ML19352A829
| ML19352A829 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1981 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19352A827 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-81-02, 50-293-81-2, NUDOCS 8106020190 | |
| Download: ML19352A829 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1981002
Text
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TERA #'s fer 50-293/81-02
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ggg-801229
810107
$
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
50293-810117
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
60293-810118
S0293-810119
Region I
50293-810122
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50293-810128
Report No.
50-293/81-02
Docket No.
50-293
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Category
C
License No. DPR-35
Priority
Licensee:
Boston Edison Company
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachuset*s 02199
Facility Name:
pugrim ncinar pnwar varinn
Inspection at: Plymouth, Massachusetts
Inspection conducted:
January b - 30, 1981
Inspectors:
Nbd
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]. Johnson,SeniorResidentInspector
date signed
date signed
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date signed
Approved by:
E;
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R. Keimirf/ ActingChief,
date signed
/Reactor Projects #.ction No.
1B
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Projects Branch No. 7
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 5-30, 1981 (Report No. 50-293/81-02)
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Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced safety inspection of plant operations
including followup on previous inspection findings, an operational safety
verification, followup on events, surveillance activities, licensee status
of TMI T.A.P. Category 'B' items, ATWS procedure review, LER followup, a
review of organization / personnel changes, and a survey of potential leaking
detectors.
The inspection involved 92 hours0.00106 days <br />0.0256 hours <br />1.521164e-4 weeks <br />3.5006e-5 months <br /> by the resident inspector.
Results:
Four items of noncompliance were identified in one area.
(Failure
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to perform required surveillances for ATWS instrumention, paragraph 3.b.(1);
Failuce to implemant station administrative procedures for the control of
Borax, for required log entries and for required valve lineup signature veri-
fication, paragtiph 3.b.(2), Failure to properly review, approve, and
distribute station procedures, paragraph 3.b.(3); and Failure to follow alarm
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response procedure for deenergizing annunciators, paragraph 3.b. (4).
Region I Form 12
U106020(90
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
r. Famulari, QC Supervisor
E. Graham, Sr. Plant Engineer
R. Machon, Nuclear Operations Manager - pilgrim Station
C. Mathis, Dep'ity Nuclear Operations Manager
T. McLoughlin, Sr. Compliance Engineer
P. Smith, Chief Technical Engineer
R. Smith, Sr., Chemical Engineer
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R. Trudeau, Chief Radiological Engineer
P.. Williard, I&C Engineer
E. Ziemanski, Managemens Services Group Leader
The inspector also interviewed other members of the health physics, opera-
tions, security, maintenance, and technical staffs.
2.
Followup on previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Noncompliance (293/80-25-01); The licensee reinstructed the per-
sonnel involved on leaving valves out of position and the purpose of the
shift turnover sheet.
Subsequent tours of the control room by the inspector
to verify valve and switch lineups following completion of surveillance
tests have not identified any similar instances.
This item is closed.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (293/80-21-01); The inspector contacted the
NRC:NRR Licensing Project Manager who indicated that the design review of
the ATWS RPT/ARI modification had been completed.
The licensee has yet to
install a backup power supply (inverter).
The licensee expects necessary
instructions and equipment to be available for implementation in April,
1981 and stated that the completion of this modification will be scheduled
for the next outage of sufficient duration prior to the planned refueling
outage of September, 1981.
This item remains open pending review of the
completed modification.
(0 pen) Deviation (293/80-30-02);
The licensee's January
9, 1981 response
to NRR concerning the status of the TMI Task Action Plan item III.E.4.2.6
stated that procedural controls would be implemented by January 15, 1981 to
meet the previous commitment of limiting containment vent and purge valve
operation to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year during reactor operation.
The inspector
reviewed the revised procedure No. 2.2.70 " Primary Containment Atmosphere
System," Revision 15, dated January 15, 1981.
This item remains open
pending a review of the implementation of this procedure change and a
review of the justification for not modifying the two remaining 20 inch
purge inlet valves.
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(0 pen) Deviatio7 (293/80-30-03); Following receipt of the IAL dated
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December _ 28, 1980 (concerning shift staffing and overtime hours) the
Itcensee informed Region I of a disagreement between the current
station policy and the. written understandings-in the IAL. As a result
' of discussions ~ with the inspector, the licensee responded to both
Region I and NRR with a letter dated December 31, 1980 which revised
the licensea's commitments and clarified the original commitments.
The current station policy includes the following:
"The Nuclear Operations Manager or his Deputy's approval must be
obtained in order to exceed the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (in the control room
performing safety related functions) however, under normal circum-
stances,
an operator shall not. exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> performing
safety related control room functions.
Deviation from the above
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restrictions may be authorized by the NOM or higher levels of
management in accordance with published procedures and with
appropriate documentation of the cause."
The inspector reviewed entries made in the W.E. instruction log to all
shifts and a revised station procedure No. 1.1.17 " Control Room
Manning" Revision 9,
which include this criteria.
This item remains open pending review of the licensee's response to
Inspection Report 50-293/80-30.
3.
Operatio.lal Safety Verification
a.
Scope
The . inspector observed control room operations, reviewed selected
logs, ana conducted discussions with control room operators
during the month of January, 1981.
The inspector verified the
operability of selected emergency systems, and verified the
proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the
security perimeter, reactor building, turbine building, process
building auxiliary bay, control room, and vital switchgear rooms
were conducted.
The inspector's observation included a review of
plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, physical
security, housekeeping, and the implementation of radiation
protectirn controls.
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These .eviews and observations were conducte.1 in order to verify
confornance with the Code of Federal Regulatians, the facility
Technica' Specifications, and the licensee's administrative
procedures.
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Findings
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(1) During a tour of the control room on January 7,1981, the
inspector questioned the licensee concerning documentation
for surveillance of the ATWS instrumentation required to be
performed by Technical Specification 4.2.G.
The licensee
determined that the daily instrument checks were not being
performed, immediately verified the operation of these
instruments (reactor vessel level and pressure) and took
action to revise station procedures to include these checks.
The inspector also reviewed documentation provided by the
licensee for the (monthly) functional tests performed on
June 19, 1980, July 25, 1980 and December 31, 1980.
Documen-
tation of (quarterly) trip unit calibrations performed for
the pressure and level instruments on May 11, 1980 and for
the level instruments on July 26, 1980, was also reviewed.
Based on this review, the inspector determined that all the
functional tests and trip unit calibrations required by T.S.
4.2.G had not been performed since equipment installation in
May, 1980. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's statements
and stated thit the appropriate surveillance procedures
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would be revised and that the trip unit calibrations would
be performed prior to the end of January,1981 along with
the monthly functional test.
Prior to the end of this inspection, the inspector verified
that the daily instrument checks were being performed and
that the functional test: and trip unit calibrations had
been performed satisfactorily on January 30, 1981.
The licensee further stated that a detailed review of all
changes required by Amendment No. 42 to the Technical Specifi-
cations would be performed to ensure that there were no
similar instances of required surveillances not being performed.
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Failure to perform the surveillances required by T.S.
4.2.G
is considered an item of noncompliance (293/81-02-01).
(2) During facility tours during the month of January,1981, the
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inspector identified several cases where the requirements of
the licensee's administrative procedures were not being
implemented.
During a tour of the reactor building on January 9,
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1981 the inspector observed a partially used container
of Borax which was unsealed and stored under an open
stairway near the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS).
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Station procedure No. 1.4.9, Revision 5, " Storage,
Handling, and Disposal of Sodium Pentaborate," Section
III, states in part that Borax will be stored in the
station warehouse and that the containers shall be kept
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sealed.
This was brought to'the attention of station management
and actions were taken to seal the partially used
container of Borax.
The licensee further stated that
procedure No. 1.4.9 would be revised to allow storage
of partially used containers of Borax and Boric Acid in
the vicinity of the SLCS, and to ensure appropriate
labeling and controls to prevent misuse.
During a tour of the main control room on January 13,
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1981, the inspector noted that a summary of the overall
operation of the plant was not being entered in the
Station Operations Log at the end af each shift as
required by procedure 1.3.7 Revision 17, " Records,"
Section- III.A.l.a.
The inspector informed the acting Chief Operuting
Engineer who immediately issued instructions to all
shifts to ensure that this requirement was implemented.
During a review of documentation associated with a
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liquid radioactive discharge of the 'C' monitor tank on
January 20 - 21, 1981, the inspector noted that although
the valve lineup had been verified prior to the discharge,
the valve lineup check sheet, OPER-28, had not been
signed by the on-duty Watch Engineer as required by
Section VIII.B. of procedure no. 7.9.2, Revision 9,
" Liquid Radioactive Waste Discharge."
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concerns and
stated that appropriate action would be taken to ensure
that this requirement was fulfilled.
These three examples of failures to implement station procedures
are collectively considered an item of noncompliance (233/81-
02-02).
(3) The inspector reviewed controlled copies of selected station
procedures to ensure that the procedures were reviewed,
approved, and distributed in accordance with the licensee's
administrative controls and regulatory requirements.
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Boston Edison Co. QA Manual Volume II, Operation of
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Nuclear Power Plants, Section 5 (revised August 6,
1979) required that Station quality assurance program
related procedures be submitted to the QA Manager for
review and approval prior to implementation. Station
Procedure No. 1.3.4, Revision 21,-" Procedures," Section
III.D., states that each procedure title page contains
a space for the signature of the QA Manager when applicable.
On January 23, 1981, the inspector identified that the
following station QA Program related procedure revisions
(as listed in Exhibit II-5-6 of the QA Manual) had been
approved and distributed for use at the station without
L?ing approved by the QA Manager.
1.2.1, Revision 9, " Operations Review Committee"
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1.3.4, Revision 21, " Procedures"
1.5.3, Revision 13 " Maintenance Request"
1.3.8, Revision 24, " Document Control"
8.1, Revision 6, " Periodic Surveillance Tests"
1.3.9, Revision 22, " Reports"
1.4.6, Revision 5, " Housekeeping"
The licensee was unable to provide the inspector with
documentation to show that the required revisions and
approval had been performed. The licensee stated that
these procedures would be immediately sent to the QA
Manager for his review and approval, and that an independent
QA audit would be performed to ensure that there were
no additional procedures which did not have the required
review and approval.
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Station Procedure No. 1.3.8, Revision 24, " Document Control,"
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Section III.A, states that controlled copies of selected
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volumes and individual procedures are maintained in accord-
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ance with Attachment 1.3.8 A-1.
Attachment 1.3.8 A-1 refers
to attachment 1.3.8 E-1 for a list of additional
controlled
copies of Volume 2.2, system operation procedures, to be
provided specifically to the Radwaste Control Room operator.
During a tour of the Padwaste Control Room on January 21, 1981,
the inspector identified that the manual of procedures in use
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by the Radwaste Operators contained n':ne (out of eleven)
system operating procedures which had been superceded by later
revisions:
Rev.
Current
Title
In Use
Revision
Procedure
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2.2.33
Makeup-Demineralizer System
4
5
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2.2.71
Radwaste Collection Syst2m
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2.2.72
Clean ~Radwaste System
4
6
2.2.83
Reactor Cleanup System
7
9
2.2.85
Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering
System
7
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2.2.97
Condensate Deminera'lizer' System 10
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2.9.98
Ultrasonic Resin Cleaner
2
3
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2.2.116
Reactor Water Cleanup Sludge
Processing
1
2
2.2.117
Shipment of Spent Resins from
Spent Resin Storage Tank
1
2
The licensee immediately repla:ed the out of date procedures
with up-to-date copies and stat:d that actions would be taken
to ensure proper distribution in the future.
These two examples of failure to properly review, approve, and .
distribute station procedures are considered an item of '
noncompliance (293/81-02-03).
(4) Station Procedure No. 2.3.1, Revision 3,
" General Action (Alcrm
Procedures),"Section III, states that a nuisance or malfunctioning
alarm may be silenced by pulling the alarm card, provided that
a yellow tag is placed on the annunciator window with the follow-
ing information: date, maintenance request number, and Watch
Engineer's name. An entry in the Control Room Log indicating this
action is also required.
Section III further states that an
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erratic alarm because of operation'at the setpoint does not require
a maintenance request number, but is required to be reactivated
when the parameter is no longer on the alarm setpoint.
An entry
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in the Control Room Log Book is required any time these actior.s
take place.
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During a review of control room annunciators on January 14,.1981,
the inspector observed that twenty-two annunciator panel alarms
were silenced by pulling the instrumentation card with no
evidence iof log entries being made
in the Control Room Log Book
and that sixteen of these had no maintenance request numbers. entered
on the yellow tag attached to the alarm window.
The licensee stated that a review of all annunciator. panels
would be performed to identify .the deenergized alarms and
that maintenance requests would be prepared for necessary
repairs by February 15, 1981.
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This failure to properly control and document deenergized
annunciator alarms is considered an item of noncompliance
(293/81-02-04).
(5) The inspector also discussed the status of main control
room annunciators with operators on duty to identify the
cause of the alarm, and with licensee management to review
actions being taken to eliminate unnecessary alarms in order
to provide operators with a " black board" if no problems
exist.
During the month of January, 1981 the licensee had taken
action to corr'ect three annunciators that had been pulled
and to clean ten annunciators that were in the alarm condition.
At the end of this month, however, there were still approxi-
mately twenty-one annunciators that were in the alarm condition
and twenty-one that had been deactivated with the alarm card
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pulled because of erratic (nuisance) conditions or because
the equipm,ent was not in use.
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Although the inspector did not identify any items of non-
compliance with the Technical Specification limiting conditions
for operation for the equipment associated with these annunciators,
concerns were expressea to the licensee's management in the
following areas:
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several annunciators which were in alarm could mask
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other problems associated with common inputs.
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several annunciators were normally in alarm during
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power operation (by design) while no abnormal condition
existed.
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several annunciators had their cards pulled because of
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being close to the setpoint and/or because of inoperability
or unused equipment.
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The licensee stated that it was also their desire to correct
the conditions which caused the annunciators to be in alarm
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or deenergized, and that they had established a program to
1 review each alarm, determine whether maintenance or a plant
-design change was needed, and assign the appropriate priorities
to effect resolution.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's statement and
stated that progress in this area would continue to be
reviewed during further routine inspections.
4.
Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection
a.
Main Stack Sample Pump Inoperable on January 7, 1981
The inspector verified that the licensee's reports met the require-
ments of 10 CFR 50.72 and that the response was in accordance
with~ procedural
and Technical Specification requirements.
Supplemental radiation monitor recordings for the affected times
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were reviewed by the inspector.
No abnormalities were noted.
No
items of noncompliance were identf.fied,
b.
Spent Resin Spill on January 17, 1981
Description of Event
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On January 17,1981 at 11:30 a.m. , water and about 20 cubic
feet of spent resin was accidentally' spilled in the Resin
Addition Room while auxiliary operators were transferring
spent resin from the
'B' Condensate Demineralizer to the
Cation Tank for backwashing.
About half of the spent resin
seeped under a door to the outside area immediately adjacent
to the building where it was contained.
An operator standing
outside the building observed the spill and immediately
notified the control room.
The leak was immediately isolated;
the licensee initiated a Radiation Alert, and notified
local, state, and federal agencies.
Station Management responded to the alarm and evaluated / monitored
further actions. At 3:00 p.m., after the s'ent resin had
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been contained, cleanup was in progress anc the licensee
determined that no significant personnel exposures or off-
site releases had occurred, the Radiation Alert was terminated.
The appropriate agencies were notified.
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Findings
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The inspector arrived at the site at about 3:00 p.m. to
monitor the:11censee's actions and determined that:
The site of the spill had been roped off and barricaded
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with most of the resin placed in several five cubic
feet containers.
Airborne surveys and radiation surveys in the immediate
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area outside the building indicated no significant off-
site release.
Discussions with HP supervisors indicated no internal
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contamination of the Watch Engineer (W.E.) who isolated
the spill.
Surveys of the W.E. following decontamination
(initially externally contamtnated to about 2000 cpm)
showed background activi.ty.
Discussions with station management at the Technical
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Support Center indicated that the cause of the spill
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was a valve lineup error during the last resin addition,
and that actions to preclude recurrence would be taken.
A review of control room logs and completed Radiation
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Emergency procedure notification forms indicated that
the Radiation Alert was reported as reqdired.
Findings resulting from a subsequent special inspection of
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this event will be addressed in Report No. 293/81-04.
c.
Circulating water Piping Corrosion
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On January 18, 1981, the licensee identified a leaking Circulating
Water System outlet pipe from the main condenser No. 1-2 water
box. Investigation revealed general corrosion of the piping,
possibly due to erosion of the internal rubber line.
Nondestructive
examination of the other three outlet piping sections revealed no
similar corrosion. Temporary repairs were made by welding and
providing external reinforcement.
The inspector spot-checked the licensee's sea water radioactivity
sample results taken in accordance with Temporary Procedure No.
81-04 on January 19, 1981, prior to dis' charging.
All samples
were less than minimum detectable activity.
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The inspector will follow the licensee's plans for permar. ant long
term repairs.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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d.
'E' Servica Water Pumo(SWP) Discharge Check Valve
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to
noting chat the 'E' SWP discharge check valve failed to close
fully /ollowing routine system surveillance on January 19, 1981.
The check valve was repaired under Maintenance Request No. 81-29-
1 and returned to service on January 27, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
e.
Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) Trip on January 22, 1981
The inspector verified that the licensee's actions in response to
the trips of 'A'
and 'C' RFP were in accordance with station
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procedures and Technical Specifications.
The licensee's investiga-
tion revealed conservative suction pressure trip setpoints.
The
licensee recalibrated the suction pressure trips and control room
pressure indication and returned the unit to full power on January
23, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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f.
Inadvertent Plant Trip on January 28, 1981
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to an
inadvertent reactor scram from full power January 21, 1981 to
verify that the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met
and that requirements of station procedures and the Technical
Specifications were met.
The licensee's investigation revealed that an isolated level
instrument (used for turbine trip) was returned to service too
quickly, momentarily affecting the RPS instruments which share
common sensing lines.
The inspector reviewed control room
indication and verified that actual level remained normal during
the transient.
The unit was returned to service on January 29,
1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observations
The inspector reviewed Technical Specification (T.S.) required sur-
veillance testing in order to verify that te' sting was performed in
accordance with approved station procedures and met the T.S. limiting
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conditions for operation.
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Portions of testing on the following systems were reviewed:
'A' Standby Liquid Control System Pump out of service for leaking
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gasket (redundant equipment testing and return to service testing).
'E' Service Water System Pump out of service to repair discharge
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check valve (redundant equipment testing and return to service
. testing).
The inspector also observed that several motor operated valves inside
containment were backseated due to previous indications of packing
leakage. .The inspector questioned the licensee concerning assurance
that these valves would meet the T.S. required closing times from the
backseat position. The licensee stated that a station approved
procedure is used to electrically backseat these valves, that all
surveillance testing for required closing times is done from the
backseat position and results to date have shown acceptable closing
times.
The licensee agreed, however, to revise the maintenance
procedure for electrically backseating motor operated valves to include
a record sheet which would be filled out for each valve and to specify
that a caution tag be placed on the valve's control switch indicating
this condition.
The inspector had no further questions.
No items of noncompliance were identified during this review.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to the IE
Bulletins listed below to verify that the actions and responses adequately
addressed the concerns of the Bulletin.
IEB 80-21; " Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Co. Inc."
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Following a request by the inspector the licensee committed to
provide a supplemental response which would address all valve
parts and not just yokes as specified in the Bulletin.
IEB 79-27; " Loss of Non-Class-1-E Instrumentation and Control
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Power System Bus During Operation." The licensee committed to
provide a supplemental response by mid-February, 1981 which would
include a schedule for completion of procedure revisions and/or
design changes.
IEB 80-24; " Prevention of Damaga Due to Water Leakage Inside
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Containment." The inspector reviewed the licensee's internal
memorandum summarizing a review of records from 1973 to the
present for any evidence of leaks inside containment and held
discussions with the staff engineer who performed the review.
One minor leak from a fan cooler in 1973 was identified.
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The inspector also reviewed system drawings to verify that the
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System is a closed
system and that the Service Water and Circulating Water Systems
do not penetrate primary. containment as open systems.
No
further information is required and this bulletin is
considered closed.
IEB 80-17; " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram
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at a,BWR" Supplement 3, Item No. 2 - The licensee modified
computer inputs and revised station procedures to implement
the acceptance criteria for scram discharge instrument volume
limit switch operability as described in the December 5, 1980
letter to Region I.
The inspector verified implementation of
the procedure changes by observations of a reactor scram on
January 28, 1981.
Supplement 4 - The licensee performed single rod scram tests
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on January 4,1981 in accordance with Temporary Procedure No.
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TP 80-87,'as required by item No. 2 of the Supplement.
Positive
indication of level from all 4 transducers was monitored on a
CRT scope and videotaped.
The test results were discussed in
a telephone conversation between the licensee, IE Region I, and
HQ personnel on January 5,1980, and it was concluded that the
The ir.spector also observed
the alarm indication in the control room from each of the four
transducers following a scram on January 28, 1981.
This bulletin remains open pending review of additional actions
required by the licensee including a full test of the CMS, and
implementation of periodic surveillance procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified during the review
of these bulletins.
7.
Status of TMI Action Plan Category 'B'
Items
The inspector reviewed the current status of the licensee's implementa-
tion of selected Category 'B' TMI T.A.P. items. This information was
provided from a review of the licensee's December 15, 1980 response,
a draft version of the licensee's January 1,1981 response, and
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discussions with the licensee's station management.
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The status of each item as provided to the inspector on January 12, 1981
is described below.
' Item
Remarks
I.A.l.l(STA)
Training program has been implemented and degreed
(or equivalent) engineers are on shift.
I.A.1.3
The licensee has noc committed to all the NRC
(Shift Manning)
criteria.
Partial commitments (as specified in
separate correspondence to NRR and IE) will be
implemented via station procedures by January 16, 1981.
I.A.2.1 (4)
The training program has been implemented
(R0/SR0 Training
Program)
I.C.5 (Feedback
The licensee has implemented procedures.
of Operating
Experience)
I.C.6 (Veri fy
The licensee has not yet committed to this item.
Performance of
The licensee plans to review station policy and
Operating
determine by Juae, 1981 to what extent the NRC
Activities)
criteria will be implemented.
II.E.4.2.(Sa)
The licensee considers that the current setpoint
(Containment
meets the criteria.
Pressure Setpoint)
II.E.4.2.(6)
The licensee had not implemented the " Interim
(Containment
Criteria for Containment Vent and Purge Valve Opera-
Purge Valves)
tion; and committed to have procedures in place by
January 15, 1981 to limit operation to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br />
per year.
II.K.3.22a
Procedures to implement this item wou',d be
(RCIC Suction)
prepared by January 15, 1981
III.D.3.3
Upgrading of Iodine monitoring had been implemented.
.
(Inplant Rad.
Monitors)
The inspector had no further questions concerning the status request
and forwarded the information to NRC:IE HQ for review.
4
9
4
15
.
8.
Emergency Procedures for Coping with Anticipated Transients Without
a.
Scope and Acceptance Criteria
The inspector reviewea 'he licensee's Emergency Procedures describing
actions required during ATWS events and other transients resulting
i.1 the inability to shutdown with control rods.
This review was
performed to determine whether the licensee's procedures contained
the following items:
Actions specified in IE Eulletin 80-17, Paragraph 4
-
-
Operator authority, responsibility, and criteria for initiation
of the-Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS), and
The requirement for the SLCS key to be readily available.
-
The following procedures were reviewed:
2.1.6 ' Reactor Scram," Revision 12
-
2.1.5 " Controlled Shutdown from Power," Revision 19
-
5.3.15 " Reactor Isolation Without Scram or Loss of Offsite Power
-
(ATWS)," Revision 4
5.3.2 " Inability to Shutdown with Control Rods," Revision 7
-
2.4.1 " Stuck or Inoperable Control Rod Drives," Revision 3
-
2.4.3 " Rod Drift," Revision 6
-
2.4.4 " Loss of Control
Rod Drive Pumps," Revision 3
-
1.1.1 " Station Organization Responsibilities," Revision 7, and
-
-
2.2.24 " Standby Liquid Control
System," Revision 7.
b.
Findings
The inspector determined that the licensee's procedures contained
the requirements and criteria specified in paragraph a.,
above,
.
"
for coping with ATWS related events.
l
The inspector also discussed these procedures with the Senior
Nuclear Training Specialist who stated that criteria for use of
the SLCS was included as a routine and continuing part of the
licensee's training program.
_
_
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.
-
s
e
16
The inspector has observed the SLCS initiation key readily available
on the main control panel (as required by station procedures)
during daily tours of the controi room.
No unacceptable items were identified during this review.
9.
Licensee' Event Report Followup
The LER listed below was reviewed to determine the sa'fety significance
and whether the reporting requirements of the Technical Specifications
were complied with.
LER 80-94/04T; Anomalous Measurement of Iodine-131 in milk from
-
Plymouth Plantation
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning an apparent error in
the event date and' justification for the conclusion that the measured
concentration was " unquestionably the result of a recent Chinese
weapons test." The inspector also stated that the report was about
four days late.
The licensee acknowledged the. inspector's comments, stated that the
~ event had inadvertently been considered in the category of a 14 day
vice 10 day report and that a revised LER would be issued correcting
the event date and providing further details justifying the conclu-
sions concerning the cause of the increased iodine concentration.
The inspector reviewed the past seven anomalous measurement reports
which had been issued within the required time frame and considered
this an isolated case.
The inspector also reviewed the revised
report LER 80-94/04T-1 and had no further questions.
10.
Personnel and Organization Changes
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of personnel recently assigned
to both on-site and off-site management positions.
This review was
performed to determine whether the education, training, and
experience described in resumes provided to the inspector by the
licensee met the requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971 " Selection and
Training of Nuclear Pover Plant Personnel."
Positions reviewed included the following;
. ._ .
. . - .
. - -
.
1
,
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17
.
.
On-Site
Deputy Nuclear Operations Managers (2)
Staff Assistant - Nuclear Safety
Off-Site
Quality Assurance Manager
,
Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
Nuclear Operations Support Manager
The inspector determined that the qualifications of the personnel
assigned met the requirements of. ANSI N18.1-1971 and had no further
questions.
11.
Survey of Possible Leaking Detector Sources
Because of concerns at another power plant, the inspector was
requested to inform the licensee of the possibility of removable
contamination on certain detectors manufactured by Ion Track
t
Instruments, Inc.
,
On January 22, 1981, the licensee performed a leak test of the sub-
ject . instruments (four of model No. 75, ar.d one model No.c70) with
all Ni-63 source smears indicating less-than minimum detectable
activity (less than 10 pico curies beta / gamma).
The inspector had no further questions and provided this informa-
tion to NRC Region I personnel.
12.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings
were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection
.
scope and findings.
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.
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