ML19352A981
| ML19352A981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8106020496 | |
| Download: ML19352A981 (2) | |
Text
W D tJ K E POWER COM PANY Power < ui;swixo 422 Sot;Trt Citi recis Stiert r. Cit Aics. ort M. N. C us.: u
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May 27, 1981
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
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',3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II K's 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
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Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
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Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 s
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Pursuant to 10CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/31-03.
Very truly yours, t' ~
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s I _) w..~... _ (0. b'i.i Od 'y William O. Parker, Jr.
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Director NRC Resident Inspector Office of Inspection and Enforcement Catawba Nuclear Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 3o/7 5
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION REPORT NUMBER:
SD 413, 414/81-03 REPORT DATE: May 23,1981 FACILITY: Catawba fluclear Station Units l&2 IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:
Electrical isolation between a Class IE Contain-ment Isolation valve and a Non-lE pressure switch in the nuclear sampling flow circuit found to be inadequate to meet Duke separation and independence require-ments.
INITIAL REPORT: On April 28, 1981, Art Johnson of NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia was notified of this deficiency by Mr. T. C. McMeekin and Mr. W. O. Henry of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, NC 28242.
COMPO ENT AND/0R SUPPLIER:
The pressure switch, Duke #NMPS5030, is a United Electric Company, Model No. J6-9508-142.
DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:
During a review of I & C devices, it was' discovered that Nuclear Sampling System pressure switch NMPS 5030 had not been specified and procured as Class lE.
This pressure switch closes a containment isolation
,alve in the event of a flow mismatch condition.
The flow mismatch function itself is not Nuclear Safety Related but the containment isolation valve circuitry is Nuclear Safety Related Class lE.
Subsequent review of all I & C devices determined that no other cases like this exist.
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATION:
The control circuit of the Class lE isolation valve was not electrically isolated from a Non-Class lE pressure switch.
The lack of isolation in this case cou'd have resulted in a non-safety device degrading the control power for one containment isolation valve by blowing the control power fuse, which would disable remote control capability.
Spurious operation of this pressure switch could have only caused the isolation valve to go to the safe position and would not have over-ridden valve operation in the safe direction.
Since this deficiency was detennined before plant operation, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
CORRECTIVE _ ACTION: Design Change Authorization ECSP-090 has been issuco to add an isolation device oetween the Non-Safety Related pressure switch and the Class lE isolation valve.
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