ML19351F126
| ML19351F126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1980 |
| From: | DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012290550 | |
| Download: ML19351F126 (17) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
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Docket No. 50-409
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(Licuefaction (La Crosse Soiling Water
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Show Cause) 6,
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TESTIMONY OF jd3 CE^
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DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE ON THE RISK ISSUE IDENTIFIED IN THE LICENSING 30ARD'S
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F.rMORANDUM AND ORDER OF NOVEMBER 12, 1980 d
Dairyland Power Cooperative (Dairyland or DPC), the holder of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LAC 3WR) and the licensee in the above-captioned proceeding, herewith submits its direct testimony -1/ on the risk issue ident:.fied in the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order Scheduling Evidentiary Hearing And Prehearing Conference, dated November 12, 1980 (November 12 Order), as follows:
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f INTRODUCTION 1
j In its November 12 Order, the Licensing 3 card announced that the purpose of the evidentiary hearing scheduled to commence on December 16, 1980 is:
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This testimony will be authenticated and offered into evidence at the evidentiary hearing scheduled to commence on December 16, l
1980 by a witness panel consisting of Dr. Mysore Nataraj a, l
Dr. Robin McGuire, and Mr. John Parkyn.
Statements of the l
Professional Qualifications of the members of the witness panel are attached hereto.
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-2 (T]o consider the single issue of the risk to the cuolic health anc safety of extending the Fe'ruarv 25, c
19ol operational cate for a cewatering system [as set forth in the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Order to Show Cause of February 25, 1980]
for some specific period of time.
The hacard analysis should assu=e a safe shutcown earthcuake crocucing peak grounc acceleration of 0.122.
Nove=cer 12 Orcer at 3 (emphasis added). 2/
It is Dairyland's position that, assuming a safe shut-down earthquake producing peak ground acceleration of 0.12g, as specified in the Board's November 12 Order, there is no risk to the public health and safety associated with indefinitely extending the proposed February 25, 1981 operational date for a dewatering system, since (1) adequate assurance exists that liquefaction will not occur beneath the key structures at the LACBWR site in the event of the occurrence of an earthquake producing a peak ground accelera-tion of 0.12g, and (2) adequate =easures have been taken to sitigate the effects of liquefaction elsewhere in the vicinity of LAC 3WR even if liquefaction were to occur in the free field at the site in the event of an earthquake producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g.
In any event, the annual probability of the occurrence of an earth-cuake capable of producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g at
,i the LAC 3WR site is such that the public health and safety would not
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In the November 12 Order and the Board's subsequent Order Changing Schedule Of Prehearing Conference and Evidentiary Hearing, dated November 25, 1980 (November 25 Order), the Board also posed a series of questions which the parties should address in their prefiled testimony.
These questions are addressed in Part II of Dairyland's testi=ony.
-3 be endangered by continued operation of LAC 3WR without a de-watering system for at least another year (i.e., until February 25, 1982).
I.
Adequate Assurance Exiscs That Liquefaction Will Not Present A Hazard To The Safe Operation Of LAC 3WR In The Event Of An Earthquake Producing A Peak Ground Acceleration Of 0.122 The soils at the La Crosse site consist pri=arily of sand deposits and hydraulic fill caterial.
A typical soil pro-file at the LAC 3WR si:e based on the soils sa=ples taken at the site shows a 20 foot layer of brown medium to coarse sand below grade, underlain by a 5 foot layer of clayey silt.
The clayey sil: is underlain by an approxi=ately 105 foot thick layer of gray to brown, fine to coarse sand with traces of gravel and rests on bedrock.
When subjected to cyclic loading, such as the loadings t
induced by an earthquake, loose sands of the type found at the LAC 3WR site tend to compact.
This compaction can cause an increase in pore pressure of the sand and a reduction in shear strength if the sand is saturated.
Liquefaction can occur if the induced shear stress due to the vibratory ground motion associated with an earth-l quake exceeds the shear strength of the soil.
An evaluation of the liquefaction potential of any given soil involves the comparison of the induced cyclic shear stress with the available cyclic shear j
strength of the soil.
The induced shear stress for earthquake loadings at a given si:e can be calculated based on the peak ground acceleration l
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-4 and other related factors.
Two methods are cocnonly used to evaluate the cyclic shear strength of a saturated sand deposit.
These =echods are (a) the analysis / testing method involving the taking of soils sa=ples and =odeling the actual site soil conditions in the labora-tory, conducting a series of stress-controlled cyclic triaxial tests on these sa=ples, and establishing the cyclic shear strength for the soil over a range of confining pressures, and (b) the e=pirical
=ethod of correlating standard penetration test (SPT) blow counts (N-values) for the soils at the site in question with the blow counts of soils at sites where perfor=ance during actual earthquake con-dicions have been observed and docu=ented.
Prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause, soils sa=ples had been taken at the LAC 3WR site in connection with the evaluation of the liquefaction potential of the site by Dairyland's consultant Da=es & Moore and earlier soils investigation performed the site, as well as in connection with the construction of at LAC 3WR rad the application to convert DPC's license for LAC 3WR to a full ter= operating license.
Prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause, Dairy-land and Da=es & Moore sub=itted a series of reports to the Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission addressing the liquefaction potential of the soils at the LAC 3WR site utilizing both the analysis / testing =ethod and the e=pirical method for evaluating the cyclic shear strength of these soils.
These reports concluded that the soils in the free field at the LAC 3WR site will not liquefy in the event of an earth-quake with a peak g=ound acceleration of 0.12g.
Dr. E. Bolton Seed
-5 a professor of Civil Engineering at the University of California at Berkeley and an internationally renowned expert on soil liquefaction, concurred in this result.
After the Order to Show Cause was issued, four additional test borings were taken directly beneath several of the plant structures on the LAC 3WR site.
These borings are representative of the soil conditions existing under all of the pile supported structures on the site (i.e., the reactor containment building, the turbine building, and the LAC 3WR stack).
These borings clearly indicate that the density of the soils b aneath the pile-supported structures at the LAC 3WR site is =uch greater than the density of the soils in the free field at the site.
Use of the increased soil density and higher S?T N-values obtained in connection with these additional borings in both the analysis / testing method and the e=pirical nethod for evaluating the cyclic shear strength of soils at the LAC 3WR site de=onstrates that the factor of safety against the occurrence of liquefaction of these soils in the event of an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g is greater than the normally accepted minimum factor of safety.
In Septenber 1980, four = ore test borings were drilled under Dames & Moore supervision.
Two of these borings were taken under the cat foundation of the stack for the coal-fired Genoa-3 plant adj acent to the LAC 3WR site and two were taken in the free field at the Genoa-3 site.
The Genoa-3 stack is the only other
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=ajor structure in the vicinity which could conceivably impact the LAC 3WR plant in the event soil liquefaction occurred.
Dames &
Moore performed additional liquefaction analyses for the soils at, and in the vicinity of, the Genoa-3 stack.
The analyses showed that the factors of safety against the occurrence of liquefaction or near the Genoa-3 stack in the event of an earthquake pro-at ducing a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g were greater than the normally accepted mini =um factor of safety.
The only other safety-related structure on the LAC 3WR supported by piles is the crib house and the site which is not associated underground piping which provide one of the sources of emergency core cooling water to the reactor containment building.
dedicated Dairylan,d has agreed to design and install a redundant safe shutdown system to be housed inside the turbine bu'ilding which of an will provide additional emergency cooling water in the event This dedicated safe shutdown system will eliminate the earthquake.
need to rely on the crib house and associated piping and will mitigate the effects of liquefaction elsewhere on the LAC 3WR site even if l
liquefaction were to occur in the event of an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g.
The present schedule calls for 25, 1981.
Dairyland this new system to be installed by February has already injected concrete grouting into several minor low depth voids which were discovered beneath the concrete slab in the turbin building during the course of the soils investigations.
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The results of the soils investigations and the additional citigative measures which Dairyland is undertaking provide adequate assurance that (1) the soils beneath the reactor containment building, the turbine building, the LAC 3WR stack, and the Genoa-3 stack will not-liquefy in the event of an earthquake producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g at the LAC 3WR site, (2) even if liquefaction were to occur in the free field at the LAC 3WR site in the event of the occurrence of an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g, its effects would be adequately mitigated, (3) the design and installation of a dewatering system for the LAC 3WR site is unnecessary to protect the public health and safety, and (4) there is no risk to the public health and safety associated with indefinitely exrending the proposed February 25, 1981 operational date for the dewatering system contained in the Order to Show Cause.
II.
It Is Extremely Unlikely That An Earthquake Capable Of Producing A Peak Ground Acceleration Of 0.12g At The LAC 3WR Site Will Occur A seismicity study performed by TERA Corporation for Lawrence Liver = ore Laboratory and the NRC Staff in connection with the ongoing Syste=atic Evaluation Program (SEF) concluded that the return period for an earthquake producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.11g at the LAC 3WR plant site is at least 1,000 years and could be larger by an order of magnitude.
Dames & Moore has examdned this probabilistic study per-for=ed by TERA, and the influence of various parameters involved, and has performed its own probabilistic analysis of the extent of
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-8 the seismic hazard at the LAC 3'JR site.
The results of this seismic hazard analysis indicate that the annual probability of a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.12g being exceeded at the LAC 3WR site is approximately 10-4 i.e.,
the return period for a 0.12g earthquake is approxi=ately 10,000 years.
Ranges in estimates of this return period, using reasonable variations in the assu=ptions concerning seismici:y and ground =otion a::enuation, vary from 6,000 to 15,000 years.
Daces & Moore's analysis utilize a seismic hazard codel and standard computer program which are com=only e= ployed in seismic hazard analysis.
The analysis essentially consists of mathe=atically integrating over all possible earthquake =agnitudes and locations, calculating the distribution of peak horizontal ground acceleration the site under investigation for each earthquake =agnitude and a:
location, and evaluating the annual probability that various levels of acceleration will be exceeded at that site.
The major contributors to the seismic hazard at the LAC 3WR site are earthquakes which occur in Northern Illinois and those which J
occur in the so-called " Central Stable Region" of the Uni:ed States.
Ecwever, Daces & Moore's analysis of the seismic hazard at the La Crosse si:e accounts for the observed occurrences of earthquakes not only in the vicinity of the site but also at = ore distant loca-tions such as Anna, Ohio and New Madrid, Missouri.
Earthquakes similar to the July 1980 Marysville, Kentucky event were also accounted for in the analysis.
Several attenuation codels were examined in the determination of return period, including a theoretical
~9 model based on the work of Nuttli (1979) and =odels reported by the TERA Corporation (1980) which are based on attenuation of int ens itia.s.
Because of compensating factors, these attenuation models do not greatly affect the estimates for the return period associated with an acceleration of 0.12g.
The probability analysis was =ade using attenuation equations which estimate seismic ground socion on general alluvium sites.
No specific a=plification of ground =ocion was estimated for the La Crosse site, as the 0.12g peak horizontal ground acceleration used in all the liquefaction analyses has already accounted for the a=plification of motion coming from bedrock to the surface.
Based on the estimated return period for a 0.12g event, the general level of the seismic hazard at the LAC 3WR site is suf-ficiently low that continued operation of the LAC 3WR plant without a dewatering system for at least another year beyond the February 25, 1981 date specified in the Order to Show Cause would not endanger the health and safety of the public.
l CONCLUSION There is little, if any, risk to the public health mad l
l safety associated with indefinitely extending the proposed February 25, 1981 operational date for a dewatering system contained l
in the Order to Show Cause. -3/
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It is estimated that it would take accroxi=atelv six conths for Dair7 and to design and install dewaterin'g system at 1
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the LAC 3WR site if, and when, a determination should ever be j
=ade that such a system would be required.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
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Docket No. 50-409
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(Liquefaction (La Crosse Boiling Water
)
Show Cause)
Reactor)
)
STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF ROBIN K. McGUIRE
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My name is Robin K. McGuire.
I as a Senior Engineer with Dames & Moore specializing in risk analysis, earthquake engineering, and decision analysis.
As such, I have participated in the earthquake risk analyses of various facilities, including LAC 3WR, to determine appropriate levels of seismic ground motion.
Prior to joining Dames & Moore, I was employed by the l
U.S. Geological Survey as a Research Structural Engineer and con-ducted scientific research to advance methods of seismic risk analysis, and developed computer prograc.s to use these =ethods for seis=ic risk evaluation in the United States.
I also conducted l
research to esti= ate earthquake ground motions for calculating the I
response of structures, comparing geophysical methods estimating seismic =ocions with recorded observations of =ocions during earth-quakes.
I hold an S.3.
in Civil Engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an M.S. in Structural Engineering from the I
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I a= a = ember of the Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering of the American Society of Civil Engineers, the Seismic Risk Coc=ittee of Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, and the Seis=ological Society of A= erica.
I a= the author of nu=erous scientific papers in the fields of earthquake engineering and risk analysis, including:
" Effects of Uncertainty in Seis=icity on Esti=ates of Seismic Hazard for the East Coast of the United States," Bulletin. Seis=olo-gical Society of America, and " Seismic Ground % tion Parameters Relations, Journal. Geotechnical Enzineerinz Division, A=erican y,pciety of Civil Engineers.
I a= a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of Colorado and the Coc=cnwealth of Massachusetts.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
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Docket No. 50-409
)
(Liquefaction (La Crosse Boiling Water
)
Show Cause)
Reactor)
)
STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
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OF JOHN D. PA'LKYN My na=e is John D. Parkyn.
I am the Assistant Super-intendent of the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor.
I have served in this capacity for 2-1/2 years, prior to which I was the Operating Engineer for the La Crosse plant for 3-1/2 years.
As Assistant Sup erintendent, I cs responsible for plant operations, maintenance, and training of licensed personnel.
I also assist in the coordina-tion of licensing activities relating to the plant, including the liquefaction show cause proceeding and the ongoing Systematic Evaluation Program being conducted by the NRC Staff.
I have authored or co-authored three technical presenta-tions to the A=erican Nuclear Society on reactor physics and ex-pended fuel storage.
I have also co-authored a U.S. Army technical paper on reactor characteristics.
Prior to my e=ployment with Dairyland Power Cooperative, I served as a licensed operator at the U.S. Army fast burst reactor i
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I also served as an engineer in the operations group at the Wisconsin Electric Company's Point 3each Units 1 and 2.
I held an AEC Senior Reactor Operator's license on Point Beach Units 1 and 2.
I hold an NRC Senior Reactor Operator's license on the La Crosse Soiling Water Reactor.
I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Wisconsin and am a Registered Professional Nuclear Engineer in the State of California.,
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM.GSSION i
In the Matter of
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DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
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Docket No. 50-409
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(Liquefaction (La Crosse Boiling Water
)
Show Cause)
Reactor)
)
STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATICNS OF MYSORE S. NATARA.JA My name is Mysore S. Nataraj a.
I am a Senior Engineer at Dames & Moore specializing in soil mechanics, earthquake engineering, and geotechnical inscrdmentation and have held that position since 1973.
As such, I have been responsible for the design, execution, and/or =anagement of a wide variety of projects involving these specialities throughout the world, including the evaluation of the seismic conditions and liquefaction potential of nuclear power plant sites.
I have supervised the various-Dames &
Moore soils investigation programs and analyses relating to the evaluation of the liquefaction potential of the LAC 3WR site.
Prior to =y enployment with Dames & Moore, I was a Teaching Fellow and Research Assistant at the University of Pittsburgh from 1968 - 1973 and a Teaching Fellow and Research Assistant at the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay from 1965 - 1968.
-2 I hold a Ph.D. in Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering from the University of Pittsburgh (1973), a Master of Technology in Soil Engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay (1967), and a 3.S. in Civil Engineering from Bangalore University, India (1965).
I am a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of New York and the Coc=onwealth of Massachusetts and a member of the A=erican Society of Civil Engineers and the Internacional Society of Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering.
I as the author of numerous technical publications, in-cluding:
(1) " Ocean Wave-Induced Liquefaction:
A Si=plified Procedure," Proceedings of the International Sv=cosium on Soils Under Cvelic and Transient Loadine (Swansea, U.K.:
January 1980);
(2) " Liquefaction Potential at an Ocean Outfall in Puerto Rico,"
Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers Soeciality Conference on Soil Dynamics and Earthouake Engineering (June 1978);
and (3) " Liquefaction Potential of a Man-Made Fill,"
Proceedings of the Central American Conference on Earthouake Engineering (San e
Salvador:
January 1978).
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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DAIRYLAND ?OWER C00?ERATIVE
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Docket No. 50-409
)
(Liquefaction (La Crosse Boiling Water
)
Show Cause)
Reactor)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Service has on this day been effected by personal delivery or first class =dil on the following persons:
Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chrm.
Dccheting & Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Ralph S. Decker Board Panel Route 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Box 190D Commission Cambridge, Maryland 21613 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. George C. Anderson Atomic Safety and Licensing Department of Oceanography Appeal Board University of Washington U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Seattle, Washington 98195 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
1
-2 Steven Burns, Esquire Office of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co=cission Washington, D.C.
20555 Karen Cyr, Esquire Office of Ex'ecutive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc=ission Washington, D.C.
20555 Richard Shisshak Plant Superintendent Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Frit: Schubert, Esquire Staff Attorney Dairyland Power Coopera:ive 2615 East Avenue, South La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Coulee Region Energy Coalition F. O. Box 1583 La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Aten:
Anne Morse Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Frederick M. Olsen, III 609 N. 11th Street La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601
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- 0. S. Hiestand s
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Dated:
December 5, 1980 i
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