ML19351A173
| ML19351A173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1981 |
| From: | Greger L, Hueter L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351A171 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-81-08, 50-254-81-8, 50-265-81-08, 50-265-81-8, NUDOCS 8106260184 | |
| Download: ML19351A173 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000254/1981008
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U.S.
F'.' CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-254/81-08; 50-265/81-08
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Docket Nos. - 50-254; 50-265
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station,' Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At: Quad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL
Inspectfan Conducted: May 4-8, 1981
S.L'n$vlp
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Inspector:
L. J. Hueter
S t' W&/M
Approved By:
L. R. Greger, Acting Chief
4 - # - 9/
Facilities Radiation
Protection Section
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Inspection Summary:
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Inspection on May 4-8 1981 (Reports No. 50-254/81-08; 50-265/81-08)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee's
actions in response to Health Physics Appraisal significant findings
and items of noncompliance, and inplant iodine sampling and analytical
capabilities. The inspection involved 43 inspector-hours onsite by
one NRC inspector.
".es ults : No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted.
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R.' Carson, Lead _ Health Physicist-
.E.
Cole,' Training Instructor
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- R. Flessner, Technical Staff Supervisor
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Gerner, ' Assistant Superintendent, - Administrative Support
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- J. Heilman, Quality Assurance Engineer
- N.' Kalivianakis,_ Plant Superintendent
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-T. Kieth, Health Physicist
- T. Kovach,_ Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor
P.' Skiermont, Health Physics Foreman-
W. Walschot, Staff Assistant
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- N. Chrissotimos, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- S. DuPont, NRC Resident Inspector
The inspector also contacted other plant staff pers'onnel.
- Denotes those.present at the exit inteiriew.
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' General'
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This inspection,1which began about 12.90 noon on May 4, 1981, while
both Units 1 and 2 were in normal operation, included tours of the
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control room, service building, turbine building, reactor building,
- and the small sample / monitor building at the base of the stack.
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Housekeeping continues to show improvement. Radiological controls
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' appear to'be generally adequate.
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3 .' ' Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Infraction (50-265/80-22): Failure to identify and control
access to a high radiation area near the sample hood on the 647'
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level of the Unit 2 reactor building and failure to control access
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(improper temporary ladder storage) to a posted high radiation area
above the Ucit 2 accumulators. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
response dated November 12, 1980, and toured the~ areas involved. The
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ladder was promptly removed and workers who had selected the temporary
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storage location were, according to licensee personnel, instructed
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to be more attentive to area posting. After initial attempts failed
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to remove the source of activity in overhead dryer / separator storage
pool drain lines near the sample hood, shielding and fencing were
erected to prevent access to the high radiation area. The area was
properly posted. Subsequently, decontamination connections were
added to the pipe run, and the line was succes'sfully flushed.
In
addition, Revision 2, (November 1980) to procedure QRS 800-S4,
" General Reactor Building Surveillance for Startup" added the
dryer / separator storage pool drain piping location to those loca-
tions to be surveyed during startup following a refueling outage.
The licensee's corrective actions appear adequate.
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-(Closed) Infraction (50-254/80-20; 50-265/80-22): Failure to
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maintain quarterly calibration frequencies on some exposure rate
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. instruments located in boxes of emergency supplies, and failure to~
limit'the count. rate to'3000 counts per minute on reusable laundered
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protective clothing. The. licensee promptly repisced the instruments:
in ques' tion with calibrated instruments. In addition, radiation
-protection management now conducts a nocthly inventory check and
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calibration review of these instruments. Documentation of this
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. activity is' included in Revision 7 (December-1980) of surveillance
form QTP-010-S4c This review has also been made'a part of the
- Technical Staff Support Surveillance' Program. Review:of -records
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confirmed conduct of the surveillance activity.
Inspection of the-
emergency' supplies, by the inspector, showed all of these instruments
to be in calibration. A weekly spot check of laundered and monitored
protective clothing has been implemented to verify conformance with
the allowable. count rati specified in station radiation control-
procedures for reusable protective clothing. This weekly check is
documented on the RCT Shift Check List-and has been'made a part of
' the Technical Staff Support Surveillance Program. Review of records
for-March and April -1981 confirmed conduct- of this surveillance
activity. In addition, stationmen (users of the laundry monitor)
were given sper.ial training in early January 1981 on proper use of
~the laundry acnitor. However, the inspector learned that no provision.
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has' been made to provide this training to new stationmen who m4y be
assigned'this work activity. .This matter was discussed at the exit
interview and the licensee committed to providing this training to'
stationmen before assignment to this duty. The licensee's corrective
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. actions, including the commitment for appropriate training before
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assignment of laundry monitor duty, appear adequate.
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4.
Organization-and itaffing
Some changes in organizational structure and staffing of the Radiation
Chemistry (R/C) Department have occurred since September 1980 (Inspection
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Report No. 50-254/80-24). The current structure and staffrag levels
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are as shown in Figure 1.
The former R/C Supervisor laf t the department
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to become Technical Staff Supervisor. The former Lead Health Physicist
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completed licensed operator training and has been promoted to R/C
Supervisor. The former Lead Chemist has been assigned a newly created
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position of Staff Assistant. A former health physicist with chemistry
training and experience has been appointed Lead Chemist. A former
Engineering Assistant in the chemistry group fills the newly created
position of Chamistry Foreman. A former Heakh Physics Foreman, has
been assigned to the newly created position or ALARA Coordinator.
A former health physicist has been assigned Lead Health Physicist.
A former Radiation Chemistry Technician (RCT) has been assigned to
fill the vacant Health Physics Foreman position. The licensee has
six new RCTs in training. The licensee has hired two recent gradu-
ates of Purdue University with health physics related degress, and
is hiring two people with degrees in chemistry or chemical engineer-
ing for work in the chemistry group. Some of the extra staff will
eventually be assigned to new CECO plants. Staffing and qualifications
appear to be adequate.
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Figuro 1.- Radiation Chemistry D;ptrtment- Org:nizntion, Quad-Citisc Station
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Plant Superhttendent
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Assistant Superintendent'for Administration
and Support Services
ALARA Coordinator
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Radiation Chemistry Supervisor
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Staff
Lead Health
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Chemist
. Assistant
Physicist
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Engineering
Health
Engineering
Ch: mists
-Foramen
Assistants
Physicists
Foremen
Assistants
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(2)
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Radiation Chemistry Technicians
(20) plus 6 in training
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5.
-Tra'inina
A Health Physics Appraisal Significant Finding was' that certain areas.
of training appeared to need improvement.
Concerning insufficient motivation to follow health physics practices:
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'due'to inadequate emphasis, in general employee training,.of low-level
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. radiation effects.and its relationship to procedures and practices for
radiation and contamination control, the inspector verified-that_ training
-revisions have been made._ The-general employee training-(NGET) course
has been revised to include a 30-minute video tape lon the subject of
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biological effects of ionizing radiation. This tape.was produced by
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Dr. sMark Barnett, Bureau of Radiological Health, Food and Drug Admin-
istration.
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Other NGET topics now presented include: dose respons'e relationships;
chronic exposure.to low dose; genetic effects; need for contamination
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control; means of contamination control; materials handling; and worker
responsibilities in contamination control. A video tape presentation
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on donning and removal of protective clothing is presented, followed
by ten percent of the class demonstrating the techniques while the rest
-of the class critiques the demonstration.
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A review of the station's annual employee retraining program (to be
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implemented _in July 1981) showed that it contains material on contani-
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nation control practices including use of protective clothing.
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Concerning the apparent weaknesses in. protective clothing training for
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contractorr; and in contam_ nation control training for maintenance
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personnel, the following licensee corrective actions were verified.
(1) The tape on proper use of protective clothing described above .
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and the class demontration/ critique was added to the training program
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for contractor personnel.
(2).A special training class emphasizing
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contamination control was presented to maintenance personnel in
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January 1981. Topics presented included: reason for the special
class; need for greater emphasis on routine observance of radiation
safety procedures and practices; definition of contamination; sources
of contamination; contamination problems in specific plant areas;
proper protective clothing; understanding SWP requirements for safe
work in a given area; movement of materials; worker responsibilities;
use of radiation occurrence reports; and proper donning and removal
of protective clothing.
Concerning reduction of the annual retraining of some RCTs from the
planned five days down to three days in 1979, and the need for more
emphasis on understanding basic health physics concepts and practices,
the following corrective actions were noted. As stated in the licen-
see's response, the 1980 RCT training consisted of five consecutive
days including one day for first aid- training. However, short ad-
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vance notice to the instructor resulted in inadequate time for pre-
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paration of the material to be presented to the first group. About
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14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> of the course were dedicated to basic health physics
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concepts. Included in the study was the BEIR III Report and the'May
1980 draft Regulatory Guide entitled "Information Concernin Risk
from Occupational Exposure." Interim emergency procedures were also
covered in the 1980 retraining.
In addition to the five-day training,
RCTs participated in annual station employee retraining, GSEP training
and drills, and training on specific laboratory and counting room
equipment. As noted in Section 11, RCTs are now being trained in
special inplant airborne radioiodine sampling and analysis under
postulated accident conditions.
Review of selected records indicates that special training and/or
revision of training program content was completed by mid-January
1981. Significant improvement in the radiation protection retraining
program since the Health Physics Appraisal is . apparent.
6.
Exposure Control .end ALARA
'Concerning inadequate control over respirator issuance on backshifts,
and failure to require return of respirators and to record information
to determine MPC-hours of exposure, the licensee has made several
improvemeats. The door to the mask issuance room is now kept locked.
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Each personal NGET card is now coded with the information ne".ded for
mask isseance, and this card is held by the mask issuer un. 1 the
mask is returned and usage information is recorded. Any unreturned
masks are readily identifiabya by the unclaimed NGET card and the
individual and/or his supervfsor can be promptly aotified. Review
of records indicates the system is effective.
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Regarding the high annual man-rem experienced at the plant, the
licensee contracted with Scientific Applications, Inc. to develop a
formal ALARA program for use at all Ceco nuclear stations. Recently
completed data processing programs will show cost-benefit analysis
of proposed ALARA efforts.
In November, a full time ALARA Coordinator
position was created and filled by a former Health Physics Foreman.
Much of his effort to date has involved development of data input
forms for the ALARA program. The six member ALARA Committee (consisting
of the Plant Superintendent, the three Assistant Superintendents,
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the R/C Supervisor, and the ALARA Coordinator) held its first meeting
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May 1, 1981, to plan implementation of the program. Progress of the
ALARA program will be followed during future inspection.
7.
Access Controls
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The Health Physics Appraisal expressed concern that entries may be
made into High Radiation Areas (HRAs) without adequate knowledge of
dose rates and that overlong entries may not be promptly recognized.
It also noted that controls on contractor work in the torus may be
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insufficient to prevent unexpected exposures because of field varia-
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tions between different areas of this extensive HRA. As stated in
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the licensee's response, the licensee believes, in general, that
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access controls for HRAs do provide sufficient assurance that HRA
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entries are made with adequate knowledge of dose rates for the
following reasons:
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' Procedures QAP?ll20-5 and QAP 1120-6, which address' entry of
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locked.HRAs, require'that radiation protection'be notified
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before entry to obtain all-available information. pertaining to
-dose rates.
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b.
Entries Lnto'HRAs for repair or modification routinely require
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' prior radiation' protection survey information'and require the .
work to be performed either with a timekeeper present or under-
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la special work permit (SWP) which defines radiological conditions.
under which work will be performed.=
c.
. Operators and operating shift foremen are instructed in their.
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respective training and retraining programs of the Laportance
of reviewing the latest survey information, available in the-
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radiation protection office, before initiationLof shift rounds
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which includes very brief entries into HRAs. For the above
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reasons, the licensee deems that a survey before each entry.isi
not'necessary. Additionally, electronic dosimeters with both
visual display and an audible indication of dose rate have.been
made available to operators for use along with their self-reading
dosimeters on their inspection rounds. Licensed senior reactor
operators are.also trained in the use of survey equipment and
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may use that equipment when entering HRAs.
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Acknowledging the need to improve timely recognition of overlong
entries into HRAs, the licensee revised station procedure QAP 1120-6.
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~The procedure requires that.the NSO verify at the completion of each
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shift that each individual who has entered a HRA without the use of
a timekeeper or a . safety man, except operators on rounds or jobs
when radio communications with the control room is possible, has
,left the area or verify that work will continue in the area. In the
latter case, the NSO is to inform the oncoming NSO of the continuing
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work. Operators on rounds normally have radio communication with
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the control room. In addition, an end of shift check is made during
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the required turnover to the oncoming replacement. No problems were
identified during review of key logs in the control room for entry
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and exit times and accounting for keys at the end of the shift.
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To improve control over contractor work in the torus area, local
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posting now identifies the highest radiation levels such as the RHR
rooms where levels up to 300 mR/hr exist, and the Reactor Building
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Equipment Drain Tank where levels up to several R/hr exist. Access
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to the latter area is now kept locked.
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8.
Contamination Controls
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The Healh Physics Appraisal identified several weaknesses with
contamination control.
a.
Management of contaminated tools and equipment removed from the
controlled area for maintenance work or surveys.
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ALlargestainless,steeltableinalowbackgroundareaofthe
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~ maintenance -shop (about 20 feet south of the decon shop and an
estimated 75 feet from.the whole body counting facility) has
been designated as the location to perform radiation surveys on-
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contaminated. tools and equipment. A practice currently being
evaluated:is the use at Trackway #1 of polyethylene bags (on a
roll), with proper marking for prescace of radioactive material,
for bagging of known or-potentially contaminated items.
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special training class, presented to maintenance personnel,
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covering movement of materials and contamination control is
' described in Section 5.
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b.
Reduced surveillance'in the maintenance shop and-laundry.
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The licensee has.re-established routine (weekly)' direct radi-
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ation and concamination surveys in the laundry and maintenance
shop areas. - However, a . review of survey records indicates that
. timeliness of the surveys and, in some cases, quality of the
surveys (based on number of survey points in a given area), 'was
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not good until March 1981. ~ This matter bears continued review
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under outage conditions (last outage ended in late December.
1980).
c.
. Questionable protective clothing requirements in portions of
Radwaste.
The licensee. notes that their' experience to date has not demon-
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strated the need to require full protective clothing for the
radwaste work crew. The licensee believes that the RCT covering
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the job. is .best suited for determining -if and when protective
clothing beyond gloves and shoe covers is needed. Due to the
relatively high direct radiation levels in the radwaste area,
the time spent to doa and remove full protective clothing, and
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the reduced work efficiency when dressed in-full protective
clothing, the licensee believes that the reduction in exposure
achieved using the~normally required protective clothing offsets
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any small risk of contamination. The licensee believes this
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practice is a net ALARA benefit which is magnified considering
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the number of different areas the operators must enter during
barrel handling operations. The licensee does not consider the
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use of lab coats as a beneficial alternative.
d.
Proliferation and prolonged duration of temporary decontamination
sites.
During the 1980 refueling outage which ended in late December,
decontamination activities were performed in five central areas
which purposely excluded the trackway area which has a tendency
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to become-a congested collection point during outages. This
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worked fairly well according to licensee personnel. The areas
were in the (1) maintenance shop, (2) 630' level of the turbine
deck, (3) 690' level (refueling floor) of the reactor building,
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. (4) near drywell entrance, and (5) near the location of piping
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. reroute for the cleanup recirculation pumps. Following the
' outage.the decon areas were reduced to two, the turbine deck
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and the reactor building refueling floor. During a tour of
both areas no items were in the turbine deck decon area and
only a-few at.the latter location.f Rope barriers, proper
postings,'and step-off pads were in place. A request has been
submitted to provide water to the turbine deck _ facility. The
R/C Supervisor still expressed the desire to establish a perma-
.nent~decon area if an available and proper location could be
found.
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~By letter dated November 21, 1980, from the 'R/C Supervisor,
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. CECO personnel responsible for contractor work were instructed
to obtain approval of the Radiation Protection Group before
establishing a temporary decon area. The notification and
approval would provide for area layout, periodic monitoring,
and disassembly of the decon~ area when it is no longer needed.
Surveillance procedure form QTP.010-S4, Revision 7, December
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1980, provides for documented monthly health physics inspection
-of decon sites in use. Records show performance of monthly
surveillance.
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e.
Widespread Occurrence of contaminated trash.
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At.the time of the Health Physics Appraisal, this condition was
attributable,' in part,,to the four-month major _ refueling outage
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which had included major plant modifications and, in part,, to
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the closing of radwaste disposal sites for several months in
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1979. Assistance by the operating department before the 1980
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fall outage helped improve the situation. Also, during the
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fall outage, additional contractor labor was used to augment
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the station work force in processing dry waste and laundry. No
significant waste accumulation was observed at the time of the
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inspection; however, it has been over four months since the
outage endet.. Of note, the licensee is considering the setup
of a fabrication facility outside the controlled area for use
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by contractors. This area should minimize congestion, waste
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generation, material surveys, and exposure to workers. The
licensee is currently cleaning out existing periphery buildings
of unneeded materials and equipment in an attempt to make space
available for fabrication work without building a new structure.
f.
Inappropriate contamiaation control practices in the laundry
and elsewhere.
Resumption of routine snrveys in the laundry area and the main-
tenance shop is discussed in Paragraph b of this section.
Establishment. of a weekly spot check of monitored, laundered
protective clothing and conduct of a training program for
stationmen who operate the laundry equipment are discussed in
Section 3 of this report. The craining program included the
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following topics:
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(1) Minimizing radiation levels in the laundry room (shielding
around dry cleaner filter and clothing bins).
(2) Replacement of dry cleaner filters when pre-set radiation
levels (75 mR/hr) are reached.
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(3) Minimizing dose.to personnel wearing lanadered protective-
' clothing.
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(4) Replacement of plastic over the detector probe when holes
develop.
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(5) Observance for significant changes in instrument background
and notification of Instrument Maintenance for adjusting
alarm set point.
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Other efforts to improve contamination control including group
specific and general training are discussed in other paragraphs
of this section and in Section 5.
Also of note, in June the
-licensee plans to receive two sensitive IRT portal uonitors for
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use at the plant exit _(guard house). The budget provides for
two more of these monitors.
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9.
Instruments
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The Health Physics Appraisal identified several weaknesses concerning
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instrumentation.
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Need for additional high range (1000 R/hr or greater) portable
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instruments for emergency use and to assure routine availability.
At the time of the appraisal, the licensee had a total of five
high range instruments ('hree xetex and two teletectors) with
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only the two teletectors being in calibration. The licensee
has since purchased one additional teletector. Of the six now
possessed, two were currently out of service for repairs. The
other four were in service and in calibration. The licensee
has budgeted for three more high range portable instruments in
1981. A new generation of high range instruments with reasonably
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rugged construction and good response characteristics is being
sought. Tentatively,_the licensee plans to budget for three
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high range instruments next year to replace older ones requiring
frequent maintenance. The stated intent is to have about nine
high range instr, ents with the expectation that at least six
would always be operable and in calibration.
It was observed that RCTs are following the instruction to
store the instruments, when not in use, in the desingated storage
area, rather than in their individual lockers, to ensure instrument
availability. Secure storage space for instruments is still
not provided. The licensee plans to provide this space when
the health physics facilities are moved to the new service
building addition in the fall of 1981.
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Area monitor charts in control room not_ legible, and date and time
marking of charts by operators and re/imaers frequently deficient.
A' review of recent chart data indicates that operators are following
the re-emphasized instruction to mark the charts at the point corre-
-sponding to midnight in addition to stamping the date on the charts.
The printer heads on the multi-point recorders for both Unit 1 and
Unit 2 area monitors had been cleaned. The printed data for Unit 2
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was clearly legib.e whos first observed during the inspection,1while
the' printer for Unit I was not inking well. The : inspector brought
this matter lto.the attention of~both operations and health physics
personnel who promptly contacted instrument maintenance. During a
tour the following day, the Unit 1 area monitor charted data was
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. observed to be legible.
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The licensee contracted Stone and Webster, Inc. to conduct a com-
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plete review of process radiation inatt.nentation including the area
radiation monitoring system. _The completed review suggests that the
system be replaced with an updated digital system. This suggestion
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was submitted by the station to the corporate office for considera-
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tion. Response is expected soon.
c.
E:cessive . chimney sample line fittings make representative sampling '
questionable.
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As noted in the licensee's response, the RCTs had, without authori-
zation, apparently added several fittings to facilitate removal *of
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the charcoal and particulate filter holder. The inspector verified
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removal of the fittings performed shortly after the matter was
brought to the licensee's attention. The RCTs were informed that
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their change was improper and that it could have affected isokenetic
sampling.
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The licensee had initially contracted with a consultant to review
isokenetic sampling capabilities of both the current stack and
reactor vent air samplers, and the new stack and vent air sampler
system being installed as a TMI followup. Not being satisfied with
the preliminary report, the licensee dropped the consultant and a
replacement consultant was obtained (Scientific Applications, Inc.)
about two months ago. The new consultant is to begin in June.
Some improvement in radiation protection related instrumentation capabi-
lity has been made since the Health Physics appraisal. Additional
improvements are being evaluated.
10.
Facilities
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The Health Physics Appradial identified several inadequacies in
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plant facilities.
a.
Lack of shielded work space for high activity sample handling
in the hot laboratory.
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As a short-term solution for handling and analyzing post-accident
. reactor coolant samples, the licensee has: obtained and set up
additional equipment; developed a procedure; and conducted a
drill on April 23, 1981.to evaluate the system. As a result of
the drill, a change in needle and tubing used for the primary _
sample and a change in hood air flow are planned.
The new procedure,.QEP-330-8, Revision 2, May 1981, is titled
" Sample Handling and Analysis of Post-Accident Reactor Coolant
Samples." It includes a diagram of lead brick compartments and
sample handling set up to provide for primary sample dilution
by a factor of 200 and then 1000 to accomodate sample handling
and analysis. The equipment is left set up in a hood in the
hot laboratory. Special equipment includes. tongs, goggles,
mobile lead pig, TLD rings for both hands,1 R and 5 R direct-
reading-dosimeters, high exposure rate instrument, and additional
lead bricks for shielding counting equipment ~if needed. During
the drill, the sample was " pulled" by a two man radiation protec-
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tion team consisting of one RCT.and one supervisor. Dilution and
analysis was performed by a chemist.
Assuming the postulated worst case accident was involved, the
critique indicated that exposure received by all individuals
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would have been within the guides established for whole body
and extremities.
For the long-term solution for handling post-accident reactor
coolant samples, the licensee is in the process of installing a
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new remote sampling system that is designqd to limit dose to 1
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mrem for sample collection.
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b.
The combined personal decontamination and medical treatment
facility is too small and inadequately equipped, and it in-
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appropriately shares space with the whole body counter.
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The condition currently remains unchanged. The whole body
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counter is to be relocated when the new service building addition
is completed in the fall of 1981. At that time, the planned
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expansion of the medical treatment facility into the
area vacated by the whole body counter should provide space for
additional equipment including an examination table or a gurney.
c.
Background fluctuations in current whole body counter location
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are excessive and its location in the same room with the personal
decontamination facility is inappropriate.
The planned relocation of the whole body counter is noted above
in Paragraph b.
Its location is to be selected to minimize
background variation.
In the interim, a special decontamination
table has been established in the maintenance shop about 75
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feet from the whole body counting room. This was done, in
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part, to eliminate the temporary collection of contaminated
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items in front of the room housing the whole body counter.
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Several improvements in facilities'are planned to' coincide with
completion of the service building" addition in the fall of
1981.
11.
In-Plant Airbhrne Radioiodine Sampling and Analysis ' System
In evaluating.the licensee's timely response to Section III D.3.3.
of NUREG-0737 regarding improved inplant airborne radioiodine sampling
and analysis, the following licensee letters-to the Commission were
. reviewed:
<
J. S. Abel letter to D. G. Eiseni- ^ dated December 15, 1980
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J.--S. Abel letter to'D. G. Eisenhut dated December 31, 1980
The licensee has on hand about L0 silver zeolite' cartridges which.
' selectively sample iodine without significant interference of xenon.
Additional cartridges could be obtained on short notice. These
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cartridges are identical in size to the charcoal cartridges used
during normal conditions for iodine sampling and can be used with
any of the approximately 45 air sample collectors _ maintained at the
site.
A multi-channel gamma analyzer will be used for analysis of the
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cartridges. A study conducted by Sargent and Bundy of post-accident
radiation levels _ at Quad-Cities Station indicates that the location
of the r -gular counting roor in the service building is such that
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radiation levels should not exceed 2 mR/hr in the counting room.
Therefore, the normal GeLi system for multi-channel gamma analysis
should be useable under all postulated accident conditions. However,
as a backup, the licensee has obtained a portable multi-channel
gamma analyzer. This unit, an EG&G Ortec 7010 (MCA) with Remote
Data Acquisition System (RDAX), features a high Purity Ge crystal
that can be stored at ambient temperature but must be cooled before
use. If the backup system would be needed, it would be a minimum of
three hours before the earliest sample results would be available if
the detector was initially at ambient temperature. The Sargent and
Lundy study identifies several in plant areas, other than the regular
counting room, in which the mobile counting equipment could be used
during accident conditions.
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Procedure QEP 330-7, Revision 2, January 1981, titled "In-plant Iodine-131
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Measur'ement During Post-Accident Conditions" describing sample collection
and analysis was reviewed. The need for several minor modifications was
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dis:ussed at the exit interview. Training of radiation protection
supervisory personnel in the use of the procedure and equipment began
in late 1980. Their training has been completed and about half of the
RCTs have completed the training. Training of the remaining RCTs
should be completed by late June 1981. This training will be included
as part of the annual RCT retraining program. The inspector identified
no significant probl~ ms in the licensee's fulfillment of their commitment
e
for improved in-plant airborne radioiodine sampling and analysis.
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12.
Liquid Radwaste Monitor System
In~ consideration of the high and variable background radiation level
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of the liquid radwaste monitoring system due to location and type of
monitor, the licensee has completed an evaluation and selection of
specifications for.a new liquid radwaste monitoring system, and bids
have been requested. The specification calls for a side stream
sample, flow measurement, and capability to decontaminate as well as
shield the sample line. The licensee plans to locate the system
outside the radwaste building to' minimize, if not eliminate, the
problem of high and variab'.e background radiation. Actual installation
is believe' to be 12-18 months away. Similar type monitors are
being considered for replacement of the service water monitors.
13.
Exit Meeting
The inspector met with' licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)
on May 8, 1981. The following items were discussed.:
a.
The purpose and scope of the inspection.
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b.
~The need for several minor modifications to Procedure QEP
330-7, Revision 2, January 1981, titled "In-Plant Iodine-131
Measurement During Post Accident Condition." The licensee
stated that the procedure would be reviewed and needed changes
would be made (Section 11).
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c.
The need for a continuing training program regarding operation
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of the laundry monitor for new stationmen. The licensee stated
that a program would be established for training stationmen in
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the use of the laundry monitor before being assigned the task
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(Sections 3 and 8.f).
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