ML19351G012
| ML19351G012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1980 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Martin T, Roberts K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351G011 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-80-27, NUDOCS 8102200778 | |
| Download: ML19351G012 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1980027
Text
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50293-800326
50293-800701
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSf0N
50293-800814
h
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
50293-800821
50293-800903
Region I
50293-800912
50293-800922
Report No. 50-293/80-27
Docket No.
50-293
License No.
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Comoany
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02199
Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Inspection at:
Plymouth, Massachusetts
Inspection conducted:
September 1-30, 1980
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Inspectors:
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K. Roberts, Resident Insipector
date signed
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J. Johnson, Senior Res(dent Inspector
date signed
date signed
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Approved by:
a
T. Martin, Chief, Reactor Pr'ojects Section
date signed
No. 3, RO&NS Branch
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 1-30, 1980 (Recort Number 50-293/80-27)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, anannounced inspection of licensee actions on previous
inspection items, an operation safety verification, plant operations (ORC) review,
surveillance and maintenance activities, LER followup, licensee actions in response
to IE Bulletins, and a review of the location of electrical load centers. The in-
spection involved 101 inspector-hours onsite by two resident inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
W. Armstrong, Deputy Nuclear Operations Manager
R. Atkins, Staff Engineer - Electrical
E. Cobb, Chief Operations Engineer
W. Deacon, Senior Electrical Engineer
R. Fairbank, Senior I&C Engineer
R. Machon, Nuclear Operations Manager - Pilgrim Station
C. Mathis, Deputy Nuclear Operations Manager
T. McLoughlin, Compliance Engineer
P.'0'Brien, Construction Management Group Leader
R. Silva, Staff Engineer - Mechanical
P. Smith, Chief Technical Engineer
R. Smith, Chemistry Supervisor
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel including members
of the Operations, Maintenance, and Security staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findinos_
(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/80-25-03): Temperature Effects on R.V. Level
Instrumentation.
The inspector reviewed the calculations / data Iised as a
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basis for the recomendation to recalibrate the reactor vessel level instru-
mentation.
Following this review and discussions with the licensee's staff
engineers, the licensee determined that this event was reportable and sub-
mitted LER 80-32.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (293/80-26-10):
HPCI Exhaust Line Snubbers. The
licensee has continued to experience HPCI exhaust line support problems.
LERs 80-34 and 80-53 describe several events.
On September 18, 1980, the
inspector questioned the licensee concerning plans to resolve the problems
of snubber integrity and transient loads (water hamer) being experienced
during system operation. The licensee replaced two additional (3 Kir',
snubbers nos. S-23-3-36 and S-23-3-37 with higher capacity (20 Kip) snubbers
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on Septerrber 22, 1980.
Plans to resolve thesa problems were also discussed
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during telephone conversations between NRC:IE:HQ D.d Boston Edison Company
NED personnel. The licensee confirmed plans to instrument the HPCI exhaust
line and use the data gathered during system operations to give operational
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loading information.
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The licensee stated that a followup report to the NRC would be provided
detailing the results of the transient analysis and actions to resolve the
problems with water hamer.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/79-21-03): The licensee has taken action to
reduce the number of control room annunciators permanently in alarm. The
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inspector has, however, noted on several occasions where more attention may
be necessary. These coments have been provided to the licensee managment
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and actions initiated to resolve them.
The insoector will continue to
review this area during the routine inspection program.
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(Closed) Follow Item (293/78-SB-01):
The licensee has installed an auto-
matic reactor fead pump trip on high reactor vessel water level (60 inches)
in accordance with PDCR 79-14. This modification is also discussed in a
letter (annual report of modifications) oded October 20, 1980 to the NRC.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
a.
Scope
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
ard conducted discussions with control room operators during the month
of September, 1980. The inspector verified the operability of selected
emergency systems and compliance with limiting conditions for operations.
Tours of the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, Process Buildings,
Security Fence, and Diesel Generator Rooms were conducted to observe
plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,
and excessive vibrations. The inspector also observed implementation of
physical security in the protected and vital areas.
The inspector observed the licensee's action involving a shipment of
radioactive waste on September 18, 1980. This review included the
following items:
Shipping paper documentation; BECO #80-368
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Loading of package (cask / liner) on vehicle
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Radiochemical isotopic analysis.
Liner No. 80-68
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Package (cask) marking / labeling
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Vehicle placarding
Cask certificate / specification
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Radiation / contamination surveys
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Completed procedure check off sheets
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b.
Findin g
(1) During a tour of the ' A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room
on September 4, 1980, the inspector questioned the Watch Engineer
accompanying him concerning the status of a low lube oil alarm
module that was not in operation. The inspector verified that the
problem had already been identified by the licensee during the daily
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EDG surveillance (OPER 27), that maintenance request no. 80-2778 had
been issued to correct the problem, and observed satisfactory level
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of lube oil in the sump (dip stick).
The inspector had no further questions.
(2) During the review of activities involving the radwaste shipment the
inspector questioned the licensee concerning the location of tamper
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seals on the cask. The licensee had already identified that the
seals should be relocated and corrected this item prior to the
shipment.
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No itams of noncompliance were identified.
(3)
During a tour of the control room the inspector questioned the
operators on shift a- to the cause/ condition of various annunciators
that were in alam or raeded repair.
The inspector aiscussed the status of the control room annunciators
with the licensee management oN stated that apparently many
could be corrected. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's
comments and stated that increased attention would be given to
correcting these items.
On subsequent tours of the control room the inspector noted some
improvements in the numbers of annunciators in alarm and will
continue to monitor the licensee's activities in this area during
future routine inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
(4) The inspector reviewed the station's internal problem / event
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ports (Failure Malfunction Repoits - FMRs) Nos. 80-01 through 90-
143.
The inspector questioned the licensee on several reports as
to the justification for not reporting the events to the NRC.
The licensee representative reviewed the list of FMRs in question
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and provided acceptable reasons / justification for not reporting
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each one.
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No items of noncompliance were identified, however, the inspector
will review the licensee's system for issuing, reviewing FMRs and
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reporting events to the NRC in a future inspection (293/80-27-
01).
c.
Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Charcoal Filters
On September 12, 1980, the licensee identified that the methyliodide
laboratory analysis required by T.S. 4.7.B.1.a.6 (for the data stated
in T.S. 3.7.B.1.b.2) had not been performed. This event is described
in LER 80-59. The licen ae took 1 mediate steps to have the sample
taken and analysis performed.
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the justification for
continued operation while preparations were being made to remove a
sample of charcoal and investigate vendors capable of performing the
off site analysis. The licensee stated that the efficiency tests (hydro-
carbon) had nct shown any degradation of the filters.
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The inspector stated that because the licensee had not been able to
account for accurate run times on both trains of charcoal and because
a definite correlation between the hydrocarbon test and the methyliodide
test could not be shown, that additional actions were necessary to justify
continued operation.
Duriig i telephone conversation with NRC.iE: Region I personnel and the
licenree representative on September 19, 1980, the licensee agreed to
take 'he following actions by 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br /> on September 25, 1980:
'(1)
Demonstrated the methyliodide removal capability of the charcoal
absorber banks of each SBGTS train satisfy Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.B.1.b(2); or,
(2)
Declared one SBGTS train inoperable and made the other SBGTS train
operable, the latter with a charcoal absorber tank of known
elemental iodine and/or methyliodide removal efficiency of at least
95%; or,
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Initiated actions to be in cold shutdown in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
These actions are described in a letter from the NRC Region I Director
to Boston Edison Company, dated September 19, 1980.
On September 23, 1980, the licensee notified the inspector of the satis-
factory results of the laboratory analysis performed on September 22 1980.
The inspector subsequently reviewed the documentation of the laborato .
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analysis on samples from both trains of charcoal which showed conformance
with T.S. 3.7.B.1.b.2.
The licensee stated that further action would be taken to accurately
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account for run times on each train, and that surveillance procedures
would be developed for ensuring that this analysis was accomplished
as required in the future.
Pending review of the licensee's action to accurately account for run
unresolved (293/80-27-02)plement surveillance procedures, this item is
times and, develop and im
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4.
Plant Operations - Operations Review Committee
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a.
Scope
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The inspector attended an Operations Review Committee (ORC) meeting no.
'80-103 on September 3, 1980 in order to verify membership and frequency
requirements as stated in the Technical Specifications and to observe
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overall conduct of the meeting.
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During this meeting the ORC reviewed plant nadifications, procedure
changes, licensee event reports, and failure / malfunction reports.
b.
Findings
No items of noncompliance were identified however the inspector ex-
pressed concern over not issuing a meeting agenda prior to the meeting,
and the level of detail of items presented during the meeting.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's statement and agreed to publish
an agenda prior to, and increase the detail of presentations during
future ORC meetings.
The inspector subsequently observed written ORC agenda being issued
and, through conversations with staff members, identified that items
were being presented in greater detail.
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
5.
Surveillance Observations
The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing
in order to verify that the testing was performed in accordance with approved
station procedures and met the Technical Specification limiting conditions
for operation.
Portions of testing on the following systems were reviewed:
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'A', 'B' RBCCW heat exchanger out of service for cleaning (redundant
equipment testing)
'A' EDG fuel line failure - (redundant equipment testing)
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' A' SBGTS fan failure - (redundant equipment testing)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Maintenance / Material Preservation
a.
Salt Service Water Piping
During a routine tour of the Intake Structure on September 5, 1980, the
inspector noted significant corrosion on the Salt Service Water system
piping. The inspector discussed the licensee's long term plans for
preservation of the piping and also expressed his concern about the ex-
tent of the through-wall corrosion.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors concern and stated that an ultra-
sonic examination of the SSW piping would be performed.
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The inspector reviewed results of QC Inspection Report I-80-724
perfonned September 7,1980.
No deficiencies were identified by
the licensee during the UT examination which showed that the piping
wall thickness remaining was between .370 and .435 inches.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
b.
'A' Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Line Repair
During a routine surveillance on September 3, 1980, the 'A'
Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) was shutdown when a fuel line fitting cracked.
The attending operator immediately noted the failure, notified the
control room, and posted a fire watch.
A priority maintenance request (MR 80-5774) was issued and recundant
components tested in accordance with Technical Specification 3.9.B.3.
The inspector verified that the repair was effected by qualified per-
sonnel using certified material, a properly completed work request with
QC concurrence and appropriate safety tagging.
The 'A' EDG was satisfactorily retested and declared operable at 3:15
a.m. on September 4, 1980.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Location of Eiectrical Load Centers
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Because of problems identified at another reactor site, the inspector was
requested to determine whether or not electrical controls for energizing /
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deenergizing valves, which needed to be operated during shutdown to cold
conditions, were located inside primary containment.
The inspector interviewed licensee management, reviewed appropriate electrical
distribution and equipment location drawings and determined that there were
no motor control centers inside the primary containment.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
8.
Licensea Event Report (LER) Followup
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review
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of records, the following LERs were reviewed to detennine whether reporting
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requirements were fulfilled, and that corrective actions had been accomplished
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in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
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-80-32; Drywell Temperature.
The licensee iioted higher-than-design tempera-
tures on the drywell and on the reactor vessel level yarway reference columns.
The licensee recalibrated the reactor vessel level instrumentation in July
1980.
The station management did not report this in an LER because of the
initial belief that the calculations were overly conservative.
Following
discussions with the licensee's corporate engineering staff and a review
of the calculations relating level effects to temperature changes, the in-
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spector stated that this event should be reported in an LER.
(See IE In-
spection Report 293/80-25 and Paragraph 2., Unresolved Item 80-25-03, of
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this Report)
(See Paragraph 2 of this Report - Unresolved
Item 80-26-10)
-80-55; RCIC Steam Suoply Valve.
(M0 1301-62) - During surveillance testing
the valve's thernal overload device generated an alarm. Testing revealed no
failed components, however, the thermal overload device was replaced as a
precaution.
The inspector verified that the overload device provides an alarm
only, and that the motor normal running current is less than the motor's rating.
The licensee is investigating why the thermal overload device is set at a lower
current than the normal running current for the motor.
-80-59; Failure to Sample the SBGT System Charcoal Filters (See Paragraph
3.c)
-80-62; ' A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) - During normal surveillance
testing the fuel line 'T' connector fitting failed. The EDG was secured,
a fire watch initiated, redundant testing performed, an inkind replacement
made, and post repair testing completed.
(See also Paragraph 6.b of this
Report)
No items of noncompliance were identified during the review of these LERs.
9.
IE Bulletin Followup
The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities in response to the IE
Bulletin listed below.
-80-06; Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated June 27, 19801 Para-
graph 2 of the Bulletin requested a schedule for testing to demonstrate that
equipment remains in the emergency mode after removal of the actuating signal
and/or manual resetting. The licensee's response stated that testing would
be completed prior to startup from the next refueling outage.
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Following questioning by the inspector, the licensee provided a revised
schedule for this testing in an internal memorandum dated September 23,
1980.
The following schedule is described:
Action
Completion Date
1.
Review surveillance / tests
September 30, 1980
2.
Write new procedure and develop
March 31, 1981
testing sequence
3.
Initiate testing
fiay 1,1981
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Complete testing program
Prior to startup following
refuel outage no. 5
This Bulletin remains open pending~ completion of the testing program and
review by the NRC.
-80-07; BWR Jet Pump Failure
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated June 19, 1980. This
response describes the inspection performed and replacement of three jet
pump beams.
The licensee also issued LER 80-11 describing the replacement
of the jet pump beams.
During the review of the licensee's surveillance procedure for taking data
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to identify jet pump degradation, the inspector noted that not all the data
required by the Bulletin was being taken. The licensee's procedure only
required individual jet pump d/p to be taken if the recirculation pump speed
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vs. flow showed an anomaly.
The inspector stated that this did not meet the requirements of the Bulletin
and asked for justification for not taking all the required data. The licensee
acknowledged the inspector's statement and stated that the data required by
the Bulletin would be taken, and the surveillance procedure revised accordingly.
This Bulletin remains open pending a review of the revised surveillance pro-
cedure and the implementation thereof.
-80-15; Possible Loss of ENS System with Loss of Off-Site Power
The inspector verified that the correction made to the ring circuit in the NRC
trailer were made as described in the licensee's response dated October 8,
1980.
Tests to date have been made on the ENS extensions in the control room, ECC
trailer, and NRC trailer.
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The licensee plans to install an ENS circuit in the Technical Support
Center (bottom of main guard house) and the new Emergency Offsite Facility
(new trailer comple.x near shorefront road).
This Bulletin remains open pending installation and testing of these phone
circuits.
-80-17; Failure of Control Rods to Fully Insert Durina a Scram at a BWR
The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses to date with resoect to the
B111etin, and supplements, and the actions taken in response to the inspector's
previous connents in this area.
The following items were discussed:
Original Bulletin
Paragraph 2.d - revised response was still pending
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correcting the time for automatic scram.
Paragraph 4 - no documentation of complete training
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concerning procedure revisions was available
Paragraph 6.b - a procedure revision was necessary
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to require all available cooling when torus tempera-
ture exceeded 800F.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's coment and stated that a revised
response would be issued correcting the scram data, full training on pro-
cedure revisions would be completed and documented by October 15, 1980, and
that a procedure re,ision for torus cooling was in progress and expected to
be approved i.ne n n t day.
Supplement 1
Paragraphs B.1,2 - the licensee's response dated
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August 14, 1980, did not adequately address the
concerns stated in the supplement.
The licensee
subsequently submitted resconses dated Seotember 16,
1980 and September 25, 1980, which describe the equip-
ment to be installed (including indications that will
be available in the control room) and that UT examina-
tions would be performed once per shift versus daily
until the permanent equioment was installed.
This Bulletin remains open pending completion of the required actions and
verification by the inspector.
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10.
Possible Excessive Hardening of Stainless Steel Bolts Durina Heat Treatmert,
On September 29, 1980, the inspector informed the licensee of possible ex-
cessive hardening caused by heat treatment and susceptibility of stress
corrosion cracking of stainless steel bolts used on specific Anchor Darling
valves.
flaterials thought to be included may have been ordered under pur-
chase order 6498-M-132 BC.
The licensee was asked to identify any systems where the subject bolts were
installed and whether in place- hardness tests could and would be performed.
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The licensee stated that a review of the subject valves ordered under the
specific purchase order indicated that the 8 inch RCIC system exhaust swing
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check valve was the only one with stainless steel bolts, that the valve is
located in the torus compartment, and that no specific in-place hardness
testing was planned.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's statement and had no further
questions at this time.
11. Unresolved Items
Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are
considered unresolved.
Unresolved items are discussed in paragraphs 2 and
3.c.
12. Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held
with sr.nior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
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