
4.
4*a, U#
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. O
- fMW, f
- ,,..g s@
e,
.t og e
e'~~
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g 4. (
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.es 84,*.8
.a I
i
i notch impact test. Appendia G 1310 CFR Part 50 re.
positin when the copper c:ntent is chout 0.15A The I
quires that a (cIl c:rve of absorbed energy vers:s effects cfirrediation ternperature en decrease in shelf I
temperature be obtained through the ductile to-energy should be considered qualitatively similar to brittle transition temperature region. The latter la those cited for the adjustment of reference located by the reference tempwature, RTNor, which temperature, i
is defined in paragraph it.F of Appendia O. De
" shift" of the adjusted esference temperature is Sensitivity to neutron embrittlement may be af.
[
defined in Appendia O as the temperature ahlft in the fected by other twidual elements such es vanadium i
Charpy Wnotcti curve for the irradiated material and by deonidation practice, as indicated by the relative to that for the unirtsdiated material, fmdings of current research in predicting radiation rneasured at the 50 foot. pound energy level or damage for materials that diffe' in chemical content measured at the 35.rnit lateral expansion level, or deonidation practice from those that make up the whicheser temperature shift is greater. In using data base, such findings should be considered. Other published data that report only the temperature shift residual elements, notably sulfur, impair the initial l
measured at the 30-foot. pound energy level, it has Charpy shelf energy of these materials, and their con.
been assumed herein that the adjustment of the tent should be kept low. Clearly. It is the remaining reference temperature is equal to the 50 foot. pound toughness at end of life or at some other critical i
shift.
period that is important. Such toughness may be The second measure of radiation damage is the given in terms of the margin between the operating j
decrease in the Charpy up r. shelf energy level. In temperature (nominally 550'F) and the limiting the absence of a standard [finition, the upper. shelftemperature based on toughness. A margin of 200 value degrees is desirabic to permit safe management of l
energy is defined herein as the average enerhove the system transients. At full power, the limiting for all specimens whose test ternperature is s upper end of the transition temperature region. Nor, temperature based on toughness is generally 150 200 mally, at least three specimens should be included; degrees above RTNDTt hence, the latter should not enowd 150 207F at end ofilfe. nis limit also svolds more specimens should be included when the shelf the problems of providing for
- annealmg, per lent appears to be marginal. However,if specimens patattsph IV.C of Appendix 0. The icvels of ere tested in se'.s of thne at each test temperature, th, orus, suifur, act having the highm average may be regarded as residual e!cmmts such as copper. phopc iieve the and vanadiam that are required to a definisig the upper shc4 energy.
of 200'F edjusted reftieriet tempef ature et end oflife
+
Tns tr,er.sure cf Ilvence used herein is the riumber in a given rentot vesal will depend on the imtial cf neutrons pv sqtare centimeter (E>lMeV). A4 as.
valus of phor of the beltline mate *ints and on the sumed fisslotspectrum energy distribution was used prcdicted Ovenu s.t the pcrticuler Imtions in the in calcuatbg th: fluence for most of the data base '
testel where the mateticos are used.
l Howeve', for application to a tractor setsel, th; ca!culateu apectrum is uwl to pred!ct fluence at a When surstillance data from th reactor 4 quer,.
gives Wa io : 1.i the wait, his pro:<durc is tion in.
t:ct boome avs.ilab!ta the weight g!ven to ;t reledre
(
tended to piectude future use of dr.ta that are pven in to the information in this guWe should depe nd on the terms of ricutron damage th,ence, credibility of the surveillance dsts esjudged by the followirg criterit:
As used herein. references i.o "% Cu" Md "% P" meat. the weight Fercint ol copper and phosphput
- 1. Materials in the capsule shoulJ be those judrA I
as measured in the survel'. lance program per ASTM most likely to be centrolling witn regard to adiation i
E18543. However, if such results are not available, dam 68e according to the provisions of this guide.
the results of a product analysis rney be used.
r Use of the procedures for prediction of radiation
- 2. Seatter in the Charpy data should be small i
l damese given in the regulatory position should be enough to avoid large uncertainty in curve fitting, t
limited to irradiation at $50125'F, because temperature is important to damage recovery proocs.
- 3. The change in yield strength should be consis.
ses. As a guideline, irradiation at 457F has been tent with the shift in tiie Charpy curve.
I shown to cause twice the adjustment of reference temperature and irradiation at 650'F, about half the
- 4. The relationship to previous surveillance data l
l adjustment produced by irradiation at 550 F for the from the same reactor should be consistent with the l
fluence levels and the steels cited in the regulatory normal trends of such data.
- The este tisw ror this gui6e is that ginn try $pericer !!. Bush.
- $ttvetvrel M steri 6 s for h 9 cleat,*pwr Plenu." lM4 A$iM Gil.
- 5. The surveillance data for the correlation i
len Metroeist Lecture.rvehe 4 in ASTM Journet or testins and monitor materialin the capsule should fall within the tvolvetion. New.19N. and its addendum *Redistion Damase in Premiere venci si.eu ror commerci i Lishi.weier Re.ctors?
scatter band of the data base for that material.
1.99 2 f
L
C. Mout.ATORY POSITION (3) The expression fit A is given la 1:rtm cf o
e' fluence as measured by c its cf n/cm'(E > I Mcv);
- i. When credible surveillance data from the rese.
however, the capression may be used in tersns of tot in question are not available, prediction of fluence as measured by units of neutron damage I
neutron radiation damage to the beltline of reactor fluence, provided the constant 10" n/cm' (E> l i
vessels of light water teactors should be based on the MeV) is changed to the corresponding value of following procedures.
neutron damage fiuence.
(4) Application of these procedutes ao materials having chemical content beyond that represented by the current data base should be
- a. Reference ternperature should be adjusted as justified by submittal of data.
a function of fluence and residual element content in l
accordance with the following capression, within the
- 2. When credible surveillance data from the rese.
limits below and in paragraph 1.C.
tot in question becorne available, they may be used to represent the adjusted reference temperature and the i
A = [40 + 1000(% Cu. 0.08)
Charpy upper. shelf energy of the beltline materialsi,t t
+ 5Xl0(% P.O.008))[f/10"j" the Quence received by the surveillance specimens.
where
- a. The adjusted reference temperature of the beltline rnaterials at other fluences may be predicted i
A = predicted adjustment of reference temperature, 'F.
i (1) estrapolation to higher or lower fluences f a fluence, n/cm'(E>l MeV)'
from credible surveillance data following the slope of the family of lines in Figure i or
% Cu = weight percent of copper, If % Cut 0.08, use 014.
(2) a streight-line interpolation between credi.
ble data on e IPrithmic plot.
% p a w eight pervt os pl osphon r, i
If % h0f05, use 0.008
- b. To predit the decrease in upper. shelf energy of the behM materia's at Ottences other than those if thJ value of A obtained by the above expression ekee:ds thst $ vea by the curve labeled " Upper
'f".lved by the surveillance specimens, procedures L
51'nt)ar to thwe given I > parageaph 2.a iney be foi U.mh" in f:igure I, the " Upper Limit" curve should loud usirm Fipite 2.
be u.ed. If % Cu is ur.hown, the "l#per Limit" cune should be used.
3, g.
' r! nts, the reacte sessel behlir;c snotedais sound have th9 rontent of residual ele.
As it'estraice li Mgure 1 br selected capper sad rents u.ch as copp:r, phosphorus, sulfur, a.d phtisphortvorsents the above ctpresslots should t e vanadium controtted to low levels. The levels the uld considered valid oni) for A >50"F and for f( 6 a 10..
be such that the predicted adjusted refeance n/ctn'( O i M eV).
temperature at the %T position in the vessel wtll et
- b. Charpy upper. shelf energy should be as.
end of life is less than 2pF, sumed Io deereue as a function of Quence and copper content as indicated in Figure 2, within the limits
- 0. IMPl.EMENTATION l
listed in paragraph I.e. Interpolation is permitted.
The purpose of this section is to provide informa.
- c. Application of the foregoing procedures tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC should be subject to the following limitations:
stafps plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.
(1) The procedures apply to those grades of This guide reflects current regulatory practice.
f SA-)02, 336 $33, and 508 steels having minimum Therefore, cacept in those cases in which the appli.
I specified yield strengths of 50,000 psi and under and cant proposes an acceptable alternative method for l-to their welds and heat afTected tones.
complying with specified portions of the Commis.
sion's regulations, the positions described in this l
(2) The procedures are valid for a nominalir-guide will be used by the NRC staff as follows:
radiation temperature of 550rF. Irradiation below 525'F should be considered to produce greater I. The method described in regulatory positions damage, and irradiation above SU'F may be con-C.I and C.2 of this Evide will be used in evaluality all sidered to produce less damage. The correction factor piedictions of radiation damage called for in Appen.
used should be justified.
dices O and 11 to 10 CpR pari 50 submitted on or 1.99 3
l afier June 1.1977; ho ever,tf an applicant wishes to plicstions docketed on or after June 1, 1977; use the recommendations of regulatory positions C.!
however, if an applicant whose application for con.
and C.2 in developin6 submittals before June 1.1977, struction permit is docketed before June I,1977, j
the pertinent portions of the submittel will be wishes to use the recommendations of regulatory evaluated on the basis of this guide.
Position C.3 of this regulatory solde in developing
]
i submittals for the application, the peetinent portions
- 2. The recommendations of reestatory position of the a plication wdl be evaluated on the basis of '
C.3 will be used in evaluating construction permit sp-this gui j
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 89 NOV -7 P 4 ;12 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
No.iI
)
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT
)
Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA - 4 COMPANY
)
50-251 OLA - 4
)
(Turkey. Point Plant,
)
Units 3 and 4)
)
CERTIFICATE.OE._ SERV.lCE I hereby certify that a copy of " Licensee's Reply To Intervenors'~ Response To Licensee's Motion For Summary Disposition Of Intervenors' "sntentions", together with attachments, was served on
't following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, prut,#cly stamped and addressed on the date shown below.
B.
Paul Cotter, Esq., Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Hon. Glenn O. Bright
- L Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Hon. Jerry Harbour
- L Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 L
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Additional delivery by hand.
~,
py
/
l' i
o o
L
-2 Office of the Secretary
.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[
Washington, D.C.
20555 l
Attention:
Chief, Docketing and Service Section (Original plus two copies)
Joette Lorion, Director **
Center for Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Ned Road #217 Miami, Florida 33143 Janice Moore
- Patricia A. Jehle Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Richard Goddard U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101,Marietta St. N.W.
- 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 John T.
Butler Steel, Hector & Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131 l
Dated this 6th day of November 1989.
l D Qf A
,enneth C.~ Manne l
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 Washington, D.C.
20036 l
- Additional delivery by Federal Express.
i.