ML19351E666
| ML19351E666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Koester G KANSAS GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012100613 | |
| Download: ML19351E666 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/C REGION IV k,
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 1000 p
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011
.g November 6, 1980 3
i-In Reply Refer To:
RIV t., A 12 Docket No. STN 50-482/IE Bulletin No. 80-21
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Kansas Gas & Electric Co.
O Attn: Mr. Glenn L. Koester Vice President-Nuclear Post Office Box 208 Wichita, Kansas 67201 Gentlemen.
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21 requires your action with regard to your power reactor facility holding an operating license or a construction pennit.
Should you have questions concerning this bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, rd r
g-Karl V. Seyfrit [
Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of Recently issued IE Bulletins cc: w/ enclosures Messrs. Nicholas A. Petrick, SNUPPS D. T. McPhee, Kansas City Power and Light Company Gerald Charnoff, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge E. W. Creel, Kansas Gas and Electric Company b
80121 o oW3
SSINS No.:
6820 Accession No.:
2008220246 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21 Ncvember 6, 1980 Page 1 of 3 VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPANY, INC.
Description of Circumstances:
On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company notified IE Region I that cracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system at their Susquehanna Stern Electric Station.
The potential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant, safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby als RHR functions could be simultaneously lost.
Spe ffically, the cracks were located in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to yoke vertical section interface.
An analysis and evaluation of the most severe'.y cracked valve yoke was performed by the lve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Vahe Company.
They concluded that the cracking was not due to casting defects, out rather was due to the yoke material not having the proper mechanical properties.
Purchased as ASTM A-216, Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke naterial had tensile and yield strengths below the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.
The cracked valve yokes were all cast by ' alcolm Foundry Company, Inc., of A
Newark, New Jersey.
The foundry is no longer in business.
Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of the other valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves at Susquehanna.
To date, approximately Salf of the valve yokes have been tested.
Of those tested, over E5 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significant?y below the appropriate value cbtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM Specification A-370.
Tt.ese additional valve yokes are oli a wide range of valve sizes and are from a number of.different purchase orders pidetd with Malcolm over a period of at least ten months during 1974 ar.d 1975.
Thus, it appears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to one short time period.
Anchor Darling intends to replace the defective valve yokes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear power plants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm have been provided.
Since Malcolm Foundry Compe.ny, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staff cannot determine directly if Malcolm has provided valve parts to other valve l
manufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.
IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980 Page 2 of 3 Actions To Be Taken by Addressees:
For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the following actions are required:
1.
Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
If no valves are identified as having potentially faulty material, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
2.
Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall immediately visually inspect for cracks all normally accessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactor operation).
3.
Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer (s) of these valves and either:
a.
Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanical properties in accordance with the ASTM material specification; if such is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below.
b.
Replace the defective materials and/or valves.
c.
Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and the basis for such actions.
For plants with an operating license, the results of your initial determination (item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, your planned action (item 3), and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
For pl?nts with a construction permit, the results of your initial determination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer (s), your planned action (item
- 3) and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall be reported within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve the affected valve manufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980 Page 3 of 3 If you desire additional information regarding thi-s matter, please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225'(R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980.
Approval
~
was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
c - --_
IE Bulletin No. 80-21 November 6, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
80-19 Failures of Mercury-Wetted 7/31/80 All nuclear power Matrix Relays in Reactor facilities having Protective Systems of either an Operating Operating Nuclear Power License (0L) or a Plants Designed by Combus-Construction Permit (CP) tion Engineering 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control your region having Switches an Operating License (0L) or a Construction Permit (CP)
Sup. 3 Failure of Control Rods 8/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding at a BWR Operating Licenses (0Ls) or Construction Permits (cps) 79-26 Boron Loss from BWR 8/29/80 All BWR power flailities Rev. 1 control blades with an Operating License (OL) 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 sealed licensees sources connectors Sup. 2 Environmental Qualifica-9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-018 tion of Class IE facilities with an Equipment Operating License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP)
Sup. 3 Environmental Qualifica-10/24/80 All power reactor to 79-108 tion of Class IE facilities with an Equipment Operating License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP)
Enclosure