ML19352B045
| ML19352B045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1981 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19352B038 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-81-04, 50-312-81-4, NUDOCS 8106020601 | |
| Download: ML19352B045 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000312/1981004
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-312/81-04
Docket No.
50-312
License No.
Safeguards Group
Licensce:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
P. O. Box 15830
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Sacramento, California 95813
Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1
Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted:
January 1-31, 1981
Inspectors:
&W
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g}gy/g)
H.k.' Caber,
nior Resident Inspector
' Date Signed
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-fen, Onik Ytesident Inspector
Da'te Signed
Date Signed
Approved By:
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G. B. 'wetzih Actin 9 Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2,
Date Sign d
Reactor Operations Projects Branch
Summary:
Inspection between January 1 and 31, 1981 (Repnrt No. 50-312/81-04)
Areas Inspected: Operational safety verification; monthly maintenance observations;
monthly surveillance observations; followup on regional requests; review of plant
operations (SALP inspection activities); licensee event report followup; on a
significant event; preparation for refueling; refueling activities; and independent
inspection effort. The inspection involved 217 inspector-hours by the resident
insp?ctors.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were
found in nine areas. One item of noncompliance was found in one area (10 CFR 50.59
Safety Evaluation not perfonned).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
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- P. Oubre' , Plant Superintendent
- D. Blachly, Operations Supervisor
N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor
D. Cass, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineering Technician
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- D. Elliott, Quality Assurance Engineer
D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant
- H. Heckert, Engineering Technician
J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer
F. Kellie, Plant Chemist
V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer
- R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor
- T. Perry, Onsite Quality Assurance Supervisor
- S. Rutter, Quality Assurance Engineer
L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director
B. Stiver, Mechanical Engineer
T. Tucker, Outage Coordinator
- D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor
W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant
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The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
employees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations,
and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
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- Denotes those attending the Exit In.terview on January 30, 1981.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control roon operators.
The inspector
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verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout
records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted
to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,
fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance
requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The
inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical
security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security
plan.
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The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector
also walked down the accessible portions of the makeup and purification
system and emergency power system to verify operability, and witnessed
portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste
shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry
codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected
as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed
prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control
records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls
were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs
and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment
maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
"A" Diesel Generator maintenance.
b.
"B" Diesel Generator maintenance.
c.
Reset of the power to flow setpoints,
d.
Diesel driven fire pump overhaul.
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Following completion of maintenance on the above, the inspector verified
that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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4.
gathly Surveillance _ Observations
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
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testing on the CRD Mechanisms, RPS Channel D, Nuclear Service Raw Water
Loop A, and Reactor Building Cooling Fans, Channel, A and verified that
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test
instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation
were met, that restoration of the affected components was accomplished,
that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure
requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
directing the test,and that any deficiencies identified during the testing
were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the test activities associated with
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the following test procedures:
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a)
SP E8.02 (1-10-81) - CRD Mechanism Exercising
b)
SP 200.08D 1-22-81) - Monthly RPS Surveillance, Channel D
c)
SP 203.07A 1-20-81) - Nuclear Service Raw Water Loop A
d)
SP 204.04A 1-16-81) - Quarterly RBS Cooling System Fans Surveillance
Test, Channel A
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Followup on Regional Requests,
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During this period, personnel from the Region V office of the NRC in
Walnut Creek, California, requested information from the Resident Inspectors
regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Infonnation was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
Security procedures, diesel maintenance and shift staffing requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Systematic Appraisal of Licensee _Pgformance (SA_L_Pj_ Inspections
By letter dated August 28, 1980, J. L. Crews of Region V advised
J. J. Mattimoe of SMUD of aspects of Rancho Seco operations which would
be receiving an increased frequency and/or scope of inspection as a
result of the Region V SALP review. These areas were Design Changes and
iodifications, Quality Ass'urance Audits, Training, and Quality Control
-4 Maintenance. The inspections performed during this period pursuant
t, the SALP evaluation are reported below.
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Review"andkudits
a.
The inspector attended a safety review committee meeting. The
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inspector verified that provisions of technical specifications
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dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications
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were met. The inspector also verified that decisions made were
reflected in the meeting minutes.
b.
Training
The inspector attended one of the licensee's operator requalification
lecture series and verified that lesson plan objectives were set
and that training was in accordance with the approved operator
requalification program schedule and objectives.
The inspector verified by direct questioning of one new, one experienced.
and one temporary employee that administrative controls and procedures,
radiological health and safety, industrial safety, controlled access
and security procedures, emergency plan, and quality assurance training
were provided as required by the licensee's technical specifications;
verified by direct questioning of one craftsman and one technician
that on-the-job training, formal technical training commensurate
with job classification, and fire fighting training were provided.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Licensee Event Report Followug
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following licensee event reports were reviewed
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to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
corrective actions were accomplished. and corrective actions to prevent
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recurrence had been accomplished i
iccordance with technical specifications.
LER 80-50 (open) West Perimeter TLD Readings Exceeded
LER 81-01 (closed) Degraded Grit Voltage Affecting Motor Starter Coils
No items of noncompliance or deviations were disclosed.
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8.
Followup on Significant Events
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Two significant events occurred during this reporting period:
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A.
Primary to CCW Leak
Samples of the Component Coolant Water (CCW) System taken routinely
on January 12, 1981, indicated a detectable amount of activity.
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After confirming detectable amounts of tritium, cesium, xencn,
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and iodine in the sample, an internal reportable occurrence report
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(AP-22) was written, and the licensee commenced investigation of
the source of the leak. On January 28, 1981,the licensee determined
the source to be the "A" letdown cooler.
Over the sixteen days
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that the investigation was underway, the plant continued to operate
at full power because the size of the leak, which was carefully
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monitored, was shown to be constant and very small.
The Plant
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Review Comittee, the Operations staff, and the Health Physics
and Chemistry staffs were all apprised of the situation and the
"on line" systems which indicate the leak's status were continually
monitored.
An immediate 10 CFR 50.59 review was initiated and
acted upon by the PRC.
No unplanned releases occurred,
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At the close of this report period, the licensee had not determined
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the type of followup action to repair the leak.
A new double capacity
Letdown Cooler is available for replacement of the present "A"
Letdown Cooler, but the licensee had not planned to install it
until the April 1982 outage.
This item will be followed up during a subsequent inspection (81-04-01).
B.
Unplanned Release at Less than Reportable Levels
On January 24, 1981 at approximately 9:00 p.m., Operators observed
two decreases in Makeup Tank pressure.
The total change was equivalent
to depressurization by 2.38 atm. in about 45 minutes.
Investigation of this incident disclosed the fact that at 9:30
p.m., on January 24, the Makeup Tank and the main generator had
been charged with hydrogen. Upon completion of these tasks, the
generator bypass valve was left cracked open and the vent valve
from the hydrogen manifold was opened. The hydrogen bottles were
then isolated from the hydrogen header. With the header at a lower
pressure than the Makeup Tank, fission gases leaked back into the
header and out the open vent.
Subsequent tests revealed PLS-085
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and HV-23506 (a series check valve and a solenoid valve from the
hydrogen header to the Makeup Tank) both leaked.
The temporary corrective action was to close two downstream valves
(HGS-002 and HGS-003) to provide duble valve isolation of the
Makeup Tank from the hydrogen header.
The licensee's calculations performed following the incident indicated
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that no technical specification or 10 CFR 20 limits were exceeded.
At this writing, the PRC has reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation
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and has recommended the following:
1.
The check valve and solenoid valve should be repaired during
the present refueling outage.
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2.
A$ engineering review of the system should be perforned.
3.
A detailed review of the existing operating procedures should
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be performed to determine if revisions may be necessary.
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4.
All operating crews should be informed of this occurrence.
5.
If possible, the sJstem itself and the generator should be
checked for potential contamination.
It is the Plant Superintendent's responsibility to act on the PRC's
recommendations.
The inspector will follow up on these and other items related to
this event.
(81-04-02)
9.
Preparations for Refueling
The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically
adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection,
and storage of new fuel; observed receipt inspections and storage of
new fuel elements and verified these activities were performed in accordance
with the licensee's procedures; and, followed up resolution of deficiencies
found during new fuel inspection.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage
control.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Refueling Activities
The inspector verified prior to the handling of fuel in the core, that
good housekeeping was maintained in the spent fuel building and verified
that staffing plans during refueling were in accordance with technical
specifications and approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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11.
Independent Inspection Effort
Discussions were held between the Resident Inspectors and operations,
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security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand
problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions
will continue as a standard practice.
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On numerous occasions, during this report period, the Resident Inspectors
attended operations status meetings. These meetings are held by the
Operations Supervisor to provide all disciplines onsite with a update
on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
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In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed
on the following items:
a.
Critical Fire Protection Area Ins 2ections,
Over the past two years, as part of the inspector's normal inspection
activities, observations of critical fire areas has taken place.
The critical fire areas include:
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Containment Penetration Valve Areas
Makeup Pump Room
Corridor to (-) 47' Level
Corridor to fiezzanine Level
Corridor to Grade Level
These locations were designated critical fire areas pending completion
of the fire protection modifications required by Amendment 19 to
the license.
The observations included housekeeping practices,
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fire equipment locations, fire suppression system operability and
use of fire watches.
In May of 1980 a QA Audit of the fire protection Amendment 19
modifications indicated that "to the best of the auditor's ability
all Amendment 19 modifications were completed prior to the Rancho
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Seco startup" on May 12, 1980. This was also documented in the
region-based inspector's Inspection Report No. 50-312/80-09.
Accordingly, those locations are no longer critical fire areas and
will be inspected in the future in accordance with normal inspection
requirements.
flo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Degraded Operation of the "B" Dieseljenerator_
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On April 18, 1980, licensee personnel discovered that the piping
between the DC-driven oil booster pump and the governor on the
"B" Diesel Generator was installed incorrectly. A Nonconforming
Report (flCR S-1910) was prepared, a design review was performed
and, based on this, it was determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 review
was not required. The flCR was dispositioned to accept "as is,"
and to continue operating, providing the diesel met the 10-second
starting requirement. The engineering review also recommended
replacement of the governor and piping at the next biannual
inspection
(scheduled for the 1981 outage).
The inspector's record review and personnel interviews indicated
the following:
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(1) 5e'ction 8.2.3.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report describes
the quick starting feature of the diesel generators.
This
feature includes a DC-driven oil booster pump which provides
hydraulic oil pressure to set the governor fuel racks until
the diesel engine comes up to speed. At that time the direct
shaft-driven oil pump can provide the oil pressure necessary
to maintain the fuel racks in the set position.
(2) The governor was replaced and tiie oil booster lines improperly
installed via Work Request No. 022134 in September,1977.
(3) Tb piping installed in September 1977 represents a change
from the system as described in the FSAR.
This change allowed
the "B" Diesel to be operated in a degraded mode for over
one year.
(September,1977 to the present.)
(4) When this condition was discovered in April,1980,and a Nonconforming
Report (NCR) was prepared, therewas no record of a related
safety analysis (required by 10 CFR 50.59) being performed
which would support continued operation of the diesel in the
above described degraded mode.
(5) The Plant Review Committee (PRC) reviewed the NCR and related
documentation on April 25, 1980. A PRC member called the governor
supplier and determinedon about April 26, 1980 (according to
a licensee representative) that with the improper piping, the
governor would not perfcrm its intended function of providing
13 foot-pounds torque to sat the fuel racks quickly. The
PRC concluded, however, t'H this event was not required to
be reported.
Based on the foregoing
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x es that the licensee failed to
a red by 10 CFR 50.59 to determine
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perform the safety anab y s .
if continued operation t,7 the "G* Diesel Generator while it differed
from the system described in the Final Safety Analysis Report
constituted an unreviewed safety question.
This is an item of apparent noncompliance.
91-04-03)
c.
Followup on Unresolved Items
Item 80-38-01 (Closed).: The licensee's internal AP-22 report referenced
in inspection report 50-31c/80-38, Paragraph 8.c, described procedural
violations dealing with a failure to follow the Work Request Procedure
AP-3.
Violations were identified by the licensee, they were reported
to the Resident Inspectors and corrective action was taken within
a reasonable time. Because the inspector has not found evidence that
the violations occur as a general rule, this item is closed.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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12. _ Exit Interview _
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
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throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on January
30, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged information tendered on the monthly inspection
activities.
During the exit interview, the inspectors discussed their preparations
for TMI related inspections which are expected to be addressed by the
end of February, 1981. The following NUREG-0737 paragraphs were preliminarily
discussed:
I . A.1.3.1 - Overtime Limits
I.C.5 - Feedback of Operating Experience
I.C.6 - Verification of Operating Activities
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II.D.3.1 - Valve Position Indication
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II.E.4.2.(5b) - Containment Isolation Modifications
No conclusions were drawn on licensee compliance with these paragraphs.
The inspector asked if action had been taken on a 12/22/80 letter to
all PWR licensees from Eisenhut dealing with control of heavy loads
(NUREG0612).
A licensee representative stated that they have seen
NUREG 0612 and have assigned a cognizant engineer from the Generation
Engineering Department to prepare a reply. The inspector also asked
if action had been taken on another licensee's Part 21 Report on 1"
Hilti Kwik-Bolts. A licensee representative stated that the Maintenance
Department has been made aware of the issue.
Two LERs (80-24 and 80-49) were also discussed. These LERs deal with
diesel generator issues and appear to require further review by the
licensee because more or different information may be available than
was originally reported.
Finally, an item of apparent noncompliance
was discussed. This delt with the improper installation of piping
associated with the "B" Diesel Generator D.C. driven oil booster pump
which assists in assurin a quick-start of the diesel.
(See Paragraph
11.b for fur her details .
One item of apparent noncompliance was identified (81-04-03).
This item of apparent noncompliance was further discussed at a meeting
on February 13,1981, between Region V operations management and certain
of the licensee's senior managers. Region V representatives provided
further explanation of the basis for this item of apparent noncompliance
and for the assignment of a severity level,
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