ML19351E672
| ML19351E672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012100629 | |
| Download: ML19351E672 (1) | |
Text
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M TRAL FILES g ** "%'.'o, UNITiD STATES LPOR e
NUCLEAR REGU.ATORY COMMISSION TIC f..,
7 ;E i.,%-d nacion av NSIC 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. suite 1000
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ARUNGTON. TEXAS 76011 STATE November 6,1980 Docket No.
50-298 M
N Nebraska Public Power District D
ATIN:
J. M. Pilant, Director "I
c-Licensing & Quality Assurance S
.o
- .i Post Office Box 499-d lj n
Columbus, Nebraska 68601
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Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21 requires your action with reged to your power reactor facility holding an operating license or a construction permit.
Should you have questions concerning this bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,f t,
i Q $i (L l Karl V. Seyfrit//
Director J
Enclosures:
1.
List of Recently issued IE Bulletins cc:
L. C. Lessor, Superintendent Cooper Nuclear Station Post Office Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska 68321 80121006#7 q)
SSINS No.:
6820 Accession No.:
8008220246 UNITED STAlis NUCLEAR REGULATORY NMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AN) ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21 November 6, 1980 Page 1 of 3 VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPANY, INC.
Descriotion o'f Circumstances:
On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company notified IE Region I that cracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system at their Susquehanna steam Electric St-,on.
The potential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant, safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby all RHR functions could be simultaneously lost.
Specifically, the cracks were located in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to yoke vertical section interface.
An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performed by the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company.
They concluded that the cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yoke material not having the proper mechanical properties.
Purchased as ASTM A-216, Grade WCB material, the a.cual valve yoke material had tensile and yield strengths below the minimuut values listed in the ASTM material specification.
The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., of Newark, New Jersey.
The foundry is no longer in business.
Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of the othe. valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves at Susquehanna.
To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been, tested.
Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly below the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardt, ass to tensile strength included in ASTM Specification A-370.
These additional valve yokes are on a wide range-of valve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed with Malcolm over a period of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975.
Thus, it appears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to one short time period.
Anchor Darling intends to replace the defective valve yckes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear power plants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm have been proyided.
Since Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staff cannot determine directly if Malcolm has provided valve parts to other valve manufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.
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- IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980 Page 2 of 3 Actions To Be Taken by Addressees:
For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the following actions are_ required:
1.
Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
If no valves are identified as having potentially faulty material, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
2.
Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall immediately visually inspect for cracks all normally accessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactor operation).
3.
Licensees or permit holders having active safety-rel 'id valves with potentially faulty _ material shall identify the manufacturer (s) of these valves and either:
a.
Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanical properties in accordance with the ASTM material specification; if such is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below.
b.
Replace the defective materials and/or valves.
c.
Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and the basis for such actions.
For plants with an operating license, the results of your initial determination (item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, your planned action (item 3), and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
For plants with a construction permit, the results of your initial determination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer (s), your planned action (item
- 3) and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall be reported within sixty days of the date'of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Offica with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve the affected valve' manufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
1 IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980 Page 3 of 3 If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980.
Approval was given under a blanket clea.ance specifically for identified generic problems.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-21 November 6, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
80-19 Failures of Mercury-Wetted 7/31/80 Ali nuclear power Matrix Relays in Reactor facilities having Protective Systems of either-an Operating Operating Nuclear Power License (OL) or a Plants Designed by Combus-Construction Permit (CP) tion Engineering 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Nisutral Control your region having Switches an Operating License (OL) or a Construction Permit (CP)
Sup. 3 failure of Control Rods 8/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding at a BWR Operating Licenses (OLs) or Construction Permits (cps) 79-26 Boron loss from SWR 8/29/80 All BWR power facilities Rev. 1 control blades with an Operating License (OL) 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 sealed licensees sources connectors Sup. 2 Environmental Qualifica-9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-018 tion of Class IE facilities with an Equipment Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
Sup. 3 Environmental Qualifica-10/24/80 All power reactor to 79-108 tion of Class IE facilities with an Equipment Operating License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP)
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