ML19351F074
| ML19351F074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1980 |
| From: | Gehr A, Hourihan P, Mcgurren H AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD), SNELL & WILMER |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17296B149 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012290430 | |
| Download: ML19351F074 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
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Docket Nos. STN 50-528 PANY, et al., Palo Verde
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STN 50-S29 Nuclear Generating Station,
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STN 50-530 Units 1, 2 and 3.
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STIPULATION OF PARTIES REGARDING CONTENTIONS AND DISCOVERY On August 11, 1980, Patricia Lee Hourihan sub-
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mitted a timely petition for leave to intervene and a re-quest for hearing in the above-captioned matter for herself as well as on behalf of two other persons, Kevin Dahl and Christopher Shuey.
On November 21, 1980, Ms. Hourihan filed a Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Conten-tions (Supplenent) setting forth 28 contentions.
On December 2, 1980, a prehearing conference was held before this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) to consider the petition for leave to intervene and to per-mit identification of the issues in this proceeding.
At the prehearing conference, the Board orally granted the petition to intervene as to Ms. Hourihan, thereby making her a full party to this proceeding.
(Ms. Hourihan, hereinafter will be referred to as "Intervenor").
CONTENTIONS During the course of the discussion of Inter-venor's contentions at the preheeling conference, Intervenor
'O12290 O s
withdrew Contentions Nos. 19, 24, 25 and 27.
With respect to the remaining contentions, it was agreed by the parties--
Intervenor, the Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Staff) and Joint Applicants--that they would confer on De-cember 9-10, 1980, for the purpose of arriving at a stipu-lation.
The parties did meet on the stated dates and agreed as hereinafter set forth.
The parties stipulate that the contentions set forth in Appendix A attached hereto are valid contentions.
By such stipulation, however, neither the Staff nor the Joint Applicants admit any of the factual assertions con-tained in such contentions or their bases.
The parties also stipulate as to the wording of the contentions set forth in Appendix B attached hereto, although, as to such conten-tions, the Staff or Joint Applicants, or both, object or re-serve their respective rights to object to their acceptabil-ity.
Pursuant to the agreement reached at the December 2, 1980, prehearing conference, Staff and Joint Applicants will file, on or before December 19, 1980, their respective re-sponses to the contentions set forth in Appendix B.
Conten-tions Nos.
3, 9,
10, 15, 16, 20, 21, and 22 from Inter-venor's November 21, 1980, Supplement are hereby withdrawn.
As to Contention No.13, the Joint Applicants and Staff further stipulate that they will not contest on grounds of untimeliness any contention (s) filed by Inter-venor respecting the revised emergency plan to be filed by -
Joint Applicants if such contention (s) is (are) filed within thirty (30) days after the filing and service of such re-vised emergency plan.
DISCOVERY The parties also stipulate to the following dis-covery schedule.
Event Time (daysl 1.
Service of Board's postconference 0
order ruling on Intervenor's con-tentions.
2.
Service by parties of written 30 interrogatories 3.
Filing of objections to written 45 interrogatories.
4.
Service of responses to written 60 interrogatories.
5.
Filing of motions to compel 75 respecting responses to written interrogatories.
6.
Filing of responses to motion 90 to compel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of December, 1980.
SNELL & WILMER l
By l
Arthur C. Gehf f
Charles A. Bischoff 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Attorneys for Joint Applicants I
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A (U 2C DMEkkAL-
- Patricia Lee Hourihan 6413 S. 26th Street j
Phoenix, Arizona 85040 1
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Cr n.,V f o Hepry'3. McGurren i.,
Counsel for NRC Staff b
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I APPENDIX A Contentions Stipulated To Be Acceptable CONTENTION NO. 1 (Combines Contentions Nos.
1, 2, 4, and 11 of Intervenor's Supplement).
Applicants will fail to maintain annual releases of radioactive materials from the normal operation of PVNGS "within the levels set forth as numeral guides for design objectives in Section II" as required by Section IV of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix I.
(Safety).
EXPLANATION:
1.
The Applicants have, in their radiological dose evaluation for routine reactor operation, used the models and data discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.109.
a.
Transfer factors listed in Regulatory Guide 1.109 and used to predict nuclide transfer to humans through various plant and animal pathways generally are lower than or at the low end of the values expressed in the scientific literature.
b.
The use of such factors and other data provided in the Guide may underestimate dose equivalents to the populations by factors ranging from 10 to 10,000 per unit.
Designation in parentheses following each contention specifies whether the contention is to be regarded as a
" safety" contention or an " environmental" contention.
2.
The exclusive use of (1) the ground level re-lease model for routine emissions limits maximum concentra-tions of gaseous effluents to points nearer to the site boundary, and (2) the exclusion of an accompanying elevated release model prevents realistic quantification of effluent concentrations at points farther from the site boundary.
3.
The projected annual release of 2,300 curies per PVNGS unit of gaseous effluents is unrealistically low given (1) the lack of operational experience with CE reac-tors larger than 850 MWe, (2) the less-efficient operational history of pressurized water reactors larger than 1,000 MWe, and (3) the operational history of 16 PWRs which in 1977 re-leased curie-quantities of noble gases in excess (by ranges from percentages to orders of magnitude) of those projected for each unit of PVNGS, and that five of those 16 plants are rated at or above 845 MWe.
4.
The Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences re-portedly now favors the so-called " super-linear" hypothesis of dose-response theory for the actinide isotopes, and an ever-growing number of scientists are supportir.g it for all nuclides.
CONTENTION NO. 5 (Revision of Contention No. 5 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
Applicants will not have an assured supply of usable treated municipal effluent for cooling purposes for A-2
Unit 3 of PVNGS during months of peak reactor need for the first five years of operation.
(Environmental).
EXPLANATION:
1.
In separate documents in 1979, both the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers questioned the availability of treated effluent to PVNGS from the 91st Avenue Sewage Treatment Plant, listing a number of mitigating factors which could, in concert, act to reduce the amount of effluent available for peak cooling needs at PVNGS.
In its response to the NRC concerning the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for proposed PVNGS Units 4 a potentially major problem and 5,
the EPA said, exists within cooling reactors 4 and 5 (and perhaps #3).
See also EPA's final EIS for the Maricopa Associa-tion of Governments Point Source Metro Phoenix 208 Waste-water Management Plan (July 1979), which includes, as Appen-dix C, a report by the Phoenix Urban Study Office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on wastewater flows from the l
91st Avenue and 23rd Avenue treatment plants versus existing commitments for treated effluent from these plants.
Figure C-3 of this latter document shows that l
under the high estimate of peak monthly reactor needs, ef-fluent availability from 91st Avenue alone would meet only about 50 percent of the needs of Unit 3, in 1986, thereby restricting use of the reactor to one-half of its designated electrical capacity.
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The report also points out that other factors would reduce by some unknown amount the available effluent to PVNGS.
These include seepage losses in the effluent transmission pipeline from west of the 91st Avenue plant to the nuclear complex, unacceptable water quality and peak seasonal need conflicts with area agriculture.
Buckeye Irrigation District's (BID) prior commit-ment of 30,000 acre-feet historically has been met on an an-nual average basis, with use higher in summer months when peak demands for PVNGS will be greatest.
Should BID be forced to reduce summer irrigation, the economic impact to the agricultural areas it serves will be extensive.
Applicants have contended that the proposed expan-sion of the 91st Avenue plant will more than offset any re-duction in effluent availability to PVNGS caused by certain unquantified, mitigating factors.
The proposed expansion has been in limbo because of funding for several years and questions still exist as to when the plant will be enlarged, however.
Even if funding is found, though, the Corps has estimated that only 10 million gallons per day (mgd) of the expected expansion of 30 mgd will be available in 1986 when Unit 3 is schedule to go on-line.
Applicant also is counting on flows from the 23rd Avenue treatment plant.
However, Mcdonald Farms uses a por-tion of the current 36.5 mgd from the 23rd Avenue plant and is believed to have prior rights to a large portion of the A-4
remaining water.
Both the EPA and the Corps insist that the exact quantity of this commitment is unknown and probably will be resolved only in a lengthy court battle.
2.
Applicants have relied on population projec-tions from Phoenix-area cities which are known to be in-flated over what is considered realistic.
Consultants have insisted that population projections in the MAG 208 study are more realistic, taking into account voluntary conversa-tion methods by the public and an ever-decreasing rise in population growth.
3.
It has been reported that the EPA recently suspended the requirement that the 91st Avenue plant achieve 30 mg/l Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) on a monthly aver-age.
Should the requirement not be mandated by the time PVNGS opens, effluent quality at the nuclear plant will be much lower than expected.
CONTENTION NO. 7 (Combines Contentions Noc. 7 and 12 of In-tervenor's Supplement).
The Applicants have failed to demonstrate their financial qualifications as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.33(f) and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix C, because they have inade-quately figured decommissioning costs.
(Safety).
EXPLANATION:
The basis for this contention is as set forth for Contention No. 12 in the Supplement.
A-5
CONTENTION NO. 8 (Revision of Contention No. 8 of Inter-4 venor's Supplement).
The base mats for Units 1 and 2 are not structur-ally able to support the systems and equipment inside con-I tainment, because some of the concrete slump tests performed I
by Engineering Testing Labs for Units 1 and 2 were falsi-fied.
(Safety).
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APPENDIX B Contentions Disputed As To Acceptability CONTENTION NO. 6A (Revision of Contention No. 6 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
The Applicants have not analyzed the financial con-sequences of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram ( ATWS) event which can result in a Class 9 accident.
[By this con-tention, Intervenor is not limiting the area of the conten-tion to only ATWS events that could lead to Class 9 acci-dents.]
(Environmental).
EXPLANATION:
Recent Commission minutes discuss the economic im-pact of a serious ATWS accident and point to the benefit of installing ATWS-mitigating measures before operation.
On-site property damage resulting from an ATWS event was esti-mated at $200 million, while off-site property damage was estimated between $100 million to $1 billion.
The estimated on-site property damage probably is unrealistic, however, considering that the LOCA at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (which was a much less serious accident than the postulated ATWS) has caused on-site damage estimated at more than $1 billion.
Estimated cost of ATWS improvements to CE units has been l
Designation in parentheses following each contention l
specifies whether the contention is to be regarded as a l
" safety" contention or an " environmental" contention.
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f placed at $1.8 million, which is greater than the cost of improvements to Westinghouse reactors, but less than the cost of improvements to B&W or GE systems.
Still, the $1.8 million estimate of cor;ective measures is far less expen-sive than the NRC-estimated on-site damage cost.
But even more alarming than the costs of on-site or off-site damage from an ATWS accident was the $40 bil-lion, single-unit estimate of replacement costs for elec-tricity.
Assuming that an ATWS event occurs at one of the three PVNGS units, replacement costs would be expected, con-servatively, to total more than $800 million over a 30-year period, assuming that the plant was shut down permanently, that it had operated at a 60-percent capacity factor, that nuclear-generated electricity averaged five cents per kilowatt-hour and that inflation doubled the cost of re-placement power every ten years.
Added to this figure would be another $700,000 for replacement power since the re-maining two units would be shut down at least for one year pending an investigation and review.
CONTENTION NO. 6B (Revision of Contention No. 6 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
The Applicants have not incorporated measures de-signed to mitigate a postulated ATWS event.
(Safety).
EXPLANATION:
1.
Absent the generic resolution of an Unre-solved Safety Issue (USI), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-B-2
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1 mission has recommended that an individual applicant for an operating license demonstrate how the design of its proposed facility will either resolve a USI or operate unaffected by such an Issue.
In a more recent decision, the NRC found that absent a resolution of a USI, the probability of the overall risk from an accident involving a USI must be shown
-6 to be less than 10 per reactor year.
ATWS, or the failure of control rods to properly insert into the reactor core following either automatic or manual scram commands, is a specific and potentially serious USI which has been the sub-ject of several USAEC and USNRC studies.
The NRC staff re-pertedly is in the process of rule-making regarding ATWS and has suggested tentative, short-term changes in reactors in 1981 and 1982 with requirements for resolution scheduled for 1984.
2.
While not a design-basis accident, ATWS is a significant problem for Combustion Engineering (CE) reactors.
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Commission minutes have described potential impacts from ATWS accidents in CE systems as " moderate".
The NRC's latest document on ATWS places the probability of such an accident
-5 at 10 per reactor year; however, more recent commission
-3 findings suggest the probability ranges between 10 to
~4 10 owing largely to the June 28, 1980, ATWS accident at Brown's Ferry Unit 3 and the increasing' number of design-basis transients in operating American nuclear reactors.
l Since there is no operational experience for CE reactors B-3
larger than 850 MWe, it is quite possible that the large PVNGS units proposed (1270 MWe each) will experience greater frequency of various types of transients and correspondingly greater opportunity for control rod-insertion failure.
Chapter 7 of the Applicants' FSAR, regarding the Reactor Protective System, does not include mechanical pro-visions for reducing the likelihood of an ATWS accident.
The Applicants cannot plead ignorance as a reason for omit-ting these items since NUREG-0460, Vol.
4, contains recom-mendations for ATWS-mitigating equipment for CE reactors.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reportedly has accepted " Alternative 3A",
with modifications, while the Commission minutes referenced above also have advanced the same recommendation, with other features, including limiting peak pressures and improving scram systems.
CONTENTION NO. 14 (Revision of Contention No.14 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
The Applicants have failed to show the effects of cumulative radiation on the Primary System of the PVNGS and the likelihood that these effects will not shorten the life-span of the plant.
(Environmental).
CONTENTION NO. 17 (Same as Contention No. 17 of Intervenor's Supplement).
The Applicants have failed to adequately consider the report on " Spent Fuel Heat Up Following The Loss of B-4
Water During Storage" prepared by the Sandia Laboratories for the NRC in September of 1978 (SAND 77-1371).
(Safety).
CONTENTION NO. 18 (Combines Contentions Nos. 18 and 26 of Intervenor's Supplement).
The Applicants have not adequately figured the costs and impacts of storage or disposal of spent fuel and other radioactive wastes, for the term of the operating li-
- censes, in the cost / benefit analysis.
(Environmental).
EXPLANATION:
The Applicants have shown that they have the capa-bility to store spent fuel and other radioactive wastes for only 10 years whereas the operating license is to be for 40 years.
CONTENTION NO. 23A (Revision of Contention No. 23 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
The Applicants have not adequately considered the effects of on-site sabotage.
(Safety).
EXPLANATION:
With the Barrier Penetration Handbook, which pro-vides a step-by-step procedure for sabotaging a nuclear power plant, available to the public through Arizona State University, the University of Arizona and public libraries, the Applicants have not shown they are not susceptable to sabotage.
B-5
CONTENTION NO. 23B (Revision of Contention No. 23 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
The Applicants have not adequately considered thc economic cost effects of off-site sabotage.
(Environmental).
EXPLANATION:
Section 3.9.1 of the PVNGS ER-OL sets forth the length of the PVNGS transmission lines and provides a map cf the transmission line routes.
History has shown the towers can be toppled quite easily with a tractor.
APS has esti-mated the cost of replacement of each tower to be $300,000.
CONTENTION No. 28 (Revision of Contention No. 28 of Inter-venor's Supplement).
The cost of PVNGS outweighs the cost of alterna-tive sources of energy.
The Applicants have not suffi-ciently met the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 51.21.
The Appli-cants have failed to show the alternatives available to meet Arizona's energy needs.
(Environmental).
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